EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No.1

요약문

This paper examines the increasing influence of various domestic factors such as academics, media, and public opinion on the China’s Japan policy in the last decade within the context of newly developed internet technology. The questions raised in this study are: has there been an emergence of societal forces, independent of the Communist Party that have begun to exert influence over the foreign policy making process? If so, how are they affecting the ability of Chinese government to frame and implement foreign policy? It argues that due to the opening up policy and the fast development of information technology, China"s hierarchical, elite-driven foreign policy making structure has experienced profound changes which are characterized as pluralization, professionalization and institutionalization. These changes have created opportunities for societal forces to influence the decision making process, which is best reflected in China’s recent policy toward Japan.

저자

Yufan Hao is Professor of Political Sciences at Colgate University. He obtained his MA and PhD from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in 1984 and 1989 respectively and was a McArthur Fellow at Harvard University Center for International Affairs 1988-1989. He was a visiting professor to Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Renmin University of China. His latest books include Chinese Foreign Policy Making: Societal Forces in Chinese American Policy Making, (Ashgate, London, co-edited, 2005); Bush’s Dilemma: Experts on the Possible Trend of American Foreign Policy (Shishi, Beijing, co-edited, 2005); Power of the Moment: American and the World after 9/11 (Xinhua, Beijing, co-authored, 2002), White House China Decision (Renmin Press, Beijing, 2002). Currently he serves as the Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities at University of Macau.

본 working paper는 미국 헨리루스재단의 지원을 받은 "EAI Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia"에 제출된 논문이며, 온라인 버전으로만 배포됩니다.

The spring of 2005 witnessed quite turbulent in China-Japan relations. Along with the issues of Security Council bid, the history textbook, and the gas exploration in disputed waters, Japan claimed on the Chinese Lunar New Year that the Senkaku Islands were officially Japanese. In February, Japan and the US declared a closer military bond. After another visit by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, where convicted Class-A war criminals are honored along with other Japanese war dead, the bilateral relations plunged to their lowest point since 1972, with a nationwide anti-Japanese riots erupting in China. Angry Chinese protesters marched on the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, throwing eggs and rocks to protest against school textbooks they say whitewash Japanese wartime atrocities in China, against Tokyo’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and against Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine. After a week of violent protests against Japan in Beijing, thousands of protesters marched on the Japanese consulate in Shanghai, smashing its windows with rocks, pelting it with paint bombs and attacking Japanese restaurants along the way. Protest spread to several large cities in the south, as Chinese massed outside Japanese stores and consulates, calling for a boycott of Japanese products and demanding that Japan own up to war crimes of 60 years ago. The rising anti-Japanese sentiments within Chinese society have made it difficult for Beijing leadership when making their policy towards Tokyo. Chinese government became increasingly tough towards Tokyo and publicly registered its objection to Japan’s bid to UN Security Council. Meanwhile, Chinese government began to clamp down harder to keep the capital peaceful before Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura’s visit. University students were warned by email not to protest. Top anti-Japanese activists in Beijing were rounded up to prevent further protests. China even began to control media coverage of Sino-Japanese relations and had cancelled a few academic conferences and workshops related to Japan.

Why did the Chinese leadership decide to take a tough stand toward Japan at the time China is trying to show to the world its intention of “peaceful rising”? At the same time, what had made the Chinese leaders continuously try to maintain relations with Tokyo, not hurting 178 billion dollars in annual trade between the two countries? Is it that the Chinese government manipulating the public so as to promote nationalism at home and to gain leverage over Japan as some international observers believed? Or when the Chinese leaders hope to engage Japan, only to find their hands tied due to powerful public sentiments nourished unintentionally by their early policy?

What happened in the spring of 2005 seems to illustrate a long overlooked element affecting Chinese foreign policy making: the influence of social forces. Since 1949, Chinese foreign policy has been traditionally viewed as highly centralized, dominated by a few powerful, personalized seniors acting free from domestic public pressure. Never before has Chinese leadership considered the interests and opinions of various domestic political constituencies. What happened in 2005 in China’s policy towards Japan seems to illustrate an interesting change. Beijing leadership had to accommodate domestic outcry in the wake of the certain external events, even though they wished to maintain and continue to improve Sino-Japanese relations. The moment may have arrived in China when policy makers cannot make policy initiatives without a serious consideration of public opinion, and without the support within the bureaucratic apparatus. This may represent a gradual but significant shift from the Communist Party’s centralized control over China’s foreign policy making, relatively free of social pressure, to a new pattern characterized by increasing domestic restraints...(Continued)