Editor's Note

On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 1: politics and security, Jonathan D. Pollack addressed that, five American presidents have tried to slow down or prevent outright North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, using the full range of political, economic and diplomatic tools and strategies. Fully realized operational nuclear weapons capability by North Korea would be a strategic disaster for China and for the United States. Since it can negatively affect both countries, North Korea’s nuclear weapons can be the task that US and China can cooperate on. To this end, the US and China need to realize through dialogues that North Korea’s nuclear weapon is a common security concern for both countries. Since it is impossible to separate North Korea from China in geopolitical, economic and historical aspects, it is necessary for the US to try to have candid talks with China on the North Korea issue, even though it is likely to be difficult.

Quotes from the Paper

Introduction                  

Joe Biden’s election as America’s 46th President and the defeat of Donald Trump necessitate a care-ful appraisal of U.S. Korea policy, and of U.S. strategy and policy in Northeast Asia as a whole. These require an evaluation of the legacy of the Trump Administration; and consideration of three issues that will shape U.S. policy in the Biden Administration: (1) reaffirming and rebuilding Ameri-ca’s alliance relationships; (2) China’s political, economic, and strategic directions and how U.S. pol-icy could influence Beijing’s policy choices; and (3) North Korea’s political, economic, and strategic orientation, and how the actions of the U.S. and other powers could influence the DPRK’s calcula-tions and future behavior. None of these issues are for the United States alone to decide. At the same time, no incoming administration starts with a blank slate. A single short essay cannot address these issues in detail, but it can identify the issues that will most likely shape U.S. policy choices.

What the Trump Administration Leaves Behind

Donald Trump will leave office as the most disruptive president in the history of U.S. foreign policy.  (Time does not allow for a comparable accounting of the effects of his presidency on America’s do-mestic politics and institutional integrity.) Trump’s disdain for alliances; his contempt for multilater-alism and withdrawal from negotiated international agreements; his adherence to stark, highly pred-atory views of international politics; his overt preference for authoritarian, anti-democratic leaders; his insistence on “America first” and mercantilist policies; and his dismissiveness of scientific exper-tise and economic logic have been evident from the very outset of his administration. With few ex-ceptions, America’s alliance relationships and international partnerships have been badly undermined, with the U.S. president no longer willing to uphold principles and policies integral to the interna-tional order developed since the end of World War II.

The Road Ahead

The upheaval in U.S. policy making over the past four years requires review of how America’s East Asian allies and partners perceive the U.S. in the aftermath of the Trump Administration. Will the damage to the U.S. “brand name” prove lasting, or is America’s reputation recoverable under a very different president? What remedial actions must be taken to prevent further damage to America’s international reputation? Or is the centrality of the United States to international peace and security simply too great for any regional actors to challenge the U.S. role? Is there an alternative strategic rationale to sustain America’s alliances that could garner ample domestic support in the U.S. and among its major security partners, including the ROK?

The China Question

The Biden Administration will also need to confront lasting challenges in relation to China. The de-terioration in U.S.-China relations under the Trump Administration has been profound, though it al-so reflects an increasing shift in U.S. thinking about China in both political parties and in U.S. public opinion. The question is not whether there will be “strategic competition” between Washington and Beijing, but what kind of competition. The core questions concern the boundaries of U.S.-China ri-valry; whether there are viable means to manage competition; the areas where cooperation remains essential; and the potential risks if both powers prove incapable of controlling their more intensely competitive instincts and practices. Korea will be at or near the center of many of these issues.

North Korea: The Strategic Outlier 

Joe Biden will be the sixth American president seeking to slow or inhibit North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. These have entailed use of the full range of political, economic, security, and dip-lomatic tools, and none of have achieved lasting success. As a consequence, the DPRK is now much closer to a fully realized nuclear weapons capability that can threaten all the states of Northeast Asia and (prospectively) the U.S. mainland. Pyongyang insists that it is not prepared to negotiate any lim-its on its nuclear weapons inventory, let alone dismantle what it already possesses. It seeks full ac-ceptance as the world’s ninth nuclear-armed state. In its view, nuclear diplomacy can only be for purposes of arms control, not disarmament. Kim Jong-un also claims that (because North Korea now possesses the means of nuclear retaliation) it can deter any American attack. But its continued de-velopment efforts and the possibility of testing new, as yet untested systems indicates that it has yet to achieve what it deems necessary for its strategic needs. Moreover, the DPRK remains unwilling to forego continued weapons development in favor of pressing economic and societal needs. At times, Pyongyang insists upon the removal of multilateral sanctions that it claims have had a crip-pling effect on its long-term development.

Author’s Biography

Jonathan D. Pollack is a nonresident senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center and Cen-ter for East Asia Policy at the Brookings Institution. Between 2012 and 2014, he served as director of the John L. Thornton China Center. Prior to joining Brookings in 2010, he was professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and chairman of the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War Col-lege, Newport, Rhode Island. He previously worked at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, Cal-ifornia, where he served in various senior research and management positions, including chairman of the political science department, corporate research manager for international policy and senior advi-sor for international policy. His recent publications include Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early 21st Century, Korea-The East Asian Pivot, Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspective on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy in the 21st Century. His principal research interests include Chinese na-tional security strategy; U.S.-China relations; U.S. strategy in Asia and the Pacific; Korean politics and foreign policy; Asian international politics; and nuclear weapons and international security. He received his master's and doctorate in political science from the University of Michigan, and was a post-doctoral research fellow at Harvard University.