EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 23

Author

Joo-Youn Jung is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Korea University (Seoul, Korea). After receiving the Ph.D. in Political Science at Stanford University, Dr. Jung worked as Postdoctoral Fellow at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute (WEAI) at Columbia University and Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta (Alberta, Canada). Dr. Jung’s major field is comparative political economy, with expertise in China. Her research interest includes the economic role of the state, the state bureaucracy and the politics of institutional and economic reform. Her recent publications have appeared in journals such as the China Review, Pacific Focus, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, and Korea Observer and edited volumes such as Adapt, Fragment, Transform: Corporate Restructuring and System Reform in South Korea, Going Private in China: System Restructuring in China, and Methods and Methodology in China Studies.

I. Introduction

During the last decade, scholars in international relations as well as policymakers have debated how to interpret the impact of China’s rapid rise on world politics. Should we consider China’s rise as a potential threat to its neighboring countries, the United States, and existing international rules and norms? Is China a status quo power, or an aggressive challenger to the existing U.S.-centric world order? Diverse views and answers have been generated surrounding these questions. However, such answers tend to focus on how observers outside of China should interpret the security implications of China’s rise. Much less is known about how the Chinese perceive their security environment and China’s increasing national power. This situation is rather ironic, because, to explain the security implications of China’s rise, understanding Chinese perceptions of China’s security priorities, national power and status, and proper international role is essential and more important than merely relying on outsiders’ speculations regarding China’s intentions.

This working paper thus raises a question that is different from the questions commonly asked thus far: how does the Chinese public perceive China’s security environment and the rise of China? More specifically, what do ordinary Chinese regard as the biggest security threat to China? Is the United States considered a rival, an enemy, or a potential threat to China’s national security? Does the Chinese public understand today’s world as a U.S.-dominated system that is hostile to China? How do ordinary Chinese perceive the level of China’s national power and international status, and what do they think that China should do with its increasing power?

This working paper acknowledges that the Chinese public’s direct impact on foreign policies is limited. As in any country, ordinary Chinese do not have enough information on or expertise in international affairs and tend not to care much about the details of foreign policies that do not seem to have a direct impact on their daily lives. Furthermore, living under the authoritarian regime, the general Chinese public has little access to the national policymaking process in general, and is almost completely excluded from the closed foreign policymaking at the top leadership level. All in all, the Chinese public does not determine how China behaves.

Nevertheless, that does not mean that the Chinese public’s perceptions of national security and status are insignificant. Even an authoritarian regime cannot simply resort to oppression and propaganda but needs a certain level of popular support and legitimacy to survive and thrive. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), facing the serious side effects of rapid economic growth and marketization, such as widening social disparity, rising unemployment, and growing signs of social unrest, has struggled with its withering ideological appeal to the public and increasingly turned to nationalism as an alternative justification for its reign. The current Chinese regime cannot ignore what the general public thinks, especially when the issues at hand ignite nationalistic sentiments among the public and the public demands more assertive and aggressive positions of the government. Public sentiments and perceptions regarding China’s national security as well as China’s international status and role can limit political leaders’ policy options either by generating fears of an angry backlash from the public against the regime or by showing the extent to which the leaders can mobilize broader support for their policy positions and preferences. While the Chinese public does not determine how China behaves, the Chinese public can set constraints on how China behaves.

To analyze how the Chinese public perceives China’s security environment and the rise of China’s national power, this working paper utilizes a recent survey designed by a team of scholars including the author, with the support of the East Asia Institute (EAI)’s Asia Security Initiative Research Center. The survey was conducted in China for fifteen days from August 26 to September 9, 2011. It drew on a random sample of 1,029 Chinese over the age of 19 in ten major Chinese cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Shenyang, Xian, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, Tianjin, and Nanjing. Respondents were selected by random digit dialing (RDD) to wire (50 percent) and wireless (50 percent) telephones using a computer assigned telephone interviewing (CATI) program. The survey outcome presented here reveals how the Chinese public perceives China’s security environment as well as China’s international status and role, and sheds new light on how rising China is likely to behave in the future.

This working paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 examines what the Chinese public regards as major threats to China. It discusses the security priorities of the general public as well as the Chinese public’s perception of the United States in comparison to other neighboring countries. Section 3 analyzes how the Chinese public perceives China’s international status and role. It discusses how the Chinese public understands power distribution in today’s world, how the public evaluates China’s power and status in the existing international order, and what kind of role the Chinese public expects China to play with its increasing power. The final section summarizes the findings of this working paper and discusses their implications.

II. Chinese Perceptions of External Threats

1. Top Security Threats: Energy, Environment, and Health Issues

What does the Chinese public perceive as the biggest threat to China’s national interests? Considering the heated discussion regarding China as a potential threat to its neighboring countries and the United States as well as the popular portrayal of China as the rival of the United States, the Chinese might also consider the economic competition and military conflicts with neighboring countries or the United States as the biggest potential threats to China’s national interests. The outcome, however, is rather unexpected.

The survey asks 1,029 surveyees how they evaluate the possibilities that major security issues would threaten China’s national interests during the next decade. Table 1 presents the answers in the order of the magnitude of perceived threat (based on the percentages summed in column 3). Interestingly, the top three issues, holding considerably higher percentages than the rest in column 3, are neither economic nor military threats from other countries. First of all, over 90 percent of the respondents think that disruption in the energy supply would threaten China’s national interests during the next decade, making it the most serious threat to China’s national interests in the near future. Almost 50 percent of the respondents regard the energy shortage as “very threatening,” which shows the sense of urgency shared among the public about a possible energy crisis. A stable energy supply is key to sustainable economic growth, and the heavy concerns about the energy shortage reveal that at the core of the Chinese public’s perceptions of national threats are the Chinese economy and its internal vulnerability...(Continued)