Yul Sohn is a Professor of International Studies at Yonsei University. He received his Ph.D in political science from the University of Chicago. He teaches Japanese political economy, East Asian regionalism, and International political economy.

Aso’s Two Visions

In a series of town hall meetings during the winter of 2005–2006, Aso Taro, then Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Koizumi cabinet, introduced an interesting concept of Japan’s role in Asia. Japan can and should play the role of a “thought leader,” who through fate has been forced to face certain very difficult issues earlier than others. Because Japan has put great effort, both monetarily and socio-politically, into resolving issues that include ultra-nationalism, an aging society, and environmental protection, it has become the forerunner for other Asians to emulate (Aso 2005). This role as a soft power leader contrasts with the existing hard power–oriented (i.e., economic) discourse of international contribution as well as the conventional soft power discourse that is rooted in the Japanese culture and sensibilities, such as animation, fashion, and cultural products. Japan’s strength lies in the firstmover knowledge it provides for Asia, creating a network of knowledge available to others (Aso 2006).

Three years later, Aso, this time as the Japanese Prime Minister, proudly announced a "Growth Initiative" that planned to double the current scale of Asia's economy by 2020 (Aso 2009a). This initiative, Aso’s first and thus far most important vision for Asia as Prime Minister, is aimed at moving Asia's economy from one driven by exports to one led by domestic demand, through encouraging region-wide development and expanded consumption. To make this effort, Japan has committed (a) US$20 billion in overseas development assistance (ODA); (b) US$20 billion for infrastructure development in Asia; (c) US$5 billion over two years for an initiative investing in Asian environmental projects; and (d) US$22 billion over two years to provide additional support for trade financing in order to underpin trade credit, and so on. Japan will mobilize all possible policy measures to support the efforts being made by Asian countries. In addition, Aso seeks to increase the attractiveness of Japan by utilizing cultural sources (such as manga, animation, fashion, authentic food) to create jobs in Japan and the region (Aso 2009b).

Aso’s recent initiative appears to have tilted in a direction different from his earlier vision of Japan as a thought leader, a well thought out and creative idea. Today, given Japan’s rapid economic contraction caused by its “once in a century” crisis, Japan finds it difficult to attain the regional leadership it desires merely by spending more money. Utilizing cultural resources will yield only a limited outcome. Finally, the initiative is targeted at Southeast Asia and the Pacific, with few attempts to assist or engage the members of Northeast Asia such as China and South Korea. Japan has so far failed to play its desired role as a thought leader for Asia. The inconsistency between words and actions underlines the strategic dilemmas that Japan has faced as China has risen to be a formidable rival in the region. 

Japan’s New Regionalism to “Soft Balance” China

Japan’s regional policies have been concerned with an increasingly powerful China. It has displaced the United States as Japan’s largest trading partner, and it has begun to be positioned increasingly at the hub of the regional economy. Chinese military modernization, fueled by double-digit growth in arms-related spending for more than a decade, has resulted in a dramatic improvement of virtually all the key elements that enable China to achieve real military options in the region. Further, Beijing has taken dramatic steps toward diplomatic leadership (Shambaugh 2004/05; Kurlantzick 2007). The Chinese have toned down their military actions and instead have focused on building soft power. Beijing has cultivated its influence in Southeast Asia while at the same time displaying its diplomatic skills as a mediator in the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia.

For many in Japan, nothing has been so disturbing as the rise of China (Pyle 2007, 312). The dramatic growth of China’s economic, political, and military influence, combined with China’s intense historically based mistrust of Japan, caused alarm, which was intensified by uncertainty about China’s future plans. Seeing China as a threat, Japan wanted its ally the United States to balance the danger. Yet, U.S. forces have been reduced and redeployed almost unilaterally in the context of the war on terror.

Strengthening Japan’s military alliance with the United States was a plausible course of action. Under the leadership of Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006) and subsequent Prime Ministers, Tokyo worked hard to improve its military relations with Washington. Along with Koizumi’s dispatch of naval forces to the Indian Ocean and deployment of ground forces to Iraq, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (the socalled Two-plus-Two meeting) has been the driving force for not just “force transformation” (that is, joint force modernization and realignment) but also “alliance transformation” (that is, a more balanced, more equal, and more normal relationship between Japan and the United States) based on shared understandings of the new security environment shaped heavily by China threat.

There were limits to the military balancing that was possible, however. Japan did not want a military confrontation with its vital economic partner (Mochizuki 2007; Samuels 2007). Likewise, economic balancing— strategically reducing economic interdependence with China—was not feasible because few alternative markets were available. Equally important was the byproduct of military integration: as Pempel puts it (2009), “Japan’s overemphasis on military posture risks exacerbating fears among Asian neighbors, which divert attention from its true strength in nonmilitary diplomacy and global appeal.” Given its shrinking economic resources available for regional competition, combined with its limited military usefulness, Japan has needed soft power—the power of ideas and visions that enable Japan to attract others in the region.

Elsewhere I have characterized a series of regional policies pursued by Japanese leaders as a “soft balancing” against China’s charm offensive (Sohn 2008). Given the Chinese initiatives that have increased its influence in the region, Japan turned with hope to a regional design that would counter Chinese initiatives while attracting other Asians. Under the leadership of Koizumi, Tokyo proposed the East Asian Community (EAC) vision and the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity vision, both in 2005. Two years later, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo declared the “Asia-Pacific Inland Sea” vision...(Continued)