

**STATEMENT OF
GENERAL WALTER L. SHARP
COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND;
COMMANDER, REPUBLIC OF KOREA-UNITED STATES COMBINED FORCES
COMMAND;
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
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I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today. As the Commander, United Nations Command (UNC); Commander, Republic of Korea – United States (U.S.) Combined Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK), it is a privilege to represent the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Department of Defense (DoD) Civilians, and their families who serve in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf of these outstanding men and women, thank you for your continued commitment to improving the quality of life for our service members and their families. Your vital support allows us to ensure the security of the ROK, promote prosperity and stability in Northeast Asia, and protect our shared national interests in the region. I appreciate this opportunity to report on the state of the Command and our plan for the ongoing transformation and strengthening of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

For the last 56 years, since ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty by the U.S. and the ROK, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has deterred aggression, maintained peace on the Korean Peninsula, and promoted security and stability in this vital region. Our bilateral Alliance has served both nations well. The ROK transformed from a country devastated by war to a vibrant democracy with the world's 14th largest economy.¹ The U.S. gained a stalwart ally and strategic partner with unwavering dedication to the defense of peace and freedom in a challenging part of the world. ROK armed forces fought alongside Americans in Vietnam and participated in OPERATION DESERT STORM. More recently, the ROK has deployed forces to Iraq and Afghanistan, being the third largest contributor of forces to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

¹ ROK gross domestic product (GDP) was valued at \$1.3 trillion in the year 2008 when measured at purchasing power parity. The GDP figure and ranking were obtained from the *CIA World Fact Book 2009*.

during most of the 2004 to 2008 time period.² The ROK's five-year presence in northern Iraq contributed significantly to the stabilization and reconstruction of that country. Similarly, the ROK currently maintains a civilian medical and vocational training team in Afghanistan and has contributed assistance to that country worth millions of dollars. On a broader scale, the ROK has also participated in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, currently having a presence in six operations around the world.³ The ROK also deployed the Cheonghae unit – which consists of a 4,500-ton destroyer and an anti-submarine helicopter – to the waters off Somalia for the conduct of anti-piracy operations.

President Lee Myung-bak's efforts to maintain regional security and stability include robust, economically-focused, and results-oriented regional outreach initiatives. Within the first year of his term of office, President Lee has conducted multiple summits with each of the national leaders of China, Japan, Russia, and the U.S. President Lee and his cabinet actively participated in our ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN exercise in August 2008 and promised even more participation in 2009. Measures aimed at strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance, establishing strategic partnerships with China and Russia, and working with Japan and China on a multi-lateral response to the recent global financial crisis demonstrates his resolve to achieve a more prosperous, stable, and secure future for the ROK.

In the past year our two nations have taken significant actions to enhance the military capabilities of and reinforce the mutual trust that underscores this great Alliance. In 2008, our

² In the year 2004 the ROK deployed 3,566 troops to Iraq, making it the third largest contingent in that country only exceeded in number by the United States and the United Kingdom. Troop figure obtained from the ROK Ministry of National Defense 2006 Defense White Paper.

³ The six UN peacekeeping operations currently having representation from the ROK are UNMOGIP (Pakistan), UNOMIG (Georgia), UNOMIL (Liberia), UNAMA (Afghanistan), UNMIS (Sudan), and UNIFIL (Lebanon).

governments agreed to maintain the current level and capability of U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula for the foreseeable future. This is a clear and visible statement of U.S. commitment to the Alliance. Our two nations also concluded host nation burden sharing negotiations, resulting in a Special Measures Agreement (SMA) that will provide ROK funding support for U.S. forces in Korea over the next five years. And I thank you for passing legislation that elevated the ROK's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) status to be on par with NATO countries and other longstanding allies. This legislation will enhance interoperability with the ROK and the Alliance's warfighting capability. Finally, the U.S. DoD approved proceeding with implementation of three-year accompanied tours for service members assigned to Seoul, Pyeongtaek, Osan, Daegu and Chinhae. This constitutes a major step forward in ending our outdated system of one-year unaccompanied tours for the large majority of service members assigned to Korea. These measures will strengthen the Alliance and improve our ability to promote regional security and stability in Northeast Asia.

The U.S. has significant national security interests in Northeast Asia. With five of the world's 19 largest economies located in the region and a combined 2008 gross domestic product (GDP) of \$16.6 trillion (23.5 percent of global GDP), Northeast Asia is a crucial component of the global economy.⁴ The ROK plays a vital role in a region that accounts for 22 percent of all U.S. trade in goods.⁵ It is a first-class economic power, our seventh largest trading partner and

⁴ GDP at purchasing power parity in 2008 for the countries of Northeast Asia were as follows: China \$7.8 trillion; Japan \$4.48 trillion; Russia \$2.22 trillion; ROK \$1.3 trillion; Taiwan \$757 billion; DPRK \$40 billion; and Mongolia \$9 billion. World GDP in 2008 was valued at \$70.6 trillion. Source: *2009 CIA World Fact Book*.

⁵ US trade in goods during 2008 was valued at \$409.2 billion with China, \$205.8 billion with Japan, \$82.9 billion with the ROK, and \$61.6 billion with Taiwan. Total US trade with these four countries of Northeast Asia was valued at \$759.5 billion in 2008, accounting for 22.3% of total American foreign goods trade of \$3.4 trillion. Source: *U.S. Census Bureau*.

one of the most technologically and scientifically advanced countries in the world that boasts the world's largest shipbuilding industry.

While Northeast Asia generates a significant share of the world's commerce, it is also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change, and has consistently posed difficult security challenges to the international community. Beyond the North Korean threat, the presence of four of the world's six largest militaries⁶ and two proven nuclear powers (China and Russia), not including the U.S., as well as historical animosities, territorial disputes, resource competition, and historical struggles for regional hegemony combine to pose long-term regional security challenges. The ROK sits at the nexus of a region influenced by – and influencing – an emerging China, a resurgent Russia, and a prosperous Japan.

U.S. presence in Northeast Asia is a long-term investment in regional stability with specific objectives: promoting democracy and free market economies; preserving peace and stability in the region; engaging other regional powers; and setting the conditions for denuclearization and the eventual peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. A strong Alliance, with a meaningful U.S. force presence, is absolutely essential to meeting these objectives. U.S. forces in Korea are adapting to changing conditions in this dynamic region. We are transforming into more modern and capable warfighting units and headquarters, while preparing to assume a doctrinally supporting role after the transition of ROK wartime operational control (OPCON) to the Korean government on April 17, 2012. An enduring U.S. force

⁶ The world's six largest militaries in terms of number of personnel are: China #1 (2.1 million personnel); US #2 (1.54 million); India #3 (1.28 million); North Korea #4 (1.2 million); Russia #5 (1.02 million); and the ROK #6 (687,000). Source: *The Military Balance 2009*, produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

presence in Korea after OPCON transition in 2012 will ensure a strong Alliance fully capable of meeting its treaty commitments well into the future.

II. NORTH KOREA ASSESSMENT

North Korea (DPRK) remains the primary threat to stability and security in Northeast Asia, though we have made progress in reducing that threat through the ongoing Six-Party Talks to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Regime survival remains the DPRK's overriding internal and external focus. Reports of Kim Jong-il's major health problems last year highlight uncertainties about the future and the possibility of North Korean instability. The DPRK's recent actions contributing to the continued chill in South-North relations, to include severe restrictions on ROK activity at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the Mount Kumgang Tourist Resort and on cross-border travel, threats against the ROK in the West Sea and unilateral nullification of the South-North Basic Agreement, as well as the DPRK's stated inability to protect the safety of civilian airliners traveling through its airspace, are reminders of the state of tension that exists between the two Koreas.⁷ The DPRK has previously resorted to provocative behavior, including ballistic missile launches, a nuclear test, and slowing down, ceasing, and reversing disablement activities at Yongbyon, all in an attempt to improve its bargaining position at international negotiations to gain concessions. North Korea remains the world's leading supplier of ballistic missiles and related technology, and remains a major proliferator of conventional weapons as well. Finally, we continue to be concerned with

⁷ The South-North Basic Agreement, formally named the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (ARNE), was signed by the ROK and DPRK on 13 December 1991. The agreement and associated supplements cover three areas of inter-Korean relations: ROK-DPRK reconciliation; non-aggression between the two Koreas; and exchanges and cooperation between the ROK and DPRK.

the threat posed by DPRK's large conventional military, artillery, ballistic missiles, and Special Operations Forces (SOF).

North Korea's Strategy and Goals

The DPRK continues to focus its strategic efforts on regime survival and reunification of the peninsula on its terms. Internally, North Korea ensures regime survival by securing the loyalty of the elites and military forces. The DPRK retains the loyalty of its elites by providing incentives purchased with hard currency partly raised through money laundering, counterfeiting, drug trafficking and arms sales. To maintain the military's loyalty, North Korea devotes up to one-third of its available resources to maintaining and developing its conventional and asymmetric capabilities, thereby seeking to deter external interference and provide leverage for international negotiations.

North Korean Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Developments

The DPRK currently maintains nuclear and ballistic missile development programs, both as a deterrent and as its greatest international manipulation tool, leverage exacerbated by the potential export of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) material. The DPRK conducted its only nuclear test in October 2006. Prior to the test, the intelligence community assessed that the DPRK had reprocessed enough plutonium for at least a half a dozen nuclear weapons. Additionally, the Director of National Intelligence assesses that in the past Pyongyang pursued a uranium enrichment capability for nuclear weapons and notes that some in the Intelligence

Community have increasing concerns that North Korea has an ongoing covert uranium enrichment program.⁸

The DPRK views its ballistic missiles programs as a source of prestige, a strategic deterrent, a means of exerting regional influence, and a source of hard currency. North Korea continues building missiles of increasing range, lethality and accuracy, thereby bolstering its inventory of missiles available for internal use or external sale, while maintaining several hundred missiles in its active force. North Korea is now fielding a new intermediate range ballistic missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam and Alaska, and continues to develop and mature systems with an intercontinental range capability. The DPRK's missile export program, with established links to Syria and Iran, among others, along with its quest to develop improved ballistic missile technology, poses a threat to Northeast Asia and the world at large. It is a threat that we cannot afford to overlook.

North Korea Armed Forces

North Korea continues to maintain the world's fourth largest armed force with 1.2 million active duty personnel, 5-7 million reserves, 1,700 aircraft, 800 naval vessels, and over 13,000 artillery systems. Though outfitted with aging and unsophisticated equipment, 70 percent of the DPRK's ground forces remain staged within 90 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), including 250 long range artillery systems capable of striking the greater Seoul metropolitan area and its 23 million inhabitants. Despite a failing economy, the North Korean government consistently diverts precious resources from the civil sector to military readiness. While

⁸Assessment obtained from the "Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community" produced by the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and released on 12 February 2009.

qualitatively inferior to CFC, resource-constrained, and incapable of sustained deep maneuver, North Korea's military forces retain the capability to inflict lethal, catastrophic destruction on and off the Korean Peninsula. They are well postured to conduct limited attacks or kinetic provocations against the Alliance, as well as our allies and interests in the region, with little or no warning.

The DPRK continues to maintain the largest SOF in the world, comprised of over 80,000 personnel. Among the best resourced forces in North Korea's military, these tough, well-trained, and profoundly loyal troops are capable of conducting illicit activities, strategic reconnaissance, and asymmetric attacks against a range of critical civilian infrastructure and military targets across the region.

North Korean Threat Outlook

The potential for North Korean instability will remain a top concern for the foreseeable future. The DPRK's long-term viability and corresponding stability remains problematic, as the North Korean government has shown little tolerance for market reform, resulting in deteriorating infrastructure and chronically depressed agricultural and industrial sectors. While keenly aware of its economic crisis and the impact of its chronic dependency on foreign aid for survival, the DPRK continues to struggle with balancing the benefits of increased international interaction and assistance against the risks such interaction and assistance pose to regime control. This raises questions about the long-term viability of an increasingly stressed North Korean regime.

Absent a commitment to economic and other reforms, we expect the regime's goals and strategy to remain static, as it pursues regime survival at the expense of both the North Korean state and its people's future prosperity.

Now, I would like to briefly discuss my three priorities for the Command: 1) be prepared to fight and win; 2) strengthen the Alliance; and 3) improving the quality of life for personnel under my command.

III. PREPARED TO FIGHT AND WIN

My first priority as Commander of CFC, UNC, and USFK is a trained, ready, and disciplined Combined and Joint Command that is prepared to fight and win. Facing any number of challenges that could arise on the peninsula with little warning, our commitment to the Alliance spans the entire spectrum of conflict, from major combat operations under conditions of general war through multiple instability possibilities to humanitarian assistance, or elimination of WMD in an environment characterized by instability. Given these varied potential challenges, it is imperative that our forces maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness.

Training

Readiness can only be maintained by training to conduct full spectrum operations in today's complex operational environment. We must ensure that our training facilities and opportunities fully support the transformation of U.S. military forces stationed in Korea. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps possess adequate training resources on the Korean Peninsula to maintain unit combat readiness including the conduct of robust amphibious operations. Eighth U.S. Army is aggressively improving, in conjunction with the Department of the Army, Live, Virtual, Constructive and Gaming technologies that train Brigade and Battalion Battle Command in a major combat and full spectrum operating environment.

USFK still faces challenges with insufficient training range capacity and capability needed to maintain the readiness of our air forces in Korea. In addition, the continued shortfall in electronic warfare training capability for our on-peninsula air assets poses a significant challenge that must be addressed. Increased deployments of U.S. air forces to off-peninsula training events will mitigate current training shortfalls within Korea and ensure the same standard of training and readiness as the rest of our combat air forces. We are working with the ROK government and military to solve our training challenges and anticipate continued progress throughout the remaining months of FY 2009 and into FY 2010.

Combined Exercises

Our CFC exercise program is designed to maintain the “Fight Tonight” readiness of our combined forces and drive the transformation of CFC into separate ROK and U.S. warfighting headquarters. KEY RESOLVE and FOAL EAGLE (KR/FE), held concurrently each year, ensure CFC readiness while visibly demonstrating the strength of the Alliance. FE is a large-scale combined Field Training Exercise, which includes the strategic deployment of U.S. forces from bases in the United States as well as the participation of 200,000 ROK troops. KR, a Command Post Exercise focused on crisis management, trains as we will fight today, with CFC executing command and control (C2) of our combined forces. KR/FE 2009, taking place this month, will once again confirm that CFC remains highly capable of deterring aggression, and should deterrence fail, decisively defeat a North Korean attack.

ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN (UFG), an annual computer-simulated warfighting exercise, focuses on training and certifying the 2012 and beyond future command structure. We executed the first UFG in August 2008 under the command structure as it will exist after the

transition of wartime OPCON of ROK forces in 2012, with two separate warfighting headquarters. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff led the warfight with U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) in a supporting role. The ROK military leadership performed well, and proved that it will be fully capable of taking the leading role in the defense of the ROK by 2012. While there is still much work to do between now and April 2012, based on performance in this first UFG exercise, I am confident that the ROK is ready for this challenge.

Readiness

Continued Congressional support for force capability enhancements is also critical to readiness. USFK has continued to make meaningful progress in several key focus areas for modernization: joint C2, communications, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); counter-fire and precision munitions; theater missile defense (TMD); and pre-positioned equipment and logistics. I ask for your support to meet resource requirements in these areas, which are essential to our readiness posture, as well as the successful transformation of U.S. forces in Korea.

Command and Control (C2) and Communications

We are making strides in modernizing our C2 and communications systems, yet a significant vulnerability to our infrastructure continues to exist. Numerous facilities are vulnerable to service disruption due to reliance on single outdated communication platforms. North Korean SOF and ballistic missiles represent the most significant infrastructure threats, but accidental damage to the data path due to construction and natural disasters also poses a threat. We are mitigating this threat by upgrading microwave capacity and replacing vintage fiber optic

cable. These upgrade and replacement programs are projected to be executed over the next few years with the high priority facilities and cable phases being completed by November 2009 which will significantly reduce existing infrastructure vulnerabilities. We will continue to address these vulnerabilities and prioritize our efforts and resources to mitigate the risk to the infrastructure with having full replacement and redundancy complete by the end of 2011.

We are also designing a Joint Information Environment-Korea (JIE) that will be designed to consolidate numerous federated systems into a unified communications network under the management of a single provider. Adoption of JIE into the Korea Theater of Operations will make operational the Joint Staff Global Information Grid 2.0 concept. The JIE-Korea approach will reduce operations and maintenance costs, lower network redundancies, and reduce network seams that have caused past network disruptions.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Continued modernization of ISR capabilities also remains a top priority, crucial to transforming the ROK-U.S. Alliance. As we prepare to transition wartime OPCON of ROK military forces in 2012, coalition interoperability is of paramount significance for the establishment of a seamless multi-national C2 capability. While the ROK intelligence community transforms in parallel with USFK transformation and the U.S. Rebalancing Intelligence effort, our preeminent challenges are to enhance intelligence sharing and the ability to leverage and integrate unique ROK intelligence capabilities without losing the synergy gained from combined intelligence production. To this end, we are now publishing new modules of CFC's Peninsula Intelligence Estimate (PIE) with the support of ROK and US intelligence

community partners – all coordinated via DoD’s Intelligence Planning (IP) initiative. In parallel with OPCON transition, the PIE will change from a CFC publication to a bilateral ROK-US intelligence community product by 2012, ensuring a common intelligence baseline for Allied operational planning, indications & warning and crisis management.

Other major milestones include maturation of integrated ROK intelligence systems; establishment of the Intelligence Fusion Center in Seoul; continued development of the Warning and Intelligence Operations Center, which is a combined intelligence coordination organization successfully tested during UFG 08; and embedded national multi-intelligence support elements at ROK military single discipline intelligence centers. Concurrently, maintenance of a viable U.S.-only link with national authorities that also enables reach back and reach forward capabilities to and from support agencies will enhance operational and strategic decision making.

Congressional support is essential to sustain and improve ISR during this critical period of Alliance transformation. Validated U.S. requirements for Global Hawk, Predator, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, along with improvements to our more sensitive intelligence capabilities, continue to exist. Support for our intelligence requirements ensures that we close the most critical gaps, support diligent ongoing daily operations, and improve the overall long-term intelligence posture in the region.

Precision Strike and Preferred Munitions

Increasing the forward stocks of preferred munitions is vital to operational success in the Korean theater. Precision strike is a critical requirement for our contingency plans because it affords the opportunity to change the dynamics of a conflict and rapidly achieve campaign objectives. Our priority ordnance requirements include: Guided Multiple Launch Rocket

System with extended range capability; a ground-launched, extended range, all weather capability to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets; precision guided munitions; and air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles. In the near-term, we will address this problem by requesting available munitions from war reserve stocks in the United States and other theaters of operations. For the mid- to long-term, we will use the DoD planning and programming process to acquire the needed munitions and capabilities.

Theater Missile Defense

The DPRK missile threat demands a robust, active TMD. PAC-3 PATRIOT Missile System upgrades and improved munitions have significantly enhanced our ability to protect critical U.S. facilities in Korea. I would like to thank the committee for its FY 2009 support of production of PAC-3 missiles and development of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense. In addition, a speed-of-light capability to destroy ballistic missiles in their early stages of flight, when combined with the previous programs, would provide a layered missile defense capability to protect U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula.

The ROK should also continue to invest in a TMD capability, which would ideally be interoperable with U.S. systems to enhance our combined defensive capabilities. The ROK recently began operational deployment of eight Configuration-2+ German PATRIOT fire units, which will be operational in 2010. Once fielded, these eight firing units will possess a U.S. PATRIOT PAC-2 equivalent theater ballistic missile defense capability. The ROK must continue to develop and field an interoperable TMD system to protect critical civilian and military command capabilities, infrastructure and population centers.

Theater Logistics, Pre-positioned and War Reserve Stocks

Army Pre-positioned Stocks-4 (APS-4), which includes critical combat equipment, weapon systems, preferred munitions, repair parts, and essential supplies, is vital for rapid combat power projection to the Korean theater. Army Materiel Command has made great strides maintaining our pre-positioned stocks in Korea. APS-4 critical combat systems are currently at 100% fill and the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) equipment set is 98% Fully Mission Capable.⁹ We annually certify APS-4 HBCT equipment set readiness during the KR/FE exercise. In March 2008, Task Force Blackhorse, from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Irwin, California, drew several APS-4 HBCT combat vehicles and conducted a road march that culminated in a live-fire exercise.

The Army is steadily addressing remaining equipment shortfalls. For example, we have 79 percent of the full authorization of up-armored (UA) High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) in our Army operational and pre-positioned fleets.¹⁰ Eighth U.S. Army fielded 170 UA HMMWVs in FY 2008, and anticipates fielding an additional 148 UA HMMWVs in the third and fourth quarters of FY 2009.

Responsive strategic transportation platforms, such as cargo aircraft and APS-4, remain essential to our ability to rapidly reinforce the Korean theater and sustain U.S. forces in the event of crisis. We tested our critical strategic airlift capability during the March 2009 KR/FE exercise, deploying multiple units to the ROK including U.S. Army III Corps Tactical Command Post. During the same exercise, elements of III Marine Expeditionary Force deployed to the

⁹ As of 4 September 2008

¹⁰ EUSA: 78 O/H of 244 AUTH; APS-4 554 O/H of 554 AUTH; total 632 O/H of 798 AUTH = 79%; EUSA G4 12 MAY 09.

peninsula via the Marine High Speed Vessel, WESTPAC EXPRESS. These deployments demonstrate the vital role that expeditionary capability and responsive strategic lift play in defense of the ROK and will continue to be a part of future exercises.

Significant progress was made in the area of war reserves stocks. In October 2008 the U.S. and ROK reached agreement on the transfer of surplus U.S. ammunition and military equipment to the ROK. Thank you for passing the special legislation that enabled DoD to reach this win-win agreement, signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Korean Minister of Defense at the recent 40th Security Consultative Meeting. Under this agreement, the ROK received 248,000 short tons of munitions and other equipment for \$280 million worth of concessions, such as munitions storage and domestic transportation costs. The transfer benefits both nations. The U.S. avoids almost \$1 billion in transportation and demilitarization costs and the ROK gains, at no cash cost, munitions stocks that will address sustainment shortages and enhance readiness.

IV. STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE

After “Prepared to Fight and Win,” my second Command priority is to continue strengthening the Alliance. In addition to improving combined military capabilities, strengthening the Alliance also requires actions that ensure the Alliance’s future viability. The most significant of these actions is the transition to a ROK-led national defense. It is both prudent and the ROK’s sovereign obligation to assume primary responsibility for the lead role in its own defense. To achieve that aim, our two nations have embarked on the most profound defense transformation on the peninsula since the end of the Korean War. This transition will be

a success story for both the U.S. and the ROK and will serve as a key foundation for future regional stability.

Wartime OPCON Transition

In September 2006 the presidents of the U.S. and the ROK agreed that the ROK should assume the lead for its own defense. In early 2007, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense determined that the ROK will assume wartime OPCON of its forces on April 17, 2012. Transitioning the Alliance to a new ROK-led military command and control structure in 2012, with U.S. and UNC forces in doctrinally supporting roles, will best serve all nations' long-term interests and matches each nation's defense capabilities. Both the ROK and U.S. will stand up new headquarters, the ROK JCS will be the supported command and the U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be the supporting command. After the transition of wartime OPCON in 2012, CFC will be disestablished. Although the U.S. KORCOM Commander will assume a doctrinally supporting military relationship, he will still maintain national command over all U.S. forces. As is USFK, KORCOM will be a fully capable and resourced U.S. joint warfighting command.

To achieve this realignment of roles and responsibilities, in 2007 the ROK and U.S. established and agreed to a transition road map – the Strategic Transition Plan (STP) – to identify requirements and milestones leading to OPCON transition in 2012. Prior to the ROK assuming wartime operational control of its own forces, U.S. and ROK planners are developing new terms of reference, crisis action standard operating procedures, wartime C2 procedures, and operational plans through formal Alliance consultative processes such as the Security Policy Initiative and the annual Security Consultative and Military Committee Meetings. Lessons learned from our

combined exercise program will also help to eliminate shortfalls in capabilities and ensure a strong and credible deterrent during the transition period. The culmination of the STP will be marked by a certification exercise in March 2012. Our intent is to achieve initial operational capability by December 2010 for the doctrinally supporting KORCOM and its Service components, followed with full operational capability by June 2011, prior to the final certification exercise.

U.S. Force Capabilities

Over the last few decades, as the ROK armed forces have gained in capability, the U.S. has reduced its ground forces in Korea while maintaining the ability to quickly repel any threat with robust and lethal U.S. regional air and naval forces. While maintaining the 28,500-force level in Korea, U.S. military capabilities in the region need to be more air and naval-centric. U.S. air and naval platforms stationed in the region provide the Alliance with strategic flexibility, and a powerful response to augment the modern, highly capable, ROK ground forces. This arrangement combined with significant U.S. follow-on forces will complete the warfight. The upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review will further refine the capability requirements of U.S. forces in Korea over the next 20 years.

ROK Defense Initiatives

Since assuming operational control in 1994 of its armed forces under armistice conditions, the ROK has made great strides in modernizing the organization, equipment, and training of its forces. The goal of the ROK's ambitious Defense Reform 2020 plan is the development of a self-reliant and technology-oriented, qualitatively superior military force. The

plan's emphasis on advanced technology will result in an approximately 45% reduction of its total (active and reserve) Army ground forces, from about 3.7 million to 2 million personnel. The ROK military is on its way to realizing its goals. U.S. willingness to share technology and advanced capabilities will enable the modernization of ROK forces to accommodate increased responsibility following OPCON transition. Further, passage by the U.S. Congress of legislation that upgraded the ROK's FMS status will greatly assist the ROK's modernization efforts and support interoperability with U.S. military forces. Beyond the real impact it will have on Alliance warfighting capability, the upgrade in FMS status is recognition of the ROK as a longstanding ally and one of the U.S.' largest FMS partners. In the year 2007 ROK spending on national defense was equal to 2.74% of GDP, lower than the 3.99% figure registered by the United States for that same year but well above the 1.57% average allocated by the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [excluding the United States].¹¹

ROK Global and Regional Security Cooperation

The ROK, a committed U.S. ally, is an active defender of freedom around the world. The ROK armed forces fought alongside Americans in Vietnam, participated in OPERATION DESERT STORM, and conducted peacekeeping operations in Somalia and East Timor. More recently, the ROK deployment in support of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, the Zaytun unit, concluded in December 2008. The Zaytun unit's five-year mission in northern Iraq contributed significantly to the stabilization and reconstruction of that country, and at its peak strength of about 3,600 soldiers in 2004, constituted the third largest national contingent of forces in Iraq.

¹¹ Percentages obtained from *The Military Balance 2008*, produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The Zaytun unit's honorable service stands as a source of great pride to the Korean people. The ROK military deployment to Afghanistan, in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, ended in December 2007; however, the ROK maintains a civilian medical and vocational training team, has contributed other military assistance worth millions of dollars, and dispatched survey teams in November 2008 and January 2009 to assess future assistance opportunities. In July 2007 the ROK deployed a peacekeeping force to Lebanon in support of UN operations there and has deployed a destroyer to the Gulf of Aden to participate in maritime security operations. We will continue to work with our Alliance partner to seek new opportunities for ROK contributions to global peace and security.

Allied Burden Sharing

Defense burden sharing is advantageous to both Alliance partners. For the U.S., host nation funded construction satisfies critical infrastructure requirements that would otherwise be borne by U.S. taxpayers. For the ROK, nearly all ROK Special Measures Agreement (SMA) burden sharing funds are expended in the Korean economy through the payment of Korean national employee wages, Korean service contracts, and Korean construction firms. In 2008 the ROK contributed 315.8 billion won (\$307.9 million) toward Korean national employee wages, funding the majority of the cost of this absolutely necessary workforce on U.S. bases. ROK SMA contributions also provided 161.5 billion won (\$157.5 million) of U.S. logistics requirements last year, through contracts with Korean companies in critical warfighting functions such as equipment repair, maintenance, and munitions storage.¹² Finally, ROK SMA funds in

¹² DOD official 2008 exchange rate 1025.7 won to the U.S. dollar was used for currency conversion.

the year 2008 are being used to conduct 264.2 billion won (\$257.6 million) worth of construction work for my command.

The ROK and the U.S. recently concluded a new SMA governing ROK cost sharing contributions for the years 2009 – 2013. Under this new agreement, the ROK will contribute 760 billion won (\$741 million) in 2009, with subsequent annual contributions increased by changes in the ROK Consumer Price Index.¹³ We have also agreed to transition ROK host nation funded construction contributions from primarily cash to majority “in-kind” provision of services, in which the ROK constructs buildings to U.S. specifications and standards in accordance with mutually agreed principles and U.S. priorities. This long-term agreement on host nation burden sharing will provide a predictable funding stream that is essential to the successful completion of our relocation plans.

V. IMPROVING QUALITY OF LIFE

Improving the quality of life for service members, DoD civilians, and their families is my third and final command priority. Our goal is to make the ROK an assignment of choice for all service members – both single and accompanied. Central to achieving this aim is allowing the majority of service members the opportunity to serve normal three-year tours, accompanied by their families. This is an important step and full implementation of tour normalization supports all of my Command priorities. It improves our “Fight Tonight” readiness by keeping trained forces in place for a longer period of time, improving continuity and stability. It demonstrates a strong, visible, and enduring U.S. commitment to security for the ROK. The greater number of American families in Korea offers more opportunities for meaningful interaction between

¹³ DOD official 2008 exchange rate 1025.7 won to the U.S. dollar was used for currency conversion.

Americans and Koreans, further strengthening the long-term viability of the Alliance. Finally, tour normalization significantly improves quality of life, eliminating long and unnecessary separation of service members from their families.

Tour Normalization

Over the past 56 years the ROK has transformed from a war ravaged country to a modern, progressive, and democratic nation. Despite Korea's emergence as a prosperous country that offers a standard of living commensurate with that found in Japan and much of Europe, we continue to rotate the majority of U.S. service members on one-year unaccompanied tours. During the Cold War, facing a significant Soviet and Warsaw Pact military threat, we encouraged our service members to bring their families on assignment to Europe. This stationing policy decision granted much needed stability to U.S. forces and sent a strong message of American commitment and reliability to our European Allies. But we have sent a message to our Northeast Asian allies that we remain less than fully committed and can withdraw our forces at a moment's notice. Conflict on the peninsula is not imminent, and, once our forces relocate to enduring locations south of Seoul, our immediate no-notice vulnerability will be dramatically less than that faced by our forces in Europe during the Cold War. A policy of three-year family accompanied tours in Korea, exactly as we have in place in Japan and across Europe, demonstrates long-term U.S. commitment to the ROK and other members of the Northeast Asia community.

Current stationing practices in Korea needlessly contribute to family separations, exacerbating the strain placed on service members and their families by continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are currently just over 4,000 U.S. service member families in

Korea. Of those, 2,135 families are Command Sponsored, authorized relocation to Korea at U.S. government expense.¹⁴ The other families, many undoubtedly motivated by the prospect of future separation during combat tours, have decided to accompany their service members to Korea at their own expense. While we provide a housing allowance for off-post quarters and medical care, relocating families to Korea without Command Sponsorship is a significant financial burden borne by service members. We ultimately seek to expand Command Sponsorship so that the majority of service members assigned to Korea have the opportunity to bring their families at government expense.

We are making progress. In December 2008 the DoD increased accompanied tour lengths from two- to three-years for service members assigned to Pyeongtaek, Osan, Daegu, Chinhae, and Seoul. The new stationing policy maintains one-year unaccompanied tours for all locations, and authorizes two-year accompanied tours at two new locations, Uijongbu and Dongducheon. In accordance with this policy change, Command Sponsorship will expand as needed growth in infrastructure, services, and base support is realized. Existing infrastructure will allow an increase to 4,350 Command Sponsored positions. A phased program will synchronize further increases in family authorizations with the expansion of necessary infrastructure. A phased approach ensures that the appropriate level of necessary services, such as education and medical care, are in place as the number of family members increase. Execution of this phased approach could be expedited if additional appropriated funding were made available for this purpose. Our goal is to eventually increase the number of Command Sponsored positions to approximately 14,250.

¹⁴ As of 4 December 2008 there were 4,044 service member families in the ROK. Of this total, 2,135 were command sponsored while 1,909 were not.

The benefits of normalizing tours are many and include improved continuity, stability, readiness and retention of regional, institutional, and cultural knowledge. Full implementation of this policy change will provide our service members a better quality of life, strengthen the Alliance, and send a strong message of U.S. commitment to the long-term security and stability of the ROK and Northeast Asia. I ask for your support of the infrastructure and services required to fully implement normalized tours in Korea, which will have a significant and lasting positive impact on service member quality of life as well as the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

Realignment of U.S. Forces

Under the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP), signed by the U.S. and ROK in 2004, U.S. forces stationed at USAG Yongsan in Seoul will relocate to USAG Humphreys near Pyeongtaek, approximately 40 miles south of Seoul. The majority of costs associated with the implementation of YRP will be paid by the ROK. A separate U.S.–ROK realignment plan, the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), provides for the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division south of the Han River. SMA burden sharing will fund a significant portion of the costs associated with this realignment. After the YRP is completed U.S. forces will no longer be located in the traditional military operational avenues between Seoul and the DMZ but they will still be optimally positioned to support ROK forces in defending the ROK against an attack from North Korea. This change moves U.S. forces to locations south of the nation's capital where they will assume a less intrusive footprint and returns valuable land to the ROK government and Korean people. Relocation of U.S. forces also offers the opportunity to significantly improve the quality of life for our service members.

The realignment of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula has frequently been contentious between the ROK and U.S. governments. The central issue has been the application of the bilaterally negotiated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) procedures to return vacated U.S. base camps to the ROK. Nonetheless, we are making progress. In 2008, we returned two SOFA granted facilities and expect to return seven other SOFA granted facilities in 2009.¹⁵ To date, we have closed 37 installations encompassing over 17,208 acres with a tax assessed value of over \$500 million and returned 35 of those installations to the ROK. Our goal is to close a total of 63 facilities and areas, two-thirds of all land granted under the SOFA, totaling more than 38,000 acres. In exchange for the return of the majority of our dispersed camps, the ROK, per our agreements, has purchased about 2,800 acres of land required to expand USAG Humphreys and Osan AB.¹⁶

Military Construction

USFK construction priorities are focused on the transformation of USAG Humphreys into a modern installation capable of accommodating U.S. forces that will relocate under the YRP and the LPP. Appropriated military construction funding remains an important component of our overall funding strategy, which includes host nation construction funds, ROK in-kind construction, and commercial investment. I ask for your support of future appropriated military construction funding requests that will provide facilities essential to the success of the ongoing relocation of U.S. forces to USAG Humphreys. Continued military construction funding also sends a clear signal to the ROK of U.S. commitment to a long-term presence and willingness to

¹⁵ These seven facilities include 4 training ranges, Camp Hialeah, a transportation management office at Camp Carroll, and a mail facility at Kimpo.

¹⁶ This figure includes 2,328 acres at Camp Humphreys and 409 acres at Osan AB.

fulfill our agreed LPP and YRP requirements. Relocation and consolidation of U.S. forces into enduring locations provides a unique opportunity to change the paradigm in Korea and start meeting the needs of our service members and their families, and allows us to dramatically improve living and working conditions. Sustained access to several different funding programs, to include U.S. appropriated military construction, ROK burden sharing contributions, and commercial investment, will be essential for this endeavor to succeed.

Family Housing

Under the YRP, the ROK agreed to fund and construct the majority of the required facilities and infrastructure at USAG Humphreys. The ROK has already spent over two billion dollars on these requirements that includes the purchase of 2,300 acres of land at USAG Humphreys and the development of 133 acres. The U.S. agreed to provide the majority of family housing. Fulfilling this obligation will display American determination to improve the quality of life for our service members by providing adequate family housing, as well as meet our commitments under an international agreement with a longstanding ally.

In FY 2009 the Army received \$125 million to fund the construction of 216 family housing units at USAG Humphreys.¹⁷ This represents a necessary start, and I appreciate the Congressional support it received, as well as the powerful message it sends to the ROK. The Army has developed a commercial investment alternative, the Humphreys Housing Opportunity Program (HHOP), to fulfill the remaining U.S. YRP family housing requirement. The HHOP involves private sector development, financing, design, construction, operations and

¹⁷ Note that a total number of 2,974 units will be built at USAG Humphreys. This total is composed of: 331 ROK-funded units; 216 US-funded units; and 2,427 units to be built under the HHOP program.

maintenance, and long-term property management of new family housing units at USAG Humphreys. The program requires no capital construction investment by the Army and housing units will be rented by soldiers through use of their overseas housing allowance. The HHOP will ultimately provide 2,427 new family housing units at USAG Humphreys. I fully support this Army initiative, as it provides a cost-effective alternative solution to our YRP housing requirement and affords the opportunity to meet our commitment to service members and their families. Additional family housing will be required to support full tour normalization, and the HHOP represents a solid foundation for a phased approach to providing housing for the increase in U.S. service member families in Korea.

Sustaining, Restoring, and Modernizing Existing Infrastructure

While we continue to commit funding toward our ongoing relocation efforts, we must not lose sight of the urgent need to maintain our current infrastructure. Some of our facilities in Korea are the most dilapidated in the U.S. military, outside of active combat or peace enforcement zones. This regrettable situation is not in keeping with our commitment to the men and women who selflessly serve our nation. We must commit appropriate resources to the recapitalization of our enduring facilities and infrastructure.

Over one-half of the buildings on Army facilities are between 25 and 50 years of age and another quarter are classified as “temporary” structures. Long-term annual sustainment, restoration, and modernization shortfalls have created a condition of continual deterioration, with many buildings accumulating substantial deferred maintenance requirements. Your commitment to our Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization Program requirements, supplemented by

ROK burden sharing contributions, will enhance our readiness and improve the quality of life for our service members and their families.

VI. CONCLUSION

The ROK-U.S. Alliance is one of the greatest bilateral success stories in modern history. In 1950, the UNC was created to defend the ROK when it was attacked by North Korea. In 1957, establishment of USFK provided a command structure to fully support the Alliance. In 1978, the Alliance further evolved with the creation of the CFC, a unified ROK and U.S. command structure. The Alliance evolved once again in 1994 when peacetime OPCON of ROK forces was transferred to the ROK. With the transition of wartime OPCON to the ROK in 2012, the U.S. and the ROK will enter a new era of cooperation, an era marked by a Republic of Korea with defense responsibilities commensurate with its capabilities and sovereign rights. After 2012, the ROK-U.S. Alliance needs to remain strong in order to preserve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as well as in the region as a whole.

Today the Alliance is more relevant to the national interests of the U.S. than it has ever been. It will remain essential to the protection and advancement of U.S. national interests in this strategically vital region of the world. We look forward to continuing this vital partnership, one that promotes freedom, democracy, and global free trade in Northeast Asia. Moving forward together, I am more confident than ever that this Alliance will continue to maintain peace and stability in a region for which Americans, side-by-side with our Korean partners, have shed blood.

I am extremely proud of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, DoD Civilians, and families serving in the ROK who selflessly support the Alliance, and through their selfless service, maintain stability in the region. Your continued support for our service members and the Alliance is greatly appreciated. I know you will agree that our men and women in uniform deserve the very best working, living, and training environment, and we should do everything in our power to provide it. Thank you.