

Negative Image Construction of North Korea

Nuclear Orientalism in the U.S. Newspapers

Binnarae Oh

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Abstract

The news coverage on the North Korean nuclear weapons program has evolved to define the national image of North Korea. The coverage affords both delivering the news and creating a negative image toward North Korea which presents the Bush administration's sentiment toward North Korea. This research focuses on the source of such hostile discourse in terms of Gusterson's (1999) nuclear Orientalism. This discourse is presented by the two elite U.S. publications, *New York Times* and *Washington Post* and both the news articles and editorial pieces in the two newspapers have offered certain images of North Korea. Through frame analysis, this study provides evidence of how these two major U.S. newspapers employ nuclear Orientalism which stems from the U.S. ambition to preserve their sole military power in the international arena. Ultimately, this research focuses on the presence of nuclear Orientalism as a justification for the current six-party talks aiming to dismantle the nuclear program in the North Korea. While the community building is a crucial way to solve global issues, in the existing imbalance between the nuclear haves and not-haves, it is important to realize the importance of objective media approach to represent subject countries. Although the evidence presented in this dissertation fails to provide a vast significance in quantitative sense; however, findings are undeniable regarding the presence of the nuclear Orientalist theory.

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Introduction

In reply to a South Korean reporter's question of why Pyongyang was spending its scarce resources on ballistic missiles, the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il answered the following:

The missiles cannot reach the U.S. and if I launch them, the U.S. would fire back thousands of missiles and we would not survive. I know that very well. But I have to let them know I have missiles. I am making them because only then will the U.S. talk to me (French 2004, 207).

Unlike the media portrayals of Kim illustrating him as a threat to world peace, in the above interview, we can observe that his attempt to acquire nuclear weapons merely aims to attack another country. Rather his intention for the weapons lies in the diplomatic ground desiring to gain a voice in the international arena.

When the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, announced its intent to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on January 10th, 2003, alarmism about the danger of proliferation has become most salient over North Korea. The surrounding discourse of the former U.S. President George W. Bush Jr.'s Axis of Evil and imminent threat to world security has had a noticeable effect upon perceptions of the reclusive and closed country, and numerous hostile and offensive interpretations of its purpose for acquiring nuclear weapons have been prominent. Despite arguments by scholars providing defensive position of the nuclear weapons, the U.S. media coverage over the North Korean nuclear issue has been framing the nation as a threat to world peace. While on one hand, world peace is believed to be preserved by the deterrence role played by the existence of current nuclear weapons by nations such as the United States (U.S.); on the other hand, world peace is threatened by the conflicts between nuclear and non-nuclear countries. Such existing paradox in today's international security discourse raises major conflict between the nuclear haves and have-nots.

The current international nuclear discourse presents bipolar images between "us", in which the U.S. is portrayed as safe with weapons, and the "other" which infers problematic non-Western country nuclear predicament. This divide in rhetoric reveals the presence of what Hugh Gusterson (1999) calls Nuclear Orientalism. Based on Said's (1978) theory of Orientalism, which argues that the West thinks of its position superior over the Orient (Said 1978, 78), Gusterson asserts that "there is a common perception

in the West that nuclear weapons are most dangerous when they are in the hands of Third World leaders” (Gusterson 1999, 111). This West-centered prejudice leads to bias when we look at Third World countries attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Here I claim that the motive behind the U.S. opposition against the North’s nuclear acquisition originates from the nuclear Orientalism.

While the extent of the threat that such a small country, in terms of population and geography, with serious destitution and economic desperation, can pose to the world is in doubt, the threat is mainly highlighted in the U.S. media. Paradoxically, the surrounding discourse is a result of social construction by post-Cold War American administrations. Looking through modern history, the only country that has ever used nuclear weapons is the U.S. And now the U.S. media attempts to secure the world from the threats and hostility raised by feeble North. The fundamental purpose behind the image construction is the “acts to preserve the profound military supremacy of the U.S. in particular and the West in general” (Cooper 2006, 372). This construction of the “Orient” image appears throughout media news reports.

The power of manipulative media representations has dominated our views in international relations. Park (2003) claims that “the window does not show the world as it is... People only see the world within the frame of the window” and goes on to say that “mass media’s consistent portrayal of certain topics ... develop images of foreign countries” (Park 2003, 145). I argue that the U.S. media uses this framing technique in order to create the “inferior Orient” image of North Korea. The American security rhetoric creates the negative image of North Korea throughout the six-party talks, the stated purpose of which is peace-building. It is evident that the consistent technique of framing creates negative image around the North’s regime as the “other” and increases concerns surrounding nuclear weapons.

Objectives

This study seeks to analyze the patterns of newspaper coverage during the last four phases of the six-party talks by the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* (henceforth NYT and WP) throughout 2007.

It explores the content of Orientalist frames used by these publications, as well as the level of attention given by them towards creating the image of an “inferior Orient”. I attempt to shed some light on understanding the current North Korean nuclear controversy and the presence of bias in nuclear weapons proliferation in the current U.S.-centered international security discourse. Over the course, the following three objectives have been accomplished: To identify framing evidence relating to the presence of nuclear Orientalist bias toward North Korea; to draw conclusions relating to these findings that are relevant and transparent in the current media and the international security discourse and; to realize the importance of community building in the North Korean nuclear weapons issue in the six-party talks.

Literature Review

The following five sections highlight a comprehensive and critical literature review that is extracted from a wide range of previous studies. Through the juxtaposition of related opinions and theories, the overview of both historical and current issues around the North Korean nuclear weapons can be fundamentally evaluated. The current Northeast Asian relations and the relationship between the U.S.’s attitude toward security issues and media framing implications will be explored. The objectivity in this section is maintained by the comparison of ideas and concepts across a wide body of literature. This review will provide insight into the Northeast Asian geopolitics, the nuclear motive of North Korea, the U.S. security hegemony, and nuclear Orientalism and media framing theories.

North Korea and the Northeast Asian Geopolitics

North Korea plays a key role in preserving peace in the region whose role is given by its strategic location. Being at the centre of Northeast Asia, North Korea holds an asymmetrically large power relative to its size whose territory is 1/19th of China (Kim and Lee 2002, 111). The Chinese president Jiang Zemin has even stated that “without peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, there can be no genuine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (Kim and Lee 2002, 111). The community building

in the peninsula involves the concern of Japan and further proliferation in the region. Deterring North Korea holds a key to maintain peace because Japan is most likely to demand their defensive position to proliferate if the U.S. allows nuclear North, and further demands by South Korea and potentially even Taiwan challenge the U.S. influence (Cha 2002, 217). As the head of the nonproliferation regime, the possible chain armament effect unsettles the current nonproliferation regime and thus, preserving peace in North Korea leads to protecting the regional, and further, the current world balance of power.

In recent decades, North Korea faces a unique military situation and the external changes in the Northeast Asia have put pressure on the regime especially since the end of Cold War. Confronting South Korea which is under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. and sharing the northern borders with the former allies, Russia and China, now among whom are allies of the U.S., North Korea feels insecure in its military position (Wishnick 2002, 142). Politically, being the only failed communist regime in the region, the post-Cold War era's changing environment put hardships on the regime. With the crumbling of Berlin wall and the demise of the Soviet Union and international communism altogether threaten the regime's stance in the international arena (Kim and Lee 2002, 111). Also the diplomatic normalizations between Moscow –Seoul and Beijing –Seoul raise tension between North Korea and its neighbors. Moreover, the increasing U.S. economic involvement in China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea is viewed as “disgusting, nauseating, and unseemly” by the North Korean regime (Wishnick 2002, 141). Such distressful reaction of the North seems to result from the neighbor countries' pro-American sentiment and this changing sentiment in the region has become an external calamity that confronts North Korea. Even though the six-party talks aim to reach a peaceful resolution through community building and cooperation by the neighboring countries, the complex relationships between North Korea and the relations with the U.S. in the region delicate the issue.

At the core of the Northeast Asian geopolitics lies the aggressive and unilateral U.S. strategy toward world security in pursuit of its military and nuclear hegemony. When the Bush administration enters the office in 2001, the 9/11 incident unsettles Washington not to mention the whole world. By

transforming the tragedy into a strategic point in time to construct the dominant view of reasserting American primacy globally (Paul 2003, 151), the administration supports a uni-polar world system with the U.S. at the centre of international politics. This is facilitated by the brinkmanship behavior of North Korea. In the post- Cold War U.S., “with the disappearance of the Red Menace, invoking patriotism to block opposition becomes more difficult” and the entrance of North Korea’s nuclear challenge serves the new created evil image (Entman 2004, 96). With the presence of North Korea as a solid enemy, it becomes easier to conduct both the domestic and international affairs. As North Korea challenges and rejects the demands to dismantle the nuclear program the U.S. gains bigger ground to secure its goal of maintaining the uni-polar world system.

Through emphasizing and building the image of North Korea as an enemy plays an essential role for the U.S. position in the world relations. Especially after North’s withdrawal from the NPT, the administration realizes that the current nonproliferation regime has failed to prevent North Korean proliferation and hence, decides to take aggressive and unilateral U.S. military action (Paul 2003, 152). Ultimately, the current nonproliferation regime lies at the heart of U.S. military hegemony. Cooper (2006) claims the U.S. has built a ‘disarmament Empire’ accusing Washington of maintaining the asymmetrical arms limitation system (Cooper 2006, 353). He believes that the current arms limitation system is “designed to preserve the military hegemony of the U.S. in particular and the West in general ... shaped in the interests of a disarmament empire - the U.S.” (Cooper 2006, 354). Also the “Pax Americana is said to have provided the stability required for the unfolding of American global hegemony” (Cooper 2006, 352) serving to preserve the system of rigid American security alliances. Thus, beyond the Northeast Asian politics and the North Korean nuclear issue, a far greater goal of maintaining the U.S.-centered world system is at the stake.

Nuclear Motive of North Korea

The Bush Administration’s discourse surrounding North Korea as an Axis of Evil clearly aims to serve the purpose of enemy-image construction. In his 2002 State of the Union Speech, Bush invokes

'evil' five times, "conveying an unambiguous and emotionally compelling frame" (Entman 2004, 1). At the core of the evil rhetoric lies the historical connection to the past discourses. The reference to popular memories of the World War II's aggressive Axis Powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan and former President Reagan's accusation of the Soviet Union as the Evil Empire both conjure up image of an enemy toward North Korea (Lee 2006, 219). Such references to the enemy image are the product of the "identity construction within the U.S.... [as] the American legitimacy of overwhelming military superiority" (Cooper 2006, 371). The evil image behind the nuclear weapons of North Korea aims to justify the American military power.

By abusing the obscure image of North Korea, the U.S. discourse can easily create a negative image due to the North's strict reclusiveness and much inexplicability, stimulating speculations of its existence. While the well-known nuclear motive behind North Korea is potential aggression, a multidimensional look at their nuclear motive is necessary as its position seems to remain defensive and diplomatic. As it is critical to understand the dynamic motives behind the North's nuclear ambition, Mazarr's (1995) presentations of nuclear motive of North Korea enhance the understanding of the North. He argues that the major reason why North Korea pursues nuclear weapons is for deterrence defensively matching the U.S. nuclear umbrella over its rival, South Korea as "insurance against an eventual South Korean conventional superiority" (Mazarr 1995, 100). The North seeks nuclear weapons as a deterrent for against the potential aggression by either the U.S. or South Korea (Cha 2002, 216). Also he includes the diplomatic leverage motive arguing that the North Korean government uses the weapons as "regime's legitimacy" (Mazarr 1995, 100). Cha (2002) also claims that the weapon gives "prestige/status... for their symbolic power" (Cha 2002, 227). Acting as a mere insurance against the loss of North Korea's traditional allies, China and Russia, it is evident that there exists more than simply an 'evil' motive. While current media report only the aggressive image most saliently, the studies reveal that the nuclear motive does not serve to be as great a threat as the images that the discourse convey; rather it remains strictly defensive and diplomatic.

The U.S. Security Hegemony

If the U.S. understands that the reason for the North Korean nuclear weapons program is based on its need to survive, and can be assured that the North Korea pursues weapons for defense, then the resolution of the six-party talks and peaceful community building will be easily reached. However, the current nonproliferation regime which legitimates the U.S. position to prevent further proliferation attempts to limit proliferation in order to preserve its nuclear power status (Chafetz 1995, 744). There exists irony and imbalance in the current nonproliferation regime. The five nuclear nations, the U.S., United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China are at the head of the United Nations Security Council preventing proliferation, yet they continue to maintain their own nuclear power. The treaty acts as “the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms” (Gusterson 1999, 113). Whilst the current nuclear nations claim that their nuclear programs remain widely political and reducing in numbers, still the existence of such powerful military weapons threaten their non-allies. It is almost too idealistic and even naïve to expect other nations to not pursue nuclear ambition for their own security.

When North Korea was accused of selling weapons to other nations by the U.S., Pyongyang has defended its position as the following:

The U.S. is the world’s largest seller of weaponry. It earns thousands of times more money selling guns warships and fighter planes than we do. We are called an evil nation: we are subjected to international trade boycotts, for doing the same thing America always does (French 2004, 209).

While the U.S. maintains the military dominance in the world, it seems only that the NPT is used to construct an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation, which is clear in the case of North Korea. The critics have highlighted the issue of the Western military hegemony and the U.S. nuclear superiority, arguing that the U.S. lacks the legitimate grounds to oppose nuclear proliferation (French 2004, 205). The core argument of NPT relates to the Western-centered military supremacy and the current post-colonial world system which allows “vertical” proliferation while opposing “horizontal” nuclear spread.

Here, the vertical proliferation refers to the “proliferation of the superpower arsenal” including the current nuclear powers and the horizontal proliferation indicates Third World or non-superpower proliferation (Gusterson 1999, 114). This nuclear opposition of the horizontal proliferation closely relates to nuclear Orientalism creating the ‘us versus them’ identity and in- and out-group mentality demonstrating the paradox that remains in the current nonproliferation regime.

Nuclear Orientalism

Perhaps the current existing asymmetry between the nuclear-haves and have-nots discourse implies a far greater divide in the international security system. The current nonproliferation regime paradoxically de-legitimizes the U.S.’s role in the six-party talks and the nonproliferation discourse is a mere tool to “generate political and cultural power by exploiting global media tropes or creating their own” (Cooper 2006, 375). This divide relates to the West and Oriental bipolar images. With the introduction of the evil discourse into the international lexicon the new source of danger and fear are identified to preserve the U.S. military programs. Former *Washington Post* journalist Chalmers Johnson claims that “North Korea is a useful whipping boy for any number of interests in Washington. The military needs a post-Cold War opponent to justify its existence” (French 2004, 137) and this is at the core of enemy-image construction. The issue of nonproliferation becomes all about a political power struggle. The U.S. hopes to gain grounds for military power and this image construction stems from Orientalist theory.

Based on Said’s (1978) theory of Orientalism, Gusterson’s (1999) nuclear Orientalist theory explains the current nuclear imbalance. The Orientalist theory refers to a distinction made between “the Orient and the Occident [British, French, or American]” (Said 1978, 2) based on the Western dominance and authority over the Orient where the non-Western countries are “orientalized”, or became Orientals, as a necessity to create “the relationship between Occident and Orient ... of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (Said 1978, 5). Turner (1994) points out that the Orientalist discourse is ultimately about the origins of the Western centered power and social change in international

relations (Turner 1994, 369). He asserts that the Orientalist discourse constructs the world in divided terms and binary oppositions, associating the West with rationality, discipline, modernity, flexibility, honesty, and compassion, and the non-West with impulsiveness, uncontrolled emotions, uncultivated-ness and antiquated-ness (Gusterson 1999, 114). Ultimately, the reason why the U.S. opposes the North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons is a result of the magnified version of fear which the U.S. itself has created in order to preserve their power in international relations. By creating the image of Orientals as the 'inferior other', the U.S. discourse on the North Korean nuclear weapons issue follows the portrayal of the "subordinate nations [represented] as the principal source of danger in the world" (Gusterson 1999, 132). It is my goal here to demonstrate the ways in which these Orientalist frameworks are used in the American media toward North Korea.

Media Framing Theories

In modern society, mass media plays a critical role in shaping the discourse of international relations. Many scholars agree that the media have become the "most significant centers of power" (Auerbach 2005, 83). The media's influence on the formulation of national images is major, especially in the case of security issues since "the media are likely to cover security issues from the point of view of the country of origin and thus tend to reflect the positions of the government and its foreign policy elites" (Dimitrova 2003, 203). Mutimer (2000) refers to mass media as a window on the world through which people learn about the world outside their country. The windows are presented through frames that allow or limit certain views to be seen and recognized. Also, frames allow us to "identify objects as objects of a particular kind" (Mutimer 2000, 7). Therefore, how news stories are presented becomes highly important and the frames that are used in the articles effectively create certain discourse that ultimately builds certain images which follow the administration's policies towards the subject country. The general definition of the term 'framing' is "the way events and issues are organized and made sense of" (Reese 2001, 7). Framing "select[s] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[es] them more salient in a

communicating text” (Entman 2004, 5). Previous researches reveal that news reports employ different frames for different countries and the frames are influenced by political, ideological, and cultural factors (Park 2003, 150). Such factors ultimately impact on the presentation of the news and commentary of foreign policy, and thus, security matters are closely anchored in frames (Auerbach 2005, 85). With the power to influence the people’s ‘perception of reality’ the media framing effect creates a perception of Orientalist image of other countries including North Korea.

Hypotheses

If news framing indeed aims to create the image of an evil “Orient” and construct such an image with regards to the North Korean nuclear issue, I can expect that the news coverage of the six-party talks follow the frames of nuclear Orientalism. I attempt to formulate that the major U.S. newspaper publications’ underlying purpose behind the North Korean nuclear weapons coverage is to create the image of enemy and construct the discourse of U.S. nuclear legitimacy. I therefore propose the following four hypotheses according to Gusterson (1999):

Hypothesis I: The NYT and WP portray North Korea as a country too poor to afford nuclear weapons due to Orientalist bias.

Gusterson’s evidence highlights that the West often believes it is inappropriate for an Orient country to spend money on nuclear weapons instead of spending money on their pressing problems of poverty, hunger, and homelessness (Gusterson 1999, 116). North Korea is one of the world’s most destitute nations. The Amnesty International report in 2007 indicates that the North Korean food shortfall is 20 percent of the entire nation, and the floods have exacerbated the outbreaks of blight and insect infestation during 2007 (*Amnesty International Report 2008*, 180). Poverty could rise as a major justification to abandon nuclear program.

Hypothesis II: The NYT and WP portray the North Korean deterrence as unstable with nuclear weapons due to Orientalist bias.

The strong sentiment by the West believes that an Oriental country's deterrence will not be stable. They believe they lack the resources to develop secure second-strike capabilities (Gusterson 1999, 118). The argument portrays non-Western leaders as whom by nature taking more risks, gambling millions of lives, or making more rash and irresponsible calculations than the Western counterparts (Gusterson 1999, 121). The West's justification is that "deterrence as practiced by the superpowers during the Cold War may not work in Third World settings because Third World adversaries tend to share common borders" (Gusterson 1999, 118). North Korea also shares its borders with South Korea, China and Russia. Japan and Taiwan are at its close proximity. Applying the same logic to the North Korean case I looked for any comment mentioning lack of second-strike capabilities due to close physical relationships with North Korea and its neighbors.

Hypothesis III: The NYT and WP portray the North Korean regime as lacking the technical maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons due to Orientalist bias.

The Orientalist theory's technical immaturity bias portrays Oriental countries as a country that lacks technology to properly build and maintain safe nuclear weapons program. He explains that the West believes the Oriental countries are technically less sophisticated and thus less able to develop safeguards against accident or unauthorized action (Gusterson 1999, 121). This emphasis on the dangers of low technology creates an image that oriental countries are technically immature.

Hypothesis IV: The NYT and WP portray the North Korean regime as lacking the political maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons due to Orientalist bias.

The oriental countries are often represented in the discourse on proliferation as countries "lacking impulse control and led by fanatical, brutal, or narcissistic leaders who might misuse nuclear weapons" (Gusterson 1999, 124). It is often also assumed in the discourse that in Oriental countries nuclear weapons exist to "serve the ends of despotic vanity" (Gusterson 1999, 125). This bias can also be

applied to the Communist regime and the national leader, Kim Jong-Il who holds the political power without any official opposition within North Korea.

Methodology

Through employing both the qualitative and quantitative method of frame analysis, I have followed Gusterson's model of a frame review of newspaper articles to provide evidence of the Orientalist framing in the selected news and editorial pieces. In Gusterson's research, he selects evidential content from the articles of which the content itself indicates the frames mentioned. He directly quotes from the news article without using coding techniques. In most of the instances he treats the articles as secondary sources. I have followed his manner of using news and editorial articles as literature pieces in which the content directly provides evidence relating to each frame. In Gusterson's model, the author chooses relevant texts from newspaper articles of which the content itself provides evidence for the frames. He directly quotes from the news article without using systemic coding schemes. In many instances he treats the articles as secondary sources of literature as evidence for his arguments. For the most part, I have followed his way of using news and editorial articles as literature pieces whose texts provide direct evidence to my claims as well.

Also in support for finding evidence of in- and out- group identities juxtaposing the potent West and inferior Orient, Izadi's (2002) naming choices of the national leaders reflect certain images of the country. Izadi raises the point that by addressing one country's leader in a certain way, the discourse can isolate the country with a negative image. She cites, Fowler and Kress (1979), and explains that "the different possibilities [of naming] signify different assessments by the speaker/writer of his or her relationship with the person referred to or spoken to, and of the formality or intimacy of the situation" (Izadi 2002, 200). The lexical choices used to portray events, actors, and politics can construct Orientalist descriptions of the "us-versus-them" image. The underlying frames to look for include themes of Oriental untrustworthiness, inferiority, backwardness, irrationality, mystical and irrational nature, submissiveness

and strangeness which all stress the “oddities of Oriental individuals as compared with a normal Western standard” (van Dijk 1996, 149-50). By looking at the naming choice for the North Korean party and lexical choices, I can conduct a critical frame analysis revealing the selectively framed nuclear Orientalism against North Korea.

Selection of News Stories

I have chosen to research the last two rounds which is divided in four phases out of the total six rounds of six-party talks. The six-party talks fail to gain apparent progress until the third phase of the fifth round in 2007 when North Korea first agrees to shut down its nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid (Graham 2008, 340). Since the February 13th accord the talks throughout 2007 have produced positive agreements and here I attempt to see how the media and news publications portray North Korea during such an intensive period in the talks. It is important to look over the major events during and between the phases as major critical events take places throughout the four phases of the talks, which juxtapose cooperative attitude and brinkmanship of the North Korean party.

The first period I have looked at includes the third phase of the fifth round of talks which took its place between the 8th of February and the 13th of February 2007. The news articles are collected from a week before and after the period when North Korea declared they would shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for emergency energy assistance (Graham 2008, 341). At this stage the first positive and productive agreement seems to have been reached. The major objectives include “the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations, normalization of North Korea-Japan relations, economy and energy cooperation” (Graham 2008, 340). Taking positive steps to increase mutual trust the participant countries took an optimistic attitude toward North Korea and Christopher Hill announces that a tentative deal had been reached between the negotiators.

The next stage resumed between the 19th of March and the 22nd of March, 2007. This is the stage when the issue of North Korean funds frozen in Banco Delta Asia rises as an obstacle in starting the dismantling process. The U.S. admitted that they have frozen North Korean funds in order to pressure North Korea to dismantle their weapons. The talks were soon abandoned as North Korea refuses to proceed without receiving the \$25 million in their hands (Graham 2008, 340). At this stage the pressure grew as neither North Korea nor the U.S. carry out the past deal. This is a critical stage as the tension continues to build. In June, Russia transferred North Korean funds, then soon North Korea declares it has closed the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, which the tension seemed to ease for the time being.

After the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors verify that North Korea has closed its facilities,¹ the third stage resumed the first phase of the sixth round from the 18th of July till the 20th of July. At this stage, North Korea confirms its agreement to disclose all nuclear programs and disables all facilities related to its nuclear programs only after Russia agreed to transfer the unfrozen North Korea funds from the Macao bank and South Korea agreed to provide fuel aid (Graham 2008, 343). However, when Japan failed to send aids proclaiming that the assistance will be held off until North Korea resolved the abductees issue,² North Korea refused to dismantle nuclear reactors. The conflict with Japan raised tension with the entire talks again.

The final stage is the second phase of the sixth round, which was held between the 27th of September and the 30th. The talks were discontinued due to a series of political conflicts and failure of community building between the participant countries. These dates are critical in carrying out the important agreements between the participant parties.

The unit of analysis in this study is individual paragraphs in the articles. This is due to the presence of more than one frame within one article which could be divided between paragraphs. It would

¹ *Guardian* Bush offers North Korea a deal to end the world's oldest cold war. 8 September 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/sep/08/usa.northkorea>.

² *Bloomberg* North Korea Warns Japan Courts 'Disaster' Over Abductee Demands. 21 July 2007, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=aFiwMiCVUwNE&refer=japan>.

have been too general to count the entire article with one frame using each individual article as the unit of analysis. In the data collection process I was interested in retrieving articles that dealt primarily with the image of North Korea in every aspect. Therefore, searches in the news database called Nexis UK used the following key phrases: North Korea, six-party talks, North Korean nuclear weapons, North Korean nuclear tests. These key terms ensured that the major focus of the story would be North Korea (Dimitrova 2003, 209). An article was selected from the database if the key phrases appeared in the headline, abstract, subheads, the contents in the news articles, news analysis, editorials, and correction notes. Editorial and commentary articles are also chosen because they present to the public, as well as to the decision-makers, the paper's opinion in a clear and unequivocal voice (Izadi 2002, 147). Based on these criteria, the Nexis search retrieved 60 news articles and 58 editorials from both NYT and WP.

Coding Categories

This study utilizes the following four categories. The coding categories have been developed through the Gusterson's four frames of nuclear Orientalist theory, combined with van Dijk and Izadi's ideas of naming and lexical choices for linguistic and stylistic bias respectively. For the Hypothesis 1, the frame to be found is poverty frame. These stories describe the poverty-stricken condition of the subject oriental country and emphasize the extravagant military spending. They portray the mass-starvation condition in a graphic manner and hope to diffuse the idea that the country should not be wasting resources on weapons because it is "economic lunacy" (Gusterson 1999, 117). They heavily criticize the regime for abandoning the nation's welfare condition. For the second hypothesis, unstable deterrence frame assumes that leaders in the Oriental countries make decisions differently than their counterparts in the West: that they are more likely to take risks, gamble millions of lives or to make rash and irresponsible calculations (Gusterson 1999, 121). They emphasize the unreliability and untrustworthiness of the subject regime; they disturb the purpose of defensive use of the weapon. The third frame, technical immaturity frame, describes the technically under-developed nuclear facilities of the subject oriental

country. They rouse concern about possible accidents or uncontrolled handling of nuclear weapons (Gusterson 1999, 121). They offer a negative description of the weapons technology and refer to it as an unsophisticated system. They suggest an image of the national leader as an irrational character who may use the weapons at his or her whim. They offer negative image of being a non-democratic government accusing the dilators of being free from democratic constraints and are thus more likely to use nuclear weapons (Gusterson 1999, 123). The naming choices in the stories include use of the complete unabbreviated title of an official (Izadi 2002, 87). They reflect the bias of the writer, and the adjectives used to describe the leaders and regimes identify different ideological affiliations.

Why New York Times and Washington Post?

Even though they are regional papers, the NYT and WP are incontestably the main elite press sources for the U.S.'s foreign policy decision-makers (Dimitrova 2008, 207). They represent international issues at the highest professional level from the elite sources and display their points of view (Dimitrova 2008, 207). As this study seeks to examine the main frames that appear in the elite press, NYT and WP present an adequate level of international issues and views of this form of press in the U.S.

Results

This section presents the findings in relation to the four frames. The following sections analyze the data and discuss the implications and contribution to community building from these findings. There are certain recurrent framings which are highlighted. While the first and the fourth frames portray North Korea as a poor and politically immature country prominently, the second and third frames of an unstable deterrent and technically immature regime appear less. Throughout the four phases, there is relatively more coverage of North Korea during the two phases of the talks than the last two phases. Looking at the distribution of the articles counted by paragraphs there are twice as many content in the news articles than

the editorials. The total sum of paragraphs in both NYT and WP is 1455, which is the total number of samples in this study. During the first stage positive steps are first taken by the all six participant parties. Out of 36 articles whose paragraphs sum up to 1455 paragraphs, only 49 paragraphs employ negative frame toward North Korea which is only 4.37 percent of the total content. There is relatively high attention to the political immaturity while the unstable deterrence and technical immaturity frames are barely present. Here I assumed that there would be almost no negative articles or content about North Korea since the talks have taken positive and cooperative steps, yet the 19 paragraphs that use political immaturity frame illustrate that there is a prominent use of negative portrayal of the North's regime.

The last phase is when the first major conflict between the U.S. and North Korea emerges over the frozen funds in the Banco Delta Asia Bank. During this stage it is evident the number of articles remain similar to the first stage. I expected that the framing frequencies would increase compared to the first phase due to the increase of tension between the parties. However, there is no apparent rise in amount of negative content toward North Korea. While the articles represent the negative sentiment toward the uncooperativeness of the subject country, and the political immaturity frame is used, still only around three percent of the total paragraphs use Orientalist framing. Again we see that the political immaturity frame was used as the most frequent framing technique. Along with the President Bush's positive statement of working on a peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula when North Korea completely disarms, a satisfactory joint statement is issued during this stage.³ With the relatively positive steps taken by the North, I expected that the number of frames and negative comments on the North's regime would significantly decrease during this time period. However, the result demonstrates that there has not been much drop in the negative framings during this time. Only the political immaturity frame appeared somewhat frequently, while the rest of the frames were rarely mentioned. Confirming the implementation of the agreement from the previous stage, the relationships between North Korea and the

³ *The HanKyoreh* Full text of press communiqué released at new round of six-nation. 20 July 2007, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/223847.html.

U.S. and with Japan improved during this period.⁴ Announcing that the bilateral exchanges will be increased, the North Korea-U.S. and North Korea-Japan parties finalized their moves toward diplomatic normalization. Here, most of the articles did not employ hostile sentiment toward North Korea and the number of frames used in this period is relatively low.

Analysis

The results indicate the linkages between presence of nuclear Orientalism in the two elite U.S. newspapers and news framing of an inferior Orient image of North Korea during the last four phases of six-party talks. The U.S. newspapers during that time frame have failed to perform objectivity in their reports; however, the presence of Gusterson's nuclear Orientalist frames is not highly significant.

The 'poverty frame' is evident throughout the articles; they specifically depict the poverty-stricken condition of North Korea and portray mass-starvation in a graphic manner. In the description of the desperate food shortage situation, the author uses graphic language such as there is "an enormous bunny in every Korean pot".⁵ This "living hell" illustrates only the extreme end of the poverty situation in North Korea. Such an explicit article brings the image of a barbaric North Korean population.⁶ Even though the frequency that the poverty frame has been used is relatively low a few articles that address the poverty issue use heavily graphic languages. However, it is surprising to see that none of the articles raise poverty and mass starvation in North Korea as a reason to abandon nuclear weapons. None of the articles blames the regime and its investment in the nuclear program for the poverty situation. I expected that the articles would raise the poverty issue as a supporting reason to denuclearize, following the Orientalist poverty frame; however, the situation in the country is only indirectly inferred by their need for foreign

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement. 3 October 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/action0710.html.

⁵ *Washington Post* A Colossal Leap of Faith In Fight Against Famine. February 2, 2007. [Appendix I]

⁶ *Washington Post* The Korean Analogy. June 6, 2007. [Appendix I]

aid. The mention of economic aid and assistance appeared in 17 paragraphs out of the 60 editorials. This is extremely low amount of inference of the North's poverty situation.

The lack of coverage on poverty raises the question of why the reports fail to address such a pressing situation in North Korea, while the country is receiving so much attention during this period. The lack of coverage on the poverty situation may be interpreted as the media's purpose to create discourse around the nuclear weapons issue without a humanistic approach. The majority of the stories focus on the nuclear weapons issue. Although the poverty frame does not contribute as an explicit reason to stop nuclear acquisition by the North, the few graphic reports on poverty and lack of objective coverage on the situation contributed to creating an extremely negative image of North Korea.

The second frame of unstable deterrence is reflected through a strong sentiment of mistrust with regards to the North Korean government. Referring to North Korea as a "terrorism-sponsoring nation",⁷ the U.S. seems to be worried that "nuclear weapons in the hands of Kim will unsettle his Asian neighbors".⁸ The report raises the question "when exactly did Kim become trustworthy?" indicating a mistrustful portrayal.⁹ The North Korean nuclear concern is magnified as a threat to world security without tangible evidence. However, generally the unstable deterrence frame did not appear often. While the sentiment of mistrust surrounding the North's nuclear deterrence capability is apparent, the frame failed to construct the unstable deterrence image in an effective way. It is therefore difficult to say whether the unstable deterrence frame was used to build an Orientalist outlook to the North's nuclear program.

While Gusterson highlights that the stories describe the technically under-developed nuclear facilities of the subject country, the articles do not focus on how incapable they are of handling the

⁷ *New York Times* Score One for Diplomacy. October 4, 2007. [Appendix I]

⁸ *New York Times* Score One for Diplomacy. October 4, 2007. [Appendix I]

⁹ *Washington Post* Conservatives Assail North Korea Accord; Deal Could Get Nation off Terrorism List. February 15, 2007. [Appendix I]

weapons. Although they do mention that the North Korean facilities are ‘old-fashioned’¹⁰; the reports focus on how capable North Koreans are at creating more weapons. The majority of the articles mention that the North Koreans have a large amount of nuclear ingredients such as uranium and plutonium.¹¹ They fail to mention the possible accidents or uncontrolled handling of nuclear weapons, this emphasis on the technical capability of North Korean nuclear weaponry builds the image of strong military threat. Even though the framing does not follow Gusterson’s theory, the point is addressed in the manner that shows an unreliable Orient discourse. Again, in general the technical immaturity frame rarely appears. It is difficult to state that the technical immaturity frame is ever explicitly used in the North Korean case.

The repetitive negative portrayals of Kim and his regimes human rights violations appear most frequently throughout the sample. The articles portray Kim as a mad, irrelevant, fickle, and even irrational actor. Most of the adjectives that come before Kim include “paranoid”, “tyrant”, “one of the world’s most isolated and criminal regimes”,¹² and associate him with “diplomatic ingenuity”.¹³ The regime is described as “a dictatorship that tolerated the death by famine of millions of its own people, brutally imprison thousands of others in camps, and a regime that depends on drug trafficking, cigarette smuggling and counterfeiting for much of its income”,¹⁴ these instances highlight the negative image of the regime.

Also the highlighting of human rights violations issues creates the image of North Korea’s lack of ability to acquire nuclear weapons due to the political condition of the country. By portraying the North Korean refugee children as “modern reminders of the terrors of Anne Frank”,¹⁵ the articles report the subhuman conditions that escapees from the crude condition of North Korea have endured. The reports depict that escapees who get caught by the Chinese police are returned to North Korea and are “executed

¹⁰ *New York Times* What Would a Diplomat Do? July 23, 2007. [Appendix II]

¹¹ *Washington Post* Nuclear Bargaining February. 14, 2007; *Washington Post* U.S. Flexibility Credited in Nuclear Deal with N. Korea. February 14, 2007 *Washington Post* N. Korea Aims to Improve on Clinton-Era Nuclear Deal. February 6, 2007; *Washington Post* U.S. Ends Bank Probe. March 15, 2007; *Washington Post* N. Korea Shuttters Nuclear Facility. July 15, 2007 [Appendix I, II]

¹² *Washington Post* A Reactor Shut Down. July 17, 2007. [Appendix II]

¹³ *Washington Post* The Plan That Moved Pyongyang. February 20, 2007. [Appendix II]

¹⁴ *Washington Post* A Reactor Shut Down; Diplomacy with North Korea finally takes a step forward. July 17, 2007. [Appendix II]

¹⁵ *New York Times* Escape From North Korea. June 4, 2007. [Appendix II]

in front of the crowd by firing squad,” and some people would rather “commit suicide by swallowing a handful of pins”.¹⁶ The treatment of political prisoners in the North Korean camps results in the deaths of many people “after having diarrhea for a week,” and even the description of sick people whom are “left in the hallway outside toilets [and] wrapped in plastic sheets ” is vividly depicted. The critical human rights violation condition includes “arbitrarily detaining, mistreating, torturing and sometimes even executing border-crossers who are repatriated”.¹⁷ The violations include “punitive strip searches, verbal abuse, threats and beatings”.¹⁸ Such graphic and extreme reports contribute heavily in building the evil and negative image of the North Korean regime.

As an illustration of the irrational national leader, consider a typical set of adjectives that come before Kim. Van Dijk points out that addressing an official with extreme formality such as using the complete unabbreviated title is expected, in the U.S. for example, officials are often addressed as President Bush while Kim is addressed as Mr. Kim 11 times in the articles, and often referred to as Dictator Kim. When the articles refer to the North Korean regime, adjectives in the news articles follow, “menace” “tyrant” “paranoid” “dictator” “odious ruler” creating the image of an evil leader.¹⁹ Also editorials even refer to the North Korean regime as “crazy uncle” and a “mistrustful” “depressing” “furious” “cruel” “inhuman” “dangerous” “isolated” “desperate” “malignant” “Stalinist” “energy-starved” regime.²⁰ They emphasize the image of a malevolent leader and regime, this point has contributed to the political immaturity frame of the Orientalist perspective. The emphasis on such gruesome pictures of North Korea especially when the multilateral agreements were drawn diminishes the North’s capability of acting as an equal and socially responsible actor in the talks. The dominant framing of North Korea

¹⁶ *New York Times* Escape from North Korea. June 4, 2007. [Appendix II]

¹⁷ *Washington Post* North Korea's Cruelty. March 17, 2007. [Appendix II]

¹⁸ *Washington Post* North Korea's Cruelty. March 17, 2007. [Appendix II]

¹⁹ *New York Times* Saving North Korea's Refugees. February 19, 2007; *New York Times* The Korea Accord: Hope and Doubt. February 15, 2007; *New York Times* Who's Sorry Now? July 15, 2007; *Washington Post* Outside Pressures Snapped Korean Deadlock. February 14, 2007. [Appendix I, II]

²⁰ *Washington Post* N. Korea Shatters Nuclear Facility. July 15, 2007; *Washington Post* Cruelty Here at Home. March 23, 2007; *New York Times* Cleaning Up the 20th Century. March 18, 2007. [Appendix I,II]

questions the regime's rationale and emphasizes the absurdity of its domestic governing policy; it derogates Kim's competence as a national leader.

Discussion

The frame analysis aims to investigate how the U.S. newspapers interpret and frame the North Korean nuclear issue during the last four phases of the six-party talks. The study tests the hypothesis of how the U.S. news and editorial pieces about North Korea use consistent frames that delineate nuclear Orientalist views. However, the data provide indirect or inferred content to build negative image of North Korea, yet no explicit and direct linkages are made between the Orientalist frames and the legitimate reason to abandon the nuclear program. From the research findings of the present study of the North Korean case, several issues emerge in relation to Gusterson's nuclear Orientalist frames. These frames may help in understanding the enemy-building effort of the U.S.'s military hegemony. This idea is based on Gusterson's claim that the Western's view of Oriental country's nuclear weapons acquisition plays an important role in the construction of national image in international relations.

It is evident that the political immaturity frame dominates the news' negative coverage of the national regime and the leader over the other three frames of poverty, unstable deterrence, and technical immaturity. The stories focus heavily on the human rights violation issue and negative portrayal of the national leader of North Korea. While during the time period the four stages of six-party talks are taking place produce agreements and induce relatively cooperative attitude from North Korea, the news reports still portray the nation as an inferior Orient rather than a rational international member that the U.S. would respect. However, while the salient reason behind the North Korean nuclear ambition angles on potential aggression, the security threat of proliferation in the region, and the despotic leader's unplanned and unanticipated use of the weapons, the North is found to be pursuing nuclear weapons for defensive and regime survival reasons. The articles emphasize the negative and incompetent aspects of the regime and the national leader's irrational personality. In both the news reports about the six-party talks and

other North Korea related stories, the political immaturity frame dominates the stories throughout the four phases I have selected. The dominance of the political immaturity frame reveals that the U.S. newspapers coverage of North Korea focuses on a negative representation of the evil regime. If we accept the statement that to frame is 'to select what information to spotlight and what to ignore ... [and] many facts are spotlighted by certain frames' (Gamson 1992, 120), then we can interpret that the political immaturity of North Korea is spotlighted through human rights violations, the treatment of political prisoners and the dictatorship of Kim and his irrational personality.

Generally, the overall tone of the framing evidence contributes in building the negative image of North Korea. Reports focus on the enemy-building of North Korea rather than treating the nation as another fair international member. The portrayal of the national leader as an irrational dictator and a mad man reveal a certain position of the news publications, and possibly the Bush administration's position at the time. As media framing is generally understood within the context of the social construction of reality approach, I have looked at social constructivism in order to find support for such image building. This bases on social constructivism sees "the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being" (Adler 2002, 95) and refers to the mass media content as "not a reflection of an objective reality" (Shoemaker and Reese 1991, 218); rather, it is a socially created product. As the media sources were full of stinging critiques of the North Korean regime despite its cooperative behavior from time to time during the six-party talks, the media frames are not a reflection of an objective reality. Despite the cooperative steps taken by the North's regime sometimes producing positive progress, only the negative aspects were highlighted. Entman (2004) states "what the media must have is good stories and they believe these by definition include drama, conflict, and human interest" (Entman 2004, 104). The North Korean case provides drama in the sense that the regime withdrew for the first time in NPT history and repeatedly deviated from its denuclearization agreements. This breach of agreement continues to produce conflicts with the U.S. and during the six-party talks continues to provide conflicting and dramatic stories. Also human interest directs the attention to the issues of poverty and horrific human rights treatment issues. In

the end, North Korea provides a perfect picture of what the U.S. media wanted in constructing the image of an inferior Orient.

Policy Implications and Community Building

As the media is a core medium in our society that affect foreign relations, its objective understanding of the position and unbiased representation of the subject country is essential in order to make the strong foundation for social and cultural dynamics of community building. The cooperative multilateral nature of talks requires a strong sense of being allies and community building. As the media's From the North Korean view, the nuclear program is an essential program for their security and state survival. However, the current multilateral approach only attempts to disarm the country from the other parties' views, without the understanding of the situation by both parties. Here, the problem is that the only way that North Korea will disarm itself is when the environment for them is ready to do so. In other words, when the U.S. military in South Korea withdraws and the U.S. vows not to invade North Korea, only then will they finally let go of their nuclear ambition. However, from the U.S.'s point of view, the possibility that North Korea might attack South Korea is real, and without the U.S. military base, presence of a lingering security dilemma hinders a peaceful and expedient resolution to the six-party talks. However, as the articles reveal, the content builds a one-sided image of North Korea. While the North Korean press is not publicly available, it can be speculated that its press and view of the U.S. also employs a myopic view. Thus, at the six-party talks table, it is obvious that neither the U.S. nor North Korea could reach a satisfactory settlement even after six rounds of talks over seven years. Understanding the North's position from its point of view, rather than pushing the country from the top with pressure and constructing an environment for them to naturally abandon their nuclear weapons are the resolutions to this problem.

Conclusion

Following Gusterson's work on nuclear Orientalism, this study attempts to investigate the presence of news framing in the two U.S. major newspapers, *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, and analyze what they signify in their effort of image construction of North Korea. Over the last four phases of the six-party talks, results indicate that while the Orientalist frames appear in these two major U.S. newspapers. These articles predominately highlight the negative representation of the North Korean government, specifically, Kim's leadership through the political immaturity frame. By breaking down the news and editorial content by paragraph, it is evident that North Korea's nature, position, personality and culture were portrayed as childish, irrational, lawless, or inferior. Such descriptions follow the definition of negative and even evil images of an Orientalist bias.

Because of the framing effect, even before we measure the North's true capacity as a potential threat, the media have developed an image of North Korea as a threat and an enemy to world security. This is due to the U.S.'s effort to create an image of enemy in order to carry out their unipolar international security policies and preserve the current nonproliferation regime. In the post-Cold War era, as the Soviet threat is no longer a valid excuse for preserving and expanding U.S. military power, the U.S.'s possession of massive nuclear weapons capability results in the need to create a discourse that presents nuclear weapons as still necessary and justifies their purpose to pursue nonproliferation. This can be observed as the America's "desperate act and struggle to preserve the world power and domination" (Gusterson 1999, 114) and the current newspaper reports reflect this attempt for power preservation through creating negative image of an inferior Orient toward North Korea.

As increasing attention is focused on the North Korean nuclear program and the multilateral talks, the relationship between the U.S. and the media coverage of the issue will become increasingly relevant. While the Bush administration's rhetoric towards North Korea and its nuclear program employs negative sentiment, the nuclear Orientalist frames do not appear as often in the news papers during the last four phases of six-party talks. Over the phases of the talks, the newspaper articles use all of the poverty,

unstable deterrence, technical immaturity, and political immaturity frames, yet none of the frames directly and explicitly mention the reason why the North should abandon nuclear weapons. Even the inference of these frames convey negative and inferior image of North Korea and such insignificant presence of Orientalist frames in the reports demonstrate that the media representation of the North Korean nuclear weapons do not exceedingly use Guseterson's nuclear Orientalist frames. Although the linkages between nuclear Orientalism and the U.S.'s negative image building in foreign affairs did not illustrate a strong presence empirically; the intentional effort to build a negative image in order to disarm their nuclear program does appear to employ nuclear Orientalist bias against North Korea.

Consequently, in today's U.S.-centered international relations, it is imperative to examine how the main elite publications in the U.S. present the international security issues and how the North Korean nuclear crisis is framed in the newspapers reveal to what extent the media have influenced the U.S. policy (Auerbach 2005, 84). Also the news framing of the official period of the six-party talks offers an important and interesting case study of how national political consensus constrained media framing. Indeed, the data are limited by newspapers as media discourse cannot be confined within boundaries. While it is difficult to confine the media discourse on which I can draw presence of the Orientalist frames, I believe that the present study is an important step towards a more dynamic interpretation of the current Orientalist theory and the realization of importance of community building in approaching the current North Korean nuclear issue as the topic becomes increasingly significant in today's international relations. [Word count: 9370]

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Appendix I-

Results: Data Findings

Table 1: Timeline of Six-party Talks

| Rounds of talks | | Dates | # of articles |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 5 th round | 3 rd phase | 8 Feb – 13 Feb 2007 | 36 |
| | 1 st phase | 19 Mar – 22 Mar 2007 | 32 |
| | Resumption of 1 st phase | 11 July – 27 July 2007 | 27 |
| 6 th round | 2 nd phase | 27 Sep – 30 Sep 2007 | 23 |
| Total #N | | | 118 |

Source: BBC News *Timeline: N Korea nuclear stand-off*²¹ (December 2007)

Table 2: Comparative Distribution of the Publications of Articles by Paragraphs

| | NYT | WP |
|---|-----|-----|
| Number of paragraphs in the news articles | 447 | 427 |
| Number of paragraphs in the editorial articles | 287 | 294 |
| Total N# | 734 | 721 |
| Total news and editorial pieces reviewed: N= 1455 | | |

Note: Numbers in table represent actual count of paragraph articles that include the respective sources. The paragraphs are counted exactly as they appear in the online version stories.

Table 3: Comparative Distribution of the Frames in the First Stage

| | 5 th round – 3 rd phase (8 Feb – 13 Feb 2007) | |
|-----------------------|--|--|
| Frames | Number of paragraphs | % of frames from the total number of paragraphs N=1455 |
| Poverty | 14 | 0.96 % |
| Unstable deterrence | 7 | 0.48 % |
| Technical immaturity | 5 | 0.34 % |
| Political immaturity | 19 | 1.30 % |
| Total # of paragraphs | 45 | 3.09 % |

Note: Numbers in table represent actual count of paragraph articles that include the respective sources. The paragraphs are counted exactly as they appear in the online version stories.

²¹ *BBC News Timeline: N Korea nuclear stand-off*. 6 December 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2604437.stm#2007>, accessed 7th July, 2009.

Table 4: Comparative Distribution of the Frames in the Second Stage

| | 6 th round – 1 st phase (19 Mar – 22 Mar 2007) | |
|----------------------|---|--|
| Frames | Number of paragraphs | % of frames from the total number of paragraphs N=1455 |
| Poverty | 11 | 0.75 % |
| Unstable deterrence | 5 | 0.34 % |
| Technical immaturity | 4 | 0.27 % |
| Political immaturity | 27 | 1.85 % |
| Total # of Articles | 47 | 3.23 % |

Note: Numbers in table represent actual count of paragraph articles that include the respective sources. The paragraphs are counted exactly as they appear in the online version stories.

Table 5: Comparative Distribution of the Frames in the Third Stage

| | 6 th round – Resumption of 1 st phase (11 July – 27 July 2007) | |
|----------------------|---|--|
| Frames | Number of paragraphs | % of frames from the total number of paragraphs N=1455 |
| Poverty | 8 | 0.54 % |
| Unstable deterrence | 7 | 0.48 % |
| Technical immaturity | 0 | 0.00 % |
| Political immaturity | 19 | 1.30 % |
| Total # of Articles | 34 | 2.33 % |

Note: Numbers in table represent actual count of paragraph articles that include the respective sources.

Table 6: Comparative Distribution of the Frames in the Fourth Stage

| | 6 th round – 2 nd phase (27 Sep – 30 Sep 2007) | |
|----------------------|---|--|
| Frames | Number of paragraphs | % of frames from the total number of paragraphs N=1455 |
| Poverty | 5 | 0.34 % |
| Unstable deterrence | 2 | 0.13 % |
| Technical immaturity | 0 | 0.00 % |
| Political immaturity | 9 | 0.61 % |
| Total # of Articles | 16 | 1.09 % |

Note: Numbers in table represent actual count of paragraph articles that include the respective sources. The paragraphs are counted exactly as they appear in the online version stories.

Appendix II- Editorials from NYT and WP

1st Stage:

The Korea Accord: Hope and Doubt
2007 The New York Times, February 15:

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9406E2DC173EF936A25751C0A9619C8B63>

The Lesson of North Korea
2007 New York Times, February 14:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/opinion/14wed1.html>

Nuclear Bargaining
2007 Washington Post, February 14:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/13/AR2007021301158.html>

The Plan That Moved Pyongyang
2007 Washington Post, February 20:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/19/AR2007021900918.html>

Conservatives Assail North Korea Accord
2007 Washington Post, February 15:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/14/AR2007021401695.html>

A Foreign Policy Built on Do-overs
2007 New York Times, February 23:

http://select.nytimes.com/2007/02/23/opinion/23friedman.html?_r=1

Fighting Iran -- With Patience
2007 Washington Post, February 25:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/23/AR2007022301701.html>

The Diplomatic Option
2007 New York Times, February 14:

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D07EFD8163EF937A25751C0A9619C8B63>

America's Quiet Victories in Asia
2007 Washington Post, February 13:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021201061.html>

A Lack of Courage in Their Convictions
2007 Washington Post, February 22:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/21/AR2007022101585.html>

2nd Stage:

North Korea's Cruelty
2007 Washington Post, March 17:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/16/AR2007031601940.html>

A Suddenly Convenient Truth
2007 New York Times, March 2:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/02/opinion/02fri1.html>

Where Those Reactors and Centrifuges Came From
2007 New York Times, March 10:

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9806E7DB1331F933A25750C0A9619C8B63&sec=&spn=&pagewanted=all>

Shinzo Abe's Double Talk
2007 Washington Post, March 24:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/23/AR2007032301640.html>

Another Intelligence Twist
2007 Washington Post, March 2:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/01/AR2007030101507.html>

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