Developmental States and Environmental Limits: Regime Response to Environmental Activism in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China

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ABSTRACTS: Government response to environmental problems is one of the key issues of our global era. Theorists differ on whether the state will respond voluntarily or as a result of popular pressure. In the rapid growth periods of the East Asian developmental states and societies – Japan (1970), Korea and Taiwan (1980s) and China (currently) – central government ministries guided growth and managed society toward that end. Their growth produced equally rapid and severe pollution, disruption and social complexity. Frustrated by their inability to control pollution and faced with rising social tensions damaging to their rule, the central ministries relaxed their grip on environmental activism. They permitted greater citizen activism around environmental issues, but not for other issues, and found ways to “use” this activism for environmental governance. The similarity of historical process in the four cases indicates the systemic interaction of economy and environment, mediated by similar core governmental ministries responding due to a mixture of ethical concern and social tensions.
I. Introduction

Human society around the world currently faces increasing global, regional and local environmental problems. Industrial growth has brought great prosperity, but has also brought environmental pollution and disruption. These problems present industrial civilization with a new dilemma -- how should we balance economic growth and environmental protection? The solutions to this dilemma involve not only technical invention, but also issues of governance and implementation in complex societies. Some degree of government involvement in setting rules and coordinating other social actors seems necessary. However, one major question, much debated in theoretical terms, is will government voluntarily take responsibility for controlling pollution and disruption, or will it only respond in the face of social protest? In theoretical terms, this question concerns the impact of environmental crisis on the constitution and response of both state and society. The framing of the research approach in this paper builds on the long line of theoretically-informed work on the “relative autonomy” of the state, that is, the state’s degree of independence from the (supposedly) more narrowly-focused interest groups and movements in society {Skocpol 1985b; Tilly 1992}. In the consideration of citizen activism as pressure on the state, the research framing adds the burgeoning work on social movements {Tarrow 1998}. Furthermore, environmental issues, as an irruption into human affairs from “Nature,” have added a new dimension to state-society interaction {Schnaiberg, et al. 2003}.

The cases of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China, because their particular type of governmental institutions and strategies resulted in a particularly severe growth-
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environment dilemma, take on special poignancy. Despite their many differences, during their time of rapid growth in particular, they all possessed some similar core governmental institutions: central ministries that guided the business sector and society toward maximum national power, growth and prosperity. To that end, these ministries consulted with and orchestrated the investments of the business sector, while attempting to paternalistically impose a coordinated order on the rest of society. Theorists have labeled this form of growth-oriented ministerial guidance as the “developmental state” (Johnson 1982; Wade 1990; Applebaum and Henderson 1992; Johnson 1995; Evans 1995; Aoki 1997; Woo-Cumings 1999). In terms of state theory, developmental states and societies differ from predatory states that suck wealth out of society, laissez-faire states that keep “hands off” the market, and socialist states that exercise rigid top-down central planning (Johnson 1982; Evans 1995).

To the world’s surprise and confounding standard Western market theories of economic growth, in different time periods, all four East Asian developmental states and societies attained unprecedented, even “miraculous” rates of economic growth (Johnson 1982; Vogel 1991). The very fruits of their rapid growth, though, brought about equally sudden changes that challenged the value of their economic achievements. One prominent cost of rapid growth was vast environmental pollution. In addition, industrial growth drew migrants from villages to cities, raised educational standards, created a restless working class, a prosperous middle class, and a wealthy entrepreneurial class, and many other changes. New social problems emerged: urban crowding, breakdown of traditional community, scattering of the family and its traditional welfare functions, growth of an underclass of unemployed, and not least, environmental disturbances such as pollution and forced displacement.
At this historical juncture, the developmental states, governments and societies faced a terrible dilemma: continue heedless economic growth, or protect the environment at the cost of growth? This growth-environment dilemma brought in its wake a second dilemma: could traditional ministerial means of controlling and guiding society suffice, or would the government have to rely on help from active citizens to solve these new environmental problems? Allowance of or cooperation with independent citizen activism would be unfamiliar terrain for developmental governments. At the historical juncture when each developmental government first confronted these dilemmas, they seemed to be either-or, zero-sum choices. Later experience, though, proved that economic growth could proceed with environmental protection, and with citizen involvement. Japan, Taiwan and Korea each found different ways of solving these dilemmas, in ways that may shed light on China’s current confrontation with the same dilemmas.

**Society-Environment Systemic Logic**

In each of the four societies, we argue, a similar basic systemic interaction between economic growth and environmental limits was at work. In the early stages of rapid economic growth, governments and factories are heedless about pollution and disruption. They fill environment with waste until their saturate its carrying capacity, at which point it changes the environment for the worse. This systemic clash of growth and the environment does not necessarily call forth government intervention and solution. All too often, authorities ignore the mounting pollution until it reaches a
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threshold that activates citizen awareness, concern, activism and then protest. But
 citizen activism also depends upon the costs imposed by the government; harsh
 repression will stifle complaints and prevent protest, but will also breed popular
 bitterness and resentment. The government will lose legitimacy and the capacity for
governance.

Environmental sociologists argue that changes in the environment cause changes
in society and politics (Catton and Dunlap 1978; Buttel 1987; Dunlap and Catton 1994;
Schnaiberg and Gould 1994; Mol 1996). A study comparing Japan, Germany, France,
England and the United States showed that the intensity of air pollution (in ppm),
combined with the numbers of people (proportion of population) affected, coupled with
the qualities of the government, predicted the rapidity and thoroughness of national
reduction in air pollution (Broadbent 1998:332-8). Japan reduced its air pollution
much more rapidly, and in the first decade much more thoroughly, than all the other
cases. This finding demonstrates a systematic linkage between economic growth and
environmental pollution, but one mediated by the particular qualities of the government
and society. The present study shows that Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, with similar
developmental strategies, did not take major measures to control pollution until pushed
by citizen activism.

Common Concepts

Though all arguable developmental governments with paternalistic ministries, in
other important ways Japan, Korea, Taiwan and China differ greatly and have changed
immensely over past half century. To make the four cases more comparable, we
analyze them at roughly analogous historical junctures -- when, at the peak of its economic growth, the developmental government began to face and react to the dilemmas of environment and governance. In Japan the juncture appeared during the late 1960s and early 1970s; in Taiwan and South Korea in the 1980s, and in China at the present time. Despite the time differences, each juncture produced an analogous problem for the developmental government: social tensions rising from growth-induced environment problems that threatened the government’s popular legitimacy as well as economic growth.

At these analogous junctures, the four developmental government ministries did not operate in a social vacuum. Around each developmental ministry hovered a different cloud of actors, institutions, conditions and influences, forming different “configurations of power.” Differences included the composition and power of their national legislatures, courts, political parties, and business interest groups; demographic size and social characteristics; activism of civil society (Vogel 1991). Their growth policies had brought about very complex, finely subdivided societies. The central developmental ministries had to find new ways to cope with these complex social environments.

In other words, to invert a theoretical concept, at the growth-environment dilemma juncture the developmental government faced a new “social opportunity structure” (an array of potential reactions from society to any government decision that would generate costs and benefits to the government). In social movement theory, the government presents emerging social movements with a “political opportunity structure” (Tarrow 1998). Here, we invert that idea to show how society can pose its
own type of opportunity structure for the government. The government could either repress, ignore or positively respond to the new problems and resultant citizen activism.

In reaction, within the government itself departments and bureaus multiplied, splits appeared and fissures widened. Economic and financial ministries gave priority to more economic growth. But welfare and environmental ministries/agencies argued for effective pollution control. Government security agencies argued for tight social control. But foreign, welfare and environmental ministries became more open to citizen activism, thinking that citizens might help them govern the environment. Environmental activists, they surmised, might act as “watchdogs” over the environment, informing them when things went wrong. Other ministerial officials, though, wanting to paternally lead a docile and obedient society, found popular activism hard to swallow.

But even the most controlling and pro-growth economic ministries came to see that environmental problems and popular tension could reduce productivity. In general, ministerial officials knew from experience the sociological principle that Max Weber enunciated a century ago -- that ruling with popular legitimacy is much easier than ruling without it (Weber 1978). In capitalist democratic governments, unresolved social problems lead to an erosion of government legitimacy and ultimately, governance problems (O'Connor 1973). Under the circumstances, allowing some popular voice would reduce the erosion of government legitimacy. Moreover, unlike more radical movements, environmental movements, while sometimes attacking a particular site, did not challenge the legitimacy of the regime itself. For these reasons, the developmental state in Japan with its democratized institutions, and even the Taiwanese and Korean governments during their authoritarian phases in the 1980s, found it prudent to modify
their governance style. These governments allowed, or even in some measure to cooperated with, more local and urban environmental activism compared to other types of movements such as labor or student).

Rapid social change activates a field of potential citizen activism, movements and NGOs. Our key point is that, faced with such a bubbling field of latent and overt resistance, the developmental government is likely to make some compromises to reduce tension. Among the various movements, it is likely to offer environmental movements with relatively greater permissiveness because of their special qualities. Other types of movements, including class-related (labor), political-institution related (for instance, pro-democracy) or status-related (anti-discrimination) protest movements readily appeal to the nation-wide solidarity of a suffering group. For this reason, they may appear more threatening to centralized bureaucratic control. Environmental problems and movements, in comparison, often appear less threatening to the developmental government.

Environmental movements have a weaker potential for society-wide recruitment. Severe environmental harm tends to be site-specific: local factories, power plants and dams. Site-specific protests may draw severe repression. But the costs to the government of such repression, such as erosion of popular legitimacy, can easily outweigh the costs of simply fixing the problem through technological investment. The movements do not demand regime-change. Once the local problem is fixed, the local movement tends to die out. Moreover, many environmental activities, such as bird-watching, do not directly threaten industrial sites. Some activities, such as
consumer recycling, may directly help attain government goals. These milder movements are easy for the government to accept.

**Government Decisions**

To really decipher the government’s reaction to this juncture, though, we need to dig deeper than merely positing a functional or rational logicalness favoring a certain response. Is the government capable of learning new responses? To some scholars, this question is key to the solution of environmental problems (Social Learning Group 2001).

Analysis of the government as an autonomous decision-maker (or “actor”) has gained popularity among social scientists since the 1970s (Evans, Rueschmeyer and Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 1995; Amenta 2005). In this light, developmental governments are such because their ministerial officials make decisions and coordinate other actors to help society develop. To understand why they make these decisions, we turn to theories of government bureaucracy, their internal workings, mutual interactions, and relations with other actors such as parties, interest groups and movements (Oszlak 2005).

The Weberian ideal-type envisioned bureaucracy as highly rule-bound and thus efficient for imposing the ruler’s will onto society (Weber 1978). Interestingly, this is not so different from the Confucian moral ideal of proper official behavior. But while
Weber envisaged law and punishment as keeping officials in line, Confucianism relied on their “virtue.”

The culturalist hypothesis attributes the East Asian developmental government to the continuing influence of its Confucian moral heritage (Tu 1996). Ministerial paternalism resembles ancient Confucian ideals of “setting the world in order” (ching-shih) (Hao 1996). Confucianist officials would feel morally impelled to both loyalty to superiors and paternalistic obligation to the people. Why officials fall away from these moral standards has been long debated in East Asia.

In practice, though, experience has shown that officials sometimes diverge from their behavioral ideal. The degree to which coercive sanctions or moral norms enforce official rectitude remains an open question. Behavior may instead conform to unthinking habit (DiMaggio and Powell 1991), or break under laziness, over-burdened schedules, opportunities for personal gain, threat, or emotional reaction (March and Simon 1993).

Moreover, within one government, ministries fight; they defend and seek to expand their own mandate and turf. Ministries can also become agents of the very groups they are supposed to regulate, further degrading the integration of the government. Under such factors, the government can become a chaotic field of power struggle resulting in incoherent policies (Oszlak 2005). In any case, to understand government behavior, we have to peer inside the “black box” of its internal dynamics.

Facing the historical juncture of the growth-environment-governance dilemma, the developmental government itself grows more departments and duties. Different
ministries and agencies take different sides. Economic ministries want continued rapid growth, but welfare and environmental ministries (agencies) to protect public health by reducing pollution. To the extent the government accepts environmental protection as a serious issue, it then faces the problem of effective implementation. If its own local agencies cannot do the job, it has to seek external allies. In the growth-environment dilemma, coming after a decade or so of rapid economic growth, the worst pollution and disruption comes from large single-point sources: factories, power plants and dams. Government environmental agencies began to recognize the usefulness of local citizens as “watchdogs” to warn of severe local pollution. It proved difficult, though, to keep the watchdogs on a tight leash.

Our paper focuses on demonstrating the similarity of historical logic and political dynamics around this common growth-environment-governance dilemma juncture. The first three cases, Japan, Taiwan and Korea, responded by opening the door to environmental activism more than to other types of movements. How China, now facing this dilemma, will respond remains history-in-the-making.

**Hypothesis and method**

In summary, our working hypothesis proposes a common developmental government response to a common historical crisis, the growth-environment-governance (GEG) dilemma. The developmental government’s rapid industrial growth generates pollution, social change and disruption. These changes turn into social problems, stimulating popular discontent, activism and protest. This new social
pressure inclines the developmental government to become relatively permissive toward citizen environmental activism.

Figure 1: Hypothesis on Dilemmas & Governance Change

The hypothesis is not a simple if-then proposition. It describes a process of change over time dependent upon a number of contingent interactions. We state the hypothesis clearly to make it vulnerable to falsification. For any case, if one or more contingencies fail to occur, the entire hypothesis could fail. To add to its frailty, the hypothesis glosses over the many differences among the four cases. These differences may divert them from the hypothesized pathway.

We use the methods of comparative-historical research to determine the degree of case fit or divergence. Comparative-historical analysis largely concerns the analysis of processes of change in whole societies or other large-scale social formation over medium to long periods of time. The method looks for common or variant processes
of change around a key issue, such as industrialization, regime change, the effect of religion on economy or politics, revolution, and many other themes (Tilly 1984b; Kalberg 1994; Skocpol 1984; Ragin 1987). At the very least, comparing the empirical cases to the hypothesis will help reveal their actual dynamic processes of change.

This paper tests the hypothesis by comparing four East Asian developmental governments -- Japan, Taiwan, Korea and China -- during the high points of their bureaucracy-led rapid economic growth. In essence, our comparative method follows the logic of John Stuart Mill’s famous “logic of similarity:” despite many differences in the four cases, a few key similar qualities suffice to produce similar outcomes (Ragin 1987). Our four cases share in common developmental government ministries, a government paternalistic ethic toward society, and the production of a growth-environmental-governance (GEG) dilemma at a particular historical juncture in their developmental trajectories. The government paternalism has its roots in a common Confucian cultural heritage (Berger and Hsiao 1990:7; Tu 1996:7). We argue that these common characteristics suffice to produce an analogous government reaction to the GEG dilemma: selective permission of and response to environmental activism, movements and NGOs, compared to other types of activism. We complement the functional logic of this argument and hypothesis with a look inside the “black box:” the internal mechanisms of government decision-making at this historical juncture.

These common qualities aside, the four cases differ in important ways that could divert them from the hypothesized common pathway. They differ in many of their dominant political and other institutions, as well as in the qualities of their societies: population, demographic characteristics, social and workforce composition,
urbanization. For decades, the countries lay on different sides of the Cold War divide. We will explore the effects of these differences in the case study sections.

The concept of the growth-environment dilemma originally appeared in the first co-author’s case study of environmental politics in Japan (Broadbent 1998). Broadbent followed up with interviews in Taiwan (fall, 2002) and Korea (summer 2004). For this paper, three sociology graduate students at the University of Minnesota, respectively from China, Korea and Taiwan, wrote those case sections. Jun Jin recently completed a year of field work in China for his dissertation on environmental NGOs in China. He has used some of his field material in his section on China. EunHye Yoo collected additional data in Korea and wrote the Korea section. Yu-Ju Chien, just starting the second year of her graduate studies, analyzed existing sources to write the section on Taiwan. Throughout, we use a mixture of sources, including interview transcripts, newspaper articles, and secondary sources. Despite writing different sections, the ideas in the entire paper reflect our fruitful collective discussions.

Case studies

Japan

Before the end of World War Two

Japanese developmental state and its paternalistic ministries had their roots in the rigid status ranking of Tokugawa Era (1603-1868) ruled by the “samurai” government bureaucracy. When, in those feudal times, peasant rebellions challenged government policies, they were harshly suppressed (Bix 1986). The Meiji Restoration
(1868) overthrew the feudal social structure, but in its place, set up a Privy Council of aristocrats to rule the nation in the name of the Emperor through a bureaucracy (*kanryo*). True to the adage “respect officials, despise the people” (*kanson minpi*) ministerial officials disparaged popular political participation. Promulgated in 1890, the Meiji Constitution established a bi-cameral national legislature (the Diet) and electoral system, but limited voting to the wealthy (about 1% of the population) (Gordon 2003:92-3). The Meiji Civil Code of 1896 (Article 34) did not allow the incorporation or nonprofit status of citizen associations, with few exceptions forcing them to operate as informal groups (Pekkanen 2003:121).

The late Meiji and Taisho Eras (1912-1925) saw the growth of elite political parties, the organization of unions and opposition parties, and the passage of universal male suffrage. But during the economic devastation of the 1930s world depression, military officers and right-wing ideologues blamed Japan’s troubles on “capitalism and democracy run amok” (Gordon 2003:189). They assassinated many political leaders, took control of the government, and invaded Manchuria and then more of China and Asia. Forcing unions, parties, and other associations into national organizations to assist the war effort, these leaders set up a wartime bureaucracy to guide the economy, control labor and integrate citizen associations under one umbrella organization (Gordon 2003:196-9, 216). These efforts produced Japan’s “vertical” and obedient social structure topped by the Emperor (Ishida 1984:24).
Occupation Reforms

With defeat and utter devastation, imperial dreams destroyed, the Japanese people fearfully surrendered to an unknown fate. The Allied Occupation (1945-52) proved much more benevolent than they expected. The Occupation’s new Constitution and other policies reduced the old structures of power while providing rights and resources to ordinary people. The new Constitution demoted the Emperor to a symbol of state, broke up the concentrated business conglomerates (zaibatsu), and destroyed the powerful rural landlord class by giving “land to the tiller.” To ordinary people, it gave a wide new range of social and political freedoms, including speech, assembly and religion. The Constitution provided for female suffrage, party and union organizing, and equal inheritance while banning discrimination. The Occupation expanded compulsory and college education and imbued the curriculum with democratic values. These reforms “stunned” elites but excited popular enthusiasm for democracy (Gordon 2003:231-2; Dower 1999).

This unprecedented “experiment in democratization” changed parts of Japan, but left others intact. To enact these enormous reforms, the small staff of the Occupation had to work with and through the existing Japanese government bureaucracies. For that reason, though the Occupation purged Japanese politics and business of “wartime collaborators,” it left the government bureaucracies relatively intact. As a result, the wartime economic administrative system remained intact and formed the basis of postwar industrial policy (Gordon 2003:225, 236).

Ordinary farming and fishing people had long been resigned to leaving decisions up to “those above” (okami) – the officials. They knew little of a “civic culture” – the
right and duty to participate in politics as a responsible citizen (Almond and Verba 1963). To the contrary, rural politics and associations remained controlled by vertical networks built on family and political party domination. They continued by informal sanctions the vertical social domination harshly set up during the wartime period (Nakane 1970; Murakami 1984; Sugimoto 2003). The prewar Seiyukai became the Jiyuto (Liberal Party) while the prewar Minseito became the Minshuto (Democratic Party).

But in the cities, these old habits and conservative parties faced powerful new challenges. With union organizers released from wartime jails, by the end of 1946, union membership had ballooned from nothing to about 5 million. These unions formed the basis for the new Japan Socialist Party and also a separate Japan Communist Party. In the first election under the new constitution, the Japan Socialist Party garnered a plurality and, forming a government with the Liberal Party, installed its leader Katayama Tetsu as prime minister (Gordon 2003:235-8).

Establishment and protest

In 1955, to counter this threat, the Liberal and Democratic Parties merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). As one party, they attained secure control of the Diet and ruled it for 38 years. Retired bureaucrats became powerful politicians in the LDP and continued to support bureaucratic dominance in the policy-making process. But the LDP now also incorporated the wealthy strata as well, thus pushing the often divergent interests of business and bureaucracy together into one faction-split
party. Compared to pre-war times, the circle of ruling elites expanded to include an unwieldy triumvirate of bureaucracy, party and business (Gordon 2003:243).

Against the cliffs of this new political establishment, rising waves of union, student, and peace movements threw themselves with vigor. The union movement reached its apogee in 1949 with 6.7 million members, but was then curtailed by the Occupation. Trying to tame the labor movement, the renascent Ministry of Labor formed its own national labor association, The General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo) (Garon 1987). At the same time, businesses engaged in a campaign to oust leftist union organizers and destroy their organizations. Drawn from the business sector, in 1962 such efforts produced the docile Domei Union Federation. Sohyo, based among the lower-level workers of public bureaucracies such as post office employees and teachers, disobeyed its official “handlers,” retained a more critical stance and continued to support the Socialist Party. But public unions were legally prohibited from striking, so their political impact was mainly expressed in limited support to other popular movements.

The student movement imbibed the democratic lessons of the post-war secondary education and college curriculum. Their teachers largely regretted their uncritical wartime support of the emperor system and strongly endorsed democratic principles. When their students entered the expanding university system in the 1950s, they gave birth to student movements highly critical of the state, the LDP, and its policies. The first wave of student movements, fueled by leftist thinking and supported by the leftist parties, attacked the 1960 renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The second wave, in the late 1960s, attacked Japan’s logistical support for the

During this peak, the police used violence to suppress student support movements on many college and university campuses. However, the state and ruling Liberal Democratic Party rebuffed and ignored the peace movement and continued its logistical support for the United States war in Vietnam. When that war ended, the peace and student movements shrank in size. The shattered student movement dissolved into radical fragments, sometimes warring with each other (Steinhoff 1992). Other student activists joined farmers, environmental and labor movements. Compared to during and before the war, the police treated these movements rather gently; they allowed the farmer and radical student movements that blocked building the Narita Airport to continue for decades. Over that long time period, the sum total of lives lost was police 2, movement 1 (Apter and Sawa 1984).

Often, the veterans of the union and student movements dispersed to their home communities and contributed the experience of resistance. To their villages and neighborhoods, they brought an understanding of the new spirit of citizenship and political participation animating the new Constitution. They also brought experience in organizing their own associations, even if they had met with defeat (Broadbent 1998:229). A new threat to local lives would soon put their talents to work.
Environment and protest

During the 1950s and 60s, as Japan worked frantically to rebuild, industry spread to almost every town and village on Japan’s eastern coast environs. While these factories brought welcome jobs, pay and prosperity, they also brought an unwelcome deluge of pollution and disruption. From 1955 to 1970, industrial waste output increased eight times. In the 1960s, much waste went into shore landfills, adding to estuary pollution (Hiraishi 1989:326). New synthetic fabric factories discharged two-thirds of their raw materials as waste into rivers, lakes and bays (Hoshino 1992). Water sources not meeting human health standards went from under 50 in 1960 to 583 in 1970 (Barrett and Therivel 1991:36; Kelley, Stunkel and Wescott 1976:85). Noise and vibration from construction, highway and rail traffic impinged ever more on people’s everyday lives (Funabashi et al. 1985).

At first, many local people did not pay much attention to the pollution. A series of shocking incidents, though, forced everyone to realize the effect of pollution on human health: arsenic in milk (1955), untested drugs (thalidomide), PCB contamination of cooking oil (1968), mercury runoff into fishing grounds, asthma from air pollution, and cadmium in food poisoned large numbers of people (George 1996; Gresser, Fujikura and Morishima 1981; Huddle, Reich and Stiskin 1975; Ishimure 1990; Kelley, Stunkel and Wescott 1976; McKean 1981; Mishima 1992; Uchino 1983:169; Ui 1992). Japan achieved the unenviable reputation of being the world’s most polluted country – a veritable “Kingdom of Pollution” (Iijima 1993:20-21; Matsubara 1971:158). U.S. ecologist Paul Ehrlich likened Japan to a "miner's canary" – a warning signal to
other industrial nations -- heed the dangers of industrial pollution or suffer this fate! (McKean 1977:204). But would other nations listen?

In the mid-1960s, the mass media took up the cause. The crippled hands and deformed children of fishing people in Minamata, poisoned by mercury-laden waste water from the Chisso petroleum refinery, became widely-accepted symbolic “icons” (Szasz 1994:84) of the horrors of pollution and the callousness of elites (Gresser, Fujikura and Morishima 1981; Huddle, Reich and Stiskin 1975; McKean 1977; Ui 1972). In the public mind, these horrible images reframed smoke and runoff from a symbol of progress to one of sickness. Imperiled citizens, caught between intensifying pollution and unresponsive government, began to complain more loudly.

Conservative government, political and business produced a complicated reaction. On the one hand, the growth-oriented elites tried to smother these fires of complaint. But at the same time, from about 1965, they recognized the severity of pollution and tried to reduce it. But they took these measures within the elite circle, so as not to appear to be giving in to popular demand. Evidence suggests that politicians and bureaucrats knew about pollution’s dangers (Iijima 1993:22; Johnson 1982:284). But MITI and other ministries, the LDP and big business did their best to discourage, discredit, and demoralize pollution victims and their protest movements (McKean 1981; Upham 1987; Broadbent 1998). Sometimes, even the victims’ own communities ostracized them for criticizing the local big company, source of jobs as well as of pollution (Iijima 1992; Ui 1968; Upham 1987).

Growth-minded ministerial officials, though, could not entirely dismiss pollution victims’ complaints as unrealistic radicalism. Rather, their distress appealed directly to
whatever sense of obligation officials felt toward “the national people (kokumin).”

Without much fanfare, starting in 1965 MITI, using its guidance powers over business, persuaded power plants to burn low-sulfur oil. Such guidance would not have worked in the United States, but in Japan’s developmental state context, businesses trusted the lead of MITI and complied. Though more expensive, this oil produced less sulfur dioxide air pollution. In addition, in 1964, the government set up the Pollution Control Service Corporation (PCSC, *Kogai Boshi Jigyodan*) to provide technical support and financial subsidies to industry and local government for pollution abatement. In 1965, the Diet approved this agency and set up Diet committees on pollution – probably the first in the world (McKean 1977:216). From 1965, under Ministry of Health and Welfare guidance, prefectural governments began taking surveys of, and entering into informal Pollution Control Agreements (PCAs) with, local polluting factories (Hashimoto, 1970).

As a result of these measures, Japan’s sulfur dioxide air pollution peaked in 1967 at 0.059 ppm (average of 15 Tokyo monitoring stations), and thereafter started a very steep decline (0.043 ppm in 1970, 0.024 in 1974, 0.01 in 1986) (Broadbent 2002). Pollution complaints which had risen precipitously from 20,000 in 1960 to peak at about 88,000 in 1966, declined by 1970 to about 70,000 (according to government statistics) (Broadbent 2002).

These changes indicate that the Japanese government took considerable informal regulatory measures well before the 1970 “Pollution Diet” and its major anti-pollution legislation reforms. True to the government’s paternalistic style, it took these measures informally so as to minimize any sense of concession to citizen power. By
these means, the government hoped to solve enough of the problem to quiet protest, while keeping society dependent upon the government.

However, the government’s measures did not sufficiently reduce local pollution to quiet people’s fears. One type of air pollution went down, but many other types of pollution remained. Tired of waiting for succor from the government, the LDP or business, frustrated locals turned to their own resources. They created new, effective local styles of protest. In the mid-1960s through early 1970s, mobilization bubbled and boiled in thousands of villages, towns and urban neighborhoods. Being very local and autonomous, but very wide-spread, these anti-pollution movements differed in their organization from the centrally-led labor, student, women’s or peace movements of the era.

The local anti-pollution movements received support from a host of outside sources: academic scientists verified their claims; opposition affiliated lawyers helped the movements file legal suits; opposition party politicians and union organizers helped them to stage demonstrations and to organize politically. The movements worked to elect opposition politicians to local legislatures and to mayor and governor positions. Responding to large protests and electoral pressures, town councils began to reject large-scale government plans for polluting petrochemical complexes (Hashimoto 1988:68; Lewis 1980).

The drumbeat of popular anti-pollution complaint and protest rose steadily throughout the country. The number of pollution protests, judged by a count of Asahi newspaper mentions, rising from almost none in 1960, reached a peak in 1970, and another even higher peak in 1973 (Figure 2) (Broadbent 1998; Broadbent 2002;
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Broadbent 2005). This kind of nation-wide popular protest was an entirely new phenomenon in Japan. This was not big-city labor, student or peace protest spearheaded by a few groups or organizations. It was widely dispersed, small-scale and rooted in local discontent. Heretofore, the government had always suppressed such local protests before it become a nationwide wave. But the new constitution, as well as Japan’s US-oriented geopolitical context, restrained it from doing so. Not only could local residents protest, and even block the operation of polluting factories, they had other new legal tools at their disposal, which they only had to realize.

Pragmatic Japanese culture encouraged the movements to stay local, to take a NIMBY (“not in my back yard”) stance. They complained about pollution in their own community, but paid little heed to problems in other communities. They did not take up the banner of universal moral causes, such as the fate of other species, “Nature” or “the planet” (Broadbent 1998:287; McKean 1981:131-36). But in some ways, local movements became potent national political factors nonetheless. They used the new powers available to local movements granted by the constitution, elections and lawsuits.

Local pollution movements, rebuffed in their local appeals to the ruling and pro-business Liberal Democratic Party, turned their support to opposition political parties, the Japan Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party. These parties promised to support their cries for pollution control. By dint of vigorous local collaborative campaigns, these groups together elected a growing wave of opposition party mayors and governors. Opposition party mayors grew from 20 in 1947 to 138 (out of 643) in 1973 (Figure 2). By 1970, opposition mayors and governors, including Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto, governed over one-third of the entire Japanese population. These mayors

This growing wave of opposition victories threatened the dominant Liberal Democratic Party. In national Diet elections, the LDP’s proportion of the popular vote had been falling; in the 1967 national elections, the LDP had received 49 percent of the popular vote, in 1969 47 percent, and in 1972 47 percent (Figure 2). Through electoral maneuvering, the LDP managed to hold on to more than 50 percent of the seats in the Diet until the 1976 election (when it recruited independent conservatives). So, the LDP feared the movements’ electoral victories. To the movements, this precise moment in history presented them a more favorable structure of political opportunities.
At the same time, new legal routes were open. Some local cases of terrible pollution illness became not only national pollution “icons,” but legal forces as well. The victims, long frustrated, joined with supportive lawyers to file suit against the companies that polluted them. Four pollution lawsuits attained national prominence: Minamata mercury poisoning, Niigata mercury poisoning case, Yokkaichi asthma, and Itai Itai cadmium poisoning. By the early 1970s, these cases stood before the Supreme Court of Japan. Citizen use of the courts at this level was unprecedented in Japanese
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politics. In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court resolved in favor of the victim-plaintiffs in all four cases, forced polluting companies to pay large damage settlements (Gresser, et al., 1981; McKean, 1981, 45-57; Ui, 1989b, 565-6; Upham, 1987). These unprecedented rulings sent shock waves through Japan’s central business leaders and paternalistic officialdom.

Both the national wave of pollution protests and the successful law suits were made possible by the new constitutional provisions – stronger basic freedoms, more open local elections, more independent judiciary. However, it took a movement with tremendous popular appeal to successfully enliven and use those new institutions. At the same time, pressure from the United States also mounted: the US National Environmental Protection Act in 1969; ocean environment negotiations in 1970 (Kato 1989:3), Japan’s pollution as an “unfair trade advantage.” In 1970, an international conference in Tokyo proclaimed universal “environmental rights” (Tsuru 1989:33).

Government response

Ministerial officials, faced with this new “social opportunity structure” that distributed power much more widely, struggled to cope with it. Constrained by the new constitution, the government did not forcibly repress the mobilization of these movements, as it had in the past. It let the movements operate in relative freedom, except when movements disrupted institutional functions.

Within the government, ministries took opposing stands on the issue. In 1966 the Ministry of Health and Welfare urged “radical” measures: human health should have
priority over economic growth, industries should be held “strictly liable” for pollution
damage even when they had not been legally negligent (no-fault liability), industries
should pay for pollution prevention measures, and the establishment of an
Environmental Agency (Hashimoto, 1970; McKean, 1977, 217). MITI, the Ministry
of Construction and the Federation of Economic Organizations, though, flatly rejected
these proposals. These debates continued within the government, and with business
and political leaders, until 1970 (Hashimoto 1988:112; Gresser, Fujikura and Morishima
Broadbent 2005).

The government passed the Basic Law on pollution in 1967 – Japan’s first
national framework for pollution control. But it called for “harmony” between growth
and the environment. The Basic Law’s weakness and lack of enforcement did little to
improve the problem (McKean, 1977, 221). While intended to co-opt and defuse citizen
worries, the Basic Law legitimized citizen concerns and sparked even more protest
Not seeing results, movements adopted more unruly means: demonstrations, sit-ins,
rallies, shut-downs and legal suits Broadbent 1998: Chp. 3).

This convergence of domestic and foreign pressure threatened the LDP and
business leaders, who feared it would damage Japan’s economic growth (Interview,
Hashimoto Michio April 3, 1990) (McKean, 1977, 226-7; Pempel, 1982, 231). The
Central Pollution Countermeasures Headquarters (CPCHQ, created by Prime Minister
Sato in July 1970) concluded that BL’s “harmony clause” had become “an inflamed
appendix and had to be surgically removed” (Asahi Newspaper, August 10, 1970) (as
In a panic, without the usual broad consultation, the CPCHQ hurriedly designed amendments to the Basic Law (Energi to Kogai, No. 140, December 3, 1970: 1129). The amendments removed the “harmony” clause, gave priority to health, designated the financial responsibilities for pollution cleanup, clarified national and prefectural division of regulatory powers over pollution, and greatly strengthened measures against air and water pollution (Kato 1989:3; Matsubara 1971:163).

In November 1970, the national Diet made history. It passed the amendments as fourteen new anti-pollution laws (Nishimura, 1989, 27; Pempel, 1982, 231, 244-247). This historic event became known as the “Pollution Diet.” It established the strictest set of environmental laws in the world at that time. The new laws made polluters financially responsible to their victims under civil law, determined cost allocation for pollution control and provided for mediated dispute resolution. They amended existing laws concerning air and water pollution, traffic pollution and noise, hazardous material transport, waste disposal and sewage, toxic waste and Natural Parks. They set new institutions, including the Environmental Agency. The following history of this legislation shows considerable success in some areas, but mixed success in others, and some areas of total neglect. But this story is told elsewhere (Imura and Schreurs 2005).

Discussion

In the Japan case, environmental movements, due to their political power, received a strong response from the government and achieved a great deal. Moreover, even before the peak of environmental protest, the government had begun to reduce
pollution. In comparison, the labor, student and peace movements did not achieve their policy objectives, either in winning more extensive union concessions, breaking the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, or ending Japan’s support for the U.S. war in Vietnam. The historical evidence reviewed here indicates that the Japan case supports our general hypothesis concerning the effect of the growth-environment dilemma in creating social tension, and the relatively paternalistic attitude of the developmental government in its permissiveness and responsiveness to the environmental movement.

**Taiwan**

Taiwan was colonized by the Japanese for 50 years before the end of World War II. After Japan lost the war, the Kuomintang (KMT, the Nationalist Party) government from mainland China took over Taiwan. In 1947, the KMT government massacred over 20,000 Taiwanese to suppress an uprising protesting bureaucratic corruption. The event, known as the “28th February Incident,” initiated the “white terror” period in Taiwan. During the Chinese Civil War, the KMT declared a Provisional Amendment for the Period of Mobilization. And in 1949, when the KMT government retreated to Taiwan, it implemented martial law in the name of the fight against the Communist in China. From that time until the late 1980s, the society was under rigorous control by the KMT regime.

Under the restriction of martial law, Taiwanese were not permitted to organize, assemble or march publicly. All social organizations such as labor unions and farmer’s associations were manipulated by the government. No opposition political parties and private social organizations were permitted. The government used the intelligence
system, military police and prisons to silence political dissidents. Most Taiwanese kept away from politics.

To compete with the Communist Party, legitimate its domination, and win people’s loyalty, the KMT government embraced a pro-growth administration policy since the 1960s. During the 1960s and 1970s, rapid industrial and economic growth made Taiwan one of the East Asian Tigers (Vogel 1991). Many high-pollution factories and power plants were imported and built. The cost of rapid economic growth finally emerged in late 1970s, when more and more environmental disputes took place across the island.

In the 1970s, external and internal crisis of legitimacy forced the autocratic government began a process of political liberalization. In 1970, the government lost its representation in the United Nations. In 1979, the United States established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China but maintained its relation with Taiwan by enacting the Taiwan Relation Act. Under the Act, the United States kept up pressure on the KMT regime to democratize.

On the island, the democratic movement began to develop through politicians participation in local elections. After the first election for national representatives held in 1969, non-KMT members (tangwai) steadily won seats in elections at different levels. In 1978, the Tangwai organized a support group that campaigned around the island. They challenged the legitimacy of the ruling government and advocated human rights and democracy. But their political activities were still considered illegal by the government and sometimes incurred serious suppression, such as the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 and the Lin family murders in 1980.
Scholars consider the period from late 1970s to 1987 the initial phase of political liberalization in Taiwan. The lifting of martial law in 1987 signals a turning point of Taiwan’s democratization. After its lifting, people could establish social organization legally, thus social movements flourished. However, collective actions and protests appeared in the early 1980s, even before the lifting of martial law. Among all movements, the anti-pollution movement is considered the most grassroots one. In the Taiwanese case, we focus our analysis on the period from the late 1970s to 1987, when social actions and organizations started to confront the authoritarian regime.

**Late 1970s-1987**

After Present Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, his son Chiang Ching-kuo was officially elected President of the Republic of China by the National Assembly in 1978. His administration started a gradual loosening of political controls. In the 1980s, organized social movements emerged, including the consumers’ movement, the anti-pollution protest movement, the nature conservation movement, the women’s movement, the indigenous peoples’ movement and so on.

It is noticeable that social movements during the period took two different forms: advocacy-oriented groups and grassroots protests. The former were characterized by their moderate tactics and the later were featured by their mass mobilization. They differed in their ways to skirt the government’s repression.

The consumers’ movement, the women’s movement, and the nature conservation movement locate in the advocacy-oriented type. Most of them were established by
upper-class, highly-educated intellectuals. To avoid political suppression, activists used strategies such as directing their attention to non-contentious or less contentious issues and establishing magazine publishing houses. For example, the first social movement organization, Consumers’ Foundation Chinese Taipei (CFCT), was founded in 1980 to defend the rights of all consumers. Many founding members were lawyers and intellectuals. To exist, it declaimed its activities as “peaceful, rational, and scientific-based” and not aligned with or supported by the democracy movement. Its main activities included campaigning at the national level for policies related to consumer concerns, providing legal assistance for consumers’ lawsuits, promoting public education about consumers’ rights, publishing Consumer Reports, promoting the establishment of legislation, etc.

The women’s movement also took similar strategies. For example, Awakening, a magazine to encourage women's self-awareness and to raise public concern about women's issues, was formed in 1982. The constituency of the Awakening Magazine Publishing House generally came from among the highly educated professionals (Fan, 2000). In addition to promoting public education, the women’s movement groups mainly devoted their efforts in drafting and lobbying laws to fight for women’s equal rights.

The same tactics were used by the nature conservation movement. Groups such as the Wild Bird Society of Taipei (formed in 1984), Homemaker’s Unions and Foundation, Green Consumer’s Foundation, the Society of Wildlife and Nature, and the Nature Conservation Union gradually emerged during the 1980s. They held activities and provided environmental education about the destruction of Taiwan’s natural
resources. In this period, they helped raised the Taiwanese people’s conservation concerns without becoming involved in contentious issues. These activities of these NGOs were relatively “milder” and “apolitical,” even if only as a pretense to ward off government criticism, and thus incurred less political restriction.

The second type of social movement, grassroots protests, was mainly constituted by local activities against environmental pollution. During the 1980s, anti-pollution protests emerged and spread across the island. Among all new social movement emerging at this time, they are considered the most long-lasting social movement with the strongest grassroots base in Taiwan (Hsiao, 2002; Fan, 2000). From the late 1970s, disputes about environmental degradation and pollution took place in various parts of Taiwan. These included the 1983 protest by Linyuan residents against an amino acid factory and the 1982-3 protest by Ninhua residents against an agricultural chemical factory. Threaten by pollution that damaged crops, livestock, fisheries or residents’ health and livelihood, local victims united to demand solutions to their own problems. Most cases were unorganized, spontaneous actions by local people. Protests were community-based, without liaison with other protests outside of their hometown.

The anti-pollution protests usually followed a similar process. At first, they tried to use legal procedure, for example, presenting a petition to the government, asking for government’s mediation, filing law suits etc. However, their legal actions did not produce satisfactory outcomes. Following that, protesters started to launch violent actions including surrounding the factories, blocking roads, and destroying property of polluters. This protest form, known as “self-relief” (zili-jiuji) or “self-rescue”, was more and more adopted in anti-pollution activism. Victims wanted to negotiate directly with
the companies responsible for pollution without going through legal procedures (Terao, 2002b). Sometimes protest actions became violent, but the use of violence at times lead to halts in the operations of polluting factories. As a result, it spread more and more widely during the 1980s.

Scholars agree that the anti-pollution movement in the early 1980s was a major force that brought about civil society and democratization in Taiwan (Hsaio, 1999; Kim, 2000). Compared with other movements which had to take moderate activity forms to avoid the government’s suppression, the anti-pollution movement that took such radical forms surprisingly incurred no repression by the government. In many cases, the central and local governments even acted as mediators between private polluters and protesters. It indicated that the government either felt responsible in settling environmental disputes or were hesitant in suppressing the anti-pollution grassroots movement during this period, even under authoritarian government.

The grassroots anti-pollution activism in this early stage differed from other social movements at that time in many aspects. First, protests were not well organized. Most protests were community-based. The protests were nationwide and scattered in different townships, villages and cities. Not until mid-1980s did these protests aligned with each other. Second, the movements were radical in demanding efficient and effective solutions of their pollution problems at all costs, even if it meant criticizing the government. The increasing number of protests during the 1980s revealed that the KMT government was incapable of solving the problems of environmental degradation. Since the anti-pollution movement was driven by “victim consciousness” (Hsiao, 1999), it had strong legitimacy in the public eye. Compared with other social movements,
Taiwanese people gave the environmental movements the highest levels of importance and legitimacy. Over time, surveys show, among all social concerns, Taiwanese people ranked environmental problems increasingly higher. In 1983, they ranked environmental pollution as the sixth most serious problem; in 1986, they ranked it second (Hsiao, Milbrath, and Weller, 1995). These factors contributed the government’s relatively permissive attitude towards the anti-pollution movement.

The anti-DuPont movement was a landmark of the grassroots environmental movement. In 1985, DuPont announced its plan, already approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to build a titanium plant in Lukang, Changhua County. Lukang residents protested that this plan lacked adequate environmental impact assessment. As distinct from previous local protests, many students and middle-aged intellectuals participated in this environmental action. Protesters carried out a demonstration in Taipei in 1986 which astonished the government. Due to such intense opposition by the Lukang people, in March 1987 Dupont finally cancelled the project. Since the protest was not only against the polluter but also against the policy-making process of the government, the triumph of anti-DuPont action shook the political structure. The nationwide anti-pollution protests widened the “civil space” for free expression and encouraged other social groups to organize and express their discontent as well. More and more students, intellectuals and professionals who supported political reform participated in social movements including labor movement, farmers’ movement, and environmental movement. Their efforts forced the authority move towards liberalization.

In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was established as the first opposition party. At that time, only a few local offices were open to competitive
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elections. The national legislature remained under the control of the KMT. Many of the activists from the environmental movement helped found the DPP. As a consequence, from the start, the DPP had very close ties with environmental movements. In its early years, the DPP kept strong relationships with social movements to promote political liberalization and democratization.

1987-2000

The lifting of martial law in 1987, with the permission of Chiang Ching-kuo, signaled the beginning of political transition towards democracy. In 1989 the Civil Organization Law was revised, meaning that social movement activists were no longer forbidden to hold meetings, to publish papers, and to establish organizations. The liberalization facilitated the rise of social movements and the establishment of NGOs. The new political freedoms allowed the Taiwanese people to voice their complaints publicly.

The lifting of martial law resulted in a dramatic increase in numbers of environmental protests. Victims took advantage of newly opened civil space to fight for their rights (Hsiao, 1999). In 1987, after the lifting of martial law, the first organized and professional environmental non-governmental organization, the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU), was formed. TEPU identified itself as “grassroots-based, movement-oriented, and knowledgeable”, and was actively involved in mainly the anti-nuclear campaign and also other environmental disputes. The majority of the TEPU’s members were university professors and intellectuals. TEPU
had a close relationship with the DPP. When discussing the solution of environmental
issues, TEPU considered reconstructing the existing political regime to increase public
participation a major goal of the movement. TEPU provided a vehicle for activists and
elites to be more actively involved in local anti-pollution cases. They used the slogan of
democratization to mobilize local groups. The environmental movement awoke victims’
feelings of being oppressed and persecuted by the authoritarian government in the past
decades. Their anger was easily transformed to the dissatisfaction with the ruling regime.

Faced with increasing anti-pollution protests, the government now needed to
find ways to ease the social discontent. The ruling KMT elites and the bureaucratic
officials tried to respond with a top-down administrative reform. By making
institutional changes, for example modifying its administration system and making new
legislation, the government wanted to ease the social discontent. These reforms started
in 1987. In that year, the Environmental Protection Agency under the Department of
Health was upgraded to the Environmental Protection Administration (Cabinet level).
In the same year, the government enacted a set of “guiding principles of environmental
protection policies.” These guiding principles first introduced the term “sustainable
development” into government policies. The EPA promoted a series of environmental
laws, trying to reduce social complaints by imposing top-down institutional change. The
KMT government did not want to admit the legitimacy of the environmental movement,
nor did it try to integrate environmental or social activists into the policy-making
process.

The government passed many environmental laws during this time: in 1988 it
amended the Waste Disposal Act, in 1991 amended the Water Pollution Regulation Law,
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However, despite this flurry of legislation, the government’s pro-growth ideologies never changed. Since economic development demanded ample energy, the government made nuclear power energy production into a necessary national project. More and more protests arose against the construction plans of big government-owned enterprises, such as the Taipower company or the Chinese Petroleum Corporation. The debates over nuclear power illustrated the pro-growth policies of the government. Conflicts over establishing the forth nuclear power plant intensified after the lifting of martial law. TEPU devoted most of its efforts and resources to the anti-nuclear movement. Against the construction of the forth nuclear power plant in Kungliao, Taipei County, TEPU organized a 20,000-person demonstration in 1994 -- the largest in Taiwan's history. Activists also conducted referendums in City or County levels to show public inclination. From the early 1990s, the anti-nuclear power movement has been the most enduring and most influential of all of Taiwan's environmental movements.

Local environmental disputes and debates over developmental projects were not resolved by the administrative reform either, since the government’s pro-growth ideology did not change. During the 1990s, there were more and more debates about developmental projects planned by government-owned companies, such as the fifth naphtha cracking plant of the China Petroleum Company and the Linkou power plant of the Taipower Company.
In the 1990s, the anti-pollution movement and nature conservation movement gradually converged. This convergence occurred because the government’s industrial plans increasingly caused damage to environmentally-sensitive areas. Government plans called for development projects on seashores or next to mountains with serious environmental impact. In cases like the Menon Dam and the highway along east coast, nature conservation activists worked with grassroots anti-pollution protesters to oppose these environmentally harmful projects. “The nature conversation movement is increasingly taking on the government’s pro-growth policies and developing conflicting discourses against the government and big industry” (Hsiao, 1999).

After Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988, Vice President Lee Teng-hui succeeded him as the first Taiwan-born president of the ROC and chairman of the KMT. In 1996, Lee became the first ROC president elected by popular vote. During his terms, under the pressure of political and social movements, President Lee carried out a top-down, gradual process of democratization. After 1993, the government turned away from its previous strategy of neglecting or cracking down on the environmental movement and was more willing to open up limited access to political participation. With the growth of citizen groups and protest events, the environment became one strong sector in civil society (Ho, 2000). But under KMT administration, most social movements groups maintained their distance from the government. Advocacy-type organizations were not incorporated into the process of policy-making (Terao, 2002b).
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**2000-present**

In 2000, Democratic Peoples’ Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election, ending one-party rule by the KMT. The DPP’s success in the presidential election marked the fulfillment of democratization and a peaceful transit of power. However, once elected, the DPP like most political parties had to compromise with many interests in the society, including business interests. As a result, the close relations between the DPP and social movements gradually eroded. The DPP government opened channels to enroll some environmental activists as policy-makers, but under the pressure of business interests, pro-growth policy still outweighs environmental protection policy. Environmental activists couldn’t change the government goal of “fighting for the economy.” The DPP government failure to cancel the plan for the forth nuclear power plant deeply disappointed the environmental movement groups. As a result, social movement activists gradually distanced themselves from the DPP.

**Discussion**

In the Taiwanese case, local environmental disputes bloomed in conjunction with political liberalization and democratization. Before the lifting of martial law, the developmental government had only allowed some mild advocacy-type social movements to establish legally, such as the consumers’, women’s and nature conservation movements. It maintained strict control over other social movements.
The advocacy-type groups had to use “milder” or “apolitical” ways to skirt the government’s restriction, whether intentionally or in pretense. But the emergence of widespread grassroots anti-pollution protests opened up the freedom of expressing discontent about polluters and the government. It revealed an increasingly important social issue that the government was responsible for but incapable of solving. The radical form of “self-relief” taken by the anti-pollution movement frequently radicalized social movements in other issues. To ease social discontent, the government promoted a top-down institutional change but failed to make a radical change in its pro-growth policy. Around the time martial law was lifted, the environmental movement started to coincide with the democracy movement. Together they facilitated the development of civil society and the process of democratization. Overall, the Taiwanese case fits our hypothesis.

Korea

From the 1970s South Korea experienced rapid industrial growth and became one of the most industrialized countries in East Asia. However, the authoritarian governments ignored the hidden environmental costs behind industrialization. Also, social activists themselves often marginalized environmental issues because they believed that changing the repressive regime should take priority. Activists tended to give issues of democratization the highest priority; they used the environmental movement as a means to avoid the direct government repression (Shin 2006).

In 1982, for example, when the first environmental NGO, the Korean Research Institute of Environmental Problems (KRIE), was established, the founders considered
this NGO as a space where anti-regime activists could get together and discuss political issues. Their main concern was not about environmental issues, but political issues, in particular, regime-change. These activists assumed that that the environmental movement sector could provide a shelter for other social activists in the student or labor movements. But if this was true, why did the environment movements enjoy relative freedom under repressive regimes in South Korea?

Korean scholars agree that the June 1987 mobilization caused the government to allow more freedom to civil society. This mobilization represents a historical turning point for South Korea, as it brought a tremendous breakthrough on the political terrain. As a result, the Chun regime fell. Chun’s successor announced direct presidential elections and the regime removed controls on labor organizing and political gatherings. Though the war-like and militant atmosphere of social movements still existed, the June 1987 mobilization definitely created a new public sphere wherein new social movement issues such as women, environment, and human rights could be accepted and discussed.

This new openness of the political system allowed the full blossoming of environmental movements in South Korea. However, if we only focus on the importance and the effects of this democratic transition and the openness of the new “political opportunity structure,” we easily lose sight of the earlier foundation and initial growth of environmental movements. Before this openness, how could environmental movements exist and survive the harsh repression towards all kinds of opposition in 1970s and 1980s South Korea? What was the driving force for South Korean environmental movements before the June 1987 mobilization?

The brief history of environmental movements in South Korea can be classified into three historical time periods: 1) before the 1987 June mobilization, 2) from the
1987 June mobilization to 1991, and 3) from 1991 to the present (Lee 1992)\textsuperscript{6} Our focus is on the first period, on how the authoritarian regime treated environmental movements. We compare movements that experienced harsh repression from the authoritarian government with those that did not.

**The 1960s and 1970s: Victims of Pollution**

Industrialization brings about environmental problems, which then can become public issues in the public sphere. However, even when experiencing pollution, it is very hard for people to recognize the hazardous outcomes of industrialization and its harm to the environment. Public recognition waited until the accumulated hazardous materials and chemicals really showed their fatal effects on the environment in graphic, visual form. In the 1970s, South Korea was in the upheaval of rapid industrialization. Industrial growth began in the 1960s and reached its peak between 1972 and 1979 -- the period of the “big push” toward heavy industrialization, that is, “industrial deepening” through the promotion of heavy and chemical industries (Haggard and Moon 1993:76). Yet, the military regime was still in power and dominated the political atmosphere. For most student groups and social movement activists, the issue of democratization got the highest priority. The most notable social movement groups in East Asia, \textit{i.e.}, students, went underground and it seemed that no one paid attention to environmental issues in the 1970s.

In the regions of Korea subjected to rapid industrialization growth, however, villages received extensive impact from pollution. In these regions, pollution from heavy metal production degraded the ocean and the land on which rural as well as urban
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populations depend for food, other materials and living space. In the 1960s, the villagers of the one of heavy industrialized areas, Ulsan, filed complaints to the central government and blamed factory owners for food scarcities and shortage of fisheries. The villagers of Ulsan\(^7\) established the Association for the Pollution Prevention (1971) and the villagers of Yoechon and Gwangyang, both areas well known for their heavy chemical industry complexes, organized the Association for the Pollution Preservation (1978).\(^8\) However, their collective action was short-lived and not well organized. Their way of objecting was just to file a complaint and get some compensation from the government. Due to lack of environment professionalism and the hostility of the regime, the environmental movement in South Korea before the 1980s was not successful in reducing pollution.

**Before the 1987 June Mobilization: Gaining the Basis**

In the 1980s, after the collapse of the Park regime caused by his assassination, the political opportunity structure seemed to be open for a short amount of time. But the successor to Park, Chun Doo Hwan, came out of the military and established a regime as repressive as Park’s. Therefore, as expected, the regime repressed anti-regime movements, labor movements and student groups. It seemed that there was no hope and room for environmental movements in South Korea. However, after the establishment of KIRE in 1982, two successful cases in environmental movement history are worth examining.

The first case, the Youngsan Lake Preservation Movement, was initiated to protect one of lakes near to Mokpo City. In 1983, the government announced a plan to
build a traditional alcohol production facility. People expected and feared the plant would contaminate their only water resource. On June 24, about 300 people including representatives of local groups and organizations picketed, urging the local government and the central government to stop the plan. These people founded the Association for the Preservation of Youngsan Lake and the leaders negotiated with the mayor of Mokpo City, the Governor of Jeolla Providence, and officials from the central government. Here is the testimony of one of the leaders, Han-Tae Suh:

Looking back, I think that we led a really future-oriented movement. We adopted every ways of protesting. Picketing, signing petitions, placing placards, attaching ribbons, surveying, visiting Youngsan Lake, visiting offices, filing a complaint, giving a lecture, and so on. I don't know how we could do them all. We didn't have any movement experiences before. I think that the government sized us larger than what we really were.

On November 8, the company, Poongjin Chemicals withdrew its construction plan.

The second case, the Onsan industrial complex case, was a much more serious case and has not been resolved yet. In 1984, Onsan was famous for its non-ferrous metals industry, but 10 percent of the local people had severe pollution-related health problems. This case is important not only in terms of the amount of public attention it got, but also in terms of its way of protesting. The professionals and elite movement leaders were actively involved in the case and they used a scientific method to measure the scale of pollution. Here is the testimony of Choi Yul, one of the leaders in KIRE:

But when we launched the campaign, it was very hard to convince people about the problems while local doctors and biochemists rejected my requests to
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scientifically prove them. I then invited the Japanese doctor Harada Masazumi—
who had previously identified industrial pollution as the cause of Minamata
disease—to visit Onsan. He described the disease in the region as a complicated
pollution-related illness far worse than Minamata. His findings were given wide
media coverage in South Korea, turning the subject into a major social issue. The
government belatedly organized an investigation team and implemented measures,
including moving residents of the area to safer regions.11

The Ministry of Environment did not admit the fact that the disease was caused
by pollution and announced a large evacuation plan for the residents.12 Though public
opinion was hostile to this announcement and urged the government to reinvestigate the
area, the government implemented the evacuation plan and the outcome was
devastating.13 In terms of changing government policy or getting compensation, the
Onsan case did not have much success. But in terms of environmental movements
attaining a social base in society, by gaining public attention and citizen awareness, the
Onsan movement was very successful.

Compared with other types of movements in the 1980s, the environmental
movements received relatively lenient repression from the government. The Chun
regime became known for its use of the military to violently repress the Kwangju
uprising in 1980. Chun sent “some 37,000 journalists, students, teachers, labor
organizers, and civil servants into ‘purification camps’ in remote mountain areas; some
200 labor leaders were among them” (Cumings 1997:384). Given the regime’s
willingness to use violence against movements, it is really surprising that the
government chose instead to negotiate with the leaders of the movements and the
victims in polluted areas.
Lee (1992:337) explained this lenient government treatment before June 1987 as happening because of the goals of the environmental movements. Environmental movements were mainly defending their basic needs of health and life. The deprivation of basic needs affected the responses of both the victims (and their supporters) and the government. On the one hand, deprivation of basic needs made the victims and movements desperate; they became willing to mobilize and protest even under harshly repressive political conditions. On the other hand, the Chun regime could be relatively lenient toward the environmental movements because the movements did not seek to overturn the current regime, but only to demand the basic needs of living -- the most important human rights of all.

After 1987, the Opening of Civil Society

As one expert notes, “the partial democratization that occurred in 1987-88 in South Korea also proceeded without dismantling the repressive government structures” (Cumings 1997:394). Nonetheless, the political terrain became much more permissive toward discussing oppositional political issues and mobilizing any type of collective action. After the 1987 June mobilization, the successor to the Chun regime, Roh Tae Woo tried to embrace civic and environmental movements in the political structure while repressing students, labor, and unification movements (Ku, 2003:60).

In the 1990s, environmental groups blossomed and institutionalized as one of central sectors of civil society. In the previous period, as we have seen, there were two significant environmental mobilizations, Mokpo and Onsan. But after 1987, the number of collective actions and environmental movements increased (Lee 1994:220).
Around the time of the 1987 mobilization, the number of environmental organizations increased at tremendous speed (Table 1). In addition, the motivation of environmental movements changed from reactive, self-defense against existing pollution, to proactive, the prevention of environmental damages. Also, after 1987, a large number of activists became professionals, in the sense of devoting their entire time to movement leadership.

In 1992, according to a Gallup Survey, 67% of South Koreans answered that environmental issues in their country were far serious than in other countries.  

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The government responded to these concerns. South Korea joined the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol followed by United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1993) and The Copenhagen Amendment to the Montreal Protocol (1994). Also in 1994 the South Korean government upgraded its Environmental Office to the status of a new Ministry of Environment. Compared to the 1980s, the Korean government started considering environmental issues more seriously.

The opening of civil society in the 1990s and 2000s brought a new sense of environmentalism to various social sectors that had been repressed under the
authoritarian regime. The South Korean government, which had traditionally defined its national policies in terms of economic development, national security, and political authority, seems to have become well aware of the many environmental consequences of rapid industrialization. Protestors have attempted to change the underlying basis of the relationship between environment and people through a series of public events, direct actions and symbolic gestures. In 2000, a survey carried out by the Ministry of Environment showed that South Koreans put more weight on environmental issues than economic development (89.9%)\(^\text{16}\). However, the immediate results of this growing public concern and blossoming environmental movements are problematic in several ways.

First, through subsidies, the government now supports a large proportion of the total budget of civic environmental associations. The statistics show that from 1990 to 1998 the amount of subsidies from the government increased 47 times\(^\text{17}\), accounting for a large amount of their total budgets. This level of government support, even though necessary and worthy of even further increase, at the same time can undermine the public legitimacy of environmental groups. In 2006, the NGO Times surveyed 201 NGO activists in South Korea on several issues concerning civic movements. 17.91 percent (36 persons) answered that the most serious problem for current NGOs is a lack of broad citizen participation\(^\text{18}\). Even one of the leaders confessed that environmental activists are just like officers from the local/central government. They do not stay and listen to people in polluted areas; they just collect data and then do not visit them again\(^\text{19}\). In terms of mobilization, environmental NGOs in South Korea suffer from lack of public support and public donations. Thus, environmental NGO dependence upon central government subsidies, by isolating them from the public, can have a
negative boomerang effect on those same NGOs. If government influence brings about goal-displacement for environmental groups, the environmental movement might have little future in South Korea.

**Discussion**

The rapid growth of environmental organizations in South Korea, as we have seen in previous sections, originated from the relatively lenient attitude that the central government maintained before and after the 1987 June mobilization. The authoritarian government established the Environmental Agency in 1984, indicating its relative concern for environmental problems. These findings offer strong support for our general hypothesis.

However, the findings also raise some challenges to the hypothesis for future research. One question involves the influence of big corporations in South Korea, *chaebol*, on both environmental movements and the government. Under rapid industrialization, especially for a developmental government such as South Korea, it is very likely that big business and the government shared a strong willingness to sacrifice the environment for the sake of rapid industrialization. Also, big business corporations probably lobbied the government to prevent the growth of environmental movements. Therefore, to prove our working hypothesis, we have to examine the relationship between big corporations and the central government regarding their reactions to environmental issues. In all the East Asian societies, the influence of big business could affect the willingness of the government to respond to environmental and other problems in a paternalistic manner. To better grasp big business influence, we will
need future efforts to delineate government formation processes, configurations of
government characteristics and society relations, and environmental movements across
country, historical or geographic contexts.

China

Environmental crisis and official response

With the rapid economic growth in the last two decades, China has borne a dire
environmental cost. It has become one of the biggest pollution producers and worst
estimate that environmental pollution costs 3 percent to 15 percent of China’s GDP.
China is the biggest user and producer of ozone-depleting substances and the second
biggest producer of greenhouse gas emissions in the world. One fourth of China’s
species are currently endangered. Moreover, continually deteriorating air, water, and
land pollution also causes increasing public health crises and social unrest. According
to a national opinion survey, environment pollution is among the most concerned social
problems, just following corruption and inequality.

The Chinese government realized the importance of environmental protection in
the mid 1970s. It established the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA)
in 1984 and upgraded it to a full ministry--State Environmental Protection
Administration (SEPA) in 1998. China also enacted dozens of environment related
laws and hundreds regulations. China actually has built one of the most
comprehensive set of environmental protection laws among the developing countries
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(World Bank, 2001).

However, the enforcement of environmental protection is far from sufficient. Two factors contributed to this insufficiency. First, as a developmental government, the government made economic growth its first and foremost goal. That has had two consequences. At the central level, government ministries related to the economy became overwhelmingly powerful, giving those ministries an upper hand in negotiating with other agencies. As a result, SEPA, the environmental ministry, is under-funded, understaffed and plays a peripheral role in central decision making. And at the local level, officials’ performance largely depends on the growth rate of local economy. To advance their careers, local officials often try every means to boost the local economy. Therefore they see environmental protection as an obstacle to economic growth and consequently their career advancement.

The second factor is the central government’s continuing loosening of control over local governments. As a major component of reform, the decentralization process has given more leverage to local governments. Local branches of SEPA are often funded mainly by local governments. Although these branches nominally answer to the central SEPA, in reality local governments usually have more control over these branches’ behavior. These two factors, economic growth as the first goal and decentralization within the bureaucracy, have significantly hindered environmental protection in China.

GONGO as a form of public participation

In order to increase the effectiveness of environmental enforcement, the
government organized and directed GONGOs. When the government decides it needs organized public participation to carry out some policy, the government creates government-organized non-governmental organizations to do the job (GONGOs). The first Chinese environmental GONGO, China Society for Environmental Sciences, was founded in 1978. Following that, environmental GONGOs flourished in the 1980s and boomed to thousands in the 2000s. GONGOs in general are under tight control by their sponsor agencies, which usually are governmental offices. The sponsor agencies often enjoy the power to manipulate GONGO leadership, funding, and agenda. Although this close relation could be helpful if GONGOs try to influence government environmental policies, usually the influence flows in the opposite direction. Due to their lack of autonomy and initiative, these GONGOs were not so effective in monitoring environmental policy enforcement. This top-down strategy did not work as well as the government had expected.

More recently, as a new tactic, the government called for public participation in environmental protection. However, by “public participation” the government meant to mobilize the public as individuals. It did not mean to encourage independent and autonomous associations outside the bureaucracy’s control. By public participation, the government hoped the public would keep watch over local governments and report any wrongdoing, such as lax enforcement of environmental regulations.

A brief history of ENGOs

ENGOS, or environmental non-government organizations, are genuinely
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independent and autonomous associations formed by citizens. Concerning such autonomous associations, government officials have always been very cautious, but they started to appear in the 1990s. In 1994, a dozen scholars, journalists, and writers created the first Chinese environmental NGO, Friends of Nature (FON). This new association signaled the beginning of a bottom-up Chinese environmental movement. Other environmentalists soon followed the cause. The number of environmental NGOs (ENGOS) grew slowly in the mid 1990s but mushroomed in the early 2000s. In 2005, the first national survey on ENGOs found more than 200 active ENGOs.25 The number indicates that ENGOs have grown dramatically in the last decade. An environmental movement emerged, making ENGOs one of the most active and influential types of NGO in contemporary China. ENGOs triggered public participation, attracted intensive media coverage, and stirred growing official attention.26

The ten-year history of Chinese ENGOs can be roughly divided into three phases: Phase One from the establishment of FON in 1994 to 1998 concerned with endangered species; Phase Two from 1998 to 2003, focusing on the urban public environment; and Phase Three, from 2003 to the present, with ENGOs starting to engage in issues involving conflicts of interest.

During Phase One, Chinese ENGOs and environmentalists mainly focused on the conservation of endangered species in remote areas. Two conservation campaigns symbolized this phase. In 1994, Xi Zhinong, a famous environmentalist and photographer based in Yunnan, a western province rich in biodiversity, initiated a campaign to protect the “golden monkey” (black snub-nosed monkey, or Rhinopithecus bieti). This monkey is only found in western China and its habitat is seriously
endangered by rampant deforestation. With help from FON, this campaign quickly drew national attention and became one of the first highly publicized environmental campaigns in China. FON also helped a campaign to save the Tibetan antelope (Pantholops hodgsonii), threatened by poaching for its fur, the finest and most expensive wool in the world. This campaign also came into the national spotlight after the 1998 death of the leader of a self-organized team fighting well armed poachers.

If Phase One emphasized conservation in remote areas, Phase Two featured environmental projects directly related to everyday public life. Founded in 1996, Global Village of Beijing (GVB) is the leading Chinese ENGO in environmental education and advocacy. GVB successfully promoted the first categorized recycling system in Beijing. In 1999, following that success, GVB persuaded one Beijing district government to initiate a pilot project on creating a “green community” in the Jiangong Nanli neighborhood. This pilot project promoted “green lifestyle,” including environmentally sound architecture (green building) energy and water conservation, categorized recycling, and grass planting. More interestingly, to promote public participation, GVB proposed a joint conference of officials, housing management, NGO, resident committee, and community representatives to discuss issues related to this neighborhood. During this pilot project, local government fully supported and cooperated with GVB. GVB views official support and cooperation as the key for the success of green community. GVB insisted on the principle of entering the neighborhood through the existing administrative system.27

Phase Three started in 2003. In contrast to the first two phases, the third phase involves ENGOs beginning to touch issues involving multiple stakeholders and large interest conflicts. The milestone of this phase is the heated and highly polarized
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campaign against hydropower projects on China’s Nu Jiang River (“Angry River,” upstream part of Salween River). Right after the National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC) approved the Nu Jiang multiple-dams project in August 2003, ENGOs initiated a highly publicized national campaign to protect the cultural and biological diversity in Angry River watershed. After intensive debates between environmentalists and local officials as well as hydropower companies, the central government first suspended the project and then reduced it from 13 dams to 4 dams. Although not fully achieving its goal, many people still cheered the Angry River campaign as the first great victory of Chinese environmental movement, an event symbolic of its growing influence.

Compared to previous environmental campaigns, the Angry River campaign had (and continues to have) three unique features. First, it focused on a highly controversial issue that might cause confrontation with local governments and big corporations. Second, for the first time, ENGOs across the country cooperated in an environmental campaign.

Third and most important, grassroots mobilization and empowerment emerged as a main campaign strategy. In almost all previous campaigns, ENGOs avoided building direct connections with grassroots activism, due to its political sensitivity. However, in the Angry River campaign, ENGOs directly mobilized villagers along the river who would be affected by the project. They also organized workshops on good governance of watershed and public participation.

The most important and dramatic example of this new strategy occurred at the 2004 United Nations Dam and Development Symposium in Beijing. ENGOs invited five affected or potentially affected villagers to attend this conference. That was the
first time in China that affected villagers represented themselves at an international conference on dam building. At the Conference, the villagers advocated “Four Rights for Villagers,” including the right to be fully informed, the right to participate in decision-making, the right to participate in projects implementation, and the right to monitor the construction of the proposed project. The villagers’ testimony at the conference was viewed by some environmentalists as a victory even bigger than suspending the Nu Jiang dam project.²⁸

From “small world” to “civil society”

The brief history of Chinese environmental movements indicates that Chinese ENGOs are moving from a strategy of cooperating with government to one of being more contentious. With the growth of organizational strength and implementation of favorable government policies, Chinese ENGOs began to reach out and become more contentious in their agenda and strategy. More than one environmentalist even claims that the much highlighted campaign on Angry River indicates a turning point in Chinese environmental movements from being cooperative to being contentious, and from “small world” to “civil society”.

Avoiding confrontation with the government is a basic strategy of Chinese ENGOs that has been well recognized in the literature.²⁹ Especially during the inception period in the 1990s, Chinese ENGOs often adopted mild repertoires of activities. As a result, Chinese ENGOs built a “small world” lacking connections to the outside society. Their main agenda included “watching bird, planting trees, and collecting garbage.” They intentionally avoided issues that might challenge the
government, such as developmental projects with huge environmental and social impacts. Living in the self-sufficient “small world”, Chinese ENGOs did not need or dare to reach out, to help marginalized and victimized social groups in aggregating and expressing their interests. In this sense, such “small world” ENGOs might, as organizations, have some qualities expected of civil society associations (voluntary membership, elections to leadership). But they would not act in the larger society, by networking and encouraging other associations, so as to generate a wider civil society.

However, after 10 years of developing, maturing, and mainstreaming, Chinese ENGOs in 2003 enjoyed some striking differences from the ones in 1994. “Small world” NGOs still exist, but those limits do not satisfy all Chinese ENGOs any more. Some Chinese ENGOs start to focus on controversial environmental issues that might involve interest conflicts and even cause confrontation with local authorities as well as giant corporations. The Angry River campaign is the most publicized example. During this campaign, environmental activists successfully mobilized and empowered the affected groups so that they could articulate group interests and demand their interests publicly. In this sense, these ENGOs have started to build a civil society which could mediate interests between the public and the government.

The government’s relative tolerance toward environmental NGOs was one key for Chinese environmental movement to develop. Will the government continue to be permissive to ENGOs when they become more contentious and more civil society oriented? So far we see mixed signs. On the one hand, some senior officials from SEPA continue to promote the indispensability of public participation and even cry for its institutionalization. On the other, government leadership recently became more cautious toward the role of ENGOs. In 2005, the government significantly tightened
its surveillance and regulation over ENGOs. Some ENGOs very active in the Angry River campaign now face many constraints from angry local authorities.

Discussion

As an ongoing case, the origins of the Chinese environmental movement partially confirm the working hypothesis. With high speed economic growth, China’s environment has severely deteriorated. The government’s first reaction was to establish a new environmental protection agency. However, due to the emphasis on economic growth and the decentralization of government, the government’s effort to rein in rampant environmental degradation from within was not effective. The government then called on public participation. Proving their capacity as an effective watchdog, environmental activism quickly flourished. In a country where the government fears autonomous organizations and excises tightly control over non-governmental organizations, officials’ permissive attitudes have been crucial for the development of Chinese environmental activism and NGOs.

However, the Chinese case also has a special feature. In the beginning, ENGOs were not localized. Their lack of threat to the government grew exactly from their lack of close and lasting connections with grassroots communities. ENGOs intentionally separated themselves from grassroots and issues involving interest conflict. This very self-censoring strategy and the consequent building of a “small world” ensured the ENGOs’ political safety.

Does Phase Three indicate a “turning point” of Chinese government governance ideology and practice toward allowing ENGO involvement in interest conflict issues?
Again, we see mixed signs. On the one hand, ENGOs have started to build an active civil society which could check government power and protect grassroots interests. On the other hand, the government is worried by the ENGO tendency and has started to limit ENGO activities. It silenced some very active ENGOs in Angry River campaign. Is this setback for Chinese environmental activism only a temporary measure by the government? Or does it represent a new trend in governance suggesting the government totally rejects public participation in environmental protection? We do not know yet. If our working hypothesis is correct, we could expect that, through continually negotiating with the government, Chinese ENGOs will be able to expand their agenda and radicalize their strategy again. And we will witness more environmental activism like the Angry River campaign.

**Conclusion**

Our four case studies demonstrate considerable support for the working hypothesis, but they also reveal gaps in our knowledge and open up further questions. Our working hypothesis proposes that the four East Asian developmental governments, by their single-minded, successful rapid economic growth, after a slight lag, generate an equally sudden rise in pollution, disruption and social change. East Asian developmental government officials perceive this rising double-headed change, growth and environment, as a *dilemma* – a conflict between two desired but contradictory goals, national power and national welfare. If they maximize growth for the sake of national power, it seems to them at this juncture, they degrade national welfare due to pollution. What to do?
The dilemma between growth and the environment may be less intense for other types of states, especially the kleptocratic state, because their officials feel less responsible for society. But so far, our research indicates, developmental government officials think they embody the society and hence feel this juncture keenly as a dilemma. To them, this growth-environment dilemma represents a historical crisis, a juncture and a turning-point in how they should manage the society. Developmental government officials are very sensitive to their legitimacy in the eyes of the public, because they know that effective social management requires a cooperative citizenry.

Frustrated by the sudden and unexpected dangers of this problem and by the difficulty of its solution, government officials may cast a newly permissive eye on citizen environmental activism as a way to reduce environmental pollution and citizen discontent (even if they reject activism for other goals). Under the impulse of pollution and disruption, society starts to bubble with discontent and criticism. This new “social opportunity structure” puts new potential costs on government slowness in fixing environmental problems, the costs of losing popular legitimacy. This sequence played out in surprisingly analogous ways, despite their differences, in each of our four cases: Japan, Taiwan, Korea and China. In dealing with this problem, the first three governments initially chose a tactical “middle way” between repression and full liberalization. The fourth case, China, may be heading that way.

Japanese economic ministries, by starting to respond even before protest reached a peak in 1970, showed a degree of paternalistic concern for society. However, the new political institutions --elections and courts -- empowered the protesting public to push the government even further. Citizen power forced the government, ruling
political party, and business leadership into convening the “Pollution Diet” with its historic reforms in environmental law and institutions. These reforms stimulated a host of detailed regulatory and subsidy institutions that effectively reduced air and water pollution to much safer levels. In contrast, when faced with more radical progressive as well as radical reactionary political movements, the government either rebuffed, ignored or made slight symbolic compromises. The main exception is the labor movement, which the government co-opted into its cooperative productivity program by rising wages and benefits.

In Taiwan, the developmental government under the authoritarian Chiang Ching-Kuo regime also generated a similar growth-environment dilemma. In response, the government quickly set up an environmental agency. Compared to other types of movements, the regime gave much wider leeway for the activities of environmental movements. After the transfer of power to Lee Ten-Hui, under the liberalizing regime, the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU) formed and helped organize the new opposition political party.

Likewise, the Korean developmental government under the authoritarian Chun regime also gave considerably more latitude to the environmental movement than other types of movements. Compared to the other three cases, Korean society, long restive under colonialist and authoritarian regimes, had a relatively strong activist potential.

Currently, China as a developmental government is in the middle of its growth-environment dilemma, and the consequent governance dilemma. Given the frailty of its own local governance apparatus, some officials in the central Chinese government called upon citizens to be watchdogs over their own environmental quality and
organized these efforts as GONGOs. But since GONGOs tended to control the public, they constrained its watchdog potential too much. Accordingly, the government has given increasing freedom to citizen-organized ENGOS and some freedom to local environmental activism. Whether the Chinese government will permit this trend to grow or will suppress it remains to be seen.

In all four cases, the growth-environment dilemma created a historical turning-point or juncture, in terms of both the government’s handling of environmental problems. In Japan, Taiwan, Korea and China, the most important decision makers on domestic growth policies have been the economic ministerial officials -- sometimes reined in by top central authorities, parties or business interests. With a single-minded devotion to promoting economic growth, they produced four economic “miracles.”

When environmental problems increasingly impeded growth and sparked civil unrest, though, these four governments made institutional changes and formed environmental agencies. The timing of the establishment of the environmental agency coincided closely with the peak domestic growth-environment clash. This temporal coincidence indicates that an alternative hypothesis for the formation of environmental agencies, the effect of diffusing global environmental norms, was not the crucial causal factor in the timing of their establishment (Frank, Hironaka and Schofer 2000).

To what particular social factors may we attribute the similarity of East Asian developmental government response to the growth-environment dilemma? Is their response directly driven by the functional “needs” of the society? Without great caution, any society that pursues heavy industrial growth will produce environmental degradation. In that sense, the causal relationship between economic growth and
environmental destruction is automatic: “systemic” or “(dys)functional.” But developmental governments were so efficient in their pursuit of growth that they produced its nemesis, environmental destruction, with equally stunning rapidity. The fact though that other types of governments, such as the kleptocratic or the state-socialist command economy, also produce the growth-environment dilemma, and let it continue into even greater devastation, indicates that there is no functional imperative for an ameliorative government response. Social conditions, broadly speaking, intervened between ecological chemistry and human political reaction.

The broad similarity in (creation of and) response to the growth-environmental dilemma in the four cases, Japan, Taiwan, Korea and China, indicates the effect of similar core social institutions (taken-for-granted sets of roles and motivations around a given collective task). So far, our observations indicate that developmental economic ministries leading a manageable business community are the common driving forces leading to these four dramatic growth-environment clashes. Why, at that G-E clash point, did the first three of our developmental government cases, and possibly also the fourth, respond to these clashes in roughly similar ways, forming environmental agencies and permitting environmental activism -- as expected in our hypothesis?

This paper has raised three different hunches about the social factors responsible for their similar response: 1) the ethical paternalism of government officials, 2) government fear of popular unrest, and 3) power struggle between economic and environmental agencies within the government. These three factors need not be alternatives; they and other factors can interact to produce government response. Moreover, even while producing similar reactions, each case may operate under
different mixtures of causal factors. To answer this question, we have to peer within the black box of government decision-making. Our current level of information does not fully illuminate this box, but it allows us to refine our hunches.

1) The effect of ethical paternalism on the East Asian government, as noted in the paper, remains highly debated. Such paternalism, if it is effective, could take different objects -- either devotion to the power of the government, or concern about the welfare of the people – and imply different policy goals. Government guidance of business investment as well as government rebuff of citizen activism seem to indicate the former. Even if government officials had a strong sense of duty, this ethic may be crumbling. In the developmental trajectory, as private businesses become more profitable, they try to shed the confining hand of ministerial guidance. To do so, they make officials that used to regulate them into their allies and proponents within the government. As these competing interests enter the government, the coherence of developmental government policy breaks down. This balkanization may reduce the coherence of government management and surveillance over the entire society, eventually permitting greater citizen activism as well.

2) At the growth-environment juncture, in each society, officials had different resources for social management and control. But in all cases, the officials feared the popular discontent bubbling over the flame of pollution and disruption. They also knew through experience the Weberian principle that that management of a cooperative society was much easier and more productive than coercion of a resistant society. Accordingly, they had strategic sense of when and where to relax their grip on society. Loosening their hold over activism, movements and NGOs which do not demand
regime change, such as the environmental ones, proved the more pragmatic tactic at this tumultuous historical juncture. Opening up to environmental activism gave the government a number of simultaneous benefits: reducing popular tensions, helping to solve environmental problems, protecting the labor force, and enhancing government legitimacy.

3) From its point of establishment, the environmental ministry or agency grew steadily in influence within the government. Its growth echoed the increase in perceived seriousness of environmental problems in the larger society. Environmental agencies in Japan and China received promotions to full ministry status. Environmental and welfare agencies provided a steady alternative viewpoint within government councils, not always listened to, but there when needed.

The four cases “opened” to citizen environmental activism in somewhat different ways. In Japan, the government first allowed, and then tried to coopt and use the citizen activism for the solution of environmental problems. In Taiwan and Korea, however, society was from the start more independent. Once ending authoritarian rule, their social activism sectors quickly blossomed into an open field of diverse movements and NGOs. China, if continues to open up to environmental activism, could follow either route, cooptive or open field. At least concerning environmental issues, the Chinese government’s disillusionment with the performance of GONGOs indicates it might move toward the open field approach.

As the growth-environment dilemma intensified in all four cases, for years the developmental government economic ministries resisted fixing and preventing environmental problems. They wanted to continue rapid growth. The great irony
here is that, in the long run, letting environmental problems intensify harms growth more than it helps it. Ultimately, any society will pay a heavy price for severe pollution and environmental disruption. This price will first be paid in human illness and degradation, as well as the devastation of other species. But as the society becomes more complex, and needs more citizen cooperation, the government will be held increasingly responsible for compensating environmental victims for their suffering. In Japan, environmental experts have calculated, it would have served the national economy well to have solved its environmental problems earlier (Imura and Schreurs 2005). Likewise, comparative research has found that environmental protections do not cause a net loss in gross domestic product, but rather boost the economy.

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Notes:

1 By “government,” we mean the central decision-making entity of a society at a given time. In the East Asian context during the rapid growth period, “the government” refers to the central ministries/agencies and their leadership. In our analytical usage, the term government does not include legislatures or political parties, which we treat as analytically distinct institutions. We sometimes adopt the anthropomorphic convenience of referring to “the government” as a unitary, voluntary actor. “State theory” can apply also to governments.

2 In this light, one can compare repeated calls, throughout Chinese history, to make officials properly perform the duties of their assigned offices <<Hao 1996 - Not Found>>, with recent sociological work on the relative conformity of different contemporary national government bureaucracies to the Weberian ideal-type (Evans and Rauch 1998).

3 For a comparative analysis of environmental mobilization in eight Japanese villages and towns during the late 1960s and 1970s, see (Broadbent 1998; Broadbent 2003).

4 A police raid of the Formosa Magazine caused the Kaohsiung Incident in December 1979. Several Tangwai activists were arrested and sentenced.

5 During the trial of the Kaohsiung Incident activists, an unknown assailant broke into the house of Lin I-Hsiung, one of the arrested activists, and murdered his mother and twin daughters.

6 There are several ways of classifying the historical periods of environmental movements. Ku(1996) presents the Korean environmental movement into four historical periods; 1) in the 1960s and 70s, 2) between 1980 and 1987, 3) between 1988 and 1991, and 4) from 1992 to the present.

7 Ulsan is the most industrialized place in the 1960s and 1970s. In 2006, the average income for urban population is over 30,000$ per year(Ulsan Daily, 2006 Aug)


9 Chosun Il-bo, June 24, 1980
10 Newsmaker, issue 665.
11 http://www.unesco.org/courier/2001_02/uk/dires.htm
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Interview with Sheri Liao, the founder of GVB

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For example, see Nevitt (1996), Ho (2001), and Yang (2005).

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