I am pleased to be back here under the sponsorship of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I thank your President, John Hamre, for the Center’s hospitality and for his personal continuing contributions to U.S. national security policy.

The Policy organization at the Pentagon does two main kinds of work. There are the day-to-day tasks - drafting instructions for negotiators, for example, or working a coalition issue in the war on terrorism, conducting defense talks with other countries or responding to a civil war in Liberia. This topical work tends to attract the most attention from the Congress, the press and the public.

But some of the most important work we do grabs few headlines. This is the longer-term thinking about U.S. defense strategy, which is the Policy organization’s second major line of effort.

From the moment President Bush came into office, he has asked the Defense Department how best to position the United States in the world for the decades ahead. He and Secretary Rumsfeld have demanding appetites for strategic thought - that is, large ideas, broad in scope, that set courses that can run many years into the future.

The name given to this effort is "transformation," because the President is determined that the Defense Department think boldly and remake itself thoroughly, changing the way we:

- Train and equip our forces.
Use them, for combat, stability operations and otherwise.
Position those forces around the world.
Work with allies and partners, and
Conduct procurement and other business activities.

Some people think of "transformation" narrowly as a matter of using new technologies to produce better weapons. But the concept is more comprehensive.

A key facet of transformation is realigning our global defense posture — that is, updating the types, locations, numbers, and capabilities of our military forces, and the nature of our alliances. That’s the aspect of transformation I want to talk with you about today.

Even before 9/11, President Bush said that the security threats of the future would differ from those of the Cold War era — that they required a different way of thinking and of organizing our defenses. He campaigned on a platform of transformation. Since the Soviet empire collapsed, he observed, the world changed far more radically than our own defense doctrines, institutions, equipment and alliances had changed.

I can report that the United States has made progress toward transformation during the Bush Administration.

First, we’ve transformed our relationship with Russia. We’ve recognized that the hostility that characterized US–Soviet relations during the Cold War has ended, hostility that was enshrined in the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Accordingly, along with the hostility, we’ve set aside that morally dubious doctrine and that out–dated treaty. We’re cooperating with Russia in many fields. And Presidents Bush and Putin agreed formally to make unprecedented cuts in their nuclear arsenals. At the beginning of this Administration many commentators voiced anxiety about the risks of US–Russian tensions over arms control, NATO expansion and other issues. This is now a non–issue.

Second, we are transforming our Alliances. Today, we have an enlarged NATO with increasing (though still far from adequate) capabilities, a good plan for streamlining NATO’s command structure, a new NATO Four–Star Command focused specifically on military transformation and an affirmative answer once and for all to that old chestnut — can NATO take on a mission "out of area." NATO has taken on command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and NATO assisted Poland in
assuming command of a multinational division responsible for stabilizing a portion of southern Iraq.

Likewise, we are developing a more robust US–Japanese alliance, an up-to-date US–South Korean alliance, and a strengthened U.S.–Australian alliance. Our key Asian and Pacific allies are investing in new technologies, playing roles in Afghanistan and Iraq, coordinating with us regarding global and regional threats, such as the North Korean nuclear program, and working with us to rationalize the US troop "footprint" in their countries to keep the alliances sustainable and capable well into the 21st Century.

And, of course, we are transforming US military capabilities – strategies, technology and organization, as well as hardware.

As we have transformed deterrence and our alliances, we want to transform our global posture. Our current posture as John Hamre mentioned, still reflects in many ways the mentality and reality of the Cold War era, during which US forces deployed forward were defensive, tripwire units that were expected to fight near where they were based. The kind of forces used for that mission are not the agile, fast, lean forces we need for the future.

Our forces overseas should not remain positioned to fight the Cold War. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s demise, we reduced the numbers of US troops deployed forward. But they remained concentrated in their Cold War locations, from which they have had to be deployed to deal with crises elsewhere – in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and other locations. Key premises underlying our forward posture have changed fundamentally: We no longer expect our forces to fight in place: rather, their purpose is to project power into theaters that may be distant from where they are based.

We are revising our thinking about forward deployed forces in light of our new strategic circumstances. The 9/11 terrorist attack literally brought home to us how dangerous those circumstances can be:

Terrorists as well as rogue states can command formidable destructive power, including through access to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, but also by targeting the critical infrastructure on which advanced industrial societies rely:

- U.S. and friendly territories are vulnerable.
- The proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missiles continues.
Ungoverned areas serve as breeding grounds for global terrorism.

Threats from these sources may require immediate military responses.

President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld directed a reexamination of US forward deployments that is free of old orthodoxies and takes the long view. We are aiming to achieve the most basic and comprehensive review of the nation’s global defense posture since the United States became a world power.

In the immediate post–World–War–II period, Dean Acheson had a sense that his work was creating institutions that would last a long time; he made that point by entitling his memoirs Present at the Creation. President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld likewise are thinking about the relatively distant future. In developing plans to realign our forces abroad, they are not focused on the diplomatic issues of the moment, but on the strategic requirements and opportunities of the coming decades.

Let’s be clear about what we are and what we are not aiming to achieve through transforming our global defense posture:

We are not aiming at retrenchment, curtailing U.S. commitments, isolationism or unilateralism. On the contrary, our realignment plans are motivated by appreciation of the strategic value of our defense alliances and partnerships with other states.

We are aiming to increase our ability to fulfill our international commitments more effectively.

We are aiming to ensure that our alliances are capable, affordable, sustainable and relevant in the future.

We are not focused narrowly on force levels, but are addressing force capabilities.

We are not talking about fighting in place, but moving to the fight.

We are not talking only about basing, we are talking about the ability to move forces when and where needed.

In transforming the US global defense posture:

We want to make our forces more responsive given the world’s many strategic uncertainties.
We want to make our military presence increasingly rotational with the emphasis, as I’ve noted, on the capabilities of forces rather than their numbers.

We want to benefit as much as possible from the strategic prepositioning of equipment and support.

We want to make better use of our capabilities by thinking of our forces globally, rather than as simply regional assets.

We want to be able to bring more combat capabilities to bear in less time, that is, we want to have the ability to surge our forces to crisis spots from wherever our forces might be.

**Strengthen Allied Roles**

It bears reemphasizing: Our military forces, both forward deployed and based at home, are only part of our military capability. Another part is rooted in the network of alliances and security relationships we have created with other nations. When the United States acts in the world, we don’t act by ourselves, but as a part of a community of states. That network of friendships and alliances is a valuable element of this community. The network’s composition and nature have changed over the years as strategic circumstances in the world have changed. To surmount such problems as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states, we need to organize differently and increase our capabilities. Realigning the US global defense posture is an essential part of what we need to do.

Understanding of our realignment plans should help lay to rest the accusations that the US favors “unilateralism” in national security affairs. Our plans will help ensure that the US has the defense resources and relationships in place to allow us to work with allies and friends in the future. It will make those relationships affordable and usable, that is to say, relevant.

Our intent is to expand existing security relationships, and develop new ones. We want to build partnerships that manage concerns, ensure compatibility among forces, and facilitate intelligence sharing. In some cases US forces will be in a supporting role, in other cases, US forces will be supported. For example, we were in a supporting role when West African ECOWAS forces intervened recently in Liberia and when Australian forces did their peace operations in East Timor. Examples of support for U.S. forces include NATO
ISAF forces in Afghanistan, and the role British and Polish forces have taken in commanding multinational divisions in Iraq.

Changes in the U.S. global posture also aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies and doctrines. As we discuss the US realignment with them, we are discussing cooperative transformation efforts. The new NATO Response Force and Allied Command – Transformation in Norfolk are examples of combined allied transformation efforts.

Realigning the U.S. posture will also help strengthen our alliances by tailoring the physical US "footprint" to suit local conditions. The goal is to reduce friction with host nations, the kind that results from accidents and other problems relating to local sensitivities. Removal of the U.S. Air Expeditionary Wing from Prince Sultan Air Base, for example, should help improve our relations with the Saudis, and relocating U.S. forces south and out of the densely-populated Seoul area in Korea will help remedy various problems with the Korean public while serving other important military purposes as well.

Contend with Uncertainty

Our new posture emphasizes agility to respond to changing circumstances. Intelligence is never perfect, so we need to be able to hedge against errors regarding emerging threats. We need to plan, but we must plan to be surprised. Our forces will be deployed forward in regions selected to enable them to reach potential crisis spots quickly. We also want to maintain familiarity with various parts of the globe.

Focus Across Regions as well as within them

In the Cold War, we focused on threats to specific regions. Now we are dealing with threats that are global in nature. So global strategies and actions are required. President Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative is an example of a global strategy for dealing with the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missile-related materiel and technology. We need to be positioned properly – with the right forces, the right relationships and the right authority – to execute that strategy. In addition, we want to develop our capacity to project power from one region to another – threats don’t respect the administrative boundaries of the Defense Department’s Unified Command Plan.

There is value in developing support capabilities away from front lines – relying on so-called "reachback" technology. For example, intelligence support, including battle damage
assessment, can be provided from outside the theater of operations. We also may be able to increase our use of “reachback” capabilities of our allies and friends.

**Develop Rapidly Deployable Capabilities**

Because our forward-deployed forces are unlikely to fight where they are based, our key goal must be to make those forces rapidly deployable to the relevant areas as events require.

We can project power in a rapid manner, whether from bases in the US or overseas, but it is helpful to have support infrastructure overseas. Examples of an expeditionary approach to warfighting that drew upon such infrastructure include Kosovo, a case of power projection within a region, in pursuit of regional stability and in concert with regional allies, and Afghanistan, a case of global power projection, in which forces flowed into Central Asia from US, European, and Asian theaters. We are encouraging allies to establish deployable – truly usable – headquarters and forces. We intend to increase combined training for expeditionary operations, for example, to encourage Allied participation in so-called “high-end” U.S. exercises.

For this deployability concept to work, US forces must be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations, which puts a premium on establishing legal and support arrangements with many friendly countries. We are negotiating or planning to negotiate with many countries legal protections for US personnel, through Status of Forces Agreements and agreements (known as Article 98 agreements) limiting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court with respect to our forces’ activities. And we are putting in place so-called cross-servicing agreements so that we can rapidly reimburse countries for support they provide to our military operations.

**Focus on Capabilities, Not Numbers**

Military capabilities have increased stunningly over the past decade as a result of technology and innovations in tactics. Our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown the world how relatively small forces can have large, strategic effects. A single fighter/bomber sortie now hits multiple targets, whereas in the past, multiple sorties were required to hit a single target. Small teams of Special Forces and Marines, supported by flexible close air support and often operating together with indigenous forces, were able to accomplish missions in Afghanistan and Iraq that in the past would have required brigades or divisions. Old military thinking about numbers has been overtaken thoroughly by events.
Longstanding notions about ratios of offensive versus defensive forces and about how much can be accomplished by a certain number of troops or platforms have had to be revised wholesale.

Military and political leaders around the world are just beginning to absorb the lessons of the recent fighting and to appreciate why US officials emphasize military capabilities as opposed to numbers of forces. These lessons have an important bearing on our global posture realignment. Our key purpose, as I’ve noted, is to push increased capabilities forward, which is crucial to the security of the United States and our allies and friends. That purpose does not require that we push additional forces forward. In fact, we can now have far greater capabilities forward than in the past with smaller numbers of forces. We want to ensure that our allies and friends recognize that, in transforming our posture, we are strengthening our commitment to secure our common interests, even in those places where we may be reducing forces levels.

Conclusion

Last week, President Bush announced that we would "realign the global posture of our forces to better address" the new challenges we face and would be consulting around the world on this matter. I have discussed the principles and purposes of our realignment work. But I want to stress that no final decisions have been made.

So the consultations that the President announced last week will be real consultations – all the decisions the President will eventually make will depend on the inputs we receive in the course of these consultations. How our partners react to our ideas is important to us, as are the steps they are willing to take to advance our common security interests through host-nation support and other means.

Indeed, the consultations in and of themselves are an element of our global posture. They help strengthen our relationships by harmonizing our thinking and our assessment of threats and military requirements. They give us an opportunity to explain the rationale of our global realignment – such as our focus on capabilities rather than numbers.

In their recent trips to Asia and Europe, Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell began to describe our efforts. Next week, my colleague Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman and I will carry forward the consultations, which will over time include US allies and partners in every region of the world. This is a global initiative, and our consultations will be global.
Our friends and allies are sensitive to changes in the US overseas posture. That is why we are consulting with them before the President or Secretary Rumsfeld makes any decisions on changes. Whatever improvements in military effectiveness the actual posture decisions produce, they will serve our interests fully only if they also help sustain and strengthen our ties with our friends, allies and partners around the world. We are confident that they will.

(끝).
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you on the Bush Administration’s review of the U.S. defense posture around the world, including the consultations we have had with our allies and friends. We appreciate the bipartisan support and the leadership this committee provides regarding this project and all the work of our armed forces and the Defense Department.

Let me begin with some general remarks on what we aim to accomplish through realigning our worldwide defense posture. I would like to discuss:

- Why transforming our global defense posture is necessary;
- The key ideas guiding the realignment decisions; and
- The consultative efforts with Congress and with our allies and partners that have informed our work.

Transforming U.S. Global Defense Posture

We are performing the most thorough restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the major elements of the U.S. Cold War posture were set in 1953, when the Korean War ended. This initiative is intended to improve our military’s forward presence to increase
our ability to fulfill US security commitments and to work with allies and partners in the decades to come in military activities across the spectrum of endeavors from combat to peace operations.

The goal of our realignment is to update our defense posture so that it looks forward, not back toward the Cold War. We want our posture to enable more effective military operations in the future — greater flexibility for our forces, their ability to deploy powerful capabilities rapidly anywhere in the world where they are needed. We want our posture to enrich our ties with our defense partners around the world — making it easier for us to cooperate, lightening our footprint, eliminating unnecessary irritations, helping them as well as us to modernize our armed forces. And we want our posture to be efficient — to be affordable — with the right kind of command structures, facilities and equipment for the work that may be required in the future.

I would like to be clear about what we aim to achieve and what are not aiming to do:

- We are not aiming at retrenchment, curtailing U.S. commitments, isolationism or unilateralism. Instead, we want to increase our ability to fulfill our international commitments more effectively.
- We are aiming to ensure that, in the future, our alliances remain capable, relevant, affordable and therefore sustainable.
- We are not focused on maintaining numbers of troops overseas, instead we are focused on increasing the capabilities of our forces and those of our friends.
- We are not talking about fighting in place, but on our ability to move to the fight.
- We are not talking only about basing, we’re talking about the ability of our forces to operate when and where they are needed.

The September 11 attacks clarified our understanding of the key security challenges that we will face in the 21st century. These include:

- The nexus among terrorist organizations, their state supporters and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction:
- Ungoverned and under-governed areas within states, which can serve as breeding grounds and sanctuaries for terrorists: and
Asymmetric warfare that adversaries will use to counter U.S. conventional military superiority.

As part of the transformation of our strategy and our alliances to deal with our new strategic circumstances, we are transforming our global posture. Much of our current posture still reflects the mentality and reality of the Cold War — forward deployed forces configured as defensive, tripwire units and expected to fight near where they were based.

In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the United States substantially reduced our troops that were deployed forward. But they still remained concentrated primarily in their Cold War locations in Northern Europe and Northeast Asia. It is from these locations that they deployed to deal with crises in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and other locations.

Now, nearly 15 years after the end of the Cold War, we no longer expect our forces to fight in place: our forces need to be able to project power into theaters that may be far from where they are based.

The Principles for Realignment

President Bush decided it was time for a comprehensive review of the U.S. global defense posture, a review that could serve the President’s broader purposes to transform the US armed forces for the future.

This review of our Global Defense Posture has been guided by five key policy themes —

Strengthen Allied Roles. First, we want to expand allied roles and build new partnerships. We have worked to ensure that our allies and friends recognize that, in transforming the US posture, we’re safeguarding the US commitment to help defend our common interests. Changes in the U.S. global posture also aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, doctrines and strategies. As we discuss the U.S. realignment with our allies and partners, we are exploring ways in which we together can transform our military capabilities. At the same time, we seek to tailor the physical U.S. "footprint" to suit local conditions. Our goal is to reduce friction with host nations, the kind that results from accidents and other problems relating to local sensitivities.

Flexibility to Contend with Uncertainty. Second, we have to create greater flexibility to
contend with uncertainty. Much of our existing overseas posture was established on the premise that we knew where we would fight. The lessons of the last 15 years tell us that we often are required to conduct military operations in places that were not predicted. It is clear that the Defense Department needs to plan, but we must plan to be surprised. Our goal is to have forces deployed forward in such a way that they can quickly reach crisis spots as necessary in the future.

*Focus Within and Across Regions.* Third, in the Cold War, we tended to focus on threats to specific regions, and tailored our military presence to those regions. Now we’re dealing with challenges that are global in nature—so global strategies and actions are necessary to complement our regional planning. We need to improve our ability to project power from one region to another and to manage forces on a global basis.

*Develop Rapidly Deployable Capabilities.* Fourth, because our forward-deployed forces are unlikely to fight where they’re actually based, we have to make those forces rapidly deployable. For this concept to work, U.S. forces need to be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations, which puts a premium on establishing flexible legal and support arrangements with our allies and partners.

*Focus on Capabilities, Not Numbers.* Finally, our key purpose is to push relevant capabilities forward. That does not require us to push additional forces forward. In fact, we can now have far greater capabilities forward than in the past, with smaller numbers of forces permanently stationed abroad. In gauging the degree of commitment the US has to a given region, the key concept is not numbers of forces or platforms we have stationed there, but the magnitude to the military capabilities we can bring to bear there rapidly.

A goal of the many consultations we have conducted with our allies and friends has been to demonstrate that, in transforming our posture, the United States is increasing its ability to help secure our common interests, whether we are increasing or decreasing the numbers of personnel or units in a given area.

Our goal is to be positioned to deal with uncertainty, with the right forces, the right relationships, the right authority and the ability to execute our missions within and across regions.
Elements of Posture – Relationships, Activities, Facilities, Legal Arrangements, and Surge

The term “posture” means not only bases or facilities. It encompasses also activities, relationships, legal arrangements, and surge capability.

When we speak of our posture in a region, we are referring not just to bases, but to the military activities we perform there. These activities include training, exercises, and operations. They involve small units working together in a wide range of capacities. They involve major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in joint and combined operations. They involve the “nuts and bolts” of providing support to ongoing operations. And they involved the force protection that we and our allies provide to one another.

Another aspect of our posture in a region are the defense relationships we have with partners there. These relationships involve interactions at all levels – from heads of state to the students that interact in the many school houses that we and our allies provide.

Our posture, of course, also includes the facilities where our forces live, train and operate. In addition to retaining, but consolidating, our main operating bases in places like Germany, Italy, the U.K., Japan, and Korea, we intend also to rely on forward operating sites with rotational presence and pre-positioned equipment. Additionally, we’ll need access to a broader range of “cooperative security locations,” the term we use for facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence, but with periodic service or contractor support.

Fifteen years of operational experience tells us that we need a new, more innovative, more joint approach to pre-positioned equipment and stocks that reflects the new requirements for operational flexibility. We are reaping benefits from rapidly advancing information technologies by consolidating administrative functions in the U.S. and elsewhere through what is called “reachback.”

Fourth, many of our current legal arrangements date back a half a century or more. We want our international agreements to be up-to-date – to reflect new realities and enable operational flexibility. They have to help, not hinder, the rapid deployment and employment of U.S. and coalition forces worldwide in a crisis. And these legal arrangements should encourage responsibility and burden-sharing among our partners and ourselves, while providing the necessary legal protections for our personnel.
Finally, US military forces need to be managed globally in a way that will allow us to surge a greater percentage of the force rapidly wherever in the world this may be required. Combatant Commanders no longer “own” forces in their theaters. The President and Secretary of Defense apportion the forces as needed – taking them anywhere in the world as the circumstances warrant.

Regional Implications

The changes we are effecting in activities, relationships, facilities, legal arrangements, and surge capacity will improve our nation’s ability to support diplomacy and perform across the spectrum of military operations globally.

In Asia, our ideas build upon our current ground, air, and naval access in Central, Northeast, and Southeast Asia to overcome the vast distances. We plan to bring additional naval and air capabilities forward into the region. We envision consolidating facilities and headquarters in Japan and Korea to gain efficiencies and enable regional and global action. Our plans would establish nodes for special operations forces and multiple access avenues for contingency operations.

Our plans for our posture in Europe include lighter and more deployable ground capabilities, leading-edge air and naval power, advanced training facilities, and strengthened special operations forces, all positioned to deploy more rapidly to the Middle East and other hot spots.

In the Middle East, we propose to maintain what we call “warm” facilities for rotational forces and contingency purposes, building on cooperation and access provided by host nations during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we have in mind a diverse array of smaller cooperative security locations for contingency access.

Working with Allies, Partners, and Congress

It bears reemphasizing: our military forces, both forward-deployed and based at home, are only part of our military capability. The network of alliances and security relationships
we have created with other nations is a key element of our ability to defend U.S. interests. When the United States acts in the world, we do not act by ourselves, but as a part of a community of states.

On 25 November 2003, President Bush stated that the U.S. would intensify consultations with friends, allies, and partners overseas on our review of global defense posture. The results of our senior-level consultations at NATO and in key European, Asian and other capitals helped to create understanding and cooperation regarding our posture realignment. Our foreign counterparts appreciated that their input was sought before key decisions have been made and they understood our global, long-term view and the strategic rationale for conducting the review at this time.

The global posture review had its origins in the 2001 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. We have made significant progress during 2003-2004, and proposals have been shared frequently with the Congressional leadership, committee leadership and members, and committee staffs. Today, we are providing an update on the decision process for strengthening U.S. global defense posture.

As the administration moves forward in discussions with allies and partners on specific proposals, Administration officials will remain in close consultation with the Congress. This will be particularly important as our consultations with allies begin transitioning from proposals for changes, to negotiations about details of those changes, to agreements on our new plans.

Finally, the global posture decision process and BRAC are tightly linked, indeed they depend on each other. They are both key components of the President’s transformation agenda, and they both will be critical instruments for stability in the lives of service members and their families. Together, they will help to provide more predictability in assignments and rotations.

The progress made to date on global posture enables DoD to provide specific input on overseas changes for BRAC 2005. That input will allow domestic implications of the global posture review – with forces and personnel either returning to or moving forward from US territory – to be accounted for as effectively as possible within the BRAC decision-making process.
Finally, as was the case with previous BRAC rounds, the U.S. will retain enough domestic infrastructure to provide for difficult-to-reconstitute assets to respond to surge needs, and to accommodate significant force reconstitution as necessary, including all forces based within or outside the United States.

In closing, we appreciate this committee’s vision and support as we work to implement necessary, strategic improvements to America’s global defense posture.
<APPENDIX3> 인터넷 자료 목록

■ 미국의 국방전략 및 변화(Transformation) 전략 관련 자료 목록

□ 미 최고 정책결정자의 발언

부시 대통령의 GPR(Global Posture Review) 관련 연설, November 25, 2003

렌스펠드 국방장관의 연설, 아태지역안보회의 (싱가폴)
Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 5, 2004, Singapore

□ 국방전략 및 변화전략 관련 각종 보고서

국방변화, 미의회 국방패널(National Defense Panel) 보고서

함동전망 2020, 미 합참 보고서

변화연구보고서, 국방부장관 스터디그룹 보고서
Transformation Study Report,

QDR 2001, 국방부 보고서

핵대세(NPR) 보고서, 미 국방부
Nuclear Posture Review Report, DoD, January 9, 2002
변화계획지침서, 미 국방부
http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/docs/transformationplanningapr03.pdf

군사변환: 전략적 접근, 국방부 OFT 보고서

■ Military Transformation 관련 인터넷자료, 책, 정기간행물 인터넷 색인
Compiled by Joan T. Phillips
Bibliographer, Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, AL, April 2004

■ 한국 국방부 자료

□ 미래한미동맹정책구상회의(FOTA) 회의 보도자료

제10차 회의 (2004. 7. 23) http://www.mnd.go.kr/anbo/hwp/10cha_kor.hwp
제 8차 회의 (2004. 5. 10) http://www.mnd.go.kr/anbo/hwp/8cha_kor.hwp
제 7차 회의 (2004. 2. 14) http://www.mnd.go.kr/anbo/hwp/7cha_kor.hwp
제 3차 회의 (2003. 9. 23) http://www.mnd.go.kr/anbo/hwp/3cha_kor.hwp
제 2차 회의 (2003. 6. 05) http://www.mnd.go.kr/anbo/hwp/2cha_kor.hwp
제 1차 회의 (2003. 4. 09) http://www.mnd.go.kr/anbo/hwp/1cha_kor.hwp

□ 국방부, <한미동맹과 주한미군> (2003. 개정판)
<APPENDIX4> 주한미군 재배치 및 변환전략 진행 일지

2003년

3월 15일 국방부 업무보고회, 노태통령 차주국방방안 마련 자시
4월 8일 제1차 FOTA 서울회의,
  - 한미동맹을 새로운 세계안보환경에 적용시킴
  - 한반도안보에 있어 한국의 역할 증대, 주한미군의 역내 안정에 대한 기여강화, 한국측은 군사능력 발전에 따라 특정임무(selected missions) 책임
  - 주한미군기지의 통합화 (조기에 용산기지 이전), 미2사단 조정에 유려
  - 연합지휘관계의 중장기적 발전방향 공동연구
4월 9일 한나라당 주한미군철수반대모임(의원 133명) 2사단 후방배치반대 친만명 서영운동 선언
5월 6일 조영길국방장관, 노태통령에게 ‘자주국방과 군전력증강사업 비전’보고.
  - 주한미군은 동북아질서유지, 한반도안보는 한국군이 주도적으로 책임
  - 국방예산 GDP 대비 2.7%에서 3%대로 증액
5월 14일 한미정상회담 공동성명
  - 부시대통령, 한반도 및 아태지역에서의 미군의 강력한 전진주문 공약 재확인
  - 주한미군 기지 통합 및 조속한 시일내 용산기지 재배치
  - 한강이북 미군기지 재배치는 신중히 추진
  - 한반도 방위에 있어 한국군의 역할 증대
5월 31일 주한미군 전력증강계획 발표
  - 전력보강을 위해 향후 3년간 110억불 투자
  - 신속동부여단(Stryker)의 한국 순환배치
  - 신형 펌프리어트 미사일 (PAC-3) 추가배치 및 AH-64D 아파치 롱보우헬 기도입, 재래식 비유도 자유낙하 폭격의 통합격탄(JDAM)으로 개량검토
6월 1일 월포워치 미 국방부 부장관 “주한미군 재배치에 따라 전력보충을 위해 향후 3년간에 걸쳐 110억불을 투자하였다”
6월 4일 제2차 FOTA 서울회의, 미국측, 주한미군 감군 의사 표명 (언론에 비공개)
~ 6월 5일 미래한미동맹정책구상이 미군의 강력한 전방배치유지 등 미국의 대한방위공약을 구체화하기 위한 부시행정부의 노력의 일환
• 주한미군 기지체계 2개 권역(오산평택-대구부산)으로 발전. 미2사단은 상당기간 주둔
• 주한미군 신무기체계 도입 계획 설명
• 한미연합군사능력발전에 연계하여 한미군간 임무전환 추진

6월 25일
찰스 캐멜 미8군 사령관, 국방부 군사편찬연구소 주한미군 군사연구실이 전쟁기념관에서 공동 주최한 ‘한국전쟁시 한미 군사적 역할과 주변국 대응’이라는 세미나에서 “한미양국간 용산기지와 미 2사단 재배치 협의에 따라 주한미군 일부병력 감소될 것” 기조연설문 발표. 이후 부인.

6월 27일
한미국방장관 회의
• 온해말부터 용산기지의 오산평택 조기 이전 합의
• 미2사단 2단계 한강이남 배치(동두천/의정부으로 통합 후 한강이남으로 이전)

7월 22일
FOTA 제3차 회의(하와이)
• 일부 군사임무의 한국군에 전환
• 2006년 말까지 용산기지 이전
• 미2사단 2단계 한강이남 배치 재확정(2008년까지)
• 연합지휘관의 중장기적 발전방향 공동연구 2005년 SCM에 결과보고

7월 30일
국방부, 국회의 국방위원회 서면 답변서, “주한미군 재배치가 철군을 의미하는 것은 아니며 철군 또는 감군과 관련하여 어떠한 논의도 진행된 바 없다.”

8월 15일
대통령 광복절 경축사, “10년네 자주국방능력 갖추기 토대 마련” 발표

8월 19일
안보관계관의 회의, 총리를 위원장으로 하는 ‘주한미군해조해안보협력협의’ 구성. 추진 주한미군해안보협력협의로 개정

9월 3일
FOTA 제4차 서울회의
• 용산기지 이전 관련 양해각서(MOU)와 합의각서(MOA) 개정한 포괄협정 마련 합의
• JSA 경비임무 한국군에 전환 유예
• 미 볼리스 차관보, 비공식적으로 이라크 전투병 파병 요청

9월 24일
도널드 런스필드 국방장관, “현대전에서는 병력규모보다 미국의 정밀성과 파괴력 및 신기술, 그리고 전략이 중요하다. 미군 당국은 현재 어떤 규모로 어떻게 재배치해야 할지 여부 등을 검토 중”

10월 1일
노 대통령, 국군의 날 연설 “자주국방” 재거론.

10월 8일
FOTA 제5차 서울회의, 용산기지 이전협상 결렬

10월 10일
피터 폰테이스 미국 합참의장, “개별적으로 주한 미군 병력은 감축될 수 있을 것으로 보다”고 발언.

10월 19일
AP통신, 부시 행정부 관리 및 외부 전문가 발언 인용해 ‘미 행정부는 현
제 3만7천명 규모의 주한 미군의 3분의 1 가량인 1만2천명을 감축하기를 원하고 있으며 한국 정부와 세부사항에 대한 협상을 진행 중"

10월 20일
고건 총리, "주한 미군에 110억 달러의 전력증가이 이뤄지면 인력 감축은 될 수 있다는 개념은 (한미가) 공유하고 있다"

11월 14일
컴즈펠드 국방장관, "한국과 일본을 상대로 양국에 배치된 미군을 적극적으로 재배치하는 문제를 놓고 국 협의를 시작할 계획"이라고 발표한 데 이어 주한 미군을 한반도 이외 지역에 투입해서는 안 된다는 데 의문 제기.

11월 17일
한미연대안보협의회의(SCM)
- 랜스펠드, 한국의 이라크추가파병 방침에 강력반발.
- 3개년간 미국의 한국방위에 관련된 110억불 군사력 증강계획 재확정
- 10개 군사담당 한국군에 전환/ 주한미군 재배치방안 협의 재확정
- 랜스펠드 공동기자회견, "주한미군 재배치는 병력 '수'가 아닌 '능력'에 중점된 변화가 이뤄질 것이며, 필요한 장소에 효과적으로 투입될 수 있는 통성을 지니어야 한다"고 강조.

11월 25일
미국, 해외주둔 미군 재배치계획(GPR) 발표.

11월 26일
백악관, "조지 부시 대통령은 한반도에서 주한 미군 감축이나 유엔사령부 재배치에 대해 아무런 결정을 내리지 않았다"고 언급.

12월 3일
디글라스 패이스 국방부 정책담당차관, 변환(Transformation) 5권척 발표

12월 26일
뉴욕타임스 인터넷판, '부시 행정부가 해외 주둔 미군의 재배치에 착수함에 따라 이런 변화는 미군이 지속적으로 중요한 역할을 해온 남한에서 가장 실감날 것으로 보인다'고 보도.

2004년

1월 16일
리차드 롤리스 국방부 아태담당 부차관보, 제6차 FOTA 하와이 회의에서 "부상기부가 2003년 11월에 주한미군사령부, 미8군사령부, 한미연합사령부, 주한UN군사령부를 오산, 평택기지로 이전할 것을 한국측에 통보"

2월 3일
워싱턴 타임스 인터넷판, "미국 국방부가 주한 미군 사령부와 유엔사령부, 한미 연합사령부 등을 재배치하는 방안을 유력하게 검토하고 있다"고 보도.

2월 7일
컴즈펠드 국방장관, "해외 주둔 미군 재배치에 따른 가장 큰 변화는 독일과 한국 등에서 일어날 것"이라고 발언.

2월 13일
FOTA 제7차 회의, 미국측 주한미군 일부 이라크전선에 차출 통보(비공개)

3월 2일
주한 미군 사령부, "주한 미군의 감축이나 연합 지휘체계의 변화에 대해 논의한 적이 없다"고 발표.
3월 31일 리안 라포트 주한미군사령관, 미하원 군사위원회 국방예산안 심의회의에서 "지금까지 주한미군 강군을 전혀 논의한 바 없다"고 강조

5월 4일 램스펠드. "주한미군 일부 추출하여 이라크 파병"가능성 시사(미공영라디오 방송 NPR의 인터뷰)
반기문 외무부 장관, "주한미군 해외배치와 관련하여 어떠한 논의도 한 바 없다"고 논평

5월 6일 FOTA 제8차 위상인 회의
- 5월 8일 • 용산기지 조기이전 위한 새로운 합의서(UA/IA)의 체결을 위해 노력 경주  
  • 촉각설 예하에 '주한미군대책위', 국방부 '미군기지이전대책단'을 통해 미2사단을 포함한 주한미군 재배치 추진을 위한 한국 정부의 노력에 미국 지원을 요청

5월 15일 미국, 주한미군 1개 여단 이라크 차출 결정

5월 17일 스티브 해들리 미 NSC 부 보좌관, 이라크 차출 한국 통보  
정부, 미국이 주한 미군의 일부를 이라크로 파견할 것을 제의했다고 발표

5월 25일 찰스캘버 미8군사령관, "주한미군은 지역내 우발사태 뿐 아니라 세계적 소용에도 투입될 수 있다"고 기자간담회에서 발언

5월 31일 정부, '주한미군 강축협상 6월7일 시작'발표

6월 4일 부사대령형, 주한미군 이라크 차출 노력에 대통령의 전화통보

6월 6일 램스펠드, 조영길 국방주관에 미군강군조치 통보 (싱가폴, 아시아안보회의)  
6월 6일 '3인위원회' (리처드 부처관보와 2명, 김숙 북미국장, 위성학 정책조정관, 한인구 국방부 국제협력관 참석)에서 2005년까지 1만 2천 5백명 감군계획을 한국정부에 통보 (뉴욕타임즈, 2004년 6월 9일자)

6월 7일 FOTA 제9차 서울회의 열림
- 6월 8일 • 용산기지 이전을 위한 새로운 합의서의 세부 쟁점(부지제공 규모) 추가 논의 독의  
  • FOTA 회의서 주한미군 강축 논의 적절히 반영

6월 23일 다크러스 페이스 미국방부 정책담당 차관, 하원 군사위원회 참문회 연설,  "지역적, 글로벌 차원의 군사행동을 위해 일본과 한국에 있는 시설과 사령부등을 통합(consolidating)할 구성"

7월 7일 콘돌리자 라이스 국가안보보좌관 방문, '주한미군 병력수를 줄이는 것이 한국에 대한 안보공약에 대한 미국의 의지를 줄이는 것이 아니다'

7월 22일 FOTA 제10차 위상인 회의
• 이라크 파병에 환영  
• 주한미군 구조변화와 무관하게 미의 안보공약 및 전쟁역지역 강화 강조  
• 용산기지 이전을 위한 새로운 합의서에 점검 합의  
• 미2사단 재배치안에 따른 연합토지관리계획(LPP) 상의 변경요인 개정
• 가능한 기지(캠프 하아리아, 캠프페이지, 캠프 퀸워터) 조기 반환

8월 4일 주한 미군 제2사단 2여단 3,600여명이 이라크로 떠남
8월 20일 FOTA 제11차 서울회의
• 용산기지 이전을 위한 새로운 합의서와 LPP 개정협정에 가서명