Regional Architecture in East Asia and Middle Power Diplomacy

November 26, 2011

Millennium Seoul Hilton, Seoul, Korea
Knowledge-Net for a Better World

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Trilateral Dialogue on
Regional Architecture in East Asia and
Middle Power Diplomacy

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Millennium Seoul Hilton, South Korea
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Program

Date: November 26, 2011  
Venue: Coral Room, 3rd floor of Millennium Seoul Hilton

9:30~9:40  Opening Remarks

9:40~12:00  Session I. How to Design Middle Power Architecture in East Asia  
Moderator: Fu-Kuo Liu, National Chengchi University

9:40~10:10  Presentation of Positioning Papers  
Korean Perspective  Chaesung Chun, East Asia Institute & Seoul National University  
Japanese Perspective  Yoshihide Soeya, Keio University  
Taiwanese Perspective  Ming Lee, National Chengchi University

10:10~12:00  Discussion  
Kang Choi, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security  
Francis Yi-hua Kan, National Chengchi University  
Seungjoo Lee, Chungang University  
Fu-Kuo Liu, National Chengchi University  
Isao Miyaoka, Keio University  
Hiroshi Nakanishi, Kyoto University  
Yul Sohn, Yonsei University

12:00~13:30  Luncheon  
Venue: Orangerie, 3rd floor
13:30~17:45  Session II. Issue-Specific Areas for Cooperation among Middle Powers
13:30~14:00  Part 1
Moderator: Chaesung Chun, Seoul National University

Economic Cooperation
Presenter   Yul Sohn, Yonsei University

Regional Security/Strategic Cooperation
Presenters  Fu-Kuo Liu, National Chengchi University
            Isao Miyaoka, Keio University

14:00~15:30  Discussion
Discussants Yih-Chyi Chuang, National Chengchi University
            Young Ho Kim, Korea National Defense University
            Sang-hyun Lee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
            Hiroshi Nakanishi, Kyoto University

15:30~15:45  Coffee Break
15:45~16:15  Part 2
Moderator: Yoshihide Soeya, Keio University

Official Development Aid
Presenter   Seungjoo Lee, Chungang University

Cross-strait Relations
Presenter   Francis Kan, National Chengchi University

Disaster Relief, Nuclear Safety, etc.
Presenter   Hiroshi Nakanishi, Kyoto University

16:15~17:45  Discussion
Discussants Chaesung Chun, Seoul National University
            Ming Lee, National Chenchi University
            Isao Miyaoka, Keio University

17:45~18:30  Wrap-up Session

* Venue for Dinner: Little Thai (Fusion Thai Restaurant)
  Seoul Finance Center B1 Floor, Taepyeong-ro 1ga, Jung-gu, Seoul
* The participants will meet at 18:45 at the lobby of the hotel and move to the restaurant by minibus.
Presentation Materials

Session I. How to Design Middle Power Architecture in East Asia
[Korean Perspective]
Chaesung Chun, East Asia Institute & Seoul National University
Common Challenges

- **Balance of power regional system** of Northeast Asia and the lack of regional multilateral institutions: importance of hard power, arms race
- Burdens from the past; nationalism, memory politics, territorial disputes
- **Transition of power** in the 21st century; rise of China, reinvigoration of Russia(?) vs. decline of the US(?) vs. changes in North Korea
- What will be the future/end-state of the combination of balance of power and power transition in the region? Multilateral cooperation or “Clash of Titans?”; overcoming the problem of “overtheorizing”
Common Challenges

- Contending East Asian security/economy/identity architectures; Changes in US-China relations and possible rivalry between two powers

- Common grounds, but also differences of each country’s China policy: South Korea and the US, Japan, Taiwan, ASEAN, India...etc.

- Discrepancy between regional economic architecture and security one: For South Korea, increasing eco. dependence on China and security cooperation with the US

- Changes from new institutional settings in the region: FTA networks, and competing institutional architectures

Common Challenges

- Dealing with each country’s problems; for South Korea, transitional North Korea - finding new peaceful order on the Peninsula in the times of new leader in North Korea; risks of Kim Jung Un’s version of “military-first” national strategy and possible domestic confusion

- To find stable domestic settings for desirable regional orders; hopes for better post-2012 regimes in Asia
Tasks for East Asian Middle Power Cooperation

- Coordination of Great Power Policies among Middle powers
- Developing common brokerage to stabilize great powers’ rivalry and clash
- Working for global governance and to import global norms and to cultivate habits of norm-based regional cooperation
- To suggest alternative regional architecture than great powers’ hegemonic ones
- To establish common roles for cooperative conveners: bringing together states and non-state actors across the region(s) to work together in issues of common interest (G20, Nuclear summit…)

Tasks for East Asian Middle Power Cooperation

- Developing more cooperative security/economy/culture regional institutions, and hopefully having initiatives from more functional and human security areas
- Taking care of each middle powers’ respective concerns: cross-strait relations, inter-Korean relations, post-Fukushima situations…
- Finding common global roles for the Third World countries; PKO, ODA, environments…
- Developing social/cultural exchanges among East Asians, esp. among young generations
- Emphasis upon value-oriented activities, in education, arts, and religion.
Visions for Future South Korean Foreign Policy

- Finding sustainable, bipartisan paradigm for “more positive role in the region”
- Building East Asian Regional Complex Network; dense network among multilayered actors in diverse issue areas (more modest than liberal ideas, but more oriented to post-modern transition)
- Establishing New Governance on the Korean Peninsula
- Contribution to the development of Global Governance
- Establishing cohesive social support for this paradigm

Major Tasks for South Korea

- From power transition to transformation of regional order; to enhance systemic flexibility to absorb power transition – peaceful adjustment of power shift with new institutions
- Developing and continuing the transformation the ROK-US strategic complex alliance in the 21st century; global/regional/peninsular level
- Engaging with China – evading both unpeaceful rise of China, and non-rise of China
- Establishing bilateral multi-level strategic network with China, and coping with uncertainty related to the development of China
China policy-opportunities

- **Complex network** with various levels of Chinese society: pluralizing identities in China – business, NGO, policy circles...
- Strengthening **market links**, empowering private sectors in China
- **More strategic dialogue**; strategic cooperative partnership
- Neighbor country’s input on Chinese view of “responsible great power” discourse

China policy-Challenges

- **Changes in China for Complex network**; Possibilities for continuing pluralization of Chinese society
- Differences in China policy among neighboring countries, and their own domestic factors
- **Collective action problem** among middle power cooperation; consensus on the what kind of future China as “non-exclusive” and “non-rivalry” goods?
- Different levels of interest, power asymmetry and threats in bilateral relations with China for each country
Major Tasks – Japan policy

- **Strategic Cooperation** with Japan, and developing ROK-Japan-US cooperation: two track cooperation for the time being, and dealing with domestic politics in two countries
- Esp. defense cooperation; now the issues of GSOMIA (The General Security of Military Information Agreement) and ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement)
- Growing common identity b/w Korea and Japan; especially among young generation
- Consensus on long-term strategy of “normalized Japan”(?), and common China and regional strategy

Major Tasks – Taiwan policy

- renewed strategic considerations toward Taiwan; from China policy toward regional policy
- New strategic vision from middle power cooperation for new regional architecture
- Finding new areas of cooperation, from socio-economic and cultural exchanges
- Finding new diversified mini-lateral arrangements with Taiwan in many issues
- More talks and shared wisdom about two unifications
Major Tasks - others

- Solving the “North Korean Problems” based on coevolution of North Korea’s normalization and surrounding countries’ long-term North Korean policies: Third way between “sunshine” and “hard-line policy”
- Participating more actively in major global institutions and applying global norms to regional problems: enhancing strategic culture for global responsibility in South Korea (ODA, PKO…)

Thank you!
The Yoshida Line as Middle Power Diplomacy

The fundamental premises of postwar Japanese diplomacy have been and will continue to be the postwar constitution (most importantly the war-renouncing Article 9) and the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Postwar Japanese diplomacy conditioned by these most fundamental premises has been called the Yoshida line, because both are the choices made by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida who had steered the postwar departure of Japanese diplomacy. Arguably, the Yoshida line still guides Japanese diplomacy, because not a single word of the constitution has been changed since its inception in 1946 until today, and the same is true for the U.S.-Japan security treaty since it was revised in 1960. This is likely to be the case for many years to come, despite the fact that the constitutional debate for a possible revision has now ceased to be a taboo, and that the role of Japan under the U.S.-Japan alliance set up has constantly been expanding. In a nutshell, changes happening in Japanese diplomacy since the end of the Cold War could be understood as those within the broad parameters of the Yoshida line, as examined below.

The Yoshida line of foreign policy, however, has had an important structural problem: it has been susceptible to challenges of nationalism seeking “autonomy” and “independence.” This was precisely because both of the basic premises of the Yoshida line, the postwar constitution and the U.S.-Japan security treaty, in essence deprives Japan of freedom of action and constrains Japanese options in a most fundamental way. In a way, it should be natural for any sovereign nation constrained to such an extent to be exposed to the question of conservative nationalism of one kind or another.

Both of Yoshida’s choices, however, can be regarded as “realistic,” against the backdrops of the extraordinary history of war of aggression since the 1930s and under the reality of the Cold War. Under these circumstances, postwar Japanese nationalism seeking “autonomy” and “independence” in the true sense of the word has been rather “unrealistic.” In fact, postwar Japanese nationalism has often manifested itself as the assertion of spiritual values or some form of passion rather than the articulation of realistic choices diplomatically and strategically. As such, postwar nationalism of Japan should be regarded as a symptom of the peculiar structural problem rooted in the Yoshida line, rather than a solution to the problem. This was amply demonstrated by the fact that postwar Japanese diplomacy was largely a success contributing to the rise of Japan as the number two economic power in the world and as a nation committed to international peace. Arguably, it was the Yoshida line that has represented Japan’s “postwar realism.”

This, however, was not achieved without a cost, the dearest cost being the susceptibility of the
Yoshida line to the challenges of nationalism seeking assertiveness or “autonomy.” This structural problem turned out to be complex, because such nationalism was divided between the ideological left and the right, and the trigger of this division was none other than the Yoshida’s original choices.

In 1946 when Yoshida accepted the postwar constitution, the Cold War had not yet erupted and the United States and the other Allied Powers had contemplated a postwar order under the principle of international cooperation including U.S.-Soviet cooperation, most typically symbolized in the scheme of the United Nations. It was expected that Asian peace would be maintained by a democratic China as the center of Asian stability, which had joined the United Nations as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The security of Japan embracing the postwar constitution had been expected to be guaranteed by the United Nations.

When the Cold War started in the European continent in 1947, however, the postwar constitution of Japan, at least from the logic of international politics, already became outdated. It was therefore natural for the United States to begin to push for Japan to reconsider the postwar constitution, particularly the Article 9. Yoshida, or for that matter the Japanese people in general, however, did not think it was wise to do so. Then emerged the idea of a possible security treaty between the United States and Japan, in order to guarantee Japan’s security, as well as for the United States to be responsible for East Asia security. Yoshida then signed the original security treaty with the United States in San Francisco in September 1951, right after signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

Equilibrium between Divided Nationalism

The Yoshida line, thus, came to embrace the postwar constitution and the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the products of entirely different international environments, which any nation would not have chosen at the same time under any given international environment. As a result, Japanese nationalism seeking “autonomy” got divided between the left and the right. The leftist political forces, believing in the postwar constitution almost as a bible, naturally had entirely negative views toward the history of war and attacked the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and later the Self Defense Forces. To the contrary, the political forces to the right of the centrist Yoshida line, initially did not like both the postwar constitution and the U.S.-Japan security treaty out of their truly conservative urge of seeking “independence,” but gradually came to accept the security treaty while harboring the agenda of a possible constitutional revision, as explicitly written in the LDP’s party platform when the party was created in 1955.

Here, divided nationalism attacked the different premises of the Yoshida line from the left and the right, but the Yoshida line has proven to be robust enough, amply demonstrating that the Yoshida line has represented an equilibrium point, deeply embedded in the San Francisco Peace Regime. Under these circumstances, changing the constitution has been tantamount to a significant modification of the San Francisco Peace Regime, and, aside from the fact that the
majority of the Japanese public repented the war enough to spontaneously retain the postwar constitution, this has been the most important external factor that has made the revision of the postwar constitution virtually impossible.

This has particularly been the case, because the dominant conservative arguments for the constitutional revision have often been closely associated with the conservative views toward the history of war of aggression, even to the extent of defending the cause of the aggressive war according to the ideology held by the military leaders at the time. Such a revision if realized is nothing other than a revolution to the postwar San Francisco Peace Regime at least logically speaking.

Curiously enough, this deep reality of postwar Japanese politics resurfaced explicitly after the end of the Cold War and particularly after the collapse of the 1955 regime in domestic politics triggered by the virtual demise of the leftist political forces at the level of national politics. Quite significantly, however, the conservative urge to revise the postwar constitution, let alone the unwillingness to accept the victors’ account of the war history has never been expressed as part of any future oriented strategy, but has simply been discharged against the political opponents in domestic politics, and against China and Korea whenever the so-called history issues, and to a lesser extent the territorial disputes, would surface as diplomatic issues.

True, emotional animosities over the history and territorial disputes with China and Korea have often been the providers of fuels to the conservative urges as well as the important reasons why the conservative atmosphere often prevails into the general public. Because of this phenomenon, it may look as though Japanese diplomatic and even strategic choices are being driven by the rise of political conservatism, even into the collision course particularly with China. As implied above, however, these conservative urges are nothing but a symptom of the structural problem rooted in the Yoshida line, and they have rarely been articulated as an explicit alternative strategy.

Implications for East Asian Regionalism
In the process of East Asian regionalism, the aspect of China-Japan “rivalry” over the leadership role has tended to be highlighted in the eyes of many observers including policy-makers. As seen below, however, this competition between China and Japan is not of geopolitical nature, but rather conceptual. Also, a hidden source of tension has to do with the different attitudes of Japan and China toward the role of the United States in East Asian regionalism, and in this respect, this “rivalry” should be regarded as a conceptual competition over the ideas as to the future of an East Asian order.

Here, the defining strategic dimension is conditioned by the U.S.-China relationship, and Japan’s approach in essence stems from its geopolitical status as a middle power rather than a strategically independent great power. As such, Japanese approach to East Asian regionalism embraces many elements of de facto middle power diplomacy, including an explicit emphasis on economic means as a drive of regional integration, and more recently on human security.
In early 1997, anticipating the birth of ASEAN 10 in the fall, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto proposed the Japan-ASEAN summit should be regularized in order to accelerate the integration of ASEAN as well as Japan’s relations with the ASEAN countries. The realization of ASEAN 10 in the fall, however, was preceded by the Asian financial crisis in the summer, forcing ASEAN countries to go through a set of restructuring efforts in domestic economies as well as regional arrangements. Also, at about the same time, China has shifted its main strategic focus from high politics to low politics. ASEAN, following its usual instinct to carefully balance relations with external powers, turned the Hashimoto proposal into its own initiative leading to the establishment of ASEAN+3 at the end of 1997.

These developments have ushered in a new momentum toward deepening regional integration. Singapore took an important initiative to officially propose a free trade agreement (FTA) with Japan in December 1999 when Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong visited Japan. Japan, which had already started to study such arrangements with several countries including Mexico and South Korea, responded positively and the negotiations gained momentum.

In the meantime, observing the momentum of a series of bilateral FTA initiatives and having achieved the goal of joining the WTO, China also came up with its own FTA initiative, as most symbolically indicated by the Chinese proposal of a free trade agreement with ASEAN at the occasion of the ASEAN+3 summit meeting in November 2000. In the following year, Chinese and SEAN leaders reached a basic agreement that they would achieve a free trade area within the coming 10 years. This was quickly followed-up in November 2002, when the leaders signed a comprehensive framework agreement to carry out the plan.

These China-ASEAN initiatives have prompted the Koizumi government to develop a more comprehensive regional strategy built upon the ongoing process of FTA negotiations. In Prime Minister Koizumi’s policy speech delivered in Singapore in January 2002, Koizumi proposed an “Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership,” built upon the “Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership,” the so-called Japan-Singapore FTA, which Koizumi signed prior to the speech. More importantly, the Koizumi proposal included an ambitious reference to an East Asian community. Koizumi said to the audience in Singapore that “our goal should be the creation of a community that acts together and advances together.” Koizumi expressed his expectation that, starting from Japan-ASEAN cooperation, “the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand will be core members of such a community.”

The proposal of an East Asian Community in the Koizumi speech has ignited a process of conceptual competition between China and Japan. Particularly, the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand embodied the line of division between the two. In the Japanese thinking, there still remains a concern about the China-centered process of community-building possibly developing into a closed region particularly vis-à-vis the United States. In this Japanese conception, the inclusion of
Australia and New Zealand holds a double function. First, they provide a venting channel leading to the United States as a security anchor in East Asia. Secondly, the membership of Australia and New Zealand is also important from the point of view of universal values that will sustain, as well as keep open, the foundations of an East Asian Community to the rest of the world.

If seen from this Japanese perspective, behind the competition over the primary institution for community building between the ASEAN+3 formula, on the one hand, and the East Asian Summit comprising of ASEAN+6 (involving Australia, New Zealand and India), on the other, lies this conceptual rivalry, if not geopolitical conflict, between Japan and China. And this should be a healthy competition, which the other East Asian nations should be involved through constructive dialogue and debate.
Introduction
The planet we live, where sovereign states, political entities, and other non-state actors interact, constructs a terminology “international system.” The international system is comprised of less than 200 sovereign states, among them 48 countries in Asia, while 21 economies forge the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In terms of their geographical sizes, population, natural endowments, degree and character of economic development vary, just like the vast diversities of their cultural, ethnic and historical backgrounds.

According to Hans J. Morgenthau, prominent scholar in international politics living in the 20th century, national power can be decisive in framing domestic as well as foreign policies. He points out that “elements of national power” can be divided into two categories, i.e., some stable, and some subject to constant change. Among the comparatively stable elements, geography has been the most stable factor that determines the national power. Countries with bigger territorial size or better strategic locations will possess certain leverages vis-à-vis others. The United States, former Soviet Union (Russia), China no doubt fit into this group, that they can be widely regarded as big powers. Countries with larger territorial sizes, like the above-mentioned countries, are especially less vulnerable if encounter large-scale wars. Second element of national power is natural resources, including food, raw materials, energy and others, making states easier to lead to stable and wealthier conditions. The industrial capacity will be another important factor that affects the efficiency that countries defend themselves. Military preparedness, including technology used in military, leadership, and quantity and quality of armed forces, will be also decisive in defending their survival. Another will be the sizes of population of different countries. Countries possess large amount population may not necessarily be big powers, since the quality of population will matter; nonetheless, countries with tiny population obviously can never be big powers. These five elements of power can be regarded as tangible power, while some intangible power elements matter, too. National character, national morale, quality of diplomacy, and quality of government, the intangible elements, are also crucial in determining national power of countries. These intangible elements are sometimes more important than those tangible ones, since they can play as supportive pillars when tangible ones are insufficient.1

The five permanent members of the United Nations are no doubt big powers, some are even superpowers. The five big powers all have both tangible and intangible elements of power. All of them have strong “hard and soft” power that they not only possess capacity of “attracting” and “persuading”

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others, but the military forces so as to fulfill their national goals and to “coerce” others to obey their will. Other countries may not possess all necessary power elements, or ones that paralleled to those of the big five when they operate their own endowments in external policies. Some states may have lethal weapons, sometimes they use lethal weapons to blackmail, but they are prone to encounter interference or sanctions from the international community and may even go further in inviting interventions.

Most of other countries, if not big powers, can be divided into several tiers based on their economic development, say, the amount of their respective gross domestic product (GDP), comparative capability in military positions, overseas military operation, international service, and other international cooperation. Of course, size of territory, population, industrial output, volume of international trade, especially geographic-strategic locations of the contemporary countries count heavily. Some countries possessing some useful national power element, can possibly be middle powers. This would help to explain why Canada, Australia, India, Indonesia, Israel and South Korea are often labeled as “middle powers.”

Middle powers have already played crucial roles in international politics in the 20th century. They were particularly noticeable in the scale-shifting of international balance of power during the Cold War era. Middle powers usually were not so powerful in many dimension, they used to be automatically, in fact inevitably, dragged into competition or confrontation between the superpowers. Middle powers located in Asia, Europe, and Americana, were absorbed into either camps. They were invited to serve as alliances, economic suppliers, buffer zones, or all of them. Therefore, they were targets of superpower competition. Some middle powers instead organized or participated in the non-alignment movement (NAM) from the middle 1950s and later the group 77. The purpose for them to join into the NAM was to avoid being pulled into the whirlpool of troubles.

Some countries in Asia suffered from war or colonial rules during most of the 20th century, during when they were poor and blank before their achieving industrial modernization. Countries like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan were either war-torn or colonial territories. They might never have imagined their being free from exploitation of colonial powers or exempted from poverty and domestic turmoil. After decades of hard-working and capital accumulation, they became prosperous and modernized. Many of them turn out to be politically stable, strategically important, and internationally proactive, and thus qualified to be middle powers. One can infer that they will continue to exert greater influence in Asia and beyond in the years to come. This paper intends to explore the trend of middle-power cooperation in East Asia, feasibility promoting to a closer cooperation, and the possible routes leading to this transition.

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2 This idea of “soft vs. hard power” is originally from Professor Nye, see Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2006).
Middle Powers in World Politics

According to scholarly research, there are many different definitions of “middle power,” not to mention more explanations of it from views of political practitioners. As Martin Wight points out, “The great powers have always been a minority in the society of states, and thus the vast majority of states are not great powers. These are the minor powers.” As Wight continues to state, “Two kinds of minor power achieve an eminence which distinguishes them from the common run: regional great powers, and middle powers.” Again, he mentions, “In such sub-systems as these, there will be some states with general interests relative to the limited region and a capacity to act alone, which gives them the appearance of local great powers. He mentions that Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia (great powers in the Arab world), Argentina and Brazil (great powers in South America), and South Africa (great power relative to Black Africa) can be candidates, in the states-system at large, for the rank of middle power.3

As scholar indicates, Wight’s categorization put pretty much on military capability, some countries with limited military capability but vast economic gravity like Japan and Germany are most of time ruled out.4 In general, according to analysis, the problem of definition has been a complex one and Carsten Holbraad began to emphasize and looks on to GNP, population and armed forces levels, and states on the list expanded.5 It is argued that states such as Israel, Syria, Pakistan, and South Korea may be regarded as sharing some minimal common characteristics. In a nutshell, all these states usually have large populations, relatively developed, possess credible armed forces, and are reasonably wealthy. To differentiate many similar countries, but not distinct in some certain respects, Holbraad calls the above-mentioned first five states as the “upper middle powers” and the rest of those the “lower middle powers.” In most assessments of position in the international hierarchy five elements of capacity are usually considered: material or economic power, military power, motivational power, achievement and potential. As scholar points, since some, if not all, of these indices involve subjective evaluations, agreement on particular classification will always be contentious.6 But one thing is clear, the middle powers are in between the superpowers and small powers, and differences in between the middle powers and small powers are apparent and perceivable.

Ever since the end of the World War II, particularly after the end of the Cold War, one can infer that one of the major characteristics has been the increasing number of the middle powers. Reasons for this phenomenon have been partly by the steady economic development, leading to some of the

5 The list presented in 1975 by Holbraad were 18 nations, namely France, the United Kingdom, China, Japan, Germany, Canada, Italy, Brazil, Spain, Poland, India, Australia, Mexico, Iran, Argentina, South Africa, Indonesia, and Nigeria. See Ibid.
6 Ibid.
once countries in poverty to be economically solid and wealthier. The technological renovation and the economic accumulation helped these countries to fulfill their prosperity. The other reason has been that the need to survive in fierce arms race during the Cold War and the consequent coalition with big powers made them militarily augmented and powerful than other contemporary counterparts. In addition to the economic development, technological innovation, security coalition, amelioration of governance and domestic political system would also offer tremendous bonus to certain countries. This is particularly true for those countries evolved through the Third-wave of political democratization once identified by Professor Samuel P. Huntington, and those Easter European countries’ drive for de-communism and political democratization after the collapse of their respective communist regimes. For these newly emerged middle powers, they have become confident of international participation, more prestige, and better accommodation with others. There have seen some striking differences if compared with the middle powers existed during the Cold War. Unlike they were called upon to get involved in the “proxy wars,” they no longer become pawns of one to “scratch” the opposite side or any others, since they are “free nations.” Secondly, strategically speaking, they have more room to speak for themselves without fearing being “punished.” Their push for institutionalization, like South Korea and Taiwan’s political democratization in from 1987, juxtaposed by the East European political change, all have shown their increasing international status, helping them qualified to be “middle powers,” if not “big powers.” Thirdly, the role of geo-economics has replaced the geopolitics to be the most decisive factor in constructing states’ national power and their position in world politics. Most time in the last century, values of individual country hinged on its ideological feature, quantity and quality of military forces, weaponry technology, its geographical location, and number of alliances, and those countries with more of the above elements will likely enjoy an upper hand vis-à-vis its rivals. The primary code of international interaction was “power struggle,” and the vital principle of international politics was “politically more powerful than others.” Ever since the early 1970’s, there emerged some newly industrialized economies (NIES), among them existed the “Four Tigers” i.e., South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. There existed some others on the various corners of the world. With the “lighthouse effect” provided by the Four Tigers, more countries followed the suit and speed up economic development. Among them some ASEAN countries became economically wealthier than ever, with this they can be big influence if multiplied by coalition composed of 10 partners. Some of the ASEAN countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore have undoubtedly been middle powers that already cast tremendous effect on to the regional international politics.

It is unlikely that major wars will occur in the future, international free trade will certainly replace protectionist policy to ensure the mutual benefits of the participating members. Fast growing volume of the international trade has made the concerning states closely knitted into a web of economic interdependence. Middle powers like Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore exerted their economic caliber involving them into China, Southeast Asian economic development and helped to pave the way for
the latter’s fast industrialization. China, for example, has been a colossal plant since its adoption of “Open and Reform” policy from late 1970s and has further developed as the world consumption market after three decades of fast development. Better economic cooperation and exchanges between the “middle powers” themselves and middle powers with others have provided a brand-new paradigm that they have jumped over the ideological and political barriers while put economic affairs in command. “Economics in command,” rather “politics in command,” has transited the international relations onto a smoother and reasonable atmosphere that peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition become possible. Through this transition, traditional or conservative thinking of security primarily focused on power struggle and balance of power gives way to the positive and progressive one that is on the bases of common security, communitarian security, and cooperative security.

According to Eduard Jordaan of the University of Stellenbosch, “all major middle powers display foreign policy behavior that stabilizes and legitimates the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives.” He again differentiates the traditional as well as the emerging middle powers. Traditional middle powers, according to Jordaan, are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic, and not regionally influential, and behaviorally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. By contrast, emerging middle powers are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratized states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviorally, states Jordaan, the emerging middle powers opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favoring regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region.7

As of the middle power diplomacy, according to Laura Neack, middle powers are states that commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace.”8 Middle powers have also the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of “good international citizenship” to guide their diplomacy. Neack goes to interpret some interesting characteristics of middle powers’ inclination carrying out foreign policy. According to her, middle powers help to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and “go-betweens,” and through international conflict management and resolution activities. Sometimes, one can perceive that some middle powers have a moral responsibility and collective capability to protect the international order from those who threaten it, including, at times, the great or principle powers. This will have explanatory capability to show the

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values of those middle powers in the, especially unstable, international order. Through the policy operation of the middle powers, often exerting their economic as well as political caliber and gravity, can help to maintain a more conciliatory atmosphere and lead to a more peaceful environment.

The Emerging East Asian Middle Powers

Although some scholars believe that Germany and Japan are not middle powers but great powers, due to their economic strengths and global influence, many of the academics still there exist some difficult area so as to make them clear-cut. According to the list raised by the Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, there exist 46 middle powers in the contemporary world, almost one fourth of the total number of whole world. This has shown the increasing number of the middle powers is unprecedented. In East Asia alone, to pick up countries near the Pacific Ocean and its adjacent area, there are Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Judging from their military capability, Japan has been one the largest maritime power in Asia, South Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan will come immediate after.

Singapore locates in the Malacca Strait, a strategically important for the petroleum transportation all the way from the Middle East to the Far East with most of them go to Japan, Korea, China and Taiwan. With its ambivalent relations with Malaysia, and traumatic memory being occupied by the Japanese colonial rule, and the strong self-consciousness on its security vulnerability, Singapore maintains small but efficient military capability. In addition to its defensive buildup, Singapore has been particularly known for its advanced economic development, and advanced information and technology (IT) industry, making it one of the world most attractive harbors in the world. Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim countries and also an indispensably crucial country in the East Asia due to its strategic location as well as its abundant natural resources. Vietnam has pass through a tortuous path of national development and economic recovery after its liberation war against the United States. Vietnam learned to fight against the “imperialist powers” not only from the United States but China, since the later invaded Hanoi in early 1979 in the excuse of “punishing the Vietnam little hegemony.” Many years after, Vietnam improved its relations with the United States, and finally normalized its diplomatic ties with Washington in 1995, Vietnamese relations with China, instead, turned out to be deteriorated recently due to their confrontation in the South China Sea. Malaysia is also a natural resources-rich Muslim country and also an active participant, like Philippines, in the ASEAN. Taiwan and Korea were once two of the Four Tigers, both are the post-modern and post-politically democratized states but Taiwan has been the most politically isolated country while South Korea actively joins into the international community and exerts its considerably big influence in world affairs. Several of the examples of South Korea's earnest in world affairs have attributed to South Korea's proactive activities in various international organizations like Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in the United Nations and South Korea's contribution in the Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) missions.

Economically speaking, the East Asian middle countries have experienced traumatic struggle
pursuing for economic development. Most of the middle powers here in East Asia once suffered from the World War II and exploitation of the imperial powers. After their liberation, they had quite unparalleled path to the industrial modernization, some of them were even the late comer, or in the category of developing economies. Nonetheless, their continuous efforts have already borne fruits. Multiplied by factors like natural resources, geostrategic location, big population, emerging economic development, these originally peripheral countries become more influential. Some of them, like Indonesia, South Korea have been invited into the G-20, the most important international economic forum in the world—through which their status of important economies have been assured.9

It is interesting to find out that the East Asian middle powers are gradually closed intertwined with greater economic interdependence, their political relations however are still very chilly. They can be knitted and cooperative in low politics, but, in other words, they are foes in some high-politics issues like territorial disputes, competition for energy, and conflicts in radical nationalism. They seem to be lacking of mutual confidence or consensus, and its highly possible that new rounds of confrontations would occur. Some Asian middle powers thus cooperated to establish the ASEAN in 1967 so as to deter aggression on the one hand, and pursue for mutual benefits and solidify collective security on the other. The common target of the ASEAN may be China, since the some of the ASEAN countries still view Beijing as the major threat. Neither do the ASEAN countries trust Japan, for they are reminiscent of Japan's invasion during the World War II. The ASEAN countries thus have adopted a coalition in their defense. Some rifts between the ASEAN countries and the out-ASEAN neighbors become inevitable. In most of the Cold War era, Asian middle powers tended to have more economic as well as political relations with the Western countries like the United States and United Kingdom, from where they enjoyed large amount of trade surplus. After the end of the Cold War, and especially after three decades of China’s quick economic growth, China has replaced the others and has become the most important trading partner of most the middle powers in this area. Economic relations can bring about a “spill-over” effect to China’s relations with local middle relations. This has been one the most conspicuous changes in East Asian political map.

**An Emerging Architecture?**

Some East Asian countries have been more proactive in participating international affairs than ever, this is especially true for the middle powers. Mentality for this enthusiastic drive can be multifaceted. First of all, the international environment has been friendly that is conducive to their deeper involvement. Cold War has faded away, the bipolar rivalries based on ideological confrontation do not have to resurge. China, for example, does not have to strongly oppose South Korea when sabotage Seoul’s interests when dealing with the Korean issues. Especially after the diplomatic normalization

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9 There are 6 member states in the Group of 20 (G-20). They are China, which shows China’s Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) ranked 2nd in the world, Japan (ranked 3rd), India (ranked 4th), South Korea (ranked 12th), Indonesia (ranked 15th), and Saudi Arabia (ranked 23rd).
between China and Korea in August 1992, China no longer treated Seoul as an antagonistic rival. Instead, China began to adopt conciliatory as well as friendly relations with South Korea. The United States does not have to regard Vietnam as its enemy like those days that they fought during the Vietnam War. Vietnam's economic development will definitely be in need of American investment as well as technological transformation. But their common interest in checking the PRC's enhanced military presence in South China Sea will likely further the Hanoi-Washington cooperation.

Taiwan, a close ally of the United States and once General Douglas MacArthur referred it to be the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” during the Cold War, has ameliorated bilateral relations with the PRC under the Ma Ying-jeou’s government. Ever since Ma Ying-jeou took power in May 2008, Taiwan has already put stabilized relations with China, rather to irresponsibly provoking Beijing, as one of the backbone of Ma’s external policies. Ma Ying-jeou, in many occasions, has declared that he would do whatever efforts possible to change the Taiwan Strait “from a killing war-field to a boulevard to peace.” Ma’s “No unification, no independence, no use of force” has been the guideline that helps to stabilize Taiwan’s constructive role in this area, and Ma’s government, in the meantime, steadfastly pursue the conciliatory attitudes to the adjacent powers based on “hezhong (harmonious relations with China), youri (friendly relations with Japan), and Chinmei (close relations with the United States).” With this rational and delicate foreign policy, Ma believes Taiwan can be a constructive force in East Asia. Judging from Taiwan’s considerable amount of GDP, vast degree of the PPP, Taiwan’s pretty good human resources (23 million people with high rate of literacy and quality), multiplied by its strategic importance, there is no reason why Taiwan should not be regarded as a middle power. The only thing retarding Taiwan’s international status as a middle power has simply been its comparative gravity compared with China, in that most countries in the international community chose to recognize that Beijing as the central government and that “Taiwan is part of China.” It is timely to acknowledge the important role that Taiwan can add to the peace and prosperity in East Asia.

Middle powers’ mutual reconciliation and their détente with neighboring big powers have made the East Asian political situation much stable and predictable. In addition to this, it has emerged conspicuous trend of further economic integration, paving the way to a more prosperous economic perspective. South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and the ASEAN countries are all eager to build up either Free Trade Agreement (FTA), or other possible styles of economic cooperation with countries here and there. Korea parliament has already ratified its “KOR-US FTA” days ago, although with fierce confrontation between the ruling Grand National Party and opposition parties. Korea’s FTA with the European Union has been underway, and many others are expected to be signed in the near future, without mentioning its active preparation for the “ASEAN plus 3,” which will eventually invite Japan and China in closer economic integration with the ASEAN countries. Japan and Taiwan are also soliciting opportunities to establish FTAs with other counterparts. In fact, Taiwan’s signature of ECFA with China last June was epoch-making, not only signified its better economic integration with China, but encouraged Taiwan to facilitate FTA with more partners. No doubt that economic integration
among the middle powers here will cast a “spill-over effect” that spread to more conciliatory political relations and end up with less likelihood of serious conflicts.

The East Asian middle powers also stress their common values and major principles exemplified by their willingness that exempted from big powers’ pressures or intimidations. The East Asian middle powers, like Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore, passed through strenuous road to political democratization and open-market economies, they all came from the war-torn countries to the postmodern industrial states. Except for Japan, all of them suffered from the colonial rules poverty, and intimidation of the big powers, either from local or distant. The middle powers no longer accept invasion, threat, or even intimidation from the big powers any more. South Korea’s amicable relations with China can possibly ruined by Beijing’s support to North Korean adventure policy. Therefore, it is imperative for China to understand the importance of its role dealing with the Korean issue and the fragility of it. South Korea will never swallow the bitter fruit of another round of Korean War, and will encounter the North Korean menace with stern resistance or retaliation. The basic South Korean value here is to stick to the democratic political system and no compromise to aggression. Korean peninsula is now the most concerned flashpoints that may resume military conflict. If South Korea feels much pressure from the North, it is well perceived that China has to be responsible of pushing Pyongyang back to the normal track, or South Korea will have to cooperate more intensively with the United States for security. Situation in Taiwan Strait has been improved recent years, but the future conflict in the Strait may not totally excluded, given the fact that the cross Taiwan Strait relations has been largely hinged on the domestic political landscape of the island. Nonetheless, any intimidation from China to put pressure onto Taiwan for quick unification will invite unpredictable result. Of course it will be wise for Taiwan to keep its promise of pro-status quo as a modus vivendi for a stable cross-Taiwan Strait relations. Ma Ying-jeou’s careful and rational policy vis-à-vis China has been welcome and applauded by the international community, including the United States. If the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the pro-independence opposition party, should win the presidential election next January, however, the cross-Taiwan relations will undoubtedly afflict further setbacks. It is therefore that middle powers like South Korea and Taiwan, Japan should cooperate hand in hand in many aspects so as to cope with their common security challenges.

If China further expands its influence in South China Sea without considering international consensus, Beijing will highly possibly invite resentment from its neighboring states. As the United States reiterates that America is going to return to Asia, and opposes to the PRC’s dominance in the South China Sea, China and the United States have seemingly waged competition, or at least exchanged criticisms against each other. Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and some other adjacent countries have been much concerned about the ascendant Chinese military presence there, new round of competition is highly possible given China’s growing assertiveness. Whether if the middle powers will unite, to what extent that the middle powers here are to cooperate, to what extent that United States will be involved into the issue, will largely up to Beijing’s stance and policy. At least
there has built a consensus among middle powers that no force welcome in resolving territorial disputes, free navigation should be maintained, and dialogues should be resorted to deal with the future contest for natural resource there. The middle powers along the basin of the South China Sea are gradually more assertive to defend their national interests, making the South China Sea more complicated and vulnerable to disputes.

**Conclusion: Routes to the Middle Power Cooperation**

When taking Canada and Norway as examples, they can be categorized as middle powers. Although far away from Asia, they provide good instance to the East Asian middle powers in many respects. Canada and Norway are known to world by their contributive activities in peacekeeping, humanitarian and green-industry efforts and are well-respected by most of nations. They sometimes can exercise persuasive influence, but rarely deciding force, or even not considered as “middle powers” in terms of military, economic or many other basic strength or in term of international rank, but they still play significant roles as intermediaries, as key providers of assistance, or in other precise ways. Scholars gave the “niche diplomacy” to describe Canada and Norway as good examples of the kind of diplomacy, in that case countries carry out measures for the international good, even what might be deemed the “global public good,” then it is seeking something is universalizable, extending well beyond national self-interest. It is suggested that it is possible for countries to do very well by doing good, to support “good” work, to perform “good deeds,” to use “good words,” and to project “good images that can pay off in terms of international prestige, and in even more practical expressions of others’ appreciation. Countries can become known, admired, and also rewarded for its “goodness”—called “niche diplomacy” concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field. The key words for conducting such an altruism are based on its being universalizable and unselfishness.

Canada has been described by Dean Acheson, the former American Secretary of State, as the “Stern Daughter of the Voice of God.” In this sense, Canada has become a model of good international citizenship. Owing partly to its dual English and French heritage, it is an active member of many international organizations, including the Commonwealth and la Francophonie. In addition, Canada pioneered in the field of peacemaking. Canada has played as a major contributor of assistance to developing countries, including the poorest, and also known for leading the international effort to ban anti-personnel landmines, i.e., the “Ottawa Process.” Norway, long known for the Nobel Prize for Peace, also provides generous aid donor to poor countries. Norway’s giving level, as a percentage of its national income, is the highest in the world. In the international relations, Norway has been

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11 Ibid.
particularly successful that Norway has been excellent in peace facilitation. The most famous effort has been focused on the Middle East, name as “Oslo Process.”

What we learn from cases of Canada and Norway has been that the primary implication of the “niche diplomacy” they employed may have virtue of its favored situation, special competence, or unique product that is more or less permanent. Scholar reminds that such an advantage might be thought of as being locational, traditional, or consensual—or some combination thereof. It is the East Asian middle powers’ obligation to search for the bases of their conciliation and cooperation, given this crucial juncture.

As being locational, the concerned middle powers have to find their roles that commensurate with their geographical locations and their strategic meaningfulness. Some middle powers like Japan and Korea are in Northeast Asia, some are in Southeast Asia, and some are in between. They all act like bridges of transportation, international trade and human interactions. Their concerns, either economic or security, are quite divergent, and virtually difficult to avoid mutual suspicion or hatred during the Cold War era. But, in fact, East Asian middle powers are very close in geography—this paves ways for intimate relations and larger room for cooperation.

As being traditional, the middle powers can sort out some values and beliefs that they commonly treasure, which stem from their common history that each has been part of the general development per se. They can definitely find they are one, and they have to unite in dealing with the new challenges. The traditional does not mean they are “the old,” they simply represent good legacies that deserve to be preserved and shared. The middle powers in East Asia have to respect their respective the cultural, linguistic, anthropologist diversities of others, then they can treasure the commonalities of them, and carry out deeds for common good.

As being consensual, the East Asian middle powers will have to extend their patience and caliber in reaching consensus among themselves, hereby it is possible to strike consensuses with countries or powers outside this area. This process can hardly be reverse. Consensual is referring to the appropriate attitudes and process that stress peaceful dialogues, mutual extension of goodwill, and mutual provision of understanding and collaboration, rather merely for the outcomes. But it is strongly believed that it will naturally bring about satisfactory matters if the manners are right. There are lots of issues and challenges should be dealt with by consensual participation of the local middle powers, most of them are even in need of their soliciting for assistance from the global powers. Being consensual is therefore a good start, and very promising beginning that will induce effectiveness and peace.

There is thus plenty room for the East Asian middle powers to cooperate, since the environment has been ripe, and the trend of it has been obvious. Given their many common issues, mutual interests, and continuing challenges ahead, the concerned countries here will have no choice but to bear the responsibility of solidifying this fledgling architecture of middle powers.

12 Ibid.
Presentation Materials

Session II. Issue-Specific Areas for Cooperation among Middle Powers
[Economic Diplomacy]
Yul Sohn, Yonsei University
ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY FOR SOUTH KOREA

Why Economic Diplomacy?

- **Concept:**
  - "What is economic is strategic, and what is strategic is economic" (Clinton, *Economic Statecraft*, 10/14/11)
  - Use political means to achieve economic ends.
  - Use economic leverage to achieve political ends.

- **US & Japan**
  - QDDR: Twin pillars of American foreign policy
  - Maehara: "economic diplomacy" to be the top priority of J’s foreign policy.
Challenges SK

- Stagnant growth
- Rising income gap
- Demographic change
- Increased vulnerability vis-à-vis the global economy
- Global risks, interconnected and clustered
- Security-economic nexus: US-China competition

Policy priorities

- Place economic diplomacy at the center of foreign policies.
- Develop an integrative approach to economic and strategic challenges.
- Define the role of South Korea in the evolving networks of relationship among states and non-state actors situated in the global capitalist system.
Launch a New Era of Economic Growth through International Trade

Co-design a New Regional Economic Architecture

Develop Complex Approaches to Global Governance

I.

LAUNCH A NEW ERA OF ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH INTERNATIONAL TRADE
FTA strategies so far...

- FTA policies were driven by a dire need to expand export markets.
  - In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, FTA policy emerged as a promising way of earning foreign currency by promoting exports.
- “multi-track approach”
- But...critics:
  - Heavily skewed towards exporters’ interest.
  - Quantity over quality

The Post Catch-up Strategies

- Balance multiple goals in trade:
  - Increase exports; increase jobs; correct income disparity.

- Explore how each bilateral FTAs can be connected into a larger network, thereby avoiding “spaghetti bowl” effect.
  - Makes individual/bilateral FTAs connectable and scalable.

- Understand the nature of trade as “trade and...”
  - Trade is a multi-purpose tool, and to be combined with other foreign policy tools to achieve its foreign policy objectives.
II.

CO-DESIGN A NEW REGIONAL ECONOMIC ARCHITECTURE

Trade Pattern: South Korea
(1) Contested regional trade architecture: China vs. USA
Networked Competition

- Competing over FTA network
  - FTA is also a means to securing strategic initiatives in designing the regional architecture.
  - US: TPP, KORUS FTA; APEC
  - China: CEFA, C-J-K, C-K, EA FTA; APT

- Alternative vision?: harmonize US and China networks

- Korea as a bridge.
  - Work for less redundancy and overlap in regional economic institutions.
  - Bridge/transit two different networks to operate compatibly.

Fostering Regional Financial Architecture

- Move ahead the Chiang Mai Initiative multilateralization.
- Work toward architecting the Asian Monetary Fund.
- Promote the Asian bond markets.
III.

DEVELOP COMPLEX APPROACHES TO GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

Renew Global Financial Architecture

- Knowledge power:
  - Understand the complexity of problems (financial threats, fiscal crisis, and currency wars) and offer prescriptions relevant to them.
  - Overcome the deficit material capabilities; Korea will be potentially fared well in that game.

- Network power and coalition politics:
  - Allying with the US alone will not suffice.
  - Make a collective appeal through coalescing with like-minded countries in and out of the G20 with shared interests.
  - As a newly emerged advanced economy, play a broker between advanced and developing nations.
Thank you
[Regional Security/Strategic Cooperation]
Fu-Kuo Liu, National Chengchi University
Emerging Security Challenges and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and Taiwan’s Strategic Vision

Fu-Kuo Liu, Ph.D.
Research Fellow
Institute of International Relations
National Chengchi University
Seoul, 26 November 2011

Recent Trends of Asian Security

• The rise of China: economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions
• East Asian regional integration efforts:
  • ASEAN plus 3
  • East Asian summit
  • TPP
• The US’ new strategy in Asia
• New challenges in the South China Sea and maritime security
The Rise of China and Its Impacts
- Assessment of the Rising China
- Seeking for a regional common understanding of the Rising China
- The rise of China: military, economic, political aspects of influences
- Change of Chinese Policy approaches
- Concerns with the rise of China

East Asian Regional Integration Process: Security Perspectives
- More security cooperation on the NTS
- Desirable for cooperation in the region
- Strategic competition within the process among big powers
- Competing for Regional leadership
The US New Attempts in Asia

- Strategic shift from Middle East to Asia (Asia Pacific)
- New focus on Asian Development
- Asian leadership: bipolarity?
- Is the US’ Pacific Century here?

New challenges in the South China Sea and maritime security

- Unsolvable disputes between China and ASEAN
- Flashing points between China and Vietnam, China and the Philippines
- Different arguments on Freedom of navigation
- Shaking China and ASEAN relation
- Regional arms races
- The US interference in the issues
- Taiwan’s helpful moderate role
- Maritime security: cooperation
Taiwan’s Strategic Vision

- Deeply engaging with China/strengthening better relationship with China
- Restructuring/redefining Taiwan’s national security: a comprehensive approach on foreign policy
- Enhancing cooperation with Japan on security issues/Taiwan links with US-Japan security alliance before moving for CBMs across the strait.
- Reengaging with Korea: seeking for common security interest – maritime security/relationship with China
- Clarifying Taiwan's regional responsibilities
Introduction

“The question is not whether China will become the most powerful nation on earth, but rather, how long it will take her to achieve this status.”

-- A.F.K. Organski, 1958

The contents of this presentation
I. Power Transition Theory (slide # 3~4)
II. Responses to Rising Powers (slide # 5~7)
III. The Case of Contemporary China (slide # 8)
Discussion Points (slide # 9)
I. Power Transition Theory

Main arguments

Core proposition
- War is most likely when a dissatisfied challenger increases in strength and begins to overtake the dominant power.

Challengers are both powerful and dissatisfied.
- Parity exists when a potential challenger develops more than 80 percent and less than 120 percent of the resources of the dominant nation.
- The threat posed by a challenger is a function of the extent of its dissatisfaction with the existing international system.

Figure 1.9  A Transition with a High Probability of War

II. Responses to Rising Powers

Status quo and revisionist states

Status quo states
- They are satisfied with the rules of the existing international order.
- The dominant state
- Reassurance is the key to alleviate the security dilemma.

Revisionist states
- They are dissatisfied with the rules of the existing international order.
- This category can be further divided into four subcategories.

II. Responses to Rising Powers

Typology of rising, dissatisfied powers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Revisionist Aims</th>
<th>Risk Propensity</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Risk-averse</td>
<td>Risk-acceptant</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Japan, 1894-1930</td>
<td>Japan, 1931-45</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Brezhnev’s USSR</td>
<td>Bismarckian Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Stalinist Russia</td>
<td>Hitler’s Germany</td>
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<td>Maoist China</td>
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II. Responses to Rising Powers
Appropriate strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Propensity</th>
<th>Risk-averse</th>
<th>Risk-acceptant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Revisionist Aims</td>
<td>Limited Engagement</td>
<td>Engagement Containment /balancing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Containment /balancing</td>
<td>Preventive war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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III. The Case of Contemporary China

Is China a status quo power?
- Yes, at least now (Johnston 2003).
- No. All great powers are revisionist (Mearsheimer 2001).
- No, but it is a cautious power with limited aims (Ross 1997; Chin 2010; Ikenberry 2011).

Engagement strategy (Schweller 1999)
- The use of non-coercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising major power’s behavior.
- Means: the promise of rewards, socialization
- Appeasement from strength (Churchill)
- Combination with balancing as a hedging strategy
Discussion Points

- Is China status quo or revisionist? If the latter is the case, what kind of revisionist power is it?

- What is the right mix of engagement and hedging for dealing with the rise of China?

- Are there any distinctive aspects for middle powers when we consider strategies dealing with the rise of China?

(End)
[Official Development Aid]
Seungjoo Lee, Chungang University
Between National Interest and Universal Norms: The Evolution of Korea’s ODA Policy

EAI Trilateral Dialogue

November 26, 2011
Seungjoo Lee
(Chung-Ang University)

01 | International Politics of ODA

• Spread of new international norms
  – Remedy the negative consequences of neoliberal reforms in recipient countries
  – Partnership between donors and recipients
  – Humanitarian-based approach
    • Freedom from poverty

• Northern European countries and NGOs
02 | International Politics of ODA

- Issue complexity
  - Poverty reduction, sustainable growth, climate change, environment

- Actor complexity

03 | International Politics of ODA

- Traditional great powers
  - Potent tools to (re)design global and regional architecture
  - Hard power and soft power

- Shifting international environments
  - The US vs. China
  - China as a new donor
• Contribution diplomacy under the MB Gov’t
  – “To increase ODA to be commensurate with Korea’s international status”
  – “To boost Korea’s international reputation”

• Accession to OECD DAC (2010)

• MOFA(2008)
  – Reformulation of ODA system
  – Increase in untied aid and entering into foreign procurement market
  – Dispatch of KOICA officials
  – Selection of core recipient countries
06 | National interest vs. Universal norm

- Basic Law of International Cooperation (2009)
  - “... to boost Korea’s international reputation by abiding by the international aid norms ....”
  - “... to be a fair competitor in the newly emerging international procurement markets ...”
  - “... to promote economic cooperation with recipient countries ...”

07 | Korea’s ODA: Overview
10 | Distribution of ODA (by Region)

11 | Challenges

- How to harmonize competing ODA paradigms
  - National interest
  - Humanitarian approach

- Long-term perspective
12 | Challenges

- How to play a mediator’s role
  - Between donors and recipients
  - Between advanced donors vs. emerging donors
  - Between states and NGOs

13 | Challenges

- Global aid architecture
  - The Seoul consensus
    - Development and the G20
    - OECD DAC, the G20, NGOs, China …

- North Korea
  - Regional collaboration
14 | Challenges

• How to streamline policymaking structure
  – Fragmented structure
  – MOFA+KOICA vs. MOF+ExIm Bank

THANK YOU!
[Changing Cross-Taiwan strait Relations and Peace and Security in East Asia]
Francis Kan, National Chengchi University
Changing Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations and Peace and Security in East Asia

Francis Yi-hua Kan, Ph.D.
Institute of International Relations
National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Introduction

East Asia, our common region, is highly dynamic and complex in the sense that it is the most rapidly developing area in the past few decades while international confrontations and intra-national conflicts still lingering around, even long after the end of the Western Cold War. Among those uncertainties in our part of the world, the protracted enmity between Taiwan and the Mainland China has been one of the most dangerous relations both before and after the end of the Cold War. Not only had Taiwan’s previous confrontation against China compromised Taiwan’s interests but it had also at times frustrated the U.S., its staunchest supporter.

Yet, the Taiwan Strait has started to experience extraordinary evolution when its two sides have begun a peace process after Ma Ying-jeou and his KMT party won landslide victory in both the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008 with the hope of a change in Taiwan’s hostile relations with the mainland and the tense environment across the strait. After assuming office, President Ma first extended an olive branch with Beijing by initiating the peace process. Both sides have started arduous negotiations over less sensitive issues and gradually accumulated some foundations of mutual trust. They have so far signed 16 concrete agreements among which the conclusion of the Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is a historic step to institutionalise and normalise their economic and trade relations, signify their pragmatic approaches, and mark a significant milestone in cross-strait relations.¹

While the Ma administration has to seek rapprochement with Beijing, it also

¹ The two sides, represented by Chairman Chiang Pin-kung of Taipei’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Chairman Chen Yunlin of Beijing’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), signed the 16-article ECFA on 29 June 2010 in Chongqing, Sichuan.
attempts to resume friendship with Washington. The KMT government has tried to convince the Americans that his ‘surprise-free’ policy would be in the best interests of the U.S. Taiwan has therefore taken a balancing act of making efforts in soothing relations with Beijing, and reiterating the strategic importance of its relations and friendship with Washington.

Such a new approach based on the pragmatism in promoting its economic liberalisation, perhaps in solving political disputes across the Taiwan Strait in the future, and in reinforcing its ties with the US and other friends around, may have great implications for the security and stability in our region and well beyond.

Changing Nature of Taiwan Strait

Past corrosive relations: The cross-Taiwan Strait relations in the past six decades have been characterised as enduring hostility. Each side of the Taiwan Strait would be suspicious of any of the other’s moves that could conveniently be interpreted as threatening its fundamental interests. The mutual distrust and fear could have dramatically spiralled to the extent that both sides would take precautious or even extreme measures, including the preparations for a military face-off, which would severely aggravate the security environment in the region. More seriously, their rivalry could have easily slipped into conflicts that would possibly drag the great powers, particularly the US, into their confrontation and hence worsening the region’s stability at large. As a result, the Taiwan Strait has long been seen as one of the most troubled flashpoints at both regional and global levels.

Recent amelioration: Fortunately, the enduring tensions across the strait have been largely reduced since both sides started to take concrete steps in improving their relations in 2008. Taiwan started to revolutionaryise its strategy towards China by markedly switching from previously confrontational attitude to reconciliatory gesture and pragmatic approach. President Ma Ying-jeou’s peace initiative is resolutely aimed at demonstrating that engagement with China will strengthen, not weaken, Taiwan’s prosperity, security and dignity. China has so far answered Taiwan’s initiative with positive response. The two sides have been able to undertake a series of talks and reach agreements on practical issues, based upon an incremental approach. Some considerable degree of mutual trust has also been obtained and may lead to broader co-operation in the future.
Military concerns: While the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have somehow adjusted the drawn-out ‘zero-sum’ competition, the peace process itself is not irreversible. Future conflicts cannot be entirely ruled out and their upgrading relations may encounter some setbacks as each side has still treated each other as potential enemy. China’s military build-up continues and its military posture to intimidate Taiwan grows stronger despite all the efforts both have tried to ease their antagonism. In response, Taiwan has to strengthen its military power to ensure certain degree of deterrence, capable enough to increase the costs of enemy’s coercion and to maximise the freedom of its allies to plan contingencies. On the whole, a stable situation where war is still an alternative is neither sustainable nor peaceful at all.

However, the new interaction between the two experienced in the past few years may gradually lead them to believe that the peace process will be a protracted and complex process and patience and wisdom are needed. At a time when the possibility of resuming the use of force still stands in the way of rapprochement, both sides have to find common values that prioritise sustainable peace and development. To adhere to such profound values, they both have to seriously contemplate making military means obsolete altogether in the handlings of their problems. Only perpetually peaceful resolutions can bring a full transformation of their bilateral relations and the security environment in the Taiwan Strait.

Future Development

Mutual interests and trust: Having resumed negotiations and ameliorated relations, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have tried to avoid repeating the ‘zero-sum game’ when handling their bilateral relations. The signing of those agreements reflects their pragmatism as both believe that the economic co-operation will maximise the prospects for mutual prosperity from which both will benefit. The determination of the leaderships in both Taipei and Beijing to conduct negotiations and conclude agreements also demonstrates their ability to reach meaningful consensus on difficult issues affecting real benefits and interests commonly shared by people on both sides.

According to the agreement, China will reduce and eliminate tariffs on 539 items that will involve 16% of Taiwan exports to the Mainland values at $13.8 billion. Taiwan will reduce and eliminate tariffs on 268 items, covering 11% of China’s exports values at $2.8 billion.

The future interaction to realise the mutual benefits will heavily rely upon continuing communication and negotiation between the two.

**Institutionalisation and normalisation:** While the ECFA itself will enhance their economic interdependence, a Cross-Strait Economic Co-operation Committee, charged with fulfilling the agreement and serving as an interim dispute settlement platform, will be one of the few pioneering institutions set up by both governments to deal with possible problems caused by the ever-growing interaction. The forming of the committee and other organisations in the evolving process of institutionalisation and normalisation represent remarkable development in their amending relations.\(^4\) The further economic co-operation and deepened interdependence are the fundamental bases for the continuing creation and consolidation of a stabilised order for both sides of the Taiwan Strait, including social, cultural, and possibly other interaction.\(^5\)

**Taiwan’s role and participation in regional integration:** Economic interdependence with the Mainland is crucial for Taiwan, but it is only one of the dimensions to enhance Taiwan’s world-class economic competitiveness and actually strategic position. The conclusion of the ECFA should overcome Taiwan’s marginalisation and open the door to its participation in regionalism and its economic co-operation and liberalisation with other trading partners, both of which are equally important for Taiwan’s vibrant economy and its legitimate demands for wider international space. The regional co-operation, like the ASEAN-centred regionalism or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), has vigorously extended to other major economies, but has not yet included Taiwan. Its absence in regionalism has made Taiwan considerably disadvantageous in its international competitiveness, particularly after the ASEAN plus one entering into force from 2010. As a matter of fact, one of the underlying motives behind Taiwan’s economic and trade formalisation with China is its participation in the regional co-operation that will raise Taiwan’s economic prospects.\(^6\) Therefore, Taiwan needs broad support from the international society for its part in the regionalism.

\(^4\) In addition to the Economic Co-operation Committee, both sides opened quasi-official offices in Taipei and Beijing representing their tourism associations, staffed with seconded government officials and tasked with promoting tourism.


Equally important, the economic interdependence in the region will be further strengthened if Taiwan can build up its bilateral economic co-operation with other major trading partners within our region and beyond. Taiwan and some of the major economies within the ASEAN have long enjoyed shared prosperity due to close trade and investment relations. Future economic co-operation between Taiwan and some Southeast Asian countries will be in the interests of all. Besides, the major global economies, namely the US, the EU and Japan, are the focus of Taiwan’s potential targets for future economic liberalisation. In particular, Washington should reinvigorate its Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) negotiation with Taipei. The US should not shy away from its economic and political leadership in East Asia and should actively involve itself in region’s co-operation bilaterally and multilaterally. The US strong support for the enlargement of the TPP is an encouraging signal to others in Asia that the US will enhance its leading role in regionalism.

Emerging Regional Order

Regional ‘G2’ framework: It may be highly debatable whether the world is witnessing an emerging global ‘G2’ international order where the US and China are competing for predominance, yet a regional ‘G2’ structure is more perceptible in the sense that the increasing interaction between these two great powers, whether co-operation or competition, and as a result, the nature of their relationship, whether partners or competitors, have become the main factors in shaping the current and future regional security of East Asia. The US has publicly acknowledged China’s growing presence and influence in region’s political, economic and security affairs. From the perspective of East Asian nations, the positive and mutually beneficial interaction between the US and China on a wide range of traditional and non-traditional security issues are meaningful and welcome. On the other hand, Asian countries are reluctant to see a severe competition between Washington and Beijing for power and influence in the region in a way they have to take side.

US military presence in East Asia: To avoid such a worst-case scenario for Asian countries, Washington has explicitly recognised the momentousness of its continuing military presence in East Asia and signalled that the US has no intention of

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retreating from Asia in the face of the rise of Chinese military modernisation. The recent US decision to increase its military presence in Australia is clear evidence that Washington is reasserting its interest in view of China’s increasing influence in South China Sea. Meanwhile, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasises that Taiwan is an important security and economic partner in a statement given at the 2011 Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum meetings. These are just two of the many cases pointing to the same direction where the US will work with the countries around to shape a regional order that would serve the best interests for all at this critical juncture when China’s continuing rise has become a phenomenon.

China has developed its military strategy of ‘access denial’ and defending itself from counter-attack by strengthening its asymmetrical military capability to challenge the US freedom of military action, to defeat American military power in East Asia, and to prevent the US reinforcements at arm’s length in the event of military conflict. America’s credibility as a capable leadership for security in East Asia highly depends upon its ability to impressively mitigate and further defeat any adversary that is fielding more potent ‘access denial’ capabilities. The US arms sales to Taiwan and America’s strong strategic alliances with its Asian partners will continue to meet its strategic goal. America’s allies and friends in Asia alike would be in a more favourable position to confidently deal with the rise of China and actively engage it if the US security commitments will endure.

Non-conventional security co-operation: Military contest may remain a major security concern to national leaders in our region, but what is more menacing to our people in this ‘post-post-Cold War Era’ is non-conventional security threat. Climate change, energy security, food security, natural disasters, communicable diseases, cross-border organised crimes and other emerging security threats all have been recognised by countries around as the most urgent issues that are affecting peoples’ wellbeing and Asia’s future security environment. The cross-border and trans-national characteristics of these new security issues require not only national commitments of...
individual countries but also international co-operation to reduce damages. To address and meet the new security threats, our region needs both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, involving all players concerned, in order to effectively harmonise policies and resources in dealing with them. More importantly, a co-ordinated way of managing the new security threats in the region can facilitate the creation of a new security culture whereby all players could comfortably discuss and solve the conventional security threats through constant dialogues and negotiations instead of violence.

Concluding Remarks: Regional Security

**Sound cross-strait relations:** From Taiwan’s perspective, its active participation in regional co-operation with its robust economy and dynamic democracy will equip Taiwan with better capability and more confidence in managing and developing its relations with China, and pursuing its future preferences in a responsible way.¹¹ For China, its improved relations with Taiwan provide a friendly environment where Beijing can diminish the possibility of conflicts with other great powers and concentrate its attention and resources on peaceful rise and development. So far as both sides stick to pragmatism, the Taiwan Strait will continue to be a basis for, not an obstacle to, the sustainable peace in our region.

**Inclusive multilateralism:** The regional co-operation in our part of the world has gradually evolved around a rising China that may not only present opportunities for but also pose threats to countries concerned. Asian nations could jointly benefit the prosperity as a result of the booming developing economies, particularly China, but they have also perceived that an increasingly assertive China may sabotage the balance of region’s power and compromise their fundamental values and interests. Therefore, all parties concerned should review the current regional order and re-shape an inclusive multilateralism that could solve problems in a peaceful way.

**Delicate and healthy relationships in regionalism:** An encompassing regional multilateralism should involve all the major powers inclusively in a way to keep the delicate and healthy balance. The US has long aimed at maintaining its continuing dominance and preserving security and stability in East Asia. In terms of the Taiwan

Strait security, for instance, Washington has employed the ‘dual deterrence’ approach on the two sides by warning Beijing not to use of force against Taiwan while cautioning Taipei not to take any measure, such as Taiwan independence, that would provoke China to take military action. The US involvement in the Taiwan Strait reflects its deep interests and indispensible role in the maintenance of region’s stability and security.\textsuperscript{12} Other major powers, such as Russia and India, are also rising to regional prominence following China and becoming important economies in Asia. Therefore, their roles in the build-up of regional co-operation are equally crucial. After all, an inclusive regionalism where all parties concerned, big and small, are involved will provide better opportunities to guarantee a lasting peace and shared prosperity the people in our region well deserve.

Complex Disaster
-Lessons after 311

Hiroshi Nakanishi
Professor, International Politics
Kyoto University

311 earthquake
Rescue operation by SDF

Help from abroad

- 諸外国等からの支援（163か国・地域及び43国際機関）
  - 物資支援 62か国・地域・機関
  - 救助隊等 29か国・地域・機関
    （イスラエル、ヨルデ、タイ、フィリピンからは医療支援チームが来訪）
  - 寄付金 92か国・地域・機関
    （総額約175億円以上）

- 米軍による支援（トモダチ作戦: 最大時）
  - 人員 20,000名以上
  - 船舶 約20隻
  - 航空機 約160機
  - 補給物資
    - 食料品 約280トン
    - 水 約770万キロリットル
    - 燃料 約4.5万リットル
  - 輸送実績
    - 貨物約3,100トン
Plate mechanism of the world

Disastarous easthquakes in East Asia

1923 Kanto : M7.9(P)
1976 Tangshang : M7.5 (Th)
1995 Hanshin-Awaji : M7.1(Th)
1999 Taiwan: M7.6(P)
2004 Sumatra: M9.1(P)
2008 Sichuan: M7.6(Th)
2011 East Japan: M9.0(P)

P=Plate type, Th=Thrust type
Even in ROK


Lessons

- General tendency for more natural disasters in East Asia and the Pacific
- Even for plate type, seismology is insufficient to predict the timing and scale of the earthquake → always update the information and preparation scheme. No perfect prevention of damage
- Thrust type earthquake possible everywhere ROK relatively immune, but thrust type is possible and M6-7.5 recorded in history
Lessons

• sharing correct information among the public is most vital for mitigation of damage and avoidance of panic
• disaster response is increasingly an important mission for the modern military
• international assistance matters greatly especially at the early stage when the gov’t and people are most in need.
  → pre-disaster preparation makes difference
• disastrous relief assistance affects people’s perception in a long-term basis

Fukushima disaster

Fukushima 1, Fukushima 2, Onagawa hit by Tsunami, F2 and O were safely stopped.
F1: SBO for three operating units
  hydrogyn explosion in units#1, 3
  radiation leakage from NSF pools in units3,
(4)
  estimated core meltdown in units1-3
Scale of the disaster

Radioactive materials fallout (Hiroshima, Chernobyl, Fukushima)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iodine131</th>
<th>Cesium137</th>
<th>Strontium90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernobyl</td>
<td>1300(3200)</td>
<td>89(280)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukushima</td>
<td>660(6100)</td>
<td>15(710)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nature of the accident

- INES Level 7 disaster as Chernobyl (TMI Level 5)
- est. 77 tera Bq released (Nuclear Safety Agency)
  - smaller than Chernobyl, but getting closer
- 70-80% of RAM spread to the Pacific water
- First nuclear plant disaster in Asia
- First caused by natural disaster
- First accident with multiple plants and NSF pools damaged
- Long-term accident where RAM leakage may continue for years

Lessons learned so far

- Weakness of governance: collective thinking of the “nuclear village” and no single authority
- Old type plant unit (GE BWR Mark1) needed much more robust improvement and protection
- Total lack of preparation for the emergency operations with complex disastrous situations
  - first 12 to 24 hours is the key to stop
Lessons learned so far (2)

- nuclear plants are reasonably protected, but once things go wrong over certain level, it can go out of control.
- if it happens, improvisation with huge manpower will be necessary.
  - radiation leakage causes serious social and psychological dislocation
- no clear-cut scientific data to say true of false
  - NSF disposal problem will decide the future of nuclear energy

Nuclear plants in East Asia
(pre-Fukushima accidents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear plants in East Asia</th>
<th>operating</th>
<th>under construction</th>
<th>planned</th>
<th>type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>BWR/PWR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PWR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>BWR/PWR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>PWR/CANDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nuclear plants in Japan, ROK, Taiwan

China nuclear power plants
Lessons for regional countries

• nuke accidents in the East Asia area (Japan, ROK, Taiwan, PRC, DPRK) likely have significant political repercussion

• international review and information sharing will help put pressure on the operators and governments who oversight the nuclear plants
Biographies of Participants

**Kang Choi** (Ph.D., the Ohio State University) is a professor and Director-General for American Studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. From 1992 to 1998, and from 2002 to 2005, Professor Choi worked in the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA). When at KIDA, Professor Choi assumed various positions such as Chief Executive Officer, Task Force for Current Defense Issues, Director of International Arms Control Studies, and one of the editors of Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (KJDA). He has done researches on arms control, crisis/consequence management, North Korean military affairs, multilateral security cooperation, and the ROK-US security alliance. From 1998 to 2002, he served in National Security Council Secretariat as Senior Director for Policy Planning and Coordination. He was one of South Korean delegates to the Four-Party Talks. Professor Choi has published many articles including “An Approach toward a Common Form of Defense White Paper,” “International Arms Control and Inter-Korean Arms Control,” “Inter-Korean Arms Control and Implications for the USFK,” “Future ROK-US Security Alliance,” “North Korea’s Intensions and Strategies on Nuclear Games., and “A Prospect for US-North Korean Relations: beyond the BDA issue.” Professor Choi holds several advisory board membership including Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Unification of National Assembly, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Unification, and the National Unificati0on Advisory Council.

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Chaesung Chun is a Professor at the Department of International Relations in Seoul National University. He is now a visiting professor at Keio University in Tokyo. He is also a director of Asian Security Initiative of East Asian Institute. He is a member of Advisory Committee for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Ministry of Reunification. He received his MA degree from the Seoul National University, and Ph.D degree from Northwestern University in the field of International Relations Theory. Major fields include international relations theory, security studies, South Korean Foreign policy, East Asian security relations. Major articles include “A Study on the Formation of European Modern States System,” “Critique of constructivism from the perspective of postmodernism and realism,” “The Rise of New Powers and the Responding Strategies of Other Countries.”

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Sang Hyun Lee, Director-General for Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea, received his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and served as a Director of the Security Studies Program at the Sejong Institute. He was a research fellow at the Korean Institute for International Studies and the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis. His primary research interests are international politics, Korea-U.S. relations, and North Korean issues, and his recent works include: National Security Strategy of the Lee Myung-bak Government: The Vision of ‘Global Korea’ and its Challenges (2009); The Obama Administration’s Perspective on Foreign Security and North Korea Policy (in Korean, 2009); Diplomatic Environment and the Korean Peninsula (in Korean, co-written, 2009); ROK-U.S. Alliance in Transition: 2003–2008 (in Korean, co-written, 2009), East Asian Community: Myth and Reality (in Korean, co-written, 2008); Information Order and East Asia: Transformation of World Politics in the Information Age (in Korean, co-written, 2008); North Korean Issue and Peace System of the Korean Peninsula (in Korean, co-written, 2008); and Transformation of ROK-U.S. Alliance (in Korean, co-written, 2008).

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