

# **ROK-Japan Security Cooperation in a Turbulent Strategic Environment**

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## ROK-Japan Security Cooperation in a Turbulent Strategic Environment

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### Abstract

China's Sino-centrism and expansionism, the U.S. America First policy, Russia's Neo-Eastern policy and North Korea's incessant adventurism pose ongoing security challenges to the Northeast Asian region. Within this turbulent global and regional strategic environment, ROK-Japan security cooperation is essential to the stability and peace in the world as a whole, in the Western Pacific, and on the Korean Peninsula.

But there is still an onslaught of issues complicating security cooperation between the two countries, including historical legacies such as the comfort women issue, territorial disputes, mutual distrust, ambivalent national interests, and distorted political and social relations. Regardless, the authors believe that ROK-Japan can improve military-military cooperation based on professional attitude, exchanges, and cooperation.

This joint research paper makes the following policy recommendations: on-going security cooperation, ranging from high-level defense cooperation to military exchanges and cooperation at various levels must endure even if an adverse political situation should arise. This includes working conferences and staff-level dialogues, defense attachés, military education exchange programs, training and exercises, peacekeeping operations and coalition forces humanitarian, aid and disaster relief operations, cyber security, counter-piracy and counter-terrorism, and information sharing and mutual logistics support. Political and social relations between Japan and Korea should not impact military security cooperation and exchanges. Our two countries should seek ways and methods of continuing our cooperation.

Better security cooperation will require the following: gradual and steady military cooperation on a range of issues; the support of the U.S. and other members of the United Nations Command (UNC), and; an early conclusion of the ROK-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA) in the field.

The neutralization strategy aims to achieve the following objectives: contain any further development of nuclear and missile threats, guide North Korea towards the negotiating table, and



prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear state. The neutralization of North Korea's nuclear and missile program is to achieve the trinity of a consensus on the level of threat posed by North Korea, military operation systems among ROK, U.S. and UNC rear in Japan, strategic communication for consensus of urgency and inevitability on eliminating nuclear warhead and missiles from the public of ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral as well as China and Russia.

If North Korea proclaims a moratorium on the development and testing of nuclear and missile production and allows IAEA members to re-enter the country with the ultimate intention of denuclearization, participants in the Six-Party Talks will be willing to resume the negotiations. In addition, Four Party Talks to sign a peace treaty and normalize relations between U.S. and Japan and North Korea will be on the table as well.

The neutralization and denuclearization of North Korea will eliminate an epicenter of regional conflict and military confrontation and pave the way for the birth of a nuclear free, unified Korea as hub of peace, stability, and co-prosperity.

## Introduction

### Objective and Background

This paper aims to examine the current realities of security and military cooperation between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan in the ever-changing turbulent strategic environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It also works to explore potential strategies and policies so as to enhance cooperative security relations between the two countries.

A tremendous strain has been placed on the global order with China's nascent expansionism, the Trump administration's 'America First' policy, North Korea's persistent nuclear and missile threat, the arms race in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, emerging actors such as the Islamic State and Multi-national Corporations (MNCs), and the impacts, flow of refugees, and the movement of terrorists, Non-traditional military threats including terrorism, cyber-attacks, and international crime, along with transnational threats such as natural disasters, global warming, and pandemic diseases, have increased and pose an ongoing threat to both global peace and human security. Constraints on bilateral security cooperation between the ROK and Japan derive from the following factors: different priorities in terms of bilateral security cooperation areas, historical legacies, territorial disputes, the comfort women issue, mutual distrust, and strained political relations. All of these security issues have led the ROK and Japan to take cooperative action with various threats and challenges to peace and security in the wider world and the Northeast Asian region, as well as more specifically on the Korean Peninsula. This has been accompanied by trust-building measures.



It is imperative for Japan and the ROK to jointly face the North Korean threats of nuclear tests and missile launches, the possible sudden collapse of North Korea, reunification, the East and South China Sea disputes, the Taiwan Strait, cyber security, terrorism, natural disasters, and others.

With a focus on both strategic elements and situational awareness, this joint paper will conduct a comprehensive security assessment from a global and regional perspective, including a Korean Peninsula view. It will draw implications for ROK-Japan security cooperation. Then, analyzing South Korea's and Japan's foreign security policies as well as current military exchanges and cooperation, the paper will present policy options for future security cooperation. Finally, we will make policy recommendations for strategic objectives and tenets of future security cooperation as well as the institutionalization of defense exchanges and cooperation.

## Theoretical and Literature Review

National diplomacy is defined as foreign activities covering security, economic, and cultural diplomacy in order to achieve national strategic objectives such as national security and the promotion of national interests. In international politics, defense diplomacy - which is a part of national diplomacy - refers to the pursuit of foreign policy objectives through bilateral and multilateral exchange and cooperation, as well as the peaceful employment of defense resources and capabilities.<sup>1</sup> This is rather unique and effective in that the military has responsibility for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and prosperity. Military cooperation is not just rhetorical expression; it is backed up directly by practical strength in accordance with a country's friendly or hostile relations.

Mutual understanding between two friendly countries contributes to the prevention of unnecessary miscommunication and miscalculation. Military-to-military relations, such as those between officers and soldiers, can mutually increase the understanding between friendly countries with similar backgrounds and mentalities. This occurs despite the various actors in this field being more nationalistic than the general citizens of the country because of the specific characteristics of the military profession.

In reviewing the international security theories of the balance of power, balance of threat, balance of terror, bandwagon, power transitions, hegemony stability, the security dilemma, and other devices, it becomes apparent that the recent Northeast Asian situation appears to reflect all of these phenomena. In the region, the rise of China has been remarkable, and in terms of regional power transition, China has surpassed Japan economically. Japan's unique self-enforced restrictions on security power are often neglected when comparisons are made. The arms race, from the perspective of the security dilemma, is competitive both in the region as well as more specifically on the Korean Peninsula.

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<sup>1</sup> Andrew Cottey, *Reshaping Defense Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: Rowledge, 2005), p.5.



Scholarly literature from South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. draw implications related to ROK-Japan security cooperation. Dr. Sook Jong Lee attempts to analyze the public opinion of U.S. citizens, as well as those of the Japanese and South Korean people,<sup>2</sup> based on public opinion surveys reflecting trilateral cooperation. Her analysis covers the warming of Japan toward the U.S., Japan's negative security situation as well as South Korea's favorable economic perceptions of China, and Japan's higher affirmative support of the U.S. during any Peninsula crisis and South Korea's noticeably lower support of the U.S. in the East China Sea dispute crisis. Her paper implies that the ROK and Japan can cooperate militarily in the region as well as globally. This, together with the paper written by U.S. scholar Man-hee Lee<sup>3</sup>, addresses in no uncertain terms China's rise, U.S. posturing, and Japan's right to collective self-defense. However, the paper does not connect Japan's position to the threat posed by North Korea nor the dilemma of possible Korean reunification.

Shogo Suzuki's paper makes strong recommendations for the advancing of cooperation between the two states. The paper unilaterally advocates the perspective of the victors of World War II as well as Korea's perspective of history.<sup>4</sup> This is argued because Suzuki does not address the justifications given by defeated Japan, nor does he mention Japan's brutal rule of Korea in comparison with other colonies, historical right-wing revisionism, or whether both South Korea and Japan share a common security threat from China's rising power and North Korea's nuclear program. Go Ito<sup>5</sup> would have benefitted from addressing the long history of the domestic situation of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF), as well as Japan's Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO), Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief (HA & DR) experiences internationally. These kinds of operations are clearly understandable and receive positive evaluations from both receiving countries and international society; such arenas are deemed suitable for practical and pragmatic ROK-Japan security cooperation. The units of both countries in the fields of these operations have effectively cooperated - except in the unique case of the JGSDF unit's 10K 5.56mm ammo urgent supply incident with the ROK PKO unit in South Sudan in 2013.

Brendan M. Howe's paper<sup>6</sup> related to Japan's "normalization" differs from the previous security policies of the Liberal Democratic Party, which established normalization with the U.S. more than half-century after the abnormal and forced policy of surrender following World War II and subsequent heavy influence of the Western model. Howe's theory makes sense in that Japan's

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<sup>2</sup> Sook Jong Lee, "ROK-Japan Relations, the Weak Link in ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Cooperation," EAI, Column, Dec 31, 2015.

<sup>3</sup> Man-hee Lee, "Japan's Reinterpretation of Its Right to Collective Self-Defense in the East Asian Power Transition," *The Korean Journal of Security Affairs*, Vol. 20, No.2 (December 2015).

<sup>4</sup> Shogo Suzuki, "Can the "History Issue" Make or Break the Japan-ROK "Quasi-Alliance"?", *The Korean Journal of Security Affairs*, Vol.20, No.2 (Dec 2015).

<sup>5</sup> Go Ito, "Japan's International Security Cooperation: Peacekeeping and Disaster-relief Operation," *The Korean Journal of Security Affairs*, Vol.11, No. 2 (Dec 2006).

<sup>6</sup> Brendan M. Howe, "Continuity and Change; Evolution, Not Revolution, in Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," *The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University*, Vol.37, No.1 (Jan-March 2013).



changing security policy has been seen as gradual. Gerald L. Curtis's paper<sup>7</sup> addresses the notion that Japan's strategy should be based on developing its capabilities, its alliance with the U.S., and its security relations with regional neighbors. It also concerns itself with maintaining a regional balance of power and the creation of a positive sum relationship with China, as well as the notion that Japan can assume a greater humanitarian role in the troubled Middle East.

In Scott A. Snyder's paper,<sup>8</sup> he asserts that the only country that is somewhat able to improve Japan-ROK relations is the U.S. However, U.S. intervention in historical issues remains an intrinsic constraint which might lead to a weakening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. R. Michael Schiffer's paper<sup>9</sup> emphasizes the importance of multilateral security mechanisms resulting from U.S. and ROK efforts. He suggests that less difficult issues, such as non-traditional security issues, offer a pathway and are likely to be effective for ROK-Japan security cooperation itself. S.A. Smith's paper shows that North Korea's nuclearization and the rise of China are important regional flashpoints in the post-Cold War world, and the latter is evidence of a power transition from Japan to China.

Previous literature identified constraints stemming from historical legacies using a unilateral perspective. They thus failed to examine such legacies from a mutual perspective, as well as from positions of a comprehensive security assessment and bilateral foreign & security policy. Previous research also failed to conduct in-depth research of the current military cooperation between Japan and South Korea as well as ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation. There was also an absence of exploration of the interaction of political relations and their impact on military cooperation. It is essential for Japan and South Korea to seriously assess common military and transnational threats, and then to explore mechanisms for security cooperation which will contribute to ensuring their national security, mutual interests, regional stability, and furthering the prospect of global peace.

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<sup>7</sup> Gerald L. Curtis, "New Directions in Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy," Tenth Annual Lecture on Japanese Politics, Feb 5, 2015, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York.

<sup>8</sup> Scott A. Snyder, "Domestic Political Obstacles and the U.S. Role in Improving Japan-Korea Relations," *Asia Unbound*, Council on Foreign Relations, Dec 22, 2015, New York.

<sup>9</sup> R. Michael Schiffer, "Envisioning a Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism," in eds., L. Gordon and Park Ro-byung, *Understanding New Political Realities in Seoul: Working Toward a Common Approach to Strengthen U.S.-Korean Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, 2008), pp.59-78.





## Comprehensive Security Assessment

### Global Perspective

The notable global rivalry for control between the hegemonic power of the U.S. - alongside its 'peace through by strength' policy - and China as an emerging great power will soon deteriorate. The U.S. continues to envelop China, which has attempted to challenge the established global order and norms using force and coercion. The U.S. continues to pursue a containment policy toward China with a confederated alliance, including ROK-U.S.-Japan military collaboration, and the diamond alliance consisting of U.S.-Japan-Australia-India, aiming to thus restore the U.S. economy through protectionist trade policy. The Trump administration plans to increase the current defense budget of \$550 billion dollars to one trillion dollars and has already requested \$603 billion for the defense budget of FY2018. The additional defense budget, which is an increase of 10% in comparison with FY2017, was \$54 billion. The Trump administration is clearly pushing towards equipping the U.S. with overwhelming military power to enable it to suppress any power or nation from challenging its global position.

In the meantime, President Xi Jinping is facing up to the challenge of the Trump administration by attempting to reshape the global order with a maritime great power strategy of Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) and the Island Chain Strategy, resurrecting China as the center of world, reorganizing the global financial order through the One Belt & One Road strategy and the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which advocates free trade in contrast to U.S. protectionism.

New emerging actors - such as Multinational Corporations (MNCs), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), global financial capital, civil society, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) - are reinforcing and strengthening their roles in the international order. In addition, terrorism, international crime, cyber security, network knowledge politics and diplomacy, and cutting-edge intelligence warfare emerging from the information technology revolution are becoming increasingly prevalent factors on the global stage.

### Regional Perspective

From an Asia-Pacific perspective, the conflict structure in the region is intensifying as transnational threats increase. The regional hegemonic rivalry between China and Japan, Northeast Asia's very own arms race,<sup>10</sup> is among the most competitive in the world. Conflict and confrontation deriving from historical legacies, territorial disputes, overlapping Air Defense

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<sup>10</sup> SIPRI, "Trends in World Military Expenditure 2016," <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-world-military-expenditure-2016.pdf>: The 4.6 % increase of military spending in the Asia-Pacific marked the highest increase, in comparison with a 2.6 % increase in Western Europe and a 2.4 % increase in Eastern Europe.





Identification Zones (ADIZ), and exclusive nationalism continue to threaten a deterioration of relations among countries in the region.

China has significantly increased its status as a military power supported mainly by its dramatic economic growth and, secondly, its Island Chain Strategy. China has trespassed and made claims on Japan's Senkaku territory in the East China Sea. It has constructed artificial islands in the South China Sea, and seeks to advance into the blue sea of the Pacific Ocean. These actions represent somewhat of a change in the balance of power and signal a power transition from Japan or/and the U.S. to China. As for the security dilemma in the post-Cold War world, the U.S., Japan, ROK, and Taiwan, as well as other ASEAN member states, rely on China and, furthermore, are economically interdependent on one another in a way that the Eastern and Western blocs have never been before.

The Trump administration has confirmed its commitment to the U.S.-Japan Alliance regarding the Senkaku Islands should a situation arise involving the PLA or related organizations. Since the end of the Sino-Russia confrontation in 1989, the relationship between the two parties has changed over time in order to prevent growing western influence.

Japan is attempting to expand its influence by enacting laws regarding collective self-defense authority and security, normalizing its defensive posture, and taking on a greater share of the burden in its various alliances. Russia is also attempting to restore the former Soviet Union Empire through the annexation of Crimea, intervention in the Syrian civil war, its "look east" policy, and strategic cooperation trials with the U.S. and Japan, while expanding its influence in the region.

The incredible increase in transnational threats including natural disasters such as typhoon, tsunami, and earthquake, cyber security threats, and pandemic diseases such as Avian Influenza (AI), Ebola, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and tuberculosis require collective regional measures.

## The Korean Peninsula Perspective

On the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has made continued efforts to enhance its nuclear and missile programs, as well as to intensify cyber-attacks and engage in psychological warfare. Two scenarios involving North Korea are predicted. Scenario one is a breakdown in the status quo through a 'Great Unification War' with a nuclear warhead being delivered by multi-missile systems. Scenario two, though less likely, is the transformation of North Korea through the adoption of Chinese-style reforms and an opening-up policy along with the abandonment of nuclear development.

South Korea, meanwhile, has successfully settled down a path after overcoming the national turmoil resulting from the impeachment of former president Park Geun-hye and the peaceful transfer of political leadership on May 10, 2017, although it continues to face issues arising from economic polarization and a social stratum conflict.



## Implications

By focusing on the most urgent threats and common issues, Japan and South Korea can and should expand their security cooperation. The urgent security threats they face are North Korea's adventurism, including nuclear and missile challenges, WMDs and proliferation, China's expansionism into the ocean, international terrorism due to failed and failing states, cyber-attacks, and counter-piracy.

These common issues are part of their obligations to the principles of freedom of navigation and over-flight in and over the high seas as ruled by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the South China Sea, HA&DR operations against natural disasters and pandemic disease, and PKOs. Both countries could also cooperate over the Arctic Sea and with the wider world. In the event of a sudden crisis involving North Korea, a closer peacetime structure of security cooperation between the ROK and Japan will prove vital in managing the challenge and threats that arise.

## Japan-ROK Foreign & Security Strategy and Current Security Cooperation

### Japan's Foreign & Security Strategy

#### Proactive Pacifism and the Right to Collective Self-Defense

Japan's policies require more ROK-Japan bilateral cooperation, and U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation. As a key global player, Japan has a commitment to regional stability and prosperity, and proactively contributes to the enhancement of global peace. The Legislation for Peace and Security, which passed in the National Diet in 2015, allows for a swift and seamless response to any situation. The Abe administration's Proactive Contribution to Peace realizes a functioning international order.

The Right to Collective Self-Defense originates from Article 51 of the UN Charter. Since 1981, Japan has understood that the use of force is not permitted by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Japan has understood that the use of the Right to Collective Self-Defense is not permitted by Article 9 of the Constitution. The Abe administration changed this understanding and application of the Constitution in 2014, and now permits the limited use of the Right to Collective Self-Defense.



## Policy toward the Korean Peninsula based on Japan's National Security Strategy

North Korea threatens Japan with WMDs - including the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Through both dialogue and pressure, Japan has made numerous and varied efforts to normalize its relations with North Korea. This has involved resolving the abduction, nuclear and missile issues in accordance with the 2002 Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.

Japan confirmed its stance that the comfort women issue was finally and irreversibly resolved through the Foreign Ministerial Agreement of 2015, but the ROK has not responded positively to these developments.

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) omitted its description of the ROK in the Diplomacy White Paper 2015. This had formerly read as "[Japan and the ROK] share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and respect for basic human rights." This removal was caused by the ROK's anti-Japanese policy. Japan had previously provided clear support for South Korea in its quest for reunification, but its stance has since become murkier.

If the ROK were to develop nuclear warheads, even against North Korea, this would potentially signal their intent to depart from the U.S. nuclear umbrella, ROK-Japan bilateral and ROK-Japan-U.S. trilateral security cooperation. It would also leave the world community facing a difficult situation and neighboring countries may not be willing to support reunification under such circumstances.

## The Foreign & Security Strategy of the ROK

Considering the turbulent strategic environment and national potentialities, the ROK could establish 'A Unified Great Korea' as a vision of the Republic of Korea as well as a Korean nation on the Peninsula. As shown in Figure 1, which compares the population size of a unified Korea and integration of South Korea's capital and technology with North Korea's huge natural resources and cheap labor with those of average level of G7 member states, a potential future combined state would be far from weak.

**Table 1. Population and GDP of G7 Member States + China, India, and the Two Koreas**

Unit: population 10,000; GDP USD trillions

Classification	U.S.	Japan	Germany	U.K.	France	Italy	Canada	China	India	ROK	North Korea	A Unified Korea
Population	3,239	1,267	8,072	6,443	6,683	6,200	3,536	13,7354	12,668	5,092	2,522	7,614
GDP	18.56	4.73	3.495	2.65	2.48	1.852	1.532	11.39	2.251	1.404	28 billion	1.422

Source: CIA, *World Factbook 2016*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/au.html>.

To achieve a Unified Great Korea as part of its national vision, the Moon Jae-in administration should develop national security strategic tenets consisting of strong security



postures and the denuclearization of North Korea, centripetal foreign security policies, and the synchronized pursuit of denuclearization- a peace regime - arms control on the Korean Peninsula.

First, from a national security perspective, the ROK should build a safe and stable country by maintaining a posture of prompt readiness against any external threats, including North Korean provocations. It is imperative for the ROK to develop a response strategy, including preemptive military action, to manage North Korea's nuclear and missile development strategy, as well as their intent and capability.

Second, by pursuing a centripetal foreign and security policy, the ROK could play a constructive and harmonious role as a geographic and geo-economic hub in the region. The ROK-U.S. alliance is the backbone of the ROK's foreign and security strategy. Simultaneously, the ROK proactively participates in implementing regional and global agendas such as the non-proliferation of WMDs, cyber security, counterterrorism, human rights, and development cooperation.

Third, unless denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula occurs, neighboring countries are will surely be reluctant to espouse their support for or not support the reunification of the Korean Peninsula as a nuclear state. Korea's exclusive independent position would likely produce isolation in the region and world. A fundamental and realistic strategy for abandoning North Korean nuclear development is essential. Mutually interconnected, comprehensive and gradual strategies along the following three pillars should be implemented: the Six-Party Talks as for the denuclearization of North Korea, a Four-Party Forum for building a peace regime, and North-South Korea Military Talks for arms control.

## Evaluation of Bilateral Military Exchanges and Cooperation

ROK-Japan security cooperation has been enhanced along with the political and social relations since normalization between the two countries took place in 1965. For Japan, the ROK is the most important neighboring country, sharing strategic interests, and is extremely vital to Japan in geopolitical terms. For South Korea, Japan is critical for sustainable economic growth and contingency on the Peninsula. The two countries share common strategic interests as allies of the U.S. and continued close collaboration between the two countries on the security front has enormous significance for regional peace and stability.

Both Japan and the ROK are encountering wider-ranging and complex security challenges including not only North Korea's nuclear and missile threat, but also counter-terrorism, PKOs, and maritime security. In order to effectively cope with these rising security challenges, it is important for the two countries to carry out trust-building measures and military cooperation. The increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula led the ROK and Japan to conclude the General Security of Military Agreement (GSOMIA) in November of 2016.

GSOMIA will likely prove effective for bilateral and trilateral cooperation by necessitating ongoing high-level dialogues between the respective Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff/Joint



Chiefs of Staff, as well as lower-level dialogues at international or independent meetings. Such dialogues can promote high-level cooperation and military cooperation and exchanges.

This type of action and the study of various international meetings at the staff level are also effective opportunities for both bilateral and trilateral cooperation. Notable examples of this have been ROK officers visiting Japan on matters related to the UN Rear Headquarters which is located in Japan exchange visits between commanding generals of Japan's Western Army and the ROK 2nd Operation Command, as well as between superintendents of Japan's National Defense Academy and the ROK Military, Navy and Air Force Academy. Domestic politics have influenced the vulnerability of these meetings.

Japan and ROK send defense and sister service attachés to their embassies in Seoul and Tokyo respectively, which means that Japan recognizes the ROK's importance in terms of security. Normally, Japan sends only three Defense Attachés to the great powers.

Japan has gradually begun to accept South Korean cadets and officers at the Japan National Defense Academy, Staff Colleges, Advanced Staff Colleges, Joint Military College, and the Japan National Institute for Defense Studies. Likewise, the ROK accepts Japanese cadets and officers at its equivalent educational institutions.

Bilateral training and exercises are still somewhat difficult due to the tense and volatile political situation. However, ROK naval vessels participated in the naval review as part of the ceremonial occasion and Japan-ROK also conducted a Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) in 2015. The Japanese and South Korean Navies participated in the RIMPAC and Cobra Gold Exercise led by the U.S. The first ROK-Japan-U.S. Pacific Dragon Exercise was carried out as a missile warning exercise in 2016.<sup>11</sup>

Both countries have already participated in the PKO United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in early-2000s, served as coalition forces in the Iraq War in mid-2000s, and deployed PKO to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in early-2010s. They have conducted counter-piracy operations as Combined Task Forces (CTF) 151 in the water off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Field-level cooperation between the two countries has been very smooth and has contributed to a greater mutual understanding. Defense medical exchanges to cope with pandemics, avian flu, CBR wound, and regional pandemic diseases in both PKO and HA & DR operations continue to be productive. Technical exchanges between ROK Special Operations Forces, the Japan GSDF Special Operations Forces Group, and the MSDF Special Boarding Unit will likely prove vital and effective in coping with terrorism.

The ROK Military Athletic Unit hosted the International Athletic Games for Soldiers in the fall of 2015. Although Japan did not send defense personnel to the international military sport events, both countries will be able to conduct military sports exchanges.

Cyber-security cooperation, which might be possible with U.S. involvement, will certainly improve in the future. Information sharing is being conducted under GSOMIA as well as at the

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<sup>11</sup> The ROK Ministry of National Defense, *2016 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2016), pp.136-137.



Japan-ROK Information Exchange Conference at the defense ministerial and sister service headquarters level.

Sisterhood relations, defense education organizations, and military bands, excluding combat units, may be possible in the first stage of extended military cooperation. This stage should be followed by a gradual broadening of exchanges in alignment with the political situation, which will likely be the most effective method. The exchange of military bands is a good example. The participation of the JGSDF Central Band in the International Military Band Festival World Fanfare 2002 and in the Gyeryong Military Cultural Festival in 2011 were both notable and positive. The ROK Naval band participated in the SDF Marching Festival in 2015. These opportunities surely enriched the mutual understanding of both countries.

### Trilateral Cooperation among U.S., ROK, and Japan

As both Japan and ROK are allies of the U.S., policy consultation among the military authorities of the three countries, mainly at the working level, has been carried out since 1994 and proven to be indispensable work towards the peace and stability of the region. Building on this, the “Information Sharing Arrangement among the Defense Authorities from Japan, the U.S., and ROK” was signed in 2014. This arrangement has worked to develop more concrete cooperation by enabling the trilateral military authorities to share classified information on North Korea’s nuclear and missiles program. In addition, in trilateral summit talks held in 2016 and in July, 2017 along with G20 summit in Germany, which issued the first joint trilateral security cooperation statement since 1994, the necessity to further advance security cooperation among the three countries was confirmed. Based on the agreement reached between the foreign and defense ministries of the three countries, instructions will be given to administrative officials in each country in order to enhance specific security and military cooperation. In June, 2017, a the U.S.-Japan-ROK Ministerial Dialogue was held on the sidelines of the 16th Shangri-La Dialogue to cope with North Korea’s nuclear and missile challenge. Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meetings were held in 2016, and these discussed at length the regional situation - including North Korea and trilateral defense cooperation. At the working level, close cooperation is conducted at various stages, such as the Director-General level and the Director level based on the framework of Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT). The three countries promote close service-to-service cooperation. In 2014, the Chief of Joint Staff of Japan, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff held the first annual Chiefs of Defense conference in Hawaii to discuss a broad range of issues, including the increasingly strained security situation, nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, and measures to enhance trilateral coordination among the three countries. Chief of Staff-level video teleconferences were held in 2016 in order to share information and cooperate with each other in response to North Korea’s nuclear test. Chiefs of Defense-level video teleconferences between the U.S., ROK and Japan were also held on May 23, 2017 and they agreed to promote “substantive” trilateral defense cooperation against North Korea’s provocations.





As for ROK-Japan bilateral cooperation, in 2015, the foreign and defense working-level Japan-ROK Security Dialogue was held in Seoul for the first time in nearly five years. Defense Ministers held the first Japan-ROK Ministerial Dialogue in four years on the sidelines of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue in 2015, and a meeting of the defense ministers was held in Seoul in the same year. In 2016 and 2017, a Japan-ROK Ministerial Dialogue was held on the sidelines of the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> Shangri-La Dialogue. Exchanges between the Chiefs of Army, Navy, and Air Staff of the two countries have also resumed. With respect to the Kumamoto Earthquake that occurred in 2016, Japan received relief supplies provided by the ROK Air Force C-130 which was able to further demonstrate close cooperation between the Japanese and ROK militaries.

**Table 2. Military Exchanges and Cooperation between Japan-ROK and U.S.-ROK-Japan**

Classification	Japan-ROK	U.S.-ROK-Japan
High level Defense Talks	Defense Ministerial Talks; Chief of Japan Joint Staff and Chairman of ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff; Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Force Staff Talks	Trilateral Foreign/Defense Ministerial Talks; Trilateral Defense Ministerial Talks; Chief of Joint Staff of Japan, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chairman of ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff Talks
Working Conferences	Director General-level Policy Talks	Defense Trilateral Talks among Assistant Ministerial Talks
Military Education Exchange Programs	Japan National Defense Academy and Korea Military, Navy, Air Force Academy; Japan Advanced Staff College and ROK Joint Military College; Japan National Institute for Defense Studies and Korean National Defense University	East Asia Security Symposium, Chief of Defense Talks
Combined & Multilateral Training and Exercises	Search & Rescue Exercises (SAREX)	RIMPAC, Cobra Gold Exercise, Pacific Reach Missile Warning Exercise
PKOs, Coalition Forces	East Timor, South Sudan, Iraq War	CTF-151 for Counter-Piracy in the Gulf of Aden
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations	Tsunami, Kumamoto Earthquake	HA&DR for Haiyan Typhoon, , Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations
Cyber Security and Counter-terrorism	Exchange between Special Operations Forces for Counter-terrorism	Cyber Security Trilateral Cooperation
Information Sharing	General Security of Military Agreement	Information Sharing Arrangement among the Defense Authorities from Japan, the U.S., and ROK
Others	Sisterhood relations, Military Band Exchanges, Military Sport Exchanges	

Source: ROK Ministry of National Defense, *2016 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2016); Ministry of Japan Defense, *Defense of Japan 2016*, [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w\\_paper/2016.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2016.html); PACOM, <http://www.pacom.mil/>.





## Implications

Military exchanges and cooperation- including military talks, military education exchanges, training and exercises, field-level cooperation between PKOs, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations- contribute to enhancing mutual understanding and cohesiveness by eliminating misunderstandings, and will become the backbone of combined operations in the event of contingency or emergency situations.

We are able to draw some principles and lessons that will enrich security and military cooperation between South Korea and Japan. They are: maintain the established military exchanges and cooperation programs; work to overcome negative sentiments toward one another, and gradually enrich deeper cooperation so as to understand each other through various military exchanges and cooperation. Such cooperation will be enriched along with hinging support from the U.S. These alliances have contributed to regional and global stability since their foundation.<sup>12</sup>

Should a crisis from North Korea's military adventurism and contingency situations arise, ROK-Japan and U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation will exemplify their power for successful operations and mutual interests.

## Institutionalization of ROK-Japan Security Cooperation

### Multi-tier Dialogue Mechanisms

Multi-tier dialogue mechanisms have already been employed gradually between the ROK and Japan bilaterally and with the U.S. trilaterally, both at the higher levels of Defense Ministers, Chiefs of Staff/Joint, and components, as well as lower levels including the Field Army, Fleet Command, Air Command, research institutes, functional organizations, and staff, even under the difficult general political issues that have occasionally arisen between two countries.

These dialogues are the backbone of further ROK-Japan security cooperation, and should continue to be planned and conducted by taking advantage of opportunities that are presented both independently and at international meetings, seminars, exhibitions, and observations. Examples of such international opportunities are: the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Seoul Defense Dialogues (SDD), the Jakarta International Defense Dialogue (JIDD), the Multilateral Security Dialogues hosted by Japan's Ministry of Defense/Self Defense Forces including the Japan-ASEAN Defense Minister's Informal Meeting, the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and staff-level Tokyo

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<sup>12</sup> 防衛省・自衛隊「平成28年度版 日本の防衛 防衛白書 Defense of Japan 2016」平成28年7月; 外務省「平成28年版 外交青書(外交青書2016)」2016.6.29.



Defense Forum; International Conferences held by private organizations including the Asia Security Summit (known as the Shangri-La Dialogue and hosted by International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)) and the Munich Security Conference; Inter-Service component Initiatives such as the Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD), the Pacific Armies Chief Conference (PACC), the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS), and various exhibitions including the Aerospace & Defense Exhibition (ADEX).

In the dialogue mechanism, capable defense attachés in both embassies in Seoul and Tokyo are vital. Topics that have been addressed at high-level conferences are as follows. There have been discussions over the security and defense policies of the two countries, the shared recognition regarding the security environment surrounding the two countries, and opinions concerning the defense policies of Japan and the ROK. In addition, consultations were held regarding specific defense cooperation and exchanges such as the participation of ROK naval vessels in the SDF Naval Review, as well as vice versa, and the implementation of the Japan-ROK joint Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX), to which the ROK side responded positively and, in 2015, ROK naval vessels participated in the Review and the continuous implementation of Japan-ROK SAREX. In the same year, the ROK Navy military band participated in SDF Marching Festival. Other discussions have addressed understandings regarding the security concerns between the two countries, and acknowledged of the importance of cooperation between the ROK and Japan as well as between the ROK, the U.S. and Japan. The ROK and Japan have agreed to strengthen defense exchanges in a variety of areas such as personnel exchanges, unit exchanges, education and research exchanges, and agreed to promote cooperation in the areas of UN PKOs, anti-piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, HA&DR Operations, affirmed the necessity of further advancing the ROK-Japan and ROK-the U.S.-Japan security and defense cooperation, and agreed to strengthen the emergency communication system between the ROK Ministry of National Defense and Japan Ministry of Defense in order to communicate and coordinate appropriately in the event of an emergency such as a North Korean provocation. The ROK-the U.S.-Japan consortium against the North Korean threat is inevitable and should be strengthened.

## The Military Education Exchange Program

The ROK and Japan have gradually promoted their military exchanges by simultaneously sending the ROK's cadets and officers to the Japan National Defense Academy, officer advanced courses at certain ground branch schools, Staff Colleges, Advance Staff Colleges, and the Japan National Institute for Defense Studies, and accepting Japanese cadets and officers at equivalent military educational organizations such as Korea Military, Air Force and Naval Academies, Joint Staff Military College, and Korea National Defense University. The ROK sends more personnel to Japan than Japan does to the ROK. Defense education exchanges are very effective in promoting mutual understanding in addition to enhancing study in the military professional arena. This



mechanism is one of the best methods of eliminating the existing prejudices between the two countries.

Personnel are invited to seminars in educational and research organizations, and the ongoing annual army or ground company-grade officer short-term unit-observation exchange program and cadet exchange program are also effective.

## Training and Exercises

Ceremonial occasions, and trainings/exercises of humanitarian operations like HA & DR and PKO, and the established mechanisms to the current emergency situation are possible, and the participation of both countries in trilateral or multilateral trainings and exercises like RIMPAC and SAREX provide good opportunities for bilateral efforts. And for the first stage of new areas for security cooperation such as the U.S.-Japan-India Malaba Naval Exercises, dispatching observers could be preferable.

In 2015, ROK naval vessels participated in Japan's Review. Japan and the ROK have conducted SAREX since the late 1990s. The first Japan- U.S.-ROK missile warning exercise, Pacific Dragon, was also conducted in 2016.

Additional military exchange programs may also be feasible. These include defense medical exchanges in the humanitarian arena – such as sending military medical doctors, dentists, nurses and medical service officers/NCOs to attend defense medical academic courses and defense hospitals. In addition, ROK military candidates may be sent to the Japan National Defense Medical College as medical cadets. Defense medical exchanges aimed at assisting with efforts to contain pandemic diseases such as avian flu, provide care to Chemical Biological and Radiological (CBR) wounded soldiers, and HA&DR operations will also provide benefits in this regard. Trainings/exercises may be productive. The ROK's medical doctors could dispatch their observation team to observe a real anti-avian flu operation in Japan's domestic Disaster Relief Operation and use what they learn to evaluate similar activity in South Korea.

## The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)

The U.S. has made every effort to resolve tensions between the ROK and Japan and facilitate improved cooperative relations between the two countries. In the beginning, the U.S. played a bridging role to resolve the comfort women and historical legacy issues between Korea and Japan. The U.S. perceived that an improvement in ROK-Japan relations was essential and urgent to be able to engage in collective counter-measures to proactively manage the North Korean nuclear and missile challenge, as well as the coercive challenge power posed by a third country towards the existing order and norms by coercion and force. The comfort women issue was resolved between the two governments in December, 2015. In November, 2016, the GSOMIA was signed between the two ministries of Japanese Ministry of Defense and the ROK Ministry of National Defense to share information related to North Korea's nuclear arsenal and missiles.

**Table 3. Japan's Intelligence Capacity and Areas for Enhancing Intelligence Capacity**

Classification	Contents
Intelligence Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Five Intelligence Satellites (two thermo, two radar, one reserve), six Aegis Ships (two Aegis ships are in the process of being built)</li> <li>- Four ground radars with a 1,000km range of detection, 17 early warning aircrafts, 77 frigates</li> </ul>
Areas for Enhancing Intelligence Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Enhance the reliability and accuracy of information via direct information and varied channels on North Korea nuclear and missile activities and capabilities</li> <li>* (IMINT) Increase the number/resolution of satellite surveillance (below 0.5m) and acquire nighttime and increment weather capabilities</li> <li>(SIGINT) Collect information in dead zones, share information collection analysis output through using their communication technology of North Korea</li> <li>(Others) Information on Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and internal activities of North Korea via all sources of information</li> </ul>

Trainings and exercises regarding GSOMIA and hot-line communication network are also required. There may be more potential sectors of cooperation in strategic research areas. ROK-Japan exchanges in research organizations to improve strategic matters are fine at the mere dialogue level. However, a deeper level of exchange could still prove difficult unless the political situation eases between the two countries in the future due to the difficulty of strategic cooperation arising from political constraints.

## Multilayered Japan-ROK Security Cooperation

### Global Perspectives

In the post-Cold War world, the role of the military has become more diverse, and global security situations, including fragile and failing states, as well as transnational threats such as peacekeeping, HA&DR, counter-piracy operations, pandemic diseases such as Ebola, and natural disasters are increasing. ROK and Japan have participated in these operations and exhibited admirable cooperation in these fields. The operations themselves make contributions to international stability, human safety, and crisis prevention, and are also effective as preparation for other contingencies. For instance, the CTF 151 anti-piracy operation itself is for the stability of the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and this operation may serve as a good template for dealing with trouble in the South China Sea.

Such operations require the Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA). The Logistic Support Agreement between the ROK and Japan for mutual support is an example of the lesson learned from the situation that arose within UNMISS (United Nations Mission in the Republic of



South Sudan) in 2013, wherein controversy was stirred up in the ROK after South Korean troops had to borrow ammunition from Japan in the field.

## Regional Perspectives

### Building a Security Arrangement in Northeast Asia

Trump 'America First' administration is strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan, which is normalizing its military and adopting a "proactive pacifism" policy, is also working to cope with Chinese expansionism and North Korea's adventurism. The rising PRC is pursuing a number of expansionist policies such as its Island Chains Strategy, Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), One Belt One Road, and has established the AIIB as an alternative to Western financial institutions. As it pursues these policies, it has formed links with Russia, which, as a Eurasian state, has revived its previous "look east" policy and continues to try to prevent western influence and to extend towards the Pacific Ocean. In the region, regional hegemonic rivalry, an arms race, problematic historical legacies, territorial disputes, overlapping ADIZ, and nationalism are all facilitating contributing factors to instability.

From a historical perspective, China's and Russia's expansionism have gone in all directions. China's northeastern expansion has come through the Korean Peninsula, and Russia's eastern expansion has come through Siberia and reached Alaska, which was sold to the U.S. in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, Sakhalin, and the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuril Islands. This last expansion was previously halted by Japan and is now held in check by the Japan-U.S.-ROK alliance.

In the meantime, Chung's study for a more cooperative security environment in Northeast Asia identifies four conditions necessary to the formation of a security arrangement in Northeast Asia. First, existing security cooperation arrangements have already made great strides in terms of developing the habits of dialogue among regional powers. Second, the dynamics of economic interdependence in Northeast Asia spill over to security cooperation. Third, transnational threats cannot be mastered by states acting individually, but should be resolved within a multilateral framework. Finally, a new spirit has arisen in the region in favor of multilateral cooperation to resolve regional issues such as terrorism, the North Korean nuclear issue, and economic constraints.<sup>13</sup>

The concept of a security regime in Northeast Asia can be implemented along three basic lines of strategy. First, a multinational epistemic community must be cultivated as the basis of a new regional network as well as a domestic consensus. Second, on the military level, key actors should systematically expand security cooperation programs, including regional defense ministerial talks and the establishment of a Northeast Asia multinational headquarters. Third, no

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<sup>13</sup> Building a security arrangement in Northeast Asia from the last paragraph of page 16 to the last paragraph of page 17 is Chung's idea for establishing a more cooperative security environment in the region.



movement towards a new security system in Northeast Asia can be made without strong leadership.

**Figure 1. Northeast Asian Security Architecture**



Sources: Chung Kyung-young, "Building a Military Security Cooperation Regime in Northeast Asia: Feasibility and Design," Ph.D., dissertation, University of Maryland, 2005.

As shown in the figure, regional summit talks should be held to discuss security issues in the region. Annual summit talks need to be established to provide guidance and policy related to resolving transnational threats. In the event of a transnational contingency situation, a political committee or ministerial meetings should decide whether they will deploy regional response forces to counter the threats. Each member state should take appropriate action to obtain domestic political consensus including obtaining the confirmation of lawmakers. Once each member state decides upon the size of the response forces, the military committee should develop a command structure for the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) according to the contingency.

A regional security cooperation architecture should be gradually implemented and institutionalized by the epistemic community and through the gradual expansion of military exchanges and strategic awareness programs through a secretariat or security cooperation center. The end state of the regime will be the establishment of multinational forces (MNF) HQs.<sup>14</sup>

A Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) was established in Seoul in September 2011 in accordance with the agreement signed and ratified at the China-Japan-Korea summit talks. This agreement promoted a vision of peace and common prosperity among the three nations. The TCS has played a crucial role in enacting confidence-building measures through trilateral dialogues, joint research studies on common areas of interest such as the environment, natural disasters, and cultural agendas. The TCS also has the potential to act as a backbone for regional stability in coping with environmental degradation, pandemic diseases, search and rescue operations in the

<sup>14</sup> Building a security arrangement in Northeast Asia from the last paragraph of page 16 to the last paragraph of page 17 is Chung's idea for establishing a more cooperative security environment in the region.





event of the sinking of a ship, and regional natural disasters including tsunamis, typhoons, and earthquakes.

## Cyber Security Cooperation

The advance of integrated circuit (IC) technology enhances the dependence of organizations on IC networks. Cyber-attacks on the IC networks of governments and militaries, and on critical infrastructure and economic activities, affect national security.

In 2013, cyber-attacks hit ROK broadcasting stations and financial institutions, the Presidential Office, government agencies, newspaper companies, and the subway system. These were the same attacks used in the past by North Korea. In 2014, a U.S. film company was hit, and the FBI announced evidence pointing towards North Korea as the perpetrator of these cyber-attacks. North Korea has been training its personnel on a national scale to conduct such attacks. More recently, in May of 2017, mass-scale global cyber-attacks from an unknown source affected nearly 150 countries. There has been speculation that these attacks were also perpetrated by North Korea.

Cyber security cooperation between the ROK, Japan, and the U.S. will be effective against cyber-attacks from North Korea and other actors. Cyber dialogues are being held between the ROK and Japan as well as between the U.S. and ROK in order to exchange views on threat awareness and relevant initiatives being undertaken by each country. Cyber dialogues could be expanded to the trilateral ROK-U.S.-Japan.

## The Korean Peninsula Perspective

### Neutralizing the North Korean Nuclear Threat

There are two potential scenarios related to North Korea's nuclear challenge. The first is the neutralization option of North Korea nuclear weapons and missiles prior to the crossing of a red line. The other option is total denuclearization, meaning North Korea stops all nuclear and missile development and tests, reaches an agreement freezing and agreeing to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through a resumption of the Six Party Talks, and eventually achieves denuclearization and a peace treaty.

The Kim Jong-un regime will likely never surrender to international sanctions and pressure until it achieves North Korea's grand strategy through nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. It is generally estimated that the near-term objective of North Korea's nuclear and missile policy is to achieve the miniaturization of nuclear warheads, acquire reentry technologies for its ballistic missiles, and then secure the status of a nuclear state like India and Pakistan. Its mid-term objective may be to join the Six Party Talks and seek the lifting of economic sanctions and other economic rewards while reducing a certain number of nuclear warheads under the pretext of non-proliferation of WMDs, while hiding its remaining nuclear arsenal. Its long-term goal may





also seek to drive U.S. forces off of the Peninsula by signing a peace treaty with South Korea endorsed by the U.S. and China. With these objectives, North Korea's strategy is "to build a strong, prosperous country" as the immediate goal in the northern part of the Peninsula, and "carry out the revolutionary tasks of national liberation and democracy" at the national level. Its final goal is to "realize the autonomy of the masses by actualizing Kim Il-sungism-Kim Jong-ilism throughout the Peninsula."<sup>15</sup>

The pillars of a strong and prosperous nation are political, military, and economic capabilities. According to "self-reliant" (*Juche*) ideology and the "military first" (*Songun*) policy, North Korea seems to perceive that North Korea has already become a great military power as a nuclear state that can fight against the United States. In accordance with economic construction in parallel with nuclear armament (the *Byungjin* line), when certain conditions are met, North Korea will seek to occupy the metropolitan area of Seoul by making pre-emptive nuclear and missile strikes, and then it will become a great economic power.<sup>16</sup>

We will never wait and see until a catastrophic nuclear war breaks out. It is imperative to neutralize North Korea's nuclear and missile threat in order to prevent a horrible disaster carried out by North Korea.

The objectives of such a neutralization strategy are to contain the additional enhancement of nuclear and missile weaponry, to guide North Korea to join the negotiation table, and to never allow North Korea to reach the status of nuclear state, which place it beyond control. To implement this strategy, the ROK should establish a task force at the National Security Office for the President that is dedicated to responding against North Korea's nuclear threats. A Tri-axis system consisting of the Kill Chain, the Korea Air Defense Missile System (KAMD), and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) should be modernized as soon as possible. Strategic command will be established during the Moon Jae-in era in order to neutralize North Korean national command authority. Strategic command, which will be in charge of command and control for the neutralization of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, will be comprised of a Special Operations Task Force Brigade, an Aviation Group, Army Missile Command, Air Force Air Defense Command, Submarine Force Command, and a Cyber-Electronic Warfare Unit.

In the meantime, neutralization of North Korea's nuclear and missile threat should be achieved via the trinity of sharing perceptions of North Korea's nuclear and missile threat, military operation systems among the ROK, U.S., and UNC (Rear) in Japan, and strategic communication to reach a public consensus on the urgency and inevitability of eliminating nuclear warheads and missile in the ROK, the U.S., Japan, and also China, and Russia. However, preemptive military action should be implemented conditionally in the event of clear-cut indicators of a North Korean nuclear and missile attack, along with US deployment assets from off the Peninsula ready to wage total war. Early operational readiness should include THAAD

<sup>15</sup> The Preamble to the Regulation for Worker Party of Korea (WPK) (Revision, April 11, 2012).

<sup>16</sup> Chung Kyung-young, "Realities and Strategies in Managing North Korea's Nuclear Challenge," *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, Vol. 2, No.2, <http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S2377740016500299?JournalCode=cqiss>.



deployment, and tactical nuclear weaponry could be redeployed to South Korea until the denuclearization of North Korea. Such a step might be proactively considered as a balancing of terror.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in said in an interview<sup>17</sup> that Japan must “take legal responsibility for its actions” and “make an official apology” in order to resolve the controversy over the deal made in 2015. President Moon stressed that the deal made under the previous administration “is not accepted by the people of Korea, particularly by the victims.” President Moon expressed his hope that ties with Japan would improve, saying in the interview that “we should not block the advancement of Korea-Japan bilateral relations just because of this one issue.”

## Peaceful Unification

Unification on the divided Korean Peninsula should be achieved in a peaceful manner by simultaneously pursuing three pillars. These pillars consist of North Korea’s denuclearization, the establishment of a peace regime, and arms control on the Peninsula. The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure and engagement” policy toward North Korea aims at denuclearization and eventually making peace. Conditionally, if North Korea declares a moratorium on nuclear tests and experimental missile launches, then the Six Party Talks will resume. In the event of reaching an agreement related to the dismantlement of the North’s nuclear and military arsenal, then Four-Party Talks among the two Koreas, U.S. and China could proclaim the end of the Korean War. This would in turn reduce tension and allow for arms control and reduction among two Koreas and the U.S. Denuclearization could enable the four parties to sign a peace treaty and achieve the normalization of relations between the U.S., Japan and North Korea.

But it takes time, and closer trilateral ROK-the U.S.-Japan cooperation will be able to prevent North Korea’s military adventurism, invite China’s active engagement with North Korea, and then to make North Korea understand that it can gain greater advantage and economic support to establish itself as a “strong and prosperous nation” through denuclearization without losing the Kim Dynasty’s grip on control.

## North Korea’s Contingency

Key actor states in the region prefer peaceful reunification on the Peninsula. However, despite harsh sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, Trump’s maximum pressure, and the inauguration of a new, progressive president in the ROK, North Korea has continued to conduct ballistic missile launches.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s Interview with *The Washington Post*, June 20, 2017.

<sup>18</sup> Hazel Smith, “Hungry for Peace, International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea,” United States Institute of Peace, 2005, Washington D.C.



ROK and the U.S. exercised restraint in their past responses to North Korea's nuclear/missile tests, the sinking of the Cheonan, and the shelling of Yeonpyong Island, but President Trump has pushed for North Korea's denuclearization by maximum pressure and dialogue.

This added pressure increases the potential for a military contingency initiated by the North, the U.S., or both at the same time, and there has always been the possibility of North Korea's aggressive adventurism such as was seen in the Korean War. In the event of a contingency on the Peninsula, an effective response will rely on ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral military collaboration through intelligence sharing and missile warning exercises. The earlier such collaboration is initiated, the more effective it will be in a contingency.<sup>19</sup>

### Outbreak of War

Reportedly, Kim Jong Un approved a "Great War Plan for Reunification" on August 25, 2012. The first phase consists of surprise attacks with nuclear missiles; the second phase is total war; the third phase is total attacks with asymmetric combat power; the fourth phase is special operations in the rear; and the final step is conquering the whole Peninsula.<sup>20</sup> Based on this plan, North Korea's nuclear strategy has been developed as a core asset for waging a unification war. In February 2014, North Korea upgraded its nuclear forces from Strategic Rocket Command to Strategic Forces Command and finalized its surprise attack doctrines. On May 7, 2016, the WPK Congress proclaimed North Korea to be a perpetual nuclear state, revealing a revision of the Worker's Party Regulations. It is estimated that North Korea now possesses 20 nuclear warheads, and will be able to develop approximately 50 nuclear warheads by 2020. After the five nuclear tests in the past decade, and with its long pursuit of miniaturizing and multiplexing nuclear explosives, North Korean forces may be equipped with large caliber howitzers, multiple launcher systems, and Scud and Rodong missiles.

In the event of an outbreak of war initiated by North Korea, ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral military cooperation will be essential to winning. Japan plays a key role by supporting and defending the UNC Rear as Rear Area supports of UNFK (UN Forces in Korea). In addition, USFJ (US Forces in Japan) act as reinforcement for UNFK and USFK units, and conduct operations with Japan such as mine sweeping, logistics including supply, transportation, medical, maintenance, and so on. These activities take place in Japan and on the high seas between Japan and the Peninsula. All of these activities require close tri-lateral security cooperation.

If North Korea attacks Japan with missiles and special operational forces, Japan will respond strongly by attacking North Korean territory with the support of the U.S. ROK's considering the ROK's Article 2 of the ROK Constitution, which proclaims "The territory of the Republic of Korea shall be the Peninsula and its subsidiary islands" and the 1991 South-North Basic

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
<sup>19</sup> Kim Jong Un's regime has conducted three nuclear tests and 51 ballistic missile test firings in the past five and half years since he assumed the position of Supreme Commander of North Korean People's Army on Dec 30, 2011. Kim Jong Il conducted two nuclear tests and 16 missile test fires during the 18 years of his rule.

<sup>20</sup> "Kim Jong-un Approved Seven-Day War Plan," *JoongAng Ilbo*, January 18, 2015.



Agreement defining the relations between the two Koreas as “special relations among Korean national people toward a unified Korea, unlike relations between nation and nation,” the ROK government should coordinate and consult with the Japanese government to permit the Japan Self Defense Forces to conduct military operations in North Korea.

**Figure 2. Deployment Map of U.S. Forces in Japan**



Source: Japan Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2016*, [http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w\\_paper/2016.html](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2016.html).

In the meantime, the ROK government would conduct Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) for US Forces dependents and American citizens from airbases and ports, including through US transportation assets bound for Japan. Japan wants to conduct NEO for 60,000 Japanese citizens who are concentrated in the Seoul area, but ROK airports allow JASDF C-130s to land there is a sticking point. This policy also prevents Japan from providing support to UN operations.

In addition to NEO, Japan needs to not only rescue an unknown number of abducted Japanese citizens living in North Korea, but also to protect approximately 7,000 Japanese citizens who were part of the 93,000 persons who resettled in North Korea between the late 1950s and 1984 via North Korea late time) from protect.

The contingency on the Peninsula might provide opportunities for China to expand to both the East and South China Seas. And in particular, Japan must maintain its protection of Senkaku Islands, and also continue to support the stability of the South China Sea with ASEAN member states.

ROK and UN Forces efforts will concentrate on protecting the ROK, and shift counter-offensive operations to defeat North Korea and subsequently achieve a free, democratic, unified Korea. Japan is not a member of UN Forces, but will support UNC's operations largely through providing combat service support directly to UNC Rear in Japan as an allied country of the U.S. and a member of UN. ROK-Japan security cooperation in peace time can prevent a crisis and, at the same time, can improve the capabilities of UNFK in the event of a war on the Peninsula. Peace



time improvement of this close security cooperation is dependent upon the strategic cooperative relations between the two countries.

## Conclusion and Policy Recommendation

In a turbulent global and regional strategic environment, which faces numerous challenges such as China's Sino-centrism and expansionism, the America First policy of the U.S., Russia's Neo-Eastern policy, and North Korea's incessant adventurism, ROK-Japan security cooperation is essential to the stability and peace in the Western Pacific, the Korean Peninsula, and the world as a whole. The contributions of the ROK and Japan to global stability against military and non-traditional military threats will support regional peace.

But there are still continuous barriers to security cooperation between two countries, which are historical legacies<sup>21</sup> such as the comfort women issue, territorial disputes, mutual distrust, ambivalent national interests, and distorted political and social relations. One of the hurdles to bilateral security cooperation is the issue of the comfort women.

We, both sides, have our challenges in improving and bolstering security cooperation between our two countries, and it will likely take time. However, in reality, we may be nearly out of time, and therefore we should make better security cooperation a priority. The authors believe that the ROK and Japan can improve military-military cooperation with the professionalism of the national defense sector of each country.<sup>22</sup>

Our policy recommendations are as follows. We recommend ongoing security cooperation ranging from high-level defense cooperation to lower-level military exchanges be established and institutionalized so as to be shielded from the political situation. Such cooperation would include the mechanism of working conference/staff-level dialogues, defense attachés, a military education exchange program, training and exercises, participation in peace keeping operations/coalition forces, humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations, cyber security, counter-piracy, and counter-terrorism, along with information sharing and mutual logistic support. In particular, political and social relations between Japan and Korea should not impact military security cooperation and exchanges. The effectiveness of such cooperation should be periodically reviewed and re-evaluated so that areas for improvement can be identified and cooperation deepened.

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<sup>21</sup> 柳周鉉「朝鮮總督府〈朝鮮侵略と抗争の歴史〉第1巻 日蝕の形骸」清風書房昭和43年8月1日; 柳周鉉著、朴容九訳「小説 朝鮮總督府(下)」講談社昭和43年7月20日; 金在洪、韓桂玉・訳「韓国軍上巻・下巻」光人社1995.8.12; 石井慎二「別冊宝島89 軍部」JICC 1989.2.25.

<sup>22</sup> 朝鮮統一問題研究会「シリーズ日韓問題 軍事一体化 危険な同盟」晩聲社1978.6.15; 朝鮮統一問題研究会「シリーズ日韓問題 軍事一体化 危険な同盟」晩聲社1978.6.15; 池東旭「中公新書1351 韓国の族閥・軍閥・財閥 支配集団の政治力学を解く」中央公論社1997.3.25; 池東旭「現代を読む 軍服を脱いだ韓国 気になる隣人」時事通信社1994.1.15; 康熙奉「こんなに凄いのか 韓国の徴兵制」スリーエーネットワーク2001.3.14; 朴正功「顎を上げて空を見なさい 韓国軍新兵の群像」仮面社1974.8.25.





There are some considerations that must be taken into account before proceeding with security cooperation. Such cooperation must be initiated gradually and steadily and range from soft matters to hard ones; cooperation must not be hindered by distorted political and social relations, but may be postponed until such time as public opinion has recovered; cooperation must be supported by the U.S. along with other UNC member states; each area of defense exchange and cooperation must be planned systematically and based on high-level defense cooperation, because of the characteristics of top-down military organization and political sensitivity, and; there should be an early conclusion of ROK-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement(ACSA) as a logistical support agreement for mutual support is required for the better security cooperation in the field. Japan's normalization in the security arena will result in improved, proactive security cooperation from Japan.

The objectives of the neutralization strategy are to contain any additional enhancements of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, to guide North Korea to join the negotiation table, and to never allow North Korea to reach the status of nuclear state. Neutralization of North Korea's nuclear and missile can be achieved through the trinity of sharing perceptions of North Korea's nuclear and missile threat, shared military operation systems among ROK, U.S. and the UNC Rear in Japan, and strategic communication to achieve a public consensus of the urgency and inevitability of eliminating nuclear warhead and missiles in the ROK, U.S., Japan, and also China and Russia. In particular, joint ROK-Japan options for enhancing the reliability of extended deterrence in order to cope with North Korea's nuclear and missile threat are as follows: first, the two countries need to develop an agreement addressing objectives, roles and capabilities; second, they must establish U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Extended Deterrence Strategic Committee that includes the established Defense Trilateral Talks in order to consult regarding strategy and policy; and third, they should conduct periodic trilateral exercises against North Korea's WMD threats.

If North Korea proclaims a moratorium on the development and testing of its nuclear and missile production and allows IAEA members reentry into North Korea, member states of the Six Party Talks will be willing to resume the talks, and Four Party Talks to sign a peace treaty and normalize relations between the U.S., Japan and North Korea will be possible.

A nuclear-free, unified Korea achieved following the denuclearization and neutralization of North Korea's nuclear weaponry will be born again as hub of peace, stability and co-prosperity from an epicenter of conflict and military confrontation in the region. ■



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