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Abstract

How does economic globalization influence individuals' welfare attitudes? Much of the focus in the literature has been on identifying the *losers* under globalization, and exploring whether and to what extent they demand *compensation* in the form of government redistribution. We argue that economic globalization shapes welfare attitudes in a more multi-faceted way. We propose four types of citizens based on self-perceived economic consequences of globalization to themselves and to the nation: collective winner, lone winner, lone loser, and collective loser. We then theorize how each type relates to three distinctive motives behind welfare demand: insurance-seeking, equality-seeking as well as compensation-seeking. We examine our theoretical expectations with the case of South Korea, where we survey social spending preferences under different hypothetical scenarios of fiscal constraint and recipient targeting. We find a surprisingly low level of support for social spending among lone losers (i.e., those who believe globalization is bad for themselves but not for Koreans in general) across all scenarios, thus evidence *against* both compensation-seeking and equality-seeking mechanisms. The support level is much higher among the lone winners, those who believe globalization is not bad for them yet hurts Koreans in general. The lone winners are more supportive than any other group when it comes to the universal flat-rate transfer. The findings together validate the insurance-seeking mechanism. Our findings have implications for the direction of welfare state development under globalization.

Keywords: Globalization; Support for Welfare State; Compensation thesis; Insurance; Inequality; South Korea

Introduction

How does individuals' exposure to economic globalization influence their attitudes towards the welfare state? One major theoretical argument, often referred to as the *compensation thesis*, posits that citizens who lose under globalized economic competition seek government protection. Depending on the size and political leverage of these *losers*, the micro-level shifts in attitude might aggregate into an effective *upward* pressure for social spending and counter the race-to-the-bottom pressure allegedly exerted by the market forces (Garrett 1995, Rodrik 1997; 1998).

A number of empirical studies have tested the thesis by examining public opinion in and across Europe and North America (Cusack, Iversen and Rehm 2006, Margalit 2011, Scheve and Slaughter 2004, Walter 2010) as well as in developing economies (Koster 2014, Lim and Burgoon 2017) and found, at best, mixed empirical support for the thesis. To reconcile the mixed or weak findings, scholars have also proposed more nuanced versions of the compensation thesis by differentiating distinct aspects of economic globalization and/or distinct functions of the welfare state (Burgoon 2001, Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2017, Hays, Ehrlich and Peinhardt 2005, Kim 2007), by factoring in various institutional settings that affect the representation of the losers (Burgoon 2012, Ha 2008, Rudra 2002), and by taking account of the availability of alternative means of protection outside the welfare state (Cao, Prakash and Ward 2007, Hwang and Lee 2014, Lim and Burgoon 2017, Rickard 2012).

However, in our opinion, there are two important limits to the existing scholarship on the economic globalization and welfare state nexus. First, the focus in the literature has been overwhelmingly on identifying *losers* and their attitudes, thereby failing to capture preferences among *winners*. Second, the focus in the literature has been on the losers' demand for (or the winners' willingness to offer) *compensatory* benefits, which is only one of several potential motivations for supporting the welfare state. The literature thus fails to capture more nuanced preferences of both *losers* and *winners*.

We argue that economic globalization shapes welfare attitudes in a more multi-faceted way and propose four types of citizens who have distinct perceptions about the impact of globalization: those who perceive that globalization benefits both themselves and others in the society (*Collective winner*); those who perceive that globalization benefits themselves but hurts others (*Lone winners*); those who perceive that globalization hurts themselves but benefits others (*Lone loser*); and those who perceive that globalization hurts both themselves and others (*Collective loser*) (See Table 1).

Table 1. Two Dimensional Globalization Perception

Effect on the Nation \ Effect on Myself	Not Bad	Bad
Not Bad	Collective Winner	Lone Loser
Bad	Lone Winner	Collective Loser

The typology also allows us to explore the existing studies' three distinctive mechanisms linking economic globalization exposure with welfare attitudes: insurance-seeking, equality-seeking as well as the much studied compensation-seeking mechanisms. We theorize how these mechanisms are invoked among the four distinct ideal-types of citizens.

We test our theoretical expectations using original survey data in South Korea, with a nationally representative sample of 1,804 Korean adults. In addition to surveying the respondents' self-perceived globalization consequences, we collected their social spending preferences under different hypothetical scenarios with different fiscal constraint (i.e., with or without budgetary surplus) as well as varying coverages of beneficiaries (i.e., strongly means-tested, moderately means-tested, and universal flat-rate benefits) (See *Research Design* section for more details). Studying South Korea has important merits in light of testing our theoretical expectations, because we can control for two factors that the literature considers important: particular existing expectation about the role of the welfare state and ethnic/racial heterogeneity (see *Case Selection* section for more details).

To preview, we find a surprisingly low level of support for social spending among *lone losers*(i.e., those who believe globalization hurts themselves but not others) across all scenarios, which is, we consider, evidence *against* both compensation-seeking and equality-seeking mechanisms. The support level is much higher among the *lone winners*, those who believe globalization is not bad for themselves yet hurts others. The lone winners are more supportive than any other group of citizens when it comes to spending on the universal flat-rate transfer. We interpret that the findings together lend the most consistent support for the insurance-seeking mechanism: those who see potential risks of economic globalization support welfare spending as an attempt to prevent the harmful consequences *ex ante*.

The paper has two main contributions to the literature. First, in exploring the nexus between globalization exposure and welfare attitudes, we move beyond the conventional approach that pits losers against winners. We argue and empirically show that some of the non-losers under globalization have reasons to demand welfare state expansion and are willing to share the fiscal burden. Second, our findings have implications for the direction of welfare state development in globalizing and emerging welfare states around the world. The size of the self-perceived globalization *losers* is limited in many countries – often only a small minority in newly industrialized, export-oriented countries such as South Korea. In democratic or democratizing countries where vote share matters, it would be thus rather unrealistic to assume that the compensatory demand among the losers can aggregate into an effective pressure for expanding the welfare state when a majority do not empathize with them. Yet our study reveals that a sizable minority of citizens classified as *lone winners* have the potential for driving the expansion of a preventive welfare state (in South Korea, the size of lone winners (21% of respondents) were indeed twice the size of lone losers (11% of respondents)). We discuss several policy ramifications in light of our specific findings in the concluding section of the paper.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we elaborate the three distinct mechanisms linking globalization exposure to welfare attitudes and derive our hypotheses.

We then introduce our survey and present our research design, which is followed by a section discussing our findings. The last section concludes with some policy implications.

Globalization Exposure and Welfare Attitudes: Three Mechanisms

We argue that dimensionalizing citizens' perception about globalization allows us to examine the plausibility of distinct mechanisms through which globalization shapes welfare attitudes. Specifically, we test three mechanisms: compensation-seeking, insurance-seeking, and equality-seeking.

First, the compensation-seeking mechanism suggests that being losers of economic globalization is associated with a higher support for the welfare state, as those losers are expected to demand more government compensation. The insurance-seeking mechanism, on the other hand, focuses on the risks and uncertainties, not necessarily on the already incurred or imminent losses, from economic globalization. The sense of increasing (or increasingly unknown) risks under liberalized economy might generate future-oriented demand for public risk-pooling as an attempt to prevent harmful consequences *ex ante* (Barr 2001, Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2017). Lastly, in contrast to the first two self-interested mechanisms, the equality-seeking mechanism focuses on people's other-regarding preferences and thus implicates that globalization shapes welfare attitudes via its effect on inequality perception (Lü and Scheve 2016, Lü, Scheve and Slaughter 2012, Norton and Ariely 2011).

Compensation-seeking Mechanism

The compensation-seeking mechanism focuses on the citizens' pursuit of government compensation in return for their losses. Perceiving economic globalization as directly harmful for their own economic security (e.g., causing unemployment or decline in earnings) would be associated with a higher support for the welfare state. Because the mechanism primarily relies on individual cost-benefit analysis, the impact of economic globalization to the nation as a whole should not affect their attitudes towards the welfare state and any losers regardless of others' well-being should support welfare spending. Thus, if the compensation-seeking mechanism is plausible, we expect the following to be true:

H1 (Compensation-seeking motive): *Individual threat perception* is associated with a greater support for social spending; in other words, both *lone losers* and *collective losers* are more supportive of social spending than lone and collective winners.

Table 2 summarizes our expectations for the mechanism. The darker red areas show the higher likelihood of supporting social spending, while the lighter red areas show the lower likelihood. To find empirical support for the mechanism, both types of losers should exhibit higher support for social spending than the winners.

Table 2. Expectations for the compensation-seeking mechanism

Effect on the Nation \ Effect on Myself	Not bad	Bad
Not bad	Collective winner	Lone loser
Bad	Lone winner	Collective loser

Insurance-seeking Mechanism

The insurance-seeking mechanism focuses on the risks and uncertainties, not necessarily on the already incurred or imminent losses (Barr 2001). The sense of increasing (or increasingly un-known) risks under globalized economy might generate demand for a public risk-pooling to in-sure themselves against the harmful consequences (Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2017). If so, perceiving globalization as threatening to the multitudes in the country would be associated with a higher support for the welfare state. The intuition is that those who think globalization hurts the multitudes take a cue from the dismal circumstance and infer that the national economy will con-tinue to be vulnerable to globalization-induced risks. Even if s/he is fairing well right now, be-cause they perceive that others are suffering from globalization, they expect that the situation might get worse and affect themselves sooner than later. This generates support for the welfare state, especially for a more preventive social policy as opposed to an ad-hoc compensation.

H2 (Insurance-seeking motive): *National* threa*t* Perceptio*n* is associated with a greater sup-port for social spending; in other words, both *lone* winner*s* and *collective* loser*s* are more support-ive of social spending than lone losers and collective winners.

Table 3 summarizes our expectations for the mechanism, again with the darker red areas showing the higher likelihood of supporting social spending.

Table 3. Expectations for the insurance-seeking mechanism

Effect on the Nation \ Effect on Myself	Not bad	Bad
Not bad	Collective winner	Lone loser
Bad	Lone winner	Collective loser

Note that both compensation-seeking and insurance-seeking mechanisms expect a higher support for welfare state among collective losers than among collective winners, but the expectations differ for lone winners/losers. Here, it pays off to dimensionalize globalization perceptions and create four types — if the compensation-seeking mechanism is plausible, lone losers who (believe they) bear the brunt of the globalization's damage should be more supportive of social spending than lone winners. To the contrary, if we find lone winners to be as supportive as or even more supportive than lone losers, the finding can be seen as consistent evidence for the insurance-seeking mechanism.

To gain more leverage to differentiate H1 from H2, we also consider individuals' sensitivity to fiscal contributions. The two mechanisms offer different expectations about the supporters' sensitivity to fiscal burden of welfare state expansion. We expect compensation seeking supporters to become less enthusiastic about a social spending program when it requires raising extra revenue. By contrast, insurance-seeking supporters should be less sensitive to fiscal contribution, because the contribution now is seen as insurance against future risks. H1 and H2 both predict a high level of support from collective losers. Thus, if our H2 is indeed driven by the insurance-seeking mechanism, we also expect to find:

H3 (Insurance-seeking motive vs. compensation-seeking motive): Support from those with higher *national threat perception* is more robust to fiscal burden than support from those with higher *individual threat perception*.

Equality-seeking Mechanism

Lastly, the equality-seeking mechanism implicates that economic globalization shapes welfare attitudes via its effect on inequality. The previous two mechanisms presume that individuals are driven by the concerns over their own material self-interests. The equality-seeking mechanism allows individuals to be driven by egalitarian norms. The main idea is that individuals are genuinely concerned about the social welfare of the population as a whole and prefer a more egalitarian society (Norton and Ariely 2011), although how much causal impact such a concern has on policy preferences (vis-à-vis the impact of self-interest) varies across societies and over time (Lü and Scheve 2016).

Studies suggest that one situational factor that strengthens the egalitarian motive is the increasing macro-level inequality (Dimick, Rueda and Stegmueller 2017, Schmidt-Catran 2016). The implication for our analysis is that individuals would seek inequality-reducing redistribution via welfare state when they perceive globalization's consequences have been unequal. More specifically, if the mechanism is plausible, we expect that individuals who feel worse off than other citizens under globalization (i.e., lone losers) should support the welfare state out of disadvantageous inequality aversion. Additionally, individuals who feel better off than other citizens (i.e., lone winners) should also lend support for welfare state out of advantageous inequality aversion. By contrast, when globalization is perceived to be harmful/beneficial to everyone in the country

including themselves (i.e., collective winners and losers), the equality-seeking mechanism should not be provoked. In essence, the equality-seeking mechanism suggests that the perceptions of individual and national level consequences interact to determine one's stance on social spending. We lay out distinctive expectations of each mechanism.

H4.1: (Disadvantageous inequality aversion) Lone losers are more supportive of social spending than collective losers.

Table 4. Expectations for the equality-seeking mechanism I

Effect on Myself / Effect on the Nation	Not bad	Bad
Not bad	Collective winner	Lone loser
Bad	Lone winner	Collective loser

H4.2: (Advantageous inequality aversion) Lone winners are more supportive of social spending than collective winners

Table 5. Expectations for the equality-seeking mechanism II

Effect on Myself / Effect on the Nation	Not bad	Bad
Not bad	Collective winner	Lone loser
Bad	Lone winner	Collective loser

Note that although H4.1 has a distinctive expectation, H4.2 shares its expectation with H2: both predict that lone winners would be more supportive of welfare state than collective winners. These lone winners may be pure egalitarians committed to reducing inequality or pure insurance seekers wanting to prevent material harms *exante*, or be the mix of both types. We suggest that one distinction between the two types lies in the preferred *beneficiaries* of social spending. Under a given level of tax progressivity, lone winners committed to reducing inequality should prefer a progressive spending benefiting the low-income to a universal flat-rate spending, as the former has greater redistributive effects per unit of money spent.[1] We thus explore the following additional hypothesis derived from the equality-seeking mechanism:

H5 (Advantageous inequality aversion + preferred beneficiaries): *Lone winners* prefer low-income targeted spending to universal flat-rate transfer.

As for the insurance-seeking mechanism, its implication for the preferred beneficiaries is less clear cut. On the one hand, insurance-seeking lone winners might prefer universal flat-rate benefits, as such guaranteed income support can serve as a buffer against an unexpected income loss under globalization. Yet they may also endorse a targeted transfer when it is seen as reducing the structural risks or negative externalities associated with the *ex ante* income distribution (Schwarze and Härpfer 2007); for instance, targeted transfers might sustain social stability and reduce crimes (Rueda and Stegmueller 2016, Sinn et al. 1995, Thurow 1971). They might also want to preempt the backlash against the open economy by offering some benefits to the most disadvantaged under globalization (Rickard 2015). From this, we take the empirical support for H5 as the corroborating evidence for equality-reducing mechanism; in contrast, the lack of empirical support for H5 indirectly renders the insurance-seeking mechanism more plausible.

Case Selection

We test the expectations using the case of South Korea, which is ideal for two reasons. First, we know from broader welfare state scholarship that citizens' experience of having lived in one or the other kind of welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990, Hall and Soskice 2001) leads them to form certain expectations[1] of the welfare state. The shared expectations among citizens explain why public support for welfare state in the Western democracies exhibits a sustained between-country variation (Jæger 2006; 2009, Larsen 2007, Svallfors 2011, but see also Aarøe and Petersen 2014, Gingrich and Ansell 2012). Testing for several micro-level casual mechanisms within a single country is challenging when shared expectations are strong, because these expectations may facilitate a certain mechanism over the other. For instance, a long equality-promoting trajectory of the welfare state (e.g., in Nordic countries) might provoke strong equality-seeking attitudes.

Most citizens in South Korea have not yet experienced a highly institutionalized form of government social protection. The identify of its welfare regime has been in flux in recent decades. Some note that the developmentalist legacy continues, although Confucian legacies are withering away as some responsibilities (e.g., long term care) shift from the family to the state (Kim and Choi 2013). Observers of the expansionary moves in employment-based social insurance programs predict that Korea might become similar to the conservative welfare states of Continental Europe (Ramesh 2003). The ambitious move towards general tax-funded, universalistic provision of services (e.g. child care) (An and Peng 2016, Estévez-Abe and Kim 2014) made yet others predict that the country might move closer to the social democratic welfare states of the Nordic countries (Kuhnle 2004). It is thus reasonable to assume that Korean citizens do not share a par-

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[1] To clarify, our proposition here is expected to hold when the budget for redistribution is viewed as exogenous. An equality-seeker who places a high emphasis on pro-poor redistribution may oppose a high degree of targeting when s/he (rightly) understands that in democracies the available budget for social spending may decline substantially as the degree of targeting rises (Pritchett 2005). We, however, expect that citizens' knowledge of budget reaction functions is limited. See Lim and Tanaka (2017) on the prevalent ignorance about tax and transfer systems among Korean citizens. To alleviate the concern, our survey experiment also includes two targeted spending proposals with varying eligibility criteria. See *Research Design* section for details.

ticular expectation about what the welfare state's primary role should be. Accordingly, the South Korean case allows us to explore the plausibility of the three micro-level causal mechanisms in a more neutral ground.

Second, we know from the literature that individuals' perception of economic loss under globalization may be driven by a milieu of factors. The perception of material damage driven by and/or combined with non-material ones can have very different impact on welfare attitudes. One of the key confounding factors is out-group anxieties (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). For instance, racial/ethnic out-group anxieties influence welfare attitudes by increasing social distance among citizens and suppressing the altruistic equality-seeking mechanism (Margalit 2012, see also Alt and Iversen 2017, Lü and Scheve 2016). Studying South Korea alleviates such complications. Given the country's limited exposure to immigration and low salience of ethnic and racial cleavages in welfare politics, we assume that the nexus between economic globalization exposure and redistributive preferences in Korea is much less confounded by out-group anxieties.[2]

Research Design

Survey Outline

We examine the hypotheses by using our original survey in South Korea. We designed the survey and undertook it online with a nationally representative sample of 1,804 Korean adults in December 2016. The sample was drawn by a Korean survey firm, *opensurvey*, from their opt-in online panel. We attempted to sample based on key demographic variables such as age, gender, and residential locations, to ensure that the sample would resemble as closely as possible the general population. In addition to key questions on attitudes towards globalization and redistribution, the survey includes an experimental component, which allows us to explore social spending preferences under different scenarios concerning fiscal constraints and targeted beneficiaries (i.e., tests for H3 and H5).

Survey Design and Operationalization of Variables

Independent Variable (Globalization Attitudes):
Our survey includes two questions on the perceived consequences of economic globalization. One question concerns the globalization's consequences on their *own* economic insecurity: "What do you think of the effect of the economic globalization (i.e., free trade, investments, and movement of workers) on your own economic situation?" The response is on a five point scale ((1) has a very bad effect to (5) has a very good effect), which is later reversed so that a higher value indicates a

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[2] Foreign population accounts for only 3% of the total population in South Korea. The International Organization for Migration-Migration Research and Training Center, Statistical Brief Series No. 2015-01 http://iom-mrtc.org/eng/ business/business02.php?admin_mode=read&no=308

more negative perception. A separate question asks about the consequences of globalization on employment insecurity of *Koreans* as a whole and the respondents were asked whether they approve/disapprove the following statement on a five point scale ((1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree): "Economic globalization (i.e., free trade, investments, and movement of workers) threatens Koreans' employment security." Table 6 summarizes the distribution of answers across the two questions.

Table 6. Two Dimensional Globalization Perception (n=1804)

Effect on Myself / Threat to Korean Citizens	Not a Threat	Threat (Bad/Very Bad)
Not a Threat	Collective Winner 47.6%	Lone Loser 11.9%
Threat (Agree/Strongly Agree)	Lone Winner 21.4%	Collective Loser 19.1%

Several reasons justify using the perceived consequences of economic globalization rather than inferring the consequences based on objective labor market standing indicators (i.e., level of education and sector of employment, e.g., Walter 2010). Recent studies find that these indicators relying on factorial or sectoral trade theories are only weakly correlated with globalization attitudes, not only due to socio-cultural confounders (Mansfield and Mutz 2009, Margalit 2012) but also due to cognitive limitations or economic illiteracy of many individuals (Rho and Tomz 2017). Moreover, such measurement strategies are expected to be even less effective in newly industrialized countries (NICs) such as South Korea than in early industrializers. For instance, the implications from factorial trade theories are unclear as these countries' structure of skill endowment is in-between early industrializers (with abundant high-skilled workers) and industrializing countries (with abundant low-skilled workers).

Dependent Variable (Welfare Attitudes):

As a dependent variable, our survey asks whether the respondents would support or oppose a hypothetical social spending proposal (hereafter *Support for Social Spending*). The response is on a five point scale ranging from (1) strongly oppose to (5) strongly support. In the hypothetical proposal, we incorporate the fiscal burden aspect of social spending (relevant for H3) by asking *Support for Social Spending* in two steps. More specifically, we first present respondents a hypothetical scenario that explicitly externalizes costs: "This is a hypothetical scenario. Your regional government has a significant budgetary surplus this year by successfully hosting an event. The government proposed that the surplus money will be spent on an income transfer program." And we asked: "Would you support this proposal?" In the second question, we say: "The budgetary surplus only allows the government to fund an one-shot transfer." We then ask: "If the transfer program is to continue regardless of the fiscal surplus, would you support the program?" Comparing the responses to the first and second questions allow us to examine how factoring in the

fiscal constraint influences support for social spending.[3] The insurance-seeking mechanism suggests that supporters with high national threat perception are less sensitive to fiscal constraint than supporters with individual threat perception (H3).

As discussed above, citizens in emerging welfare states lack a shared understanding of what a *typical* social spending entails. We take advantage of the lack of *ex-ante* expectations, and randomly vary the coverages of a hypothetical social spending program. We hypothesized above that the equality-seeking *lone winners* would prefer pro-poor targeting to universal flat-rate benefits (recall H5). Our survey's experimental component allows testing for the hypothesis. More specifically, we randomly assign respondents to one of the three hypothetical spending proposals: (1) universal spending where all residents receive a flat rate transfer; (2) moderately means-tested spending where those earning less than 80% of the median income are eligible for the transfer; (3) narrowly Means-tested spending where only those earning less than 40% are eligible.[4]

Covariates:

In addition to the above-mentioned variables, our survey also includes basic demographic questions on age, gender, and level of education. The education variable is especially important because it is a commonly used indicator of individual level factor endowment (where the college educated is considered as highly-skilled) and also an indicator of susceptibility to out-group anxiety or framing against globalization (where the low educated is considered to be more susceptible to such anxiety and framing). We also control for respondents' assessment of regional government performance. This is because respondents might be reluctant to support the proposal they find desirable when the government is perceived to be lacking capacity or credibility to implement it. Because individuals might seek protection not by demanding government for welfare state but by demanding employers for a better protection or by relying on market-based risk-pooling (Lim and Burgoon 2017), we include a variable measuring individuals' access to private pension in model specifications. Lastly, we control for the 5-scale ideological self-placement variable; (1) conservative to (5) progressive.

Empirical Analysis

Preliminary Analysis: Determinants of Globalization Attitudes

Our primary interest is in understanding the nexus between globalization exposure perceptions and welfare attitudes. Yet, we begin by tentatively exploring what determines globalization expo-

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[3] Although it is common to ask respondents about their general attitudes toward welfare systems and support levels for redistribution, most existing surveys do not attempt to explicitly externalize/internalize costs. In our opinion, this leads to measurement errors. Our two-step question should mitigate the problem.

[4] For the experimental component, we conducted a manipulation check and made sure that respondents understood the hypothetical scenario.

sure perceptions, which should require another paper to discuss in more detail. In Table 7, we summarize the results. The first two columns employ the ordinal perception measures for individual effect (i.e., whether globalization hurts my own economic security, Model 1) and collective effect (i.e., whether globalization hurts Koreans' economic security, Model 2) respectively as dependent variables.

First, we find that education is a significant negative predictor of individual threat perception (consistent with the factorial trade theory prediction in the context of a high income OECD economy), yet is not a predictor of national threat perception. Contrary to existing findings that the higher educated believe/understand that open economy is good for the nation as a whole (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, Mansfield and Mutz 2009), education does not explain globalization's national-level effect perceptions among Koreans. Being male, older, and lower-income increases both individual and collective threat perceptions. Being left-leaning in terms of political ideology is associated with a stronger collective treat perception, consistent with the existing findings on social determinants of attitude (e.g., socialization via trade unions, see Ahlquist, Clayton and Levi 2014).

Table 7. Determinants of Globalization Attitudes: Individual and Collective Threat Perceptions

	Ordered Logit (1:Very Good-5:Very Bad)		Multinomial Logit (Base: Collective Winner)		
	Individual (1)	Collective (2)	Lone Winner	Lone Loser (3)	Collective Loser
Gender	−0.271***	−0.276***	−0.150	−0.140	−0.195
	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.127)	(0.156)	(0.132)
Age	0.008*	0.025***	0.029***	0.004	0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Level of Education	−0.185***	−0.009	0.137	−0.111	−0.111
	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.118)	(0.099)
Income	−0.060**	−0.045*	−0.021	−0.080*	−0.055
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.036)
Ideology	0.027	0.089**	0.029	−0.122	0.156**
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.075)	(0.063)
Constant			−2.302***	−0.021	−1.327**
			(0.566)	(0.682)	(0.583)
N	1,804	1,804			

*p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

In Model 3, we examine the determinants of the four distinct attitudinal type as classified in Table 1. We fit a multinomial model with the baseline category being the *collective winner*. The main findings evident from the table are: left-leaning respondents are more likely to be collective losers than being collective winners; respondents with lower income are more likely to be lone losers than being collective winners; and older respondents are more likely to be either lone winners or collective losers (i.e., exhibiting negative national threat perception) than being collective winners. Figure 1 visually summarizes how the four attitudinal types are distributed among some theoretically interesting sub-populations: middle school vs. college, income (4rd vs. 8th deciles), age (33 vs. 53) and ideology (center-right vs. center-left).[5]

Figure 1. Key Determinants of Globalization Attitudes

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
[5] Other covariates are controlled at sample medians

In every sub population we visualize, the biggest group is the collective winners and the smallest is the that of lone losers. The dominant size of the collective winners suggests that Korean citizens across different socio-economic and ideological positions are generally positive about the consequences of economic globalization. Importantly, the lone winners and collective losers are quite similar in their sizes. In other words, those perceiving negative national-level consequences are split in two over the individual-level consequences. We find more lone winners than collective losers among the higher educated, higher income, older, and right-leaning citizens. Collective losers outnumber lone winners among the lower educated. Among the younger, lower income, left-leaning citizens, the two groups are of almost the same size.

Main Findings

We now move on to the models of welfare attitudes in Table 8.[6] The first two columns (Models 4 and 5) employ the ordinal perception measures for globalization consequences. Model 4 finds that negative individual effect perception is associated with a *lower* support for social spending, which contradicts the predictions based on the compensation-seeking mechanism (H1). Model 5 finds that negative collective effect perception is associated with a *greater* support. The finding is consistent with the insurance-seeking mechanism (H2).

The statistically significant interaction effects in Model 6, however, suggest that the effect of individual and collective consequence perceptions should not be investigated separately. Interpreting the effect of one without factoring in the conditional effect of the other might be misleading. The interaction effect based on Model 3 are visualized in Figure 2. The probability of being (strongly) supportive of social spending is plotted with 90% confidence intervals, while setting all other covariates at sample medians.

The clear upward sloping line with *blue* shades in the figure suggests that perceiving high individual threat under globalization has a varied effect on welfare attitudes depending on the perception of collective threat. The probability that citizens facing high individual threat support social spending is only around 30% when globalization is perceived to do no collective harm, but over 50% when globalization is perceived harmful to Koreans. The 20 percentage point difference in support level implicates that collective losers are much more supportive of social spending than lone losers. This is partial evidence for the insurance-seeking mechanism (H2), and against the disadvantageous inequality aversion (H4.1: lone losers are more supportive of social spending to reduce inequality).

Also interesting to note in Figure 2 is a surprisingly constant level of support among those perceiving positive individual effects under globalization (cf., the flat solid line with *red* shades). The probability of supporting social spending is around 50% for both lone and collective winners. We thus do not find evidence for the advantageous inequality aversion (H4.2: lone winners are

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[6] At this initial stage, we do not introduce the fiscal burden implication yet; we also pool together the respondents treated with different hypothetical social spending proposals.

more supportive of social spending to reduce inequality than collective winners). Importantly, our finding shows that winners of globalization are clearly *more* supportive of social spending than lone losers (the red shades above the blue towards the left-end), and equally supportive of social spending than collective losers (the red shades overlapping the blue towards the right-end). The finding casts additional doubt on the compensation-seeking mechanism.

Table 8. Effect of Globalization Perception on Welfare Attitudes

	DV: Support for Social Spending Ordered Logit (1:Strongly Disagree-5:Strongly Agree)			
	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Globalization Perception Ordinal (1:Very Good-5:Very Bad)				
Individual Effect	-0.111* (0.057)		-0.509*** (0.195)	
Collective Effect		0.094** (0.046)	-0.191 (0.173)	
Individual*Collective			0.104* (0.055)	
Globalization Perception Categorical (Baseline: Collective Winner)				
Lone Winner				0.008 (0.113)
Lone Loser				-0.344** (0.140)
Collective Loser				0.081 (0.119)
Controls				
Gender	0.119 (0.090)	0.143 (0.090)	0.119 (0.090)	0.131 (0.090)
Age	0.011*** (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.004)
Level of Education	0.062 (0.068)	0.067 (0.068)	0.061 (0.068)	0.068 (0.068)
Income	0.014 (0.025)	0.017 (0.025)	0.016 (0.025)	0.014 (0.025)
Ideology	0.237*** (0.043)	0.233*** (0.044)	0.227*** (0.044)	0.229*** (0.044)
Private Pension	-0.146** (0.062)	-0.146** (0.062)	-0.153** (0.062)	-0.141** (0.062)
Government Performance	0.128*** (0.050)	0.142*** (0.050)	0.142*** (0.050)	0.134*** (0.050)
N	1,804	1,804	1,804	1,804

*$p < .1$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$

Figure 2. Globalization Perception and Support for Social Spending

Interaction of Individual and Collective Effect Perceptions

In Model 7, we estimate the effect of the four attitudinal types by entering them as nominal variables. Interpretation in light of our hypotheses is easier this way than having an interaction term of two ordinal variables. Our findings are visualized in Figure 3. We compare the probability of being (strongly) supportive of social spending across the four categories of citizens, while setting all other covariates at sample medians. The solid vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Consistent with our findings from Model 6, we find a distinctively lower level of support among lone losers. The finding contradicts the compensation-seeking mechanism (H1) and the disadvantageous inequality aversion mechanism (H4.1). The other three categories show only small differences from one another. Does this finding lend support for the insurance-seeking mechanism? Note that thus far, we have not factored in fiscal constraint for the welfare state expansion. We hypothesized above in light of the insurance-seeking mechanism that support among those with higher national threat perception would be more robust to fiscal constraint be-

cause they should be willing to incur the cost to offset future risks. We now turn to examining the expectation to see whether the insurance-seeking mechanism can survive the test.

Figure 3. Globalization Perception and Support for Social Spending: By Categories

Globalization Effect Perception and Support for Social Spending

In Model 8 in Table 9, we conduct this test. The dependent variable, *Support Robustness*, is measured by the support level without budget surplus minus the initial support level. A negative value indicates a decrease in support under the fiscal burden. For instance, if an individual who was strongly supportive (=5) of social spending under the budget surplus scenario changes her mind to be neutral (=3) when primed to think about extra revenue for the spending, she is assigned a score of 3−5=−2. By construction, the value of *Support Robustness* can be more negative for those with a high level of initial support. The resulting bias, however, should not hinder our test of H3 because we are primarily interested in comparing collective winners (without national threat perception) and lone winners (with national threat perception). As shown in Figure 3, the two groups' initial support levels were not statistically different. We also control for the initial level of support to alleviate remaining concerns. Our finding from Model 8 is visualized in Figure 4.

Table 9. Globalization Perception and Welfare Attitude under Fiscal Constraint

	Support Robustness OLS (-4 t 4)	Support for Spending: Fiscal Constraint Ordered Logit (1:Strongly Disagree-5:Strongly Agree)		
	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Initial Support	-0.389***			
	(0.021)			
Low Income Targeted			1.425	-0.539***
			(1.282)	(0.133)
Globalization Perception Categorical				
Lone Winner	0.199***	0.368***		0.517***
	(0.053)	(0.111)		(0.193)
Lone Loser	-0.021	-0.195		-0.234
	(0.065)	(0.139)		(0.243)
Collective Loser	0.092*	0.222*		0.179
	(0.055)	(0.118)		(0.214)
Lone Winner*Targeted				-0.227
				(0.235)
Collective Loser*Targeted				0.082
				(0.256)
Globalization Perception Ordinal				
Collective Effect			0.733**	
			(0.298)	
Individual Effect			0.108	
			(0.346)	
Collective*Individual			-0.117	
			(0.096)	
Collective*Targeted			0.727**	
			(0.371)	
Individual*Targeted			-0.541	
			(0.424)	
Three-way Interaction			0.200*	
			(0.119)	
Constant	0.978***			
	(0.195)			
N	1,804	1,804	1,804	1,804
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

**Figure 4. Robustness of Support for Social Spending**

Note the difference in height of red and green bars. Whereas collective winners (in red) are likely to lower the support by over 0.2 point, the support among lone winners (in green) is highly stable with the confidence intervals including zero. We also find that support among collective losers (with national threat perception) are more robust than that among lone losers (with no national threat perception). Both findings lend support for H3, thereby the insurance-seeking mechanism.

Model 9 in Table 9 employs *Support for Social Spending* under fiscal constraint as the dependent variable. The predicted support levels based on Model 9 are visualized in Figure 5 along with the predictions from Model 7 (under budget surplus). Within each category, the similarity in height between red and blue bars indicates the robustness of support to fiscal burden. The red and blue bars for the lone winner category are most similar in height with substantially overlapping confidence intervals, suggesting that supporters in this category are most robust to fiscal constraint. The red and blue bars for the collective winners are most different. When budget surplus is removed, the probability of being (strongly) supportive of social spending in this category drops over 10 percentage points from 47% to 35%. Again, the findings are consistent with H3.

Figure 5. Support for Social Spending (Model 7 vs. Model 9)

Globalization Perception and Support for Social Spending with Fiscal Burden

Meanwhile, the difference in the height of blue bars captures the between-category difference in support levels under the fiscal constraint scenario. While our earlier analysis (Model 7, red bars) did not find much difference between the two types of winners, the new results suggest lone winners (43%) are clearly more supportive of social spending than collective winners (35%). This can be seen as evidence for H4.2 (egalitarians seeking to reduce advantageous inequality) as well as H2 (insurance seeking winners under national threat). This is where we turn to our last hypothesis (H5): if advantageous inequality aversion was driving the finding, we expect the lone winners to prefer lower-income targeted social spending which, at a given level of tax progressivity, is more inequality-reducing. To test the hypothesis, we employ a dummy variable *Targeted* to indicate those respondents in treatment groups with a spending proposal that targets the lower income.[7]

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[7] We combine those treated with narrow means-test and moderate means-test.

Figure 6. Globalization Perception and Social Spending Preference

Globalization is Somewhat Bad for Me


Globalization is Somewhat Good for me

In Model 10, we employ two ordinal indicators of globalization perception. The substantive effects are visualized in Figure 6. The top figure summarizes the predicted support among losers and the bottom figure among winners. We are most interested in the attitudes of lone winners (i.e., the bottom figure; towards the right end). We find that lone winners exhibit a much lower level of support when treated with low income targeting (42%) than with universal flat rate benefits (over 73%). The finding clearly contradicts H5.

While losers under globalization (i.e., the top figure) also prefer universal flat rate spending over low income targeting, their preference gap remains much smaller (less than 10% points) compared to that of lone winners (over 30% points).

Figure 7. Support for Social Spending by Proposed Beneficiaries

Globalization Perception and Support for Social Spending by Beneficiaries

In Model 11, we employ the nominal indicators of globalization attitudes. The key finding that lone winners strongly prefer universal flat rate spending holds in this model as well. The findings are visualized in Figure 7. The figure allows to more easily compare the support levels across the eight distinct sub-samples. The highest level of support is found among lone winners

treated with universalistic proposal. Indeed, this group is the only group whose predictive probability of support exceeds 50%. They are followed by the collective losers treated with universalistic proposal whose predictive probability of support is over 45%. The findings contradict H5 and corroborate H2, which posits that national threat perception provokes insurance-seeking via welfare state.

Figure 7 also highlights a low level of support for targeted spending across all subpopulations. For instance, the support level among the lone winners treated with low income targeting (36%) is lower than that among the collective winners treated with universalistic transfer (42%).

Conclusion

Many scholars have studied the nexus between globalization exposure and welfare demands. However, little is known about how perceived individual and collective consequences of globalization interact to shape welfare attitudes. This paper proposed four types of citizens based on self-perceived economic consequences of globalization to themselves and to the nationals: collective winner, lone winner, lone loser, and collective loser. The two-dimensional preferences also allowed to test three mechanisms through which globalization shapes people's welfare attitudes: compensation-seeking, insurance-seeking, and equality-seeking mechanisms.

Empirical analyses based on our original survey first find that losers of globalization are no more supportive of welfare state than winners. The finding attests to the importance of examining complex preferences of winners as well as losers and justify our typology. Second, in terms of mechanisms, our empirical analyses consistently pointed to little support for the compensation-seeking and equality-seeking mechanisms. Instead, we find the most consistent support for the insurance-seeking mechanism. Those who fear potential risks or uncertainties under globalization are likely to support social spending, rather than those suffering from material losses or concerned about unequal distributional consequences. In more substantive terms, we find that winners of globalization are more supportive than lone losers in both universalistic and targeted social spending. Overall, the most supportive of social spending turn out to be the lone winners. Lone winners are more supportive of universalistic spending than collective losers, while as supportive as collective losers for targeted spending.

We believe our study has important theoretical and empirical implications for the welfare state development under globalization. But we also acknowledge that our study in the context of South Korea may not be readily generalizable to many other settings. The limited social distance among citizens, relatively low inequality (but see Koo 2007), and relatively small and immature social policy institutions (Yang 2013) might distinguish the country from other emerging economies (e.g., those in Latin America with more long-standing welfare programs) as well as from the mature, Western welfare states. We thus need further comparable research with similar surveys to assess the generalizability of our study. Still, we believe our study provides a foundation for such future comparative research.

As we mentioned in the introduction, self-identified economic *losers* from globalization are expected to be the minority in newly industrialized or export-oriented developing countries. Our survey of over 1800 South Koreans confirms this. Lone and collective losers combined accounted for only 30% of the respondents. In democracies where vote share matters, the compensatory demand among the losers alone is thus not strong enough to generate welfare state expansion. Yet our study reveals that a sizable minority of citizens classified as *lone winners* have the potential for driving the expansion of the welfare state, especially of universal preventive policies of the welfare state. In South Korea, the size of lone winners (21% of respondents) were indeed twice the size of lone losers (11% of respondents) (recall Table 6).

If lone winners were to drive the welfare state expansion under globalization, what are the ramifications for the protection of the poorest and disadvantaged? As the redistributive effect of universal flat benefits (the form of spending preferred by lone winners) depends on the tax system, answering this question would require further research on tax preferences of citizens. In South Korea where both tax revenue and tax progressivity remain low, introducing new universal flat benefits under the current system has limited progressive redistribution potential. The demographic composition of lone winners also makes us less sanguine (recall Figure 1). We see more lone winners among the educated, higher-income, and right-leaning citizens; that is, the subpopulations that the existing literature finds to be associated with a weak support for redistribution, if not all types social polices.

At the same time, the literature suggests that a *weaker* overlap between the traditional supporters of redistribution (i.e., the disadvantaged) and the insurance-seekers (i.e., the insecure) cultivates a *broader-based* support for the welfare state (Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger 2012). Once globalization broadens the support base for the welfare state, the type of policy frames employed by political leaders and policy entrepreneurs might play a critical role in determining the direction of the welfare state expansion. Framing a new social spending as an essential future-oriented policy (i.e., insurance for uncertainties) might be more effective in tapping into the lone winners' willingness to support than framing the spending as pro-poor or egalitarian. Such a framing could allow the government to raise more social spending revenue, which in turn, help the government pursue compensatory or egalitarian goals via increasingly generous, universalistic benefits (Korpi and Palme 1998). The "Robin Hood function" (Barr 2001) of the welfare state can be hidden but need not be discarded. ■

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