South Korea as New Middle Power
Seeking Complex Diplomacy

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I. Introduction

South Korea’s sustained economic growth since the early 1960s transformed a once aid-dependent poor country into an economic middle power by the mid-1990s.¹ This was internationally recognized when South Korea became an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member in 1996. With its fast recovery from the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, South Korea’s nominal GDP became the eleventh largest in the world in 2002. Since then, the country’s economic size has been ranked between 11th and 15th in the world. In terms of territorial size, South Korea is a relatively small country, ranked 108th among the 234 countries of the world. However, its population is fairly large, ranked 23rd among the 220 countries of the world. Its human capital is competitive as its rank of 15th in 2011 UN’s Human Development Index among 169 countries suggests. South Korea’s military power is usually ranked as one of the top ten in the world as well. In June 2012, South Korea’s population reached 50 million. Combined with its per capita income of about US$24,000, the South Korean media celebrated this achievement as a sign of South Korea’s entry into the “20K-50M Club,” which has only happened for the seventh time in the world after major powers had achieved this status.² All these statistics illustrate clearly that South Korea is one of the leading middle powers in the world.

Although South Korea has been a middle power for the past two decades, its statecraft has not matched its middle power status until it only recently adopted middle power diplomacy. South Korea is a late comer to middle power diplomacy, which used to be dominated by a few conventional and rising middle powers. This timing is rather unique
since academic and policy discussions on middle powers have been limited over the past decade. New discussions are much desired to reflect the increasingly networked international environment. South Korea poses an interesting case in the study of middle power diplomacy for several reasons. First of all, the international environment has become an era of governance where the hierarchical power structure has been further weakened by emerging horizontal transnational networks focused on diverse issues. Past discussions on middle powers have focused on this phenomenon of power diffusion, but they have not paid enough attention to the new source of power emerging from a network structure that is independent of economic or military influences. Since global challenges will be increasingly governed through inter- or non-governmental transnational networks, network power is likely to be a major source of influence for middle power diplomacy. Second, South Korea is located in a dangerous environment. The Korean Peninsula is the scene of tensions between the two Koreas as well as the two great powers, China and the United States, who compete through their political ties to the two Koreas. This U.S.-China power competition, combined with the security threat from North Korea, detracts from South Korea's efforts to pursue multilateral middle power diplomacy. With the lingering Cold War security challenge that is paradoxical to globalization, South Korea pursues strong alliance diplomacy with the United States on the one hand, and balanced multilateral diplomacy on the other. These two diplomatic efforts can be linked well when Washington supports Seoul's intention behind its middle power diplomacy and China recognizes South Korea's influence in the region positively. However, U.S. strategists often misunderstand South Korea's middle power statecraft as seeking to break away from the alliance and be closer to China. On the other hand, China tends to dismiss South Korea's regional role as subservient to U.S. interests. Whether South Korea can overcome this dilemma through complex networks with other middle powers will be a great diplomatic challenge.

This paper has three parts. The first part critically reviews existing discussions on the definitions of middle powers and the international environment favorable for their operation. In this part, I will argue that network power should be the new source of emerging middle powers in the twenty-first century. The second part will examine the Asia Pacific region, where a power transition from the United States to China is taking place. Specifically, I will look at how this power transition pressures middle powers to utilize networking in order to hedge the risk of being dominated by one of the two great powers. The third part considers how South Korea came to actively pursue middle power diplomacy and assesses its capacity to sustain this diplomacy in the future. The conclusion summarizes the opportunities and limits of South Korea's middle power diplomacy, and suggests
some policy directions to harmonize middle power diplomacy with alliance politics.

If middle powers are categorical actors defined by their relative position between great and small powers, middle power diplomacy is statecraft behavior. Linking these two different concepts, I will define middle “power activism” as a middle power’s conscious effort to translate its positional and network power to diplomatic and foreign policy statecraft. Whether such statecraft can enhance a middle power’s influence is a separate question that needs to be answered with empirical findings, and is beyond the purpose of this paper.

II. Theoretical Debates on Middle Powers

1. Multidimensional Definitions of Middle Powers

As early as 1589, Bartolous of Sassoferrato, the Italian post-glossator, divided states into three types: small city states, medium states, and great states. It is interesting to note that he said, “middle-sized states are the most lasting, since they are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness, and the wealth and power being moderate, passions are less violent, ambition[s] find less support … than in large state[s] (Holbraad 1984, 12).” The idea of linking size to a state’s behavior is seen in today’s definition of a middle power. However, a middle size concept is too relative to concisely define a country’s position in the hierarchical power structure. How to define a country as a middle-sized state is also difficult since the criteria for measuring middle size varies greatly. Moreover, a middle-sized state does not translate its middle position to purposeful behavior utilizing this position.

Recognizing the definitional ambiguity, Cooper (1993, 17-19) categorized four approaches in defining a middle power: (1) a positional approach locating a middle power at the middle point in a range of bigness to smallness in terms of population, economic strength and complexity, and military capability, (2) a geographic approach physically or ideologically locating a middle power between the system’s great powers, (3) a normative approach viewing a middle power as potentially wiser, more virtuous, and more trustworthy with its recourse to diplomatic influence rather than to force, and less selfish when taking responsibility for the creation and maintenance of the global order, (4) a behavioral approach defining a middle power by its behavioral tendency to engage in middlepowermanship, such as pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems,
embracing compromise positions in international disputes, or adopting the notions of “good international citizenship” to guide its diplomacy.

Ping (2005, 51-53) re-categorized the definition of a middle power to include a statistical definition, a perceived-power definition, and a statecraft-based definition in parallel to Cooper’s positional, normative, and behavioral definitions. As a preparation for establishing a hybrid theory of these three definitions for middle powers, he introduced a new statistical method for identifying middle powers through nine statistical measures. When this method was applied to the thirty-eight member states of APEC, ASEAN, SAARC, and ECO for the year 2000, fourteen states were identified as middle powers in the Asia Pacific region for the year 2000. This statistical definition is a more inclusive method for defining middle powers since the normative definition can be biased to Western values of developed countries and, therefore, excludes non-Western middle powers. However, advocates for behavioral or statecraft definition have criticized this statistical identification of middle powers in that it only delineates the potential candidates as middle powers who are not necessarily engaged in middlepowermanship. Instead, they suggest specific roles and behavioral patterns as sufficient conditions to be qualified as a middle power.

Cooper et al. (1993, 25-26) divides middle power behavior into three patterns of catalysts, facilitators, and managers. Catalysts provide the intellectual and political energy to trigger an initiative and take the lead in gathering followers around it. Facilitators focus on agenda-setting and engage in some form of associational, collaborative, and coalitional activities. Their central technique of leadership consists of coalition-building on issue-specific questions. Managers emphasize institution-building, creating formal organizations or regimes, and developing conventions and norms. They argue that this behavior requires the technical skills of specialists and entrepreneurs. It is Oran Young who has expressed the entrepreneurial leadership of a state in the formation of international regimes. Entrepreneurship involves a combination of imagination in inventing institutional options and skill in brokering the interests of numerous actors to line up support for such options. A leader in this context is an actor who undertakes efforts to craft attractive institutional arrangements and persuades others to come on board as supporters of such arrangements (Young 1989, 355). International regimes are usually formed through institutional bargaining where the issues at stake lend themselves to contractarian interactions among participants. Participants usually approach regime formation as a problem-solving exercise and seek arrangements that all participants can accept as equitable rather than efficient as necessary for institutional bargaining to succeed. Accordingly, entrepreneurial leaders in institutional bargaining are neither hegemons who can impose their will on others nor ethically motivated actors who seek to supply public goods in international
society. They are actors who are skilled at inventing new institutional arrangements and brokering the overlapping interests of parties concerned with a particular issue area (Young 1989, 373).

Among related factors, Evans and Grant (1991) emphasized creativity as the most important factor enabling middle powers to take the lead. Although middle powers cannot act creatively on any issue, “quick and thoughtful diplomatic footwork” can compensate for a middle power’s relative hard power weakness (ibid, 325). Intellectual leadership through force of ideas is certainly directed toward building a coalition with like-minded states. From the existing literature on middle powers, Ravenhill (1998, 310-313) defines middle power status as comprising the five “Cs” of capacity, concentration, creativity, coalition-building, and credibility.

While all these functions and skills embody middle power diplomacy, this statecraft cannot be realized without sizable positional power in the international power hierarchy. It is difficult to imagine weak states being able to carry out middle power statecraft, that is, playing the role of a middle power without any positional power. This positional power includes both material and non-material resources. At the same time, positional power does not necessarily make a country engage in middle power activism that results in a specific middle power behavior. What both a positional and a behavioral definition of middle powers miss, though, is network power, which is embedded in networks. Middle powers can create networks as agencies, and their roles are also conditioned by network structure. As the hierarchical international power structure is being complemented by a horizontal network of states, defining middle powers in their relative position in a power hierarchy needs to be complemented by their position within and between networks. At the same time, the behavioral definition of middle powers tends to assign too much freedom to individual states that are independent of interstate networks. The middle power behavior of today’s increasingly networked world needs to be accounted for in the context of network structure.

2. Power Diffusion and Increasing Multilateral Cooperation

Contextual changes allowing middle powers to take on greater roles are accompanied by globalization that enhances cooperation among states to solve problems. In particular, changes in the power structure and the nature of agendas in the international system have been identified as important. Cooper et al. (1993, 21-22) attributed the middle power activism since the late 1980s to three changes in the international system: (1) the opening of windows of opportunities due to the relative decline of American resources in responding to
greater vulnerabilities, particularly in the international economic system; (2) change in the post-Cold War global agenda from high policy issues of security agenda to low policy issues of economic security and social concerns of the environment and human rights; (3) the enmeshing of domestic politics with foreign policy as illustrated by the external to internal case of market protectionism or the opposite from internal to external activism in the environment, human rights, or development assistance.

These changes in the international system are now deeper and more complex since their writing. International problems have become more complex and driven by the further globalization of information, markets, pollution, disease, and terrorism to the extent that a few great powers cannot resolve these problems alone. As more multilateral management through institutions or ad hoc forms of coalition become necessary to respond to these global problems, numerous international venues for middle powers to operate in have been created. Regardless of disagreeing generic definitions of the international system as either the U.S.-led unipolar or the U.S.-restrained multipolar order, the nature of power in the international system has been increasingly diffused to the extent that no single or several great powers control the system. In order to create a new global/regional governance system or maintain the existing one, multilateral inter-governmental cooperation and networking among various international actors is necessary. This gradual transformation of the international system from a less hierarchical one to a more horizontal order will enlarge the diplomatic maneuvers and opportunities of middle powers compared to those of great and small powers. Great powers with vested interests are too rigid to adapt to the changing international environment while small powers are too weak to seize opportunities and utilize them to their advantage.

The widely recognized trends of power diffusion and diversified agenda in the international system have prompted secondary powers to seek policy responses and initiatives in niche areas where they have the advantage. Cooper (1997) argues that finding niche areas for middle powers is based on a functionalistic perspective rather than a normative one that regards middle powers as good multilateralists. The specialized interests of middle powers and related experiences in differentiated issue-specific tasks provide them the enhanced status and constructive roles in the related international system (Cooper 1997, 4-5). Niche diplomacy based on this functionalism is particularly rational in the post-Cold War international order, where risks and opportunities inherent in moving from the rigidities of an old order toward the uncertainties of a new environment coexist. Cooper writes, “The concept focuses on the ability of individual countries, like biological species or firms, to identity and fill niche space on a selective basis through policy ingenuity and execution (5).” Accordingly,
middle power leadership and initiatives are based on their entrepreneurial and technical competence rather than their structural forces of power.

Labeling the trend “result-oriented diplomacy,” Higgott (1997, 37-38) argues that the evolving diplomatic practice in an era of globalization is the increasing importance of issue-specific, mission-oriented diplomacy, cutting across ideological, regional, and developmental barriers. This mission-oriented diplomacy requires the functional leadership and coalition building by an active state bureaucracy, the skills to cooperate with non-traditional actors in the space where a middle power can play enhanced roles, and the adaptability to issue linkages such as between intellectual property and multilateral trade negotiations or between gender/environment and development. Hart (1976) once distinguished three approaches in measuring power in international relations. They are control over resources, control over actors, and control over events and outcomes. Among these, he argued, control over events and outcomes is the best measurement, since only this approach takes into account the interdependence among actors and produces more advantageous descriptive and normative analyses of power. Middle powers can find their niche in diverse issue-specific forums and events, therefore, despite their relative weakness in controlling resources or actors like great powers.

Henrikson (1997, 43) defines the international management conducted by middle powers as mediation using tools of communication, formulation, and manipulation. Mediating functions for middle powers in international affairs are to conciliate, to interconnect, and to integrate. Mediation can take place within institutions, across them, or entirely outside them. Also, mediation can be multilateral based in international organizations or regimes, plurilateral among interested countries, and unilateral largely on its own (Henrikson 1997, 55-56). Middle powers lack sufficient resources to count on “buying” an agreement between disputants so that they rely on their roles in international institutions deriving from their membership, participation and leadership there. Mediation itself is rarely sufficient to ensure the adoption or implementation of a policy. Nevertheless, he points out, a middle power mediator has a good chance of being effective since the organization has the historical continuity, the institutional structure, and the legal and moral authority needed to enable the mediator’s work (Henrikson 1997, 47). Since the effective middle power management depends on stable institutional institutions where diplomatic solutions prevail, middle powers are active multilateralists seeking diverse membership and credibility, and often reinforcing existing international norms.

Using two criteria of the routine, heroic form and the diffuse-discrete scope, Cooper (1997, 9-13) categorized Canada and Norway as exercising the routine-diffuse diplomacy that is suitable for the role of an institution builder on the one hand, and Australia and Sweden as using the heroic-discrete diplomacy that take high stakes niche building activities on
the other hand. He argues that the nature of the ideological divide within middle powers and the question of external alignment are factors in making middle powers respond differently to systemic changes.10 Of course, this overall pattern can change. For example, Michaud and Belanger (2000) argued that Canada’s foreign policy was “Australianized” by shifting to more discrete and heroic diplomacy in the case of seeking a global ban on anti-personnel landmines and reform of the U.N. Security Council. Once a country has pursued active middlepowermanship, it does not mean that it will continue to do so. There is a rise and fall of middle power activism among popularly labeled middle powers themselves. Observing two prominent middle powers, Canada and Australia, Ravenhill (1998, 317-318) attributes the decline of middle power activism—the decline of Canadian middle power activism in the late 1980s and the rejection of Australian activism of the Hawke and Keating Labor governments by coalition government in 1996—to deteriorating economic circumstances. Economic downturn tends to make domestic politics pull away from a nation’s international agenda, and governments tend to cut the budget for foreign ministries. Ultimately, Ravenhill (1998, 320) argues, the change in middle power activism is better attributed to choice by the governments of the day. In this case, the government’s choice is a result of complex conditions, such as improved economic conditions, partisan choices, and the personal interests of political leaders.

As noted in the above discussion, the literature on middle power activism of the 1990s has recognized the increasing multilateralism of the post-Cold War era. Focusing on middle powers, however, questions on their relations with great powers in the changing international environment have been neglected.

3. Influence of Great Powers upon Middle Powers

While the power diffusion and increasing need for multilateral cooperation enable middle powers’ broader strategic choices and maneuverability, they are still largely constrained by great or central powers. Focusing on this structural constraint, Holbraad (1984) delineates middle power roles according to three types of international systems shaped by central powers: the unifocal, the dualistic, and the multiple system. In the case of the unifocal system where only one great power exists, the manner in which the great power maintains its position and the means by which it pursues its goals are bound to affect the conduct and role of middle powers in the system.11 Under the dualistic system, middle powers can have a larger scope for autonomous roles when the two great powers are engaged in moderate rivalry. Neither exposed to intense pressure to link their international conduct to the central rivalry nor subject to a high degree of managerial control by diplomatically concerted efforts from the
two great powers, the middle powers under this situation are free to pursue regional interests and local concerns of their own. Holbraad (1984, 151-152) argues that middle powers can take various subsystem roles and even establish themselves as the local power with or without great power backing. In the last case of a multiple system, where more than three great powers exist, middle powers, as in the case of the dualistic system, were in a better situation when the great powers were mixing cooperation and conflict rather than engaging in two extremes of concert or conflict. Some middle powers can participate in the central system by joining balance of power alliances while others devote their attention more exclusively to various sub-systemic concerns (Holbraad 1984, 204).

This influence of central powers upon middle power options today is far more limited compared to the time when Holbraad was writing in the early 1980s. The relative decline of the United States has become visible since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the global financial crisis of 2008. Zakaria (2008) has characterized the “rise of the rest” as the post-American power diffusion. It is not only U.S. central power that has been in decline, but the relative decline of the G7 is also visible. The rise of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, or the BRICs, has transformed economic global governance from the G7 to a more inclusive G20. The G8 (G7 plus Russia) share of global GDP has decreased from 67 percent to 54 percent between 1999 and 2009. On the other hand, the share of non-G8 G20 countries in global GDP increased from 14 percent to 23 percent during the same period (Kirton 2011, 52-53). Sharing the view of changing power distribution beyond a few great powers, Ikenberry characterizes today’s world order as making the transition to a post-hegemonic liberal internationalism. In this “liberal internationalism 3.0,” we will witness the expanded participation of rising non-Western states in core governing institutions, increasingly intrusive and interdependent economic and security regimes, and a more rule-based system coupled with new realms of network-based cooperation. Great powers can also adapt to this new governance era by accumulating network power. For example, Slaughter (2009, 95) argues that the United States has a clear and sustainable edge in the networked world where the state with the most connections will be the central player. U.S. traits such as a horizontal social structure and a culture of entrepreneurship and innovation can have advantages in a global economy which is increasingly driven by networked clusters of the world’s most creative people (ibid., 96). However, whether U.S. power is derived from connectivity rather than hegemonic domination is difficult to validate due to American exceptionalism in security areas and some important international regimes such as the Kyoto Protocol and the UN Convention on the Law of Sea.

Kahler (2009, 12-14) defines three distinct forms of network power: bargaining power, social powers, and the power of exit. When a country has more networks, it has the bargaining power of leverage through links to network partners that are otherwise weakly connect-
ed or those that have few outside options. Social power is created and accessed through ties with other states in the international system and influence within networks is constituted by informational or normative links. Middle powers have more incentives to seek leadership by making connections that are possible without hard power backups. The increasingly horizontally networked world provides a more favorable environment for middle powers to create or participate in networks and play the role of a bridge state or a broker within networks. These kinds of middle power networks are not like hub-and-spoke networks, since middle powers cannot initiate networks by becoming a hub as a great power can. Rather, these networks are transient and the roles of middle powers inside them are fluid.

Reflecting on the existing literature on middle power activism, I argue for three points. First, a middle power must be equipped with positional power that is strong enough to employ both material and non-material resources for its active diplomacy. Most middle powers discussed actually occupy the upper middle position in the economic power hierarchy. Compared to territorial or populational size, economic strength is much more important for middle powers to engage in active diplomacy. Second, the international or regional system must be favorable to allow a positionally qualified middle power to engage in middlepowermanship. Less tension among great powers is critical so that they can be more willing to cooperate with middle powers for their benefit. Given that great powers do not share power on their own, it is important for middle powers to be strategic in order to generate cooperation from great powers. Third, middle powers need to have many state or non-state networks. Limited international networks will prevent middle powers from taking on mediating, brokering, or bridging roles. All these roles are embedded in networks. In this sense, one can say that the power of today's middle powers is essentially network power. Without resources and networks, middle power activism will remain aspirational rather than consequential in enhancing diplomatic influence or bringing changes in the regional system to their preference.

III. Middle Power Dilemma in the Asia Pacific Region

Despite power diffusion and the rise of networks over power hierarchy, middle powers in the Asia Pacific region are in a dilemma as they are caught between old and new great powers, the United States and China. The power transition from the United States to China has resulted in the two powers' sharing power in the region through competition
and cooperation. Still lacking multilateral security architecture and an integrated market as in the case of the European Union, East Asia and the wider Asia Pacific region are now more under the stronger influence of U.S.-China power competition than of any other region. As Shambaugh (2005) rightly points out, the visible power transition in Asia over the past half a century has been the return of China as the central actor. China's neighbors increasingly look to Beijing for regional leadership and China's own diplomacy has become more confident, omni-directional, and proactive. Its economy functions as a major engine of regional growth and has contributed to the regionalization of the East Asian economy. Asian trade and foreign direct investment inflows have become more Sino-centric, breaking away from the Japan-led flying geese model (Ohasi 2005). While the Japan-centered regionalization since the late 1970s came to an end by the 1990s due to Japan's market protection and relationalism, Chinese openness has contributed to market integration in the region (Lincoln 2004; Hatch 2010). As China creates regional demands and increasingly absorbs the manufactured products of East Asia, the U.S. trade share in many East Asian countries has decreased as it gives way to China.

Regarding China's military modernization, U.S. responses have registered different tones. Some are wary that China will be the main global competitor for U.S. military and strategic influence within a decade (Tkacik 2007, 1). Others believe that China's military will not be able to catch up with the United States in the near future as the military budget gap between the two countries will still be too great. Fravel (2009, 126) argues, "China's strategic goals are keyed to the defense of a continental power with growing maritime interests as well as to Taiwan's unification and are largely conservative not expansionist." Accordingly, he suggests, China is only developing internal control, peripheral denial, and limited force-projection capabilities consistent with these objectives. The 2012 Military Balance reports that China's defense budget remains 12 percent of that of the United States in 2011 and that the U.S. position as the world's major military power will not change despite the expected defense budget cuts. At the same time, however, it reports that China has increased its share of regional military expenditure to more than 30 percent in Asia and is gradually widening strategic priorities from the defense of China's borders to force projection within East Asia and further afield in order to secure sea lines of communication.14

It is not only China but also middle powers in the Asia Pacific, such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam who are all investing in improving air and naval capabilities. Military build-up among the Asia Pacific middle powers reflects this region's security uncertainty primarily derived from the rising U.S.-China power competition. With the end of military operations in Iraq and the planned
withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2015, the Obama administration is rebalancing toward Asia in order to contain Chinese influence. Defining the United States as an Asia Pacific power, Washington’s return to Asia from the Middle East has been conspicuous over recent years. In 2010, offering the simple premise that “America's future is linked to the future of the Asia Pacific region; and the future of this region depends on America,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s January 12 speech in Hawaii made it clear that U.S. interests are in continuing its traditional economic and strategic leadership in the region. Later in a speech on October 28, 2010, in Hawaii again, she reiterated U.S. engagement in Asia by utilizing its three main tools: its alliance with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, its emerging partnership with Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, India, and China, and its work with regional institutions such as ASEAN, APEC, and the East Asia Summit (EAS). The EAS in particular was expected to emerge as a forum for substantive engagement on pressing strategic and political issues, including nuclear nonproliferation, maritime security, and climate change.\footnote{15} The U.S. participation in the EAS and its negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership are widely interpreted as part of Washington’s efforts to contain the China-centered ASEAN+3. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta also, on June 2, 2012, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, remarked that the United States will play a deeper role for the security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific Region by rebalancing toward the region with more forces. He mentioned that the United States has chosen to make the region a priority despite the defense budget cuts of $487 billion over the next ten years, since it is home to the world’s fastest growing economies and the world’s largest militaries.\footnote{16} Expressing the Obama administration’s strategic shift as a “strategic pivot to Asia,” he revealed that the United States will have by 2020 60 percent of its naval forces in the Pacific and 40 percent in the Atlantic, in contrast to the current 50-50 divide.

The U.S.-China power competition in the Asia Pacific region puts particular pressure on middle powers that have a military alliance relationship with the United States. All of the U.S. allies in the region have deepened their economic relationship with China. At the same time, they see the value of their military alliance with the United States as a way to balance China’s military threat. While not wishing to choose one power over the other, there are some differences among countries in coping with this dilemma. Australia and Japan are more willing to cooperate with the U.S. encirclement of China, while South Korea is much less willing to translate its strong military ties with the United States on the North Korea threat toward China issues. In a similar vein, J. Chung (2009) distinguished South Korea as a hedger from serving as a balancer of Japan or Australia.\footnote{17} Hobrad’s thesis that middle powers discover more effective diplomatic roles when great powers engage in moderate rivalry rather than concert or conflict can be applied to
the Asia Pacific region where the United States and China compete. When these existing and emerging great powers act in concert, regional or global affairs would be determined primarily by the decision of the United States and China. On the other hand, greater conflicts between the two great powers would put many middle powers into the dilemma of having to choose one side or the other. If the U.S.-China power competition escalates into military tensions, middle power diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region will be weakened. Spero (2009, 148) argues that middle powers seek to avoid dominance by great powers and can influence great power security dilemmas through regional and cooperative bridging alignments. These bridging alignments are meant “for all neighbors to less[en] regional security dilemmas, rather than [to] play countries against one another, hide behind neutrality, or distance by non-alignment (152).” These alignments are possible for Spero since middle power behavior is “other-help,” in contrast to the “self-help” of great power behavior trying to enhance their influence by changing the distribution of power.

Amid the power competition between the United States and China, whether middle powers in the Asia Pacific region can align with the goal of preventing the U.S.-China power competition from escalating into military confrontation is a big question. Unlike the middle power cooperation in non-traditional security areas of other regions, middle powers in the Asia Pacific cannot ignore or avoid security cooperation to check the U.S.-China rivalry.

IV. South Korea’s Recent Middle Power Activism

1. South Korea as a Late Comer to Middle Power Activism

Cooper (1997, 13-18) divided middle power diplomacy into three waves. The first wave consisted of a number of countries identified with the nonalignment movement such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia. In particular, India stood out for its advocacy if a New International Economic Order and its embrace of an anti-hegemonic position. The second wave of middle powers included Nigeria, Mexico, and Algeria in the 1970s and 1980s, as critics of the international norms shaped by the advanced countries of the West. The third wave of middle powers emerged in the 1990s. These include the agricultural reformers of the Cairns Group, such as Malaysia and Argentina, or the regionally active countries like Australia and Sweden. Rather than dividing middle power cycles by
periods, Jordaan (2003) divides middle powers into two groups of traditional and emerging ones. Traditional middle powers include the western democracies of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, while emerging middle powers include Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Malaysia, South Africa, and Turkey. Compared with regionally ambivalent and insignificant traditional middle powers, he argues, emerging middle powers are regionally significant and active in mediating conflicts.

South Korea would be a case of an emerging middle power that is regionally active in the fourth wave of middle powers of the early twenty-first century. Despite the continuous power diffusion and further decline of U.S. power during the past decade, there has been no discussion arguing for the fourth wave of middle powers. South Korea’s recent middle power activism brings renewed interest in the current dearth of debate on middle power diplomacy.

South Korea’s foreign policy discourse specifically mentions “middle power” or jung-gyun-guk diplomacy both in government and among policy experts. This trend began to widely circulate following the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008. Under the slogan of “Global Korea,” the Lee government has hosted many international events such as the G20 Seoul Summit, the Fourth High-level Forum for Development Effectiveness, and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. These global agendas, such as development assistance, peacekeeping operations, and climate change have been highlighted to a greater degree than under the previous governments. The related budgets have been increased and new concepts such as “green growth” have been developed. As a matter of fact, the previous Roh Moo-hyun administration first introduced South Korea’s mediating role as a bridger and a hub nation under the slogan of a “Northeast Asian Era of Peace and Prosperity” (Lee, 2008). This precocious move under the vision of the Roh administration’s pursuit of an autonomous foreign policy backfired as it resulted in a loss of trust and cooperation from Washington. Accordingly, the Roh administration changed the focus from a peace broker in Northeast Asia to a networked trader across all the major regions of the world. Although the Roh administration introduced the concepts of middle power roles and established important free trade networks, it did not set middle power diplomacy as an umbrella policy vision. Under the Lee administration’s “going global” foreign policy, middle power diplomacy has been adopted strategically to enhance the country’s national status. Policymakers view “middle power” as a useful term in positioning South Korea as a significant country between a few great powers and the other weak countries. With the aspiration of playing a bigger role, middle power diplomacy has been popularized. Soft power, network power, and public diplomacy are usually employed as useful ingredients in assisting South Korea’s middle power diplomacy. There-
fore, one can say that the recent efforts to look beyond East Asia and seek a global role are an important turnaround in South Korea’s foreign policy history. It is interesting to note that today only South Korea is actively promoting middle power diplomacy rhetorically. “Middle power diplomacy” is also overused due to a lack of clarity on its exact definition. Recently, existing regional cooperation, wiser engagement of China, and virtually all efforts at coalition building in international affairs have come to be labeled as part of the mission of middle power in South Korea (Choi 2009; Kim, 2012).

The shift toward a more global role for South Korea has been accompanied by the parallel development of strengthening its alliance relationship with the United States. Security ties with the United States have been tightened due to North Korea’s ongoing nuclear ambitions and more specifically its conventional threat following the sinking of the Choenan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. The ROK-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, after being delayed for several years, finally came to be ratified in March 2012. The inclusion of South Korea in the G20 Summit was rumored to have been decided by President George W. Bush due to his close relationship with President Lee. The hosting of the Nuclear Security Summit at Seoul was also based upon the close relationship between President Barack Obama and President Lee. Beyond these personal relationships between the leaders of the two allies, the changing power dynamics in East Asia are a primary reason for South Korea’s importance in U.S. foreign policy. With the East Asia power shift moving from Japan to China, South Korea is gaining strategic value in U.S. foreign policy. This has become prominent more under the Obama administration, which is pursuing a reengagement with the Asia Pacific region with an eye to checking a rising China. The gradual decline of Japan caused by its prolonged economic depression and a lack of leadership was exacerbated by its March 11 earthquake and the subsequent Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011. Accordingly, Seoul’s attempts to increase its multilateral activities have been supported by Washington within the framework of U.S.-led multilateral cooperation. If Prime Minister Mahatir bin Mohamad’s Malaysia has pursued anti-American middle power activism in East Asia, South Korea’s recent global activism unfolded when the ROK-U.S. relationship has been at its strongest.23

Drawing from the power network mapping in East Asia, S. Kim (2011, 68-70) argues that South Korea is expected to play a mediating role in U.S.-China relations since it is located in the middle position between the U.S.-led triangle with Japan and South Korea, and the China-led triangle with Russia and North Korea. Accordingly, he argues, South Korea’s positional power as a mediator in the regional power structure can be realized either between North Korea and the others, or between the U.S. and China when South Korea successfully carries out complex network diplomacy. Despite this optimistic expc-
tation derived from the analysis of network structure, in reality, the military alliance relationship with the United States restrains South Korea’s middlepowermanship between the United States and China. Any premature attempt to mediate between them would be perceived by Washington as weakening the alliance relationship. Moreover, Seoul has not received enough trust and respect from Beijing so that such an attempt is likely to be dismissed as being too ambitious by China. Accordingly, it would be more rational for South Korea to pursue middle power diplomacy on global issues based on its U.S. support while staying away from some regional security issues that would invite U.S.-China rivalry, such as the Taiwan issues and the South China Sea maritime disputes.

South Korea’s middle power activism between China and Japan is more feasible. Rozman (2007, 199) points out that South Korea is uniquely situated at the crossroads of four great powers—the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—each of which is entitled to an assertive regional policy. In this geopolitical environment, according to Rozman (200-201), South Korea’s national interest is best served when it strives for a region of equilibrium where the weight of China is balanced by the weight of nearby Japan coupled with that of the distant United States, rather than joining a U.S.-led containment against China or acceding to a Sino-centric regional order. He writes, “It requires calibrating the course of Sino-Japanese relations and making studied choices about possible responses, avoiding overreaching by claiming to be a balancer and underachieving by fearing to draw criticism (ibid., 200-201).” Spero (158-160) takes South Korea’s role as a pivotal middle power in Northeast Asian security. According to him, South Korea has bridged the Asian divide since the end of the 1990s through new bilateral diplomatic and economic ties with North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, and also has assisted the latter four countries in focusing their regional efforts more concertedly on North Korea.

South Korea’s recent diplomatic efforts can be said to be aligned with this course. Currently, South Korea is aiming to initiate the South Korea-China-Japan triangle as a core venue for regional cooperation in East Asia. The opening of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul in September 2011 symbolizes South Korea’s middlepowermanship in the China-Japan rivalry. The more security-orientated triangle of South Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation came to be balanced with this economic-based trilateral cooperation among the core countries in East Asia. China, Japan, and South Korea have been using the institutional framework of ASEAN+3 for their summit diplomacy. Forging more direct dialogue through the trilateral ministerial and summit meetings is only possible when both China and Japan recognize South Korea as a responsible stakeholder in regional affairs.

Trade networks can also be a venue for South Korea’s middle power diplomacy. South
Korea is relatively well connected to the outside world. According to the KOF Index of Globalization in 2012, South Korea was ranked as 60th among 208 countries surveyed. South Korea’s political globalization stands at 32nd, but its economic and social globalization remains at 84th and 103rd. The bureaucratic regulation against foreign capital and weak foreign investment makes South Korea’s economic globalization pale in comparison to its high status as the 7th largest exporter in the world. Still, Seoul has expanded its free trade networks. As a major trading country, South Korea has been actively pursuing both a bilateral and a multilateral free trade agreement policy. Adding two major FTAs with the European Union and the United States, which became effective in 2011 and 2012 respectively, to the existing FTAs with ASEAN, Chile, and Peru, South Korea is now linked to free trade networks that account for 61 percent of the world’s GDP. Only Chile and Mexico have concluded more FTAs with other countries. These trade networks can be useful resources for South Korea to play a bridging or mediating middle power role, at least on trade issues.

2. Resources for South Korea’s Middle Power Activism

(1) Material Resources

The increasing interdependency and interconnectedness of nation states with various horizontal networks of information, economic flows, and political consultations tend to make the hierarchical nature of the international power structure less rigid and allow for more diverse sources of international statecraft. Nevertheless, certain degrees of material conditions are necessary for a middle power to play an active role in international realms. The material capacity of South Korea is suited for middle power diplomacy, as it is one of the world’s larger economies. Compared with the other G20 member countries, the Blue House Policy News reported that South Korea has had a better economic performance in 2011. Based on the 2010 IMF data, South Korea ranked 6th in terms of its economic growth rate and 9th in terms of per capita income. It is also the 7th largest exporter among the G20 member countries.

With increasing economic confidence, both Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) have been regarded as two major pillars of middle power diplomacy by the South Korean government. After passing a law regarding participation in UN peacekeeping operations in late 2009, South Korea has been dispatching its military overseas under the framework of the UN or other multilateral peacekeeping operations. As of June 2012, 1,463 soldiers have been dispatched to fifteen countries, such
as Afghanistan, Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and the United Arab Emirates. Through the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 635 soldiers were dispatched, while 678 soldiers are part of U.S.-led multilateral peacekeeping missions. Although South Korea’s participation in peacekeeping operations is often mentioned as a pillar of middle power diplomacy, it is questionable whether South Korea is able to find its niche diplomacy in human security. As Behringer (2003) demonstrates, human security is a demanding area for middle powers to specialize in during the post-Cold War period. Although U.S. support or opposition is still a major factor in determining middle power initiatives in human security, Canada and Norway have achieved successful diplomacy with like-minded middle powers in making the U.N. peacekeeping missions more rapid. They have also been instrumental in banning anti-personnel landmines through the Ottawa Process and establishing the International Criminal Court. Hayes (1997, 76–83) has maintained that Canada assisted the early UN peacekeeping operations with its commitment to collective security and incorporated humanitarian aid to the peacekeeping mandate after the end of the Cold War. He said that Canadians liked to see themselves as “friendly folk” mediating rather than fighting, and defined their identity in the world by participating in peacekeeping operations (Hayes 1997, 73). By contrast, the South Korean military’s main role is to deter the North Korean threat, which places limits on the scale of its peacekeeping efforts outside of the Korean Peninsula. Public support for peacekeeping operations tends to decrease quickly when tension between the two Koreas rises. Overall, overseas peacekeeping activities are not likely to be a major pillar of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy so long as most of its soldiers are needed to stay home. In addition, dispatching engineering and medic soldiers for U.S.-led multilateral peacekeeping missions has often invited domestic opposition. It would seem to be more rational for South Korea to participate in promoting a human security agenda and setting its institutional mechanisms rather than dispatching soldiers.

Development assistance can be a more effective pillar of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy. South Korea is indebted to several decades of foreign aid that helped it to transform from the one of the poorest in the world to an industrialized country. Accordingly, helping to support countries’ economic development is widely regarded as a way of returning gratitude to international society. The shift to development assistance activism came with South Korea’s entry into the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD in November 2009. Intertwined with the Lee administration’s “Global Korea” foreign policy, increases in ODA contributions and sharing the country’s development experiences have become the norm for foreign policymakers. The Basic Law for International Development Cooperation was legislated and committed South Korea’s ODA volume to reach
the level of 0.25 percent of GNI by 2015. Development assistance is also the area where the South Korean government consciously attempts to test its middle power role, such as an agenda setter or a bridger. In late 2011, South Korea hosted the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at Busan and tried to bridge Western donors and developing countries by inserting the development agenda in the conventional aid effectiveness agenda. The fact that the slogans “improving quality and effectiveness of development cooperation” and “from effective aid to cooperation for effective development” were included in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation reflects these efforts. South Korea has also sought South-South cooperation and the incorporation of new donors like China to the international aid system.

(2) South Korea’s Soft Power and Social Capital in East Asia

Both great and middle powers are increasingly conscious of building their soft power. It is natural for elites responsible for statecraft to try to maintain a positive image before the foreign public and enhance favorable opinions toward their country, since vast flows of information and instant communication of today’s information age can bring both advantages and disadvantages to their foreign policy goals. To great powers, soft power is something to supplement their hard power in order to enjoy more comprehensive power. On the other hand, middle powers tend to regard soft power as an alternative source of influence to compensate for their weaker economic and military power. Soft power as defined by Nye (2004) is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment.” It essentially lies in a country’s persuasiveness to bring about a following from other parties. This ability coincides with the much debated middle power virtues, such as creativity and credibility. A middle power that is equipped with soft power also has advantages in building coalitions among like-minded parties or mediating between parties in a conflict.

Soft power ultimately depends on how much the foreign public views a country favorably. In that regard, South Korea enjoys relatively good soft power according to the CCGA-EAI survey of 2008 for six countries. South Korea’s overall soft power score was higher than China’s both in the United States and in Japan. This poll also shows that South Korea can have a mediating role between China and Japan since both the Chinese and the Japanese view South Korea more favorably than they view each other (Lee 2012, 144-157). The 2012 Global Poll by BBC and GlobalScan also shows both Chinese and Japanese favorably inclined toward South Korea. Only 10 percent of Chinese viewed Japanese international influence as positive (Japan was ranked the least favored country
among Chinese, even lower than Iran and North Korea) while 34 percent of them were positive toward South Korea's influence (South Korea was 3rd in the favorability ranking of foreign countries among Chinese). Japanese also viewed South Korea's influence in a positive way with 34 percent. This is much higher than the 10 percent of Japanese who responded positively toward China (W Chung 2012). The space for South Korea's middle power diplomacy between China and Japan would be bigger when these two neighboring countries are in modest rivalry rather than in concert. While the possibility of China-Japan consultation in regional affairs appears unlikely today, South Korea's favorability in the region is not guaranteed. For example, a recent poll has shown that Chinese favorability toward South Korea is in decline. This turnaround in Chinese favorability could be interpreted as negative receptiveness among deferential Chinese toward South Korea's middle power activism (Lee 2011a).

(3) Political Leadership and Public Support

South Korea's next leadership role is likely to continue with middle power diplomacy as the appropriate foreign policy practices of an advanced country. Multilateral diplomacy through active participation in global institutions and networks will continue to gain equal importance together with the two basic priorities of managing North Korean threats and maintaining a strong alliance with the United States. South Korean public opinion seems to be positive toward sustaining such middle power activism.

In the EAI’s 2010 national identity poll, 76.8 percent of South Koreans viewed their country as a middle power while 19.9 percent answered that South Korea is a weak power.34 To the question of “what kind of role should South Korea take in resolving international problems?,” 53.1 percent answered that South Korea should play a bridging role between advanced countries and developing countries; 24.7 percent believed that it should play a supporter role by helping countries that are suffering from poverty or natural disasters; 19.1 percent favor a leading role in setting agenda and norms in international society. Obviously these roles are not exclusive, but how South Koreans perceive their country’s middle power role is meaningful from a heuristic purpose. As seen in Table 1, when these middle power roles are compared with the responses on national position, more than half of respondents who view South Korea as either a middle or a weak power favor South Korea’s bridging role. Among those respondents who view South Korea as a great power, South Korea’s leadership role is favored.

In 2010, compared to the similar 2005 poll, 10 percent more of South Koreans have become positive about sending PKO missions or aiding poor countries, 72.4 percent and
49.4 percent of respondents answered positively to each item. In addition, 51.5 percent also answered that South Korea should comply with the decision of international organizations, which is much higher than 37.5 percent five years ago. This compliance attitude is related to the decline in perception that South Korea is not respected in the world from 66.9 percent to 50.5 percent between the two polls of 2005 and 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Table 1] South Koreans’ Perceptions of South Korea’s International Role on the Basis of Their Country’s Positional Status Perceptions (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader role</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great nation (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle power (783)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small power (203)</td>
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Source: Lee (2011b, 92).

The above poll data illustrate that the South Korean public has begun to appreciate their country’s international role. Nevertheless, nationalistic sentiments surrounding sovereignty issues when engaging in negotiations with foreign partners or territorial and historical disputes can easily flare up to the degree of dampening trust from neighboring countries. How to manage and absorb this nationalism constructively within middle power diplomacy remains a challenge for policymakers. Middle power culture seeking shared international norms and universal values needs to be planted in the civil society of South Korea.

V. Conclusion

There has been a dearth of discussion on middle power diplomacy in the twenty-first century. How middle powers can achieve their unique roles as facilitators, mediators, bridgers, or brokers in niche issues was mainly discussed during the 1990s. This is the first period in the post-Cold War era when economic and social issues have been rising in importance over hard security issues. The globalization effects of interdependency have been very much felt in this regard. Why then was the debate on middle powers and their
diplomacy less popular over the last decade despite further power diffusion in the governance era is a curious question. Perhaps it is related to European integration that has made individual conventional middle powers’ roles less salient in multilateral diplomacy. Middle power alignments have been absorbed into regionalism in the case of Europe. Newly emerging non-Western middle powers can be said to be more regionally active, paradoxically because regionalism based on multilateral institutions and shared identity has not arrived within the region. The conventional Pacific middle powers such as Canada and Australia still represent middle power diplomacy, but lack the innovation to adapt to this much more complex world. In this context, South Korea’s late entry to the race of “quiet” middle power diplomacy in the late end of the first decade of the second millennium poses an interesting case.

As a late comer, South Korea can benefit from an increasingly networked world, since network power can be achieved without requiring hard power. South Korea’s trade networks and new convener roles in many international forums provide channels to conduct middle power diplomacy. Although a middle power culture such as a prevalent embrace of international norms and rules needs to be formed, South Korea’s leadership and public support for its middle power diplomacy is quite sustainable. Among the issue areas, South Korea has a better chance to play middlepowermanship in development assistance rather than global peace keeping missions until security threats from North Korea disappear. Utilizing a vibrant civil society for middle power missions in human security and supporting IT education are both promising areas for the future of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy.

Regionally, South Korea’s potential contribution to multilateral cooperation will be substantial. In particular, its bridging role between China and Japan can be significant with its strong soft power and positive image to each country. However, a middle power role between the United States and China seem to be less feasible. South Korea has been increasingly tied to China primarily through trade and investment networks. Nevertheless, its alliance with the United States takes precedence over its economic and political ties with China. As long as the North Korean security threat continues to exist, South Korea will have to rely upon the United States to deter North Korea. Consequently, in the U.S.-China rivalry Seoul cannot take on a neutral position in security areas to mediate between them. South Korea’s foreign policy, accordingly, will seek both alliance diplomacy with the United States and middle power diplomacy going beyond the alliance. The former is centered on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, while the latter targets both regional and global agendas. South Korea rose to a middle power status fairly early, but its middle power activism came late as its foreign policy was for so long only focused on the bilateral alliance relationship
with the United States. Now, South Korea’s diplomatic capital has accumulated enough that it can pursue both alliance and middle power diplomacy.

There are both opportunities and risks when pursuing these two kinds of diplomacy simultaneously. It will be in South Korea’s interest to maximize U.S. cooperation for its global middlepowermanship while avoiding being caught directly in U.S.-China power competition. South Korea would be better to seek alignment with other middle powers in the Asia Pacific region who share a similar security dilemma. If the U.S.-China rivalry remains limited, South Korea’s middle power diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region will then have a better chance to be successful. If the rivalry turns out to be severe, the pressure to align with the United States will be greater for South Korea since weakening or losing its alliance relationship will be too huge a risk when compared to other ally middle powers of the United States. At the same time, South Korea has no interest in joining a U.S.-led encirclement of China, considering Beijing’s critical role in managing North Korea and reunification contingencies. While remaining anchored with the alliance but seeking further ties with China, South Korea’s middle power diplomacy will seek cooperation with other middle powers in the region as a way of hedging the uncertain power transition between the United States and China. In this sense, the South Korean case can be a new middle power model for complex diplomacy, managing both alliance and middle power diplomacy to the greatest common denominator.
Endnotes


3 The term middlepowermanship was first used by a Canadian diplomat and academic, John W. Holmes, as a specific approach to diplomacy. In the Canadian context, this meant to reduce tensions between the two political combatants of a bipolar Cold War world. But it has been circulated widely as the activity of middle power diplomacy with certain characteristics as suggested by Cooper et al. here.

4 His method is to rank each state in all nine statistics (population, geographic area, military expenditure, GDP, GDP real growth, value of experts, per capita GNI, trade as a percentage of GDP, life expectancy at birth) in conjunction with the fixed brackets of great (first four ranks of 38 member states of the listed regional bodies), middle (the following fifteen ranks, i.e., from the 5th to the 19th) and small powers (remaining nineteen at the bottom). If a state appears in five or more of the nine tables in a particular class, then that state is found to be of that class. See Ping (2005, 66-104).

5 These fourteen middle powers are Australia, Canada, Chile, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. Only China, Japan, and United States are identified as great powers.

6 Cooper et al. (1993, 20-21) distinguished the reactive behavior of middle powers in the Cold War period of the 1950s-1960s from middle power activism since the late 1980s. If the early middle powers of the “first followship” loyally supported the norms and rules of the international system and performed certain tasks to maintain and strengthen that system, they wrote, the middle powers of a later period became increasingly quick and flexible in responding not only to some new conditions but in taking different forms of policy initiatives.

7 Cooper (1997, 5) points out that Canada and Australia directed their attention toward areas such as relief and rehabilitation of displaced people where they held a high degree of resources and reputational qualifications.

8 The conciliation type of mediation diplomacy is good offices, the full range of third-party dispute settlement and conflict resolution services short of formal arbitration or other methods of adjudication. The interconnecting type of mediation diplomacy is bridge-building, often a less intricate effort involving merely establishment of contact and communication between groups, nations, or societies, as well as governments. The integrating type of mediation diplomacy is the planetary management aiming at integration of the international sys-
tem, involving a more complicated form of intermediation requiring a technical capacity to engineer a collaborative solution among participants. Henrikson regards the nature of this mediation diplomacy as good offices, bridgers, and integrators that would be essentially sympathetic, symbolic, and systematic respectively (Henrikson 1997, 56-60).

9 Henrikson (1997, 47) explains three reasons for this. Mediatory diplomacy is merely a phase of a negotiating cycle; a mediating country cannot fully commit itself to a negotiation lest it itself become a party to the issue or the conflict and is no longer seen as neutral; the mediator as distinct from an arbitrator is not formally authorized or empowered to decide upon the rightness of arguments made by the disputants or to prescribe a settlement based upon its own conception of justice.

10 According to Cooper, Canada participates in international organizations with wider activities while Norway does not. Swedish diplomacy fits more with the Canadian, covering an extensive terrain across the security, economic, and social domains while favoring robust and politicized mission-oriented diplomacy like Australia does. He mentions that the Swedish leftist government had made it take on a more high profile stance independent of the United States. The sense of isolation and vulnerability had made Australia oscillate between cocky assertiveness and abject submissiveness, however.

11 Taking an example of the U.S. preponderance in the inter-American system, Hobraad (98-100) points out that the primarily commercial interests of the United States in Latin America were managed through weaker regional institutions and the U.S. concentration on the nearer parts of the region, which made geographically closer middle powers tie to the United States while more remote ones took on somewhat independent positions.

12 Since the great powers in the multiple system are likely to be divided into hostile camps, middle powers may face greater opportunities as well as greater risks. Some middle powers are able to draw diplomatic benefits from balancing between the camps while others end up as victims of the rivalry (192-193).

13 Kahler (2009, 13) argues that bargaining power is the power of nodes that serve as brokers while social power inheres to highly connected nodes and the power of exit is often wielded by less embedded nodes at the margins of networks.

14 The U.S. defense budget in 2011 was 739.3 billion U.S. dollars and China’s was 89.8 billion U.S. dollars (IISS 2012). In addition to the qualitative gap of military technology and leadership, this huge quantitative gap between the 1st and 2nd military spender is not likely to be narrowed in the near future. Nevertheless, this gap is smaller in the East Asian region since China’s military capability concentrates in this region while the U.S. has to divide its capability to the Atlantic Ocean.
For these two speeches, see http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135090.htm and http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/150141.htm.


Chung categorized the responses of fifteen countries to the rise of China. He labeled weak countries like Myanmar, North Korea, Cambodia, and Laos as bandwagoners, Taiwan, Japan, Australia as balancers, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, Philippines as active hedgers, and Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam as hesitant hedgers. Analyzing five variables, he developed five hypotheses: more trade dependence upon China does not make a country a balancer; larger overseas Chinese economic share makes a country more vigilant against China’s intrusion; undemocratic regime tend to be less antagonistic to China; countries that have territorial disputes with China lead them to be more wary of rising China; an alliance with the United States makes countries less likely to bandwagon with China.

Spero expands Schroeder’s “specializing” strategy—one of four alignment strategies with “hiding,” “transcending,” and “bandwagoning”—as middle power strategy entailing “support of assistance” for other powers in order to change great powers’ purposes and methods in using power and, in so doing, to promote middle power leadership. From Schweller (1994)’s framework of three alliance forms of “balancing,” “bandwagoning,” and “binding,” and two alternatives of “distancing” and “engagement,” Spero elaborates engagement as middle power alignment strategies.

There were other forms of initiatives as well, such as Nigeria’s coalition efforts against the apartheid of South Africa or the inter-bloc middle power consortium like the Lagos Forum (Brazil, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Austria), and Mexico’s initiative to bridge between the North and the South through the Cancun conference and the Contadora group initiative.

Higgo and Cooper (1990, 600) say that the Cairns Group of Fair Trading Nations, formed in Cairns, Australia, in August 1986 with the aim of securing major reform in international agricultural trade, is a unique case of economically diverse countries making coalitions to restrain and modify the behavior of larger and more powerful actors through the strengthening of the international economic order.

The post-apartheid diplomacy of South Africa in facilitating renewed 1995 NPT negotiations and the 1994 Lockerbie issue also belong to this third wave as well (Hamill and Lee, 2001).

While tied with its strong alliance relationship with the United States, South Korea has long favored multilateral cooperation since the end of Cold War. For the past three decades, a focal regional boundary that each South Korean government has emphasized has varied from the larger Asia-Pacific to East Asia or the narrower Northeast Asia.
23 For Malaysia’s middle power diplomacy oriented to East Asian region with an anti-U.S. orientation, see Nossal and Stubbs (1997).


27 Only the troop dispatch to the UAE is based on bilateral military cooperation.

28 The remaining 170 soldiers were dispatched through bilateral military cooperation. See http://peacekeeping.go.kr.

29 For the forty years after the end of World War II, over 100,000 Canadians had taken part in over 32 operations across the globe. One thousand Canadian soldiers participated in the first major U.N. emergency force in the Sinai in 1956.

30 In 2002, South Korea’s ODA expenditure was a mere 279 U.S. million dollars, which was 0.05 percent of GNI. In 2010, ODA expenditure more than quadrupled to 1.17 U.S. billion dollars, which is 0.12 percent of 2010 year’s GNI.

31 See Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 2011.


33 When the question of the international influence of seventeen countries was rated among twenty-two countries, South Korea was ranked 12th with an average 37 percent of positive answers while Japan and China were ranked as 1st and the 5th respectively with average positive answers of 58 percent and 50 percent.

34 Only 3 percent of respondents answered that South Korea is a great power.
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