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Abstract

In recent decades, several nations in East Asia have transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy. The emerging democracies in the region, however, do not converge on a single pattern of civil-military relations as the analysis of failed institutionalization of civilian control in Thailand, the prolonged crisis of civil–military relations in the Philippines, the conditional subordination of the military under civilian authority in Indonesia and the emergence of civilian supremacy in South Korea in this article demonstrates. The article argues that both structural and agential factors loom high in the evolution of post-transitional civil military relations. However, structural contexts cannot completely explain if a new democracy will establish civilian control over the armed forces. Rather, the ‘political entrepreneurship’ of civilian decision-makers plays an important role to account for the diverging patterns of civil-military relations. In Korea and Indonesia it was strategic action, prioritization, timing and careful sequencing by civilians, who took advantage of upcoming opportunities, and utilized them for restructuring civil-military relations, which has enabled civilians in Korea and Indonesia to overcome past legacies of military intervention into politics. In Thailand, on the other hand, civilians overestimated their ability to steer the military through robust action, thereby, provoking the military’s intervention. In the Philippines, consecutive civilian governments forged their “symbiotic relationship” with military elites, which allows civilian rule to survive. At the same time, however, military officers demand material rewards, political influence on the government, and expanded decision-making powers as quid pro quo, while protecting its institutional well being. In all four cases, the evaluation of civil-military relations has far-reaching consequences for the prospects of national security, political stability and democratic consolidation.

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Introduction

Over the past 25 years, East Asia has seen numerous transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. Democratic transitions have taken place in the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1987), Mongolia (1990), Thailand and Taiwan (1992), Cambodia (1993), Indonesia (1999) and East Timor (2002). Even though most scholars generally agree that these democratizations have contributed to a decline of the political power of the armed forces, as is also testified by the stability of civil-military relations in most authoritarian regimes as well as a decreasing frequency of military coups and military regimes in the region, there are ample signs to suggest that the military is still a crucial political force in many countries. Furthermore, the September 2006 coup in Thailand and approximately ten attempted-but-failed military coups in the Philippines since 1986 indicate that in this part of the world, 'the military coup is not a problem of the political past, but a continuing danger, even for electoral democracies that have persisted for over a decade' (Barracca 2007, 138).

Figure 1. Frequency of Military regimes and Military Coups in Asia (1950-2011)

* Numbers of coups (attempted and successful) are calculated with data from the "Global Instances of Coups", collected by Powell and Thyne (2011). The main source for data on military regimes for the period 1960-2003 is Hadenius and Teorell (2006). Backdating the starting years of regimes to 1950 and continuing the data for the period 2004–2010 by the author. In order to avoid multiple observations per country year, all hybrid military regime types were classified as military regimes. A
list of all cases, replication data and appendices are available at http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2 or can be found in Hadenius and Teorell’s Appendix B. Asia includes PR China, Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Nepal, Brunei, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, South Vietnam, North Vietnam (Vietnam).

Democratization in other countries also has seldom meant de-politicization of the military or full-fledged civilian control. Civil–military relations in East Timor, while not as unstable as in the Philippines or Thailand, are also strained. In Indonesia, the armed forces (TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia) after more than ten years of democratic reforms still play significant roles in local politics, internal security, and the national economy, and enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy from civilian oversight in the post-authoritarian period. Even South Korea and Taiwan—generally considered by most observers as success stories regarding democratic consolidation and the democratic reform of civil-military relations (Croissant 2004; Kuehn 2008; Woo 2011:2)—have struggled with de-militarizing government apparatuses and the political decision making process, dismantling the political management system which formed the backbone of the civil-military system under the authoritarian order, creating robust, credible and functioning civilian institutions of civilian oversight, institutionalizing civilian infrastructure beyond the government apparatus, and developing strong civilian capacities to manage the security sector. Only in Mongolia, civilians were able to fully institutionalize democratic control within the first ten years after the demise of authoritarian rule. In many new democracies in the region, the quest for civilian control remains high on the political agenda (Alagappa 2001; Beeson and Bellamy 2008; Chambers and Croissant 2010; Croissant and Kuehn 2011).

What Civilian Control Is … and What Is Not

Traditionally, civilian control has been implicitly defined as the lack of military coups and military rule or, alternatively, a low risk for such events (Edmonds 1988, 93; Croissant et al. 2010, 954). The problem with this negative definition of civilian control is that coups are only the tip of the iceberg. It does not capture other more nuanced forms of military influence that are potentially no less harmful for civilian rule than the military coup, such as military control over “reserved domains” (Valenzuela 1992), “vertical prerogatives” (Pion-Berlin 2003), the encapsulation of military internal affairs from civilian intrusion, and the dependence of democratic governments upon the military to carry out security and development operations inside the territorial borders of their nations. To avoid the “fallacy of coup-ism” (Croissant et al. 2010) it is necessary to describe civil-military relations not in terms of dichotomy but in those of a continuum of distribution of decision-making power between civilians and the military (see also Welch 1976, 2; Desch 1999:6).

So, how, precisely should civilian control be defined and conceptualized? In a couple of recent article, Croissant et al. (2010, 2011a) have proposed the definition of civilian control as
“that distribution of decision-making power in which civilians have exclusive authority to decide on national politics and their implementation. Under civilian control, civilians can freely choose to delegate decision making power and the implementation of certain policies to the military while the military has no decision-making power outside those areas specifically defined by civilians. Furthermore, it is civilians alone who determine which particular policies, or aspects of policies, the military implements, and the civilians alone define the boundaries between policy-making and policy-implementation” (Croissant et al. 2010, 955).

Based on this definition and following insights from Timothy Colton’s analysis of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union (Colton 1979) and Harold Trinkunas’ work on Latin America (Trinkunas 2005), civilian control can be conceptualized as a set of norms, rules and institutions that structure the balance between the strength and bargaining power of civilian political institutions on the one side, and the political strength of the military on the other in five different decision-making areas of civil-military relations (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Decision Making Areas of Civil-Military Relations

A) The area of *Elite Recruitment* defines the rules, criteria and processes of recruiting, selecting and legitimizing political office holders, which means the degree of openness of the political processes to competition, and the degree of participation, the inclusiveness of political competition (Dahl 1971, 4-6). Civilian control over rules of political competition is undermined when public offices are excluded from open competition and if the military influences electoral procedures. Civilian control over the rules of participation is constrained if the military enjoys constitutionally reserved representation in cabinet and parliament, has informally recognized or institutionalized veto powers regarding the appointment of members of the government or public administration, control elements of the electoral process, or if
active service personnel hold positions of political leadership. A further distinction must be made between military ascension within the defense orbit and outside of it. When active duty officers serve on national security councils, or are appointed as defense ministers, this constrains civilian authority, but does not question the civilian nature of the political regime, so long as military influence is contained within the defense sphere, the elected president is commander in chief, civilians retain a majority on the security council, and continue to make the nation’s policies. However, when the military acquires non-defense cabinet portfolios and legislative presentation in large numbers, this calls the civilian nature of the government (Pion-Berlin 2003, 12).

B) Public Policy comprises the rules and processes of policy-making (“agenda-setting”, “policy-formulation”, “policy-adoption”) and policy-implementation. Military expansion into this arena allows the military to ascend to important, official or unofficial, decision-making functions within government. This provides the military the opportunity to influence, veto or even determine national policies and priorities national policies, be they social, economic or political. To determine civilian control over policy-making, the extent to which the armed forces can assert their will against civilian wishes in the processes of agenda setting, policy formulation and policy adoption must be analyzed. Regarding control over policy implementation, it must be analyzed to what extent the military is able to exert influence on state administrative agencies charged with implementing political decisions.

C) Internal Security entails all decisions and specific measures regarding the deployment of the military for missions and in operations of keeping peace, order and security inside the territorial borders of a nation. It includes military's involvement in riot control, domestic law enforcement, border control, and counter-terrorism operations, the cooptation of the military to put down insurrections, logistic support and restoration of civilian infrastructure and military development operations (see Rasmussen 1999; Collier 1999; Trinkunas 2005; Wilkinson 2006). Measures of the degree of civilian control over this area are the extent to which civilians have the effective authority to formulate the roles and missions of the military, do decide on the principles, goals and guidelines for military’s internal operations, and the extents of the armed forces’ autonomous capabilities to dominate non-military security forces, law enforcement agencies and the national intelligence apparatus.

D) National defense, that is safeguarding the nation’s territory against external military threats, traditionally is the primary role of any armed forces. Even though most military forces in the post-cold war era reoriented from territorial defense to new missions such as delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid and disaster relief, international operations and multilateral peacekeeping, this shift did not supplant territorial defense as, at least formally, the primary function of national armed forces. Especially in nations which face permanently high levels of external threats, that generate the necessity of a special modus vivendi in civil-military
relations, there is a great degree of cooperation and interconnection between military and civilian elites and military officers are involved in many direct and indirect ways in the formulation of defense policies. In fact, effective and efficient defense policies - require that civilians are willing to utilize the military’s professional expertise (Bruneau and Trinkunas 2008), especially because in most established and emerging democracies, democratically elected civilians neither worry much “about investing the necessary time to understanding defense, strategy, tactics, preparation, budgeting, deployment, doctrine, or training.” (Pion-Berlin 2005, 19) nor have incentives to do something about their “attention deficits” (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007). Still, civilian control requires that civilians, although the depend on the experience and advise of military leaders, possess the ultimate decision-making power in this area.

Military Organization comprises all defense-related policies which define missions, roles, structure, and organization of the military; decisions about acquisition, logistics, training and equipment, as well personnel management and the military promotion system. While a certain degree of organizational autonomy is necessary for the military to fulfill its missions and roles, civilian control requires the ability of civilians to define its range and boundaries. However, for Latin America, Pion-Berlin has demonstrated that impediments to the enforcement of full political control of the civilians over the military are especially strong in this area (Pion-Berlin 1997). One reason for this is that civilian attempts to expand their authority into the military’s internal affairs are often perceived by military leaders as assault on the professional integrity, cohesion and identity of the military-as-institution. Another important reason, however, is the lack of strong civilian capabilities and institutions to manage military affairs. The ultimate indicator for civilian control in this arena of civil-military, however, is the extent to which civilians can define and enforce the limits of military self-regulation of its internal affairs, and who has the ultimate say when it comes to conflict between civilians and soldiers about military equipment, logistics, organization, education, doctrines, and personnel management and promotions.

Full-fledged civilian control, at least in principle, requires that civilian authorities enjoy uncontested decision-making power in all five areas while in the ideal-type military rule soldiers dominate all decisions concerning political structures, processes, and policies and civilians possess no autonomous political authority except in those areas specifically defined by the military. The reality in many emerging democracies, however, is more ambiguous as the extent of civilian authority or military influence varies both between the areas and over time. Often, civil-military relations are characterized by spheres of overlapping or shared competences, zones of contestation between civilians and soldiers, the delegation of responsibilities, as well as informal networking between military officers and civilian elites. Those cases, in which decision-making power is divided between civilians and the military are positioned somewhere along the spectrum of the continuum (Croissant et al. 2010, 955; see also Desch 1999, 6). Still, disaggregating civilian
control into different areas allows for nuance in analysis, permits differentiated assessments of the extent of civilian decision-making power in each of these areas, as well as a comprehensive evaluation of the overall patterns of civilian control and avoids conceptually and empirically untenable dichotomies.

Finally, it is important to note what civilian control is not. First of all, civilian control is not be equated with democratic control. While “democracy isn’t possible without civilian control of the military,” the experiences of civil-military relations in communist one-party regimes illustrate “that civilian control of the military is clearly possible without democracy” (Forster 2006, 96). In any authoritarian regime, the military obviously is a crucial partner in the elite coalition (Ezrow and Frantz 2011). In civilian authoritarian regimes, however, the military’s political aspirations are kept in check and are neutralized by institutional mechanisms of authoritarian political control and the prevalence of other forces such as non-military security forces, and the intelligence apparatus, leaders and cadres of the ruling party, apparatchiks and civilian technocrats, entrepreneurial and business elites, or members of the traditional elite. This is true both for autocratic regimes in the Middle East (Henry and Springborg 2010) and one-party states in different regions of the world (Joo 1995). Especially the communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have had largely solved the problem of civilian control by institutional mechanism, although the armed forces still had some degree of political influence and enjoyed considerable autonomy in its internal affairs considerable autonomy (see Colton 1979; Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982; Betz 2004).

Second, civil-military relations are a very broad subject. The focus on civilian control and military influences does not capture all relevant issues in this relationship (Feaver 1999). Other important questions, for example, are if the armed forces can achieve roles and missions assigned to them by political leaders and decision-makers (“effectiveness”), and at what costs in lives and resources (“efficiency”) (Bruneau 2005; 2012). Nonetheless, most scholars consider the question of “who guards the guardians” still most important issue in the study of civil-military relations in most countries around the world and the main theme of the “civil-military problematique” (Feaver 1996; Pion-Berlin 2011).

Third, effective civilian control does neither imply effectiveness and efficiency in civil-military relations (Bruneau and Goetze 2006, 71) nor good governance in the security sector. It simply ensures that civilians alone are responsible for political decision making (Trinkunas 2005, 8). Even in the democratic new member states of the European Union and NATO in East-Central Europe the practices of civilian control do not fulfill the normative ideal of democratic security sector governance (Forster 2006), which include not only the effective control of the military by democratically elected civilian authorities but also, among other things, parliamentary oversight, transparent decision making, civil society participation, ensuring that military training is in line with the norms and values of democratic societies, and providing human security (cf. Hänggi 2004).

Fourth, the idea of civilian control does not assume an apolitical military. It assigns the military the role to defend society, not to define it (Kohn 1997, 142). But all armed forces are
political to some degree (McAlister 1964). Israel, for example, is a liberal democracy with a great degree of interconnection between military and civilian elites, close involvement of military leaders in government policy formation within the normative framework of generally accepted civilian control. (Kamvara 2000, 75) The question for civilian control is not whether the military yields political influence, but how and how much.

**Mapping Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary East Asia**

Before the next part of this paper will provide a more nuanced analysis of civilian control in South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, it is important to note that East Asia is remarkably diverse in terms of regime types and patterns of civil-military relations. Though there is a good deal of variation in the regime classifications provided by various measurements of democracy such as Polity IV, Freedom House and the Bertelsmann Transformation-Index, the political regimes of the region can be broadly classified into three categories. The first category compromises long-established and consolidated democracy of Japan and six countries which have experienced a political transition to democracy in one way or another in the last two decades or so. Depending on the “presence of a substantial array of civil liberties” (Freedom House 2010), the countries in this category can be further differentiated into ‘liberal democracies’ and ‘electoral democracies. Even though there are considerable differences between the cases in regard to the quality of democracy, the stability of the political process and the extent to which the democracies have been able to achieve broad legitimacy and popular support both among the broader populace and political elite, in all these cases, elections have become the generally accepted method of transferring political power, and legislatures and (in presidential systems) the chief executive are elected in competitive elections (cf. Diamond 2008).

The second category consists of ‘electoral authoritarian regimes’ (Schedler 2006) in Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia and, since the parliamentary elections of December 2007, also Thailand. In all three countries, formal democratic institutions coexist with authoritarian political practices. While elections are the principal means for acquiring political power, ‘incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate election results’ (Levitsky and Way 2002, 61). Though there is variation in the extent in which civil liberties are truncated and political competitiveness is constrained both between the cases and over time, in all three countries, incumbents effectively prevent a level playing field from developing (cf. Case 2011; Levitsky and Way 2010).

The third group includes six unambiguously authoritarian regimes. It is a heterogeneous group of one-party rule in Laos, Vietnam, North Korea and the People’s Republic of China, military rule in Burma/Myanmar and hereditary monarch in Brunei. There are significant differences between the cases with regard to the question of who rules how and why. Nevertheless, all six regimes have in common that they do not allow for limited political
pluralism. Even though there is do different extent competition between different segments of the ruling coalition within the regime, they can correctly be classified as ‘closed authoritarian regimes’ (Diamond 2002).

As for the patterns of civil-military relations in contemporary East Asia, Alan Siaroff’s (2009) continuum for measuring the degree of military intervention into a state’s political and civilian affairs, although it is not fully congruent with the previously described multidimensional concept of civilian, provides a helpful starting point. Within his conceptual scheme, he envisages a continuum of civil–military relations that ranges from ‘civilian supremacy’ and ‘civilian control’ (in contrast to the first category, civilians lack expertise in military affairs, do not hold the military to account for past human rights violations, and cannot control its internal affairs), across the intermediate categories of ‘conditional subordination’ and ‘military tutelage’, to military control and military rule. His measurements for more than 80 countries around the world including most states in East Asia demonstrate the extreme variation that exists in the region even after the general decline of military influence in past decades (op.cit: 89-92).

The cross tabulation of regime classifications and Siaroff’s categorization for the year 2007 suggest that regime type is not a very good predictor of the kinds of civil-military relations to be found in the region. For example, his measurement puts North Korea, China and Singapore in the same category of ‘civilian supremacy’ as the liberal democracies in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Furthermore, the category of ‘civilian control’ comprises democracies such as East Timor and the Philippines, but also Malaysia and Vietnam. In addition, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Laos are listed as cases of conditional subordination of the military under civilian authority, whereas Thailand (2006–07) and Myanmar are included in the categories of military control and military rule, respectively.

Table 1. Categories of Civil–Military Relations and Regime Types in East and Southeast Asia (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian Supremacy</th>
<th>Civilian Control</th>
<th>Conditional Subordination</th>
<th>Military Tutelage</th>
<th>Military Control</th>
<th>Military Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regime classifications by the author based on evaluations of Freedom House (2008) and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008). The year 2007 was chosen because Siaroff provides only data for 2007. The six-fold country categorization of civil–military relations is based on Siaroff (2009: 92); no data for Brunei. Siaroff’s classification is
Table 1 provides useful information regarding the variety of patterns of civil-military relations in East Asia. It clearly supports the argument that civilian control is possible without democracy, while robust civilian control is a necessary condition for the emergence and consolidation of a full-fledged democracy. Up till now, Siaroff’s approach provides the only attempt to actually measure the concept of civilian control across a large number of cases. In doing so, he generates valuable data which can be utilized in empirical research to test hypotheses about how structural variables such as political institutions, security threats, socioeconomic factors or political culture influence the level of civilian control.

At the same time, however, conceptualization and measurements have some serious shortcomings. First, the framework lacks a theoretical argument from which the different categories of civil-military relations could be deduced. Second, the delineation of the six categories is not based on an explicit definition of each category. While Siaroff provides for measurement thresholds between the different categories, it is not clear which criteria must be fulfilled to qualify for a certain categorization and what the weight of individual criteria is in the overall index. For example, one of his indicators is the existence of a civilian defense minister and a defense organization dominated by civilians. Although Siaroff seems to consider this is a requirement for “civilian supremacy”, he puts both China and North Korea into this category, although in both countries this post is usually hold by an active service military.

Third, in many Asian countries, the actual situation is more complex than Siaroff’s categorization might suggest. Of course, the classification of Myanmar as military rule is unambiguous. The same holds true for civilian supremacy in Japan (Min 2010; Hikotani 2009).

Although scholars agree that in contrast to Myanmar, civil–military relations in Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are characterized by a relatively low risk of military rule, there are significant differences between the cases. In non-communist hegemonic party systems, such as in Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia, control is exercised by a personal ruler (Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia), includes the fusion of civil–military roles (Singapore), or is safeguarded by informal networking between military officers and the dominant government party (Malaysia). Notwithstanding the ‘supremacy’ or (conditional) control of civilians over the militaries in these countries, the armed forces are not apolitical. For example, in post-civil war Cambodia, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party relies on the military for political support. At the same time, the armed forces function predominantly as a “large income-generating and electoral machine, which created slush funds for commanders, cementing their loyalty to the center and financial and political support for the government while keeping the opposition weak” (Hughes 2009: 107). In Malaysia, the armed forces (MAF) are one of the country’s key symbols of Malay identity (Crouch 1997). Since the country gained its independence in 1957, the MAF has remained a predominantly Malay institution, with its highest echelons filled almost exclusively by
Although subordinate to the civilian authorities, the UMNO leadership rewards the political loyalty of military officers (after their retirement) with positions in state enterprises, public offices, and party politics (Beeson and Bellamy 2008, 81). And in Singapore, the distinction between non-military and military functions is even less clear. Since the 1980s, military officers became involved in several types of political and administrative activities, including cabinet posts, senior positions in the public sector, and direct representation at the highest levels of the ruling People’s Action Party (Huxley 2000: 230–236). The military thereby became a ‘part of the ruling class’ and ‘a source of recruits for renewing the ranks of the PAP government’ (ibid., 241-245).

While active military personnel in Singapore are prohibited from joining any political party, even the PAP, in Vietnam and Laos, the higher echelons of the party–military leadership are inextricably intertwined; many party leaders are also career soldiers (Thayer 1995). As in other communist countries, Vietnam and Laos have an iron triangle of party–army–state relations, where military elites (the “party in uniform”, Perlmuter and LeoGrande 1982) occupies high-level positions in the military and party. However, the militaries in both countries tend to engage more actively in economic activities and in the political decision-making process than has been the case in the former communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While the opaque nature of policy making in Vietnam makes it difficult to assess how much influence the military actually has, scholars generally agree that it is a considerable amount (Manyin 2005:317–318). Judging from its presence in politics, the state, and the economy, the Laotian military plays an even more prominent role. Military officers occupy many top positions in governmental administration and ministries, still dominate the 11-member Politburo of the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), and are deeply involved in legitimate as well as illicit economic activities (Freeman 2006:138–9).

In regard to North Korea, traditionally, the Korean People’s Army has been the “revolutionary armed forces of the Korean Workers’ Party” (KWP constitution of 1980, Chapter 7, Article 46). However, since the of the “military-first policy” (son’gun chongch’i) in 1995, the military has partially replaced the party and party control over the KWP, especially defense policy-making and military’s internal affairs, has eroded (Kim Ilpyong 2006: 72). Though most scholars agree that Kim Jong-il is in command of the KPA, considerable consensus exists that the military-first-policy has given the leading political role to the services of the armed forces (Gause 2006), while some observers even describe the extent of the KPA’s involvement in politics outside the defense orbit as a kind of “institutionalized military intervention in civilian politics” (Moon/Takesada 2001: 358). Siaroff’s measurement, however, does not reflect the changes that have taken place over the past fifteen years or so regarding the extent of military influence and the sweeping shifts in the balance of power between the party (that is, civilians) and the People’s Liberation Army. Neither does his conceptual scheme capture the even more profound changes in the strategies utilized by the highest political leadership in order maintain the loyalty of military officers to the political leadership. These strategies include of course typical authoritarian survival strategies such as counterbalancing by various rivaling military cliques, permanent monitoring through the intelligence apparatus and non-military security. However, some scholars note that
the regime increasingly relies on other, less ‘robust’ strategies of appeasement and cooptation such as granting the military vast economic, social and political privileges, and increasing its prerogatives and autonomy from the party (Gause 2006; Scobell 2006).

Likewise in the People’s Republic, the Chinese leadership has maintained its control over the People’s Liberation Army down to the platoon level by using political commissioners who hold a disciplinary status equal to the respective military commanders, but are solely responsible to the Communist Party (Shambaugh 1991: 546ff). This, however, was more part of a broader strategy for preventing the military from seizing political power, than to control the military. In fact, as Ellis Joffe so aptly noted: “Throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has occupied a pivotal position in the Chinese political system” (Joffe 1982:132). Although few observers would contend that today the PLA is not under firm party control, in the past “involvement by the army in ‘political’ affairs and domestic security was considered normal and legitimate” (Shambaugh 2002: 17). Moreover, as Swaine argues, “the military’s historical involvement in elite policy-making served as an important mechanism to advance the military’s institutional interests, while also playing an arbiter role between competing civilian groups” (Swaine 2005:2). Though “the ‘rules of the game’ in civil-military relations in China have changed considerably”, especially since the 1990s, this has not only contributed to increased military professionalism but also strengthened the military’s autonomy vis-à-vis the Communist Party (Shaumbaugh 2002: 19). Siaroff’s conceptual scheme, however, does not adequately capture these nuanced differences in the forms, modes and patterns of civil-military relations. Neither does it permit a fine-grained description or differentiated assessments of the extent of civilian decision-making power or military influence over different areas of civil-military relations, nor a definite assessment of the state of civilian control in East Asian countries.

Initial conditions: Origins and Historical Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in East Asia

Scholars have frequently noted the relevance of initial conditions, authoritarian legacies and the paths to democracy for civil-military relations in post-authoritarian countries. For example, Zoltan Barany (1997) identifies the lack of substantive traditions of military interventionism in politics and the strong believes of the communist officer corp in the principle of civilian supremacy as key factors for the relatively smooth transition from communist to democratic civilian control in most post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. In contrast to this, scholars who work on Latin America often trace the problems of new democracies with institutionalizing civilian control over the military back to the institutional legacies of the military regimes (Loveman 1999). With regard to Asian countries, some researchers stress the importance of antecedent historical factors during the early times of the formation of state, nation and politics as key variables for the evolution of contemporary civil-
military relations. For example, Muthiah Alagappa argues that due to their particular role during the processes of decolonization, nation- and state-building, Asian soldiers often demand a privileged status as “guardian” of the nation (Alagappa 2001, 9). As a consequence, often the military has seen its missions profile diversify and increase over time. Eventually, soldiers became heavily engaged in political decision-making, commercial activities, social development and civic action projects, and in putting down internal insurrections.

Finally, Felipe Agüero in his comparative research on Latin America and Southern Europe emphasized the interaction the different roles the armed forces play in the transfers of power as key explanations for the differences both between the regions and within the regions with regard to the institutionalization of democratic civilian control (Agüero 1998:384, 2001:207-209). Although he makes the point, that nature of the authoritarian regime matters as challenges in civil-military reforms are especially acute and arduous in transitions from military rule to democracy, the most important factor in his framework is the extent of military control over the democratic transition: the stronger military influence, the more prerogatives of the military survive transition and the more institutional power the military has to stifle post-authoritarian reforms (Agüero 1995:139-153).

In East Asia, there are some important similarities regarding the nature of civil-military relations in the authoritarian period (Croissant and Kuehn 2009: 191): In all five countries reported on here, the military has been a powerful political actor and well-integrated into the authoritarian elite coalition. In all five countries the armed forces had pervasive influence on political issues other than defense matters, preformed various secondary roles such as national security, police-work, development activities and nation building. Authoritarian rulers have time and again relied on military coercion to guarantee regime security and maintain law and order. Furthermore, according to military folklore in Indonesia and Thailand, the armed forces were not merely part of the nation – they created the nation. Even in South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, where the military’s role as an agent of nation-building had been less accentuated, the armed forces imagined themselves as the warrantors of national survival and defenders against communist subversion. Such common characteristics notwithstanding, a careful analysis of civil-military relations in East Asia reveals also some fundamental differences in the relations between authoritarian regime and armed forces, the nature of the national armed forces and their roles in the transitions which, in turn, had a profound impact on civil-military relations in the post-authoritarian politics.

Compared with most other regions touched by the “third wave”, East Asia stands out because of the heterogeneous nature of the authoritarian regimes and their civil-military relations. In Latin America, authoritarian regimes were essentially controlled by military elites, while in communist Eastern Europe civilians controlled the government. In East Asia, however the variety of authoritarian regimes included civilian authoritarianism in Taiwan and the Philippines, military-authoritarianism in Thailand and South Korea, and ‘civilianized’ military rule in Indonesia. But with the passage of time, the degree to which military officers were major or predominant political actors often differed, as did the degree to which the military’s power was
institutionalized and the extent to which the military-as-institution remained separate from the military-as-government (see Summary Table 2).

**Indonesia**

Particularly in Indonesia, the ability of the armed forces (ABRI, renamed TNI in 1999) to influence government policies significantly change over time. According to its self-conception, the Indonesian military had played a crucial role in the struggle against Dutch colonialism. Following almost two decades of civilian governance under the so-called “Guided Democracy” of President Sukarno, the self-proclaimed „New Order” regime of General Suharto (president since 1967) originated in a slow motion coup of Suharto with the backing of the Indonesian military (Crouch, 1988). Originally a military regime headed by a military junta, Suharto soon marginalized his most important comrades in coup plotting.

Until the late 1970s ABRI was the predominant political force within the regime, second only to the president (Slater 2010,133). The military exercised full control over the security apparatus and defense policies and defined its primary role as defender of the nation against internal enemies and an agent of socio-political development. This was reflected in the institutional overlap of military and civilian administrative functions under the territorial system (koter). Based on the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine and the practice of promoting active-duty military personnel to non-military duties, the military had privileged access to the political centre, policy-making and public administration at every level of the state (Honna 2003). Therefore, military officers were able to exert considerable influence on public policy and elite recruitment. Moreover, the military engaged in revenue-generating activities such as authorized military-owned businesses, military collaboration with private businesses and military involvement in illicit activities. In the late 1970s, however, the military’s position as the most powerful institution deteriorated as the personalistic and autocratic character of Suharto’s rule grew stronger. Suharto packed ABRI with political appointments and simultaneously, favored the civilian factions within Golkar, the regime party. Consequently, “what started as a system of oligarchic military rule evolved into a highly personalized regime, backed in nearly equal measure by military and civilian organizations.” (Slater 2010:133)

At the same time, Suharto’s use of the military promotion system, patronage politics and rule-and-conquer strategies to control ABRI generated internal divisions. When Indonesia entered the transition to democracy (“reformasi”) in 1998, one of the main demands by pro-democracy groups and the public was military withdrawal from politics. The military leadership opposed the use of military force against protests, while the remaining Suharto loyalists among the top brass were in no position, to block the transition (Lee 2009). Immediately after the downfall of Suharto, civilian elites pressure the military to revoke its dual function doctrine that justified the military’s role in politics. The military, however, was allowed to retain its business holdings (Sukma 2010).
Unlike in Indonesia, the military’s role as an agent of nation-building in the Philippines had been less accentuated. Historically, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had been controlled by elected civilian elites such as Congressmen, the President and local oligarchs who exploited their influence over military appointments to build personal connections with ambitious officers as means of engaging in political competition (Anderson 1998, 213; Hedman 2001, 168).

Notwithstanding the more or less working system of civilian control, the AFP also considered itself a pivotal vanguard of the modern state and bulwark against communist subversion (McCoy 2000). Given that under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1952 the US assumed the provision of external defense for the country, this caused the AFP to concentrate on internal security and counter-insurgency operations (Hall 2010, 29-30; Arugay 2010, 9; Wu 2011, 40). This, to a large extent, shaped its size, training, equipment, and doctrine. Immediately after the independence, the country was faced with a rebellion coming from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the Hukbalahaps or Huks. Consequently, already in the early 1950s, the military’s role had expanded deeply into various fields of political and social activities. For example, already in 1950, both counterinsurgency strategy and the policy constabulary had shifted from being directed by the (civilian) Defense and Interior departments to management by the military. In 1951, for the first time, the Commission on Elections deputized soldiers to help guarantee orderly elections. Under President Magsaysay (1953-1957), military civic action projects mushroomed, and numerous active-duty soldiers were appointed to civil posts in government (Berlin 2008: 42-78). While the military lost much power in the following years, President Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986) commenced a resurgence of AFP political influence (Hernandez 1984). With the support of the top brass of the Philippine military, the democratically elected President declared martial law in 1972, thereby effectively destroying the democratic system. Following the imposition of martial law, Marcos centralized control over military promotions in his hands. Apart from this, Marcos appointed military officers to key posts in the civilian administration and government owned or control corporations, increased the military budget by more than 700 per cent between 1972 and 1985 and almost tripled the manpower strength of the AFP from 62,000 in 1972 to 159,000 in 1986 (Ciron 1993, Table 5.5). At the same time, however, the AFP became an increasingly brutal, corrupt, incompetent organization with “key promotions […] based on political patronage” (Overholt 1986).

Marcos attempted to create and sustain a strong alliance with the military by filling military leadership positions with his family, friends from his native region (Northern Luzon) and his former classmates from the University of the Philippines cadet corps so that in the early 1980s, “the AFP looked more like Marcos’s Praetorian Guard than a properly professional military.” (Hedman 2001, 178). However, Marcos’ strategy of consolidating his personal control over the military by dispersing perks and relying on primordial ties inevitably had far-reaching implications as it undermined the professionalism, integrity and discipline of the military officer corp (Kim Insoo 2008, 41).
The frustration of junior and middle-ranking officers with widespread corruption in the military, the lack of professionalism, promotions based on favoritism, and the government’s inability to develop an effective approach towards the threats of communist rebellion and Muslim secessionist movement led young and politically radicalized graduates of the Philippine Military Academy to form the Reform Armed Forces Movement (RAM). (Ciron 1993) On February 22, 1986, about 300 RAM officers led by Defense Minister Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Fidel Ramos, who had announced their withdrawal of support for the President, staged a coup d’etat. The coup failed but facilitated the “People’s Power” mass mobilization against the dictator. Within a couple of days, almost 90 per cent of all army units had declared their support for the military rebels and the civilian opposition (Lee 2009: 649).

Marcos demise in February 1986 set the stage for contestation between a deeply politicized and factionalized military on one hand and disunified civilians on the other (Thompson 1995). Since Marcos’ regime was built on informal networks and personal connections, there were no working institutions of civilian oversight or control. The collapse of military hierarchy, the lack of effective institutions, the sudden breakdown of the authoritarian regime and the contested legitimacy of the new democratic government, created an ideal environment for rouge factions within the AFP to actively seek political dominance. Thus, in the early years after the transition, the fragile democracy was under siege by its own military.

**Thailand**

In Thailand, the “Men on Horseback” (Finer 1962) have been active, even dominant, in politics and the state for most of the twentieth century (Yawnghwe 1997). Beginning with the “People’s Revolution” coup of 1932, which forced King Prajadipok (Rama VII) to relinquish absolute power and lasting through the 1970s, the Thai society considered it almost “natural” for the military to take over the government. From 1939 until 1973 (with a brief interregnum between from 1944 to 1947), a series of military dictators ruled the country either as personal dictators or within the broader political framework of institutionalized, direct military rule (Chai-anan 1995).

However, long-term processes of economic and social change, together with the rise of private business and party politics starting in the 1970’s, weakened the power of the ruling generals and bureaucrats. In the early 1980’s, this development led to the liberalization of the “bureaucratic polity” (Riggs 1966; Wyatt 1984). A “soft” authoritarian regime, overseen by the King emerged, which some Thai scholars described as “half democracy” in 1980. Gen. Prem Tinsulanond became unelected Prime Minister and Army Commander concurrently. From 1980 to 1988 Prem dominated the armed forces while a weakly-institutionalized, elected Lower House was permitted to exist. Political liberalization during the rule of Prime Minister General Prem (1981-1988) led to a short-lived democratic interregnum with an elected member of parliament (Gen. [ret.] Chatchai Chunhavan) as Prime Minister. During this time, the armed forces became increasingly suspicious of the new premier. Growing military perceptions of civilian interference in its domain eventually led to a coup of the army under Commander Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon in February 1991.
The coup of February 1991 brought authoritarianism back to Thailand and civilian control remained low through the March 1992 election until the downfall of the military-dominated government in May. The all-military National Peace-Keeping Commission coup group appointed civilian Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun and his Council of Ministers to administer the country while an appointed and unicameral National Legislative Assembly acted as parliament. In December 1991, a new constitution came into force. It allowed for a continuation of the military-dominated Senate, the possibility of a non-elected Prime Minister, and maintained the eligibility of active-duty military officers for public office in the Senate (Murray 1996, 13; Pasuk and Baker 2000, 357-8). The political prowess of the armed forces was further accentuated by military Class 5’s establishment of the Samakhitham Party to compete in the March 1992 parliamentary elections. (Murray 1996, 5)

The elections resulted in Army Commander Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon being elevated to the post of Prime Minister and it appeared certain that the military would further extend its power. However, mass civilian protests commenced in May 1992 aimed at forcing the military from power. As the armed forces sought to repress the demonstrations, soldiers killed numerous protestors and the king intervened to ease Suchinda out of office. The massacre—known as “Black May”—forced soldiers to withdraw, and to be content with behind-the-scenes influence (Chai-annan 1995). However, the military-dominated Senate remained in office though the Constitution was amended to accommodate the demands of the May uprising, a major one of which was that the PM must be an elected member of the Lower House. The “Angel” parties who had opposed the coup d’etat of 1991 won a narrow victory in the September 1992 election, and subsequently formed a coalition cabinet under the leadership of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai from the Democratic Party (DP). Even after transition to democracy in September 1992, however, the old bureaucratic elites were able to preserve significant political powers, particularly since the military defended its political and institutional autonomy as well as significant political prerogatives (Surarchart 1999).

From the period 1932 to 1992, at least four lasting legacies developed which had an enormous impact upon Thai civil-military relations in the post-1992 era (ibid.; Ockey 2001; Chambers 2010a; 2010b): (1) a tradition of a monarchy with deeply-ingrained power over Thai society and the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF); (2), a traditionally-authoritarian military subservient to the monarch which concentrated on internal security; (3) low internal cohesion and unity of the RTAF’s officer corps since at least the 1940s; (4) a very weak and intermittent history of civilian oversight over the military.

South Korea

In South Korea, the military’s influence had been decisive in shaping national politics from 1961 to 1988. The military intervened twice in order to supplant the sitting government. The first military coup was staged by a group of reformist middle ranking officers and graduates of the seventh to tenth class of the Korean Military Academy (KMA) under the leadership of Major General Park Chung-hee against the dysfunctional civilian government of Prime Minister Chang
Myon (Kim Insoo 2008, 106). The younger officers who planned and executed the coup were more of a “ruler type” military (Nordlinger 1977) and, thus, intended to stay in power indefinitely. Senior officers, who were involved at later stages of the coup, were “moderators” (ibid.) who wanted to return to the barracks as soon as possible (cf. Kim Y.M. 2004). After the 1961 coup, a military junta (“Supreme Council for National Reconstruction”, SCNR) governed the country for two years. However, Park’s political role form the start was so great that he reduced the likelihood of collegial rule. After the adoption of a new constitution in 1963 which institutionalized the new regime, Park retired from the military and ruled the country as a quasi-civilian president with the strong backing of the military.

Park’s increasingly repressive regime transformed the poverty-stricken country into one the fastest growing economies of the world. Simultaneously, under Park’s ideology of “Total Security” (chongryokanbo) the South Korean society was systematically organized into a kind of garrison state (Y.M. Kim 2004, 123). Measured in relation to the GNP and per cent of government spending, military expenditure was one of the highest in the world. Moreover, the male population was systematically integrated into the military defense system either by mandatory military service or by mandatory military training through the militia-like Civil Defense Corps and the Student Home Defense Corps. As a consequence, in the early 1980s almost 16 percent of the male population was member of the armed forces, either as uniformed soldiers or as part of the regular reserve force (Croissant 2004). At the same time, Park engaged the elite graduates of the military academies and the ROTC programs as junior government officers and placed them in strategic posts in the civilian administration and state enterprises (Moon and Rhyu 2011). By offering privileged access to career chances after active military service, the armed services became the single most important channel for upward status mobility in Korean society. In addition, retired generals were assigned ambassadorial posts in large numbers and filled the ranks of the Democratic Republican Party of President Park. The proportion of ex-general ministers was also substantial (see Table 3).

The second coup took place after Park was assassinated by his security chief in 1979. Major General Chun Doo Hwan, then Commander of the National Defense Security Command (NDSC) first staged a mutiny within the military in December 1979 and then seized political power in May 1980. As with the 1961 coup, the military group which led the 1979 coup was drawn from a small group of middle ranking officers and KMA graduates. Known as the “Hanahoe”(One Group) faction, this group had occupied key positions inside the security apparatus in the final stage of Park’s dictatorship. The coup-plotters formed a junta called “Special Committee for National Security Measures” (SCNSM) only to hand power over one year later to coup-leader Chun Doo-hwan. In contrast to Park Chung-hee, however, Chun did not establish personal control, but the Hanahoe officers who staged the 1980 coup exercised collective leadership (Y.M. Kim 2004:126). Finally, while active Hanahoe members occupied strategically important posts in key military units and military intelligence agencies, retired members were assigned to essential posts in the office of the president, the ruling party, and Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP). (Moon and Rhyu 2011)
As in 1963, the military tried to provide a minimum of stability in regime leadership through adopting a new constitution which, among other things, provided for indirect presidential elections after the end of President Chun’s single seven-years term in 1987. However, when President Chun announced his choice of Roh Tae-woo, a fellow KMA classmate and one of the Hanahoe generals who staged the 1980 coup with Chun, for the next president, major demonstrations took place throughout the country, bringing hundreds of thousands of protesters onto the streets of any major city including Seoul.

The Chun government deliberated declaring martial law, but was deterred by opposition from the US as well as resistance from within the military, namely non-Hanahoe middle-ranking officers, who made clear that they would not repress mass protests. (Kim Insoo 2008:50) Realizing, that the Hanahoe-controlled military government was in no position to mobilize troops against the demonstrators (Insoo Kim 2008, 161), Roh Tae-woo declared his plan for democratic reforms on June 29, 1987, paving the way for democratic reforms (Lee MW 1990). Negotiations between government and opposition brought sweeping political reforms including a new constitution and direct presidential elections. As it turned out, electoral victory went to Roh Tae-woo. Although he was democratically elected, many South Koreans, and especially the opposition, „considered his presidency a mere continuation of the old military regime because of his background, his involvement in the 1980 coup, and the military legacies (such as the Hanahoe) that he inherited from Chun” (Moon and Rhyu 2011).

Given the extent of militarization of politics, economy and society it is evident that the military had been the most powerful institution in South Korea since the 1960s. The military nature of the Park and Chun regimes is clear from their origins, although the Park regime had evolved into a more civilian form of authoritarianism in the 1970s. It is important, however, to note some important differences between the military regimes in South Korea and most militarized authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia and South America which reduced the capacity of the military regime to place extensive constraints on the successor regime.

1) The South Korea military was characterized by low internal cohesion and unity of its officer corp since the time of the establishment as the Korean Constabulary in 1945. Factionalism was one of the most important push-factors for the 1961 coup and the 1979/80 coup, respectively. With the passage of time with the passage of time, the nature of internal divisions changed but the South Korean military never united to pursue its corporate interests. (Insoo Kim 2008, 158-159) In the 1980s, the main cleavages evolved around conflicts between graduates from different classes of the KMA, especially between Hanahoe and non-Hanahoe officers(Clifford 1994, 138ff; Moon and Kang 1995, 173ff).

2) Although South Korea remained under militarized authoritarian rule for almost three decades, the military as institution was separate from the military as government. Both the military intervention of 1961 and 1979/80 were “factional coups” (Finer 1962) of small groups of officers against the incumbent government and their military superiors. The
military regimes were “non-hierarchical” (Linz and Stepan 1996), “quasi-civilian” (Finer 1962) and personal, “rather than direct and institutional” (Y.M. Kim 2004:121).

3) In the 1980s, the small military faction in power, Hanahoe, was isolated from the rest of the military’s officer corps. Hanahoe, which accounted for about 4.4% of all KMA graduates, had to prevent the disgruntled mass of military officers from revolting against them, as the majority of non-Hanahoe officers felt systematically excluded from military leadership positions. Hence, during the mass demonstrations against the Hanahoe-led military regime, most military officers “were given a clear motivation” to not support the government’s attempt to repress the push for democratization” (Kim Insoo 2008:14). This also meant that most military officer did not block attempts by democratically elected civilians in the 1990s, to remove Hanahoe from positions of power within the military (see below).

4). In order to control the military as institution and to prevent other factions from staging a coup, Park Chung-hee had created a number of military inspection institutions and placed the elite military units such as the Capital Defence Command, the Army Security Command and the Special Warfare Command („counter-coup units”) and military surveillance organizations and intelligence agencies under the command of loyal officers (Moon and Rhyu 2011).viii In the 1980s, the Hahanhoe faction capitalized on its ability to control these agencies by keeping their opposition within the military under permanent surveillance (Kim Insoo 2008: 62, 146). These institutions and instruments which were created by the military as government in order to control the military as institution, were utilized by democratically elected governments after 1988 to monitor and eventually depoliticize the armed forces (see Section 5)

5) Although the armed forces did fulfil several secondary roles in addition to its primary role (i.e., territorial defense against a Northern attack), unlike its peers in Thailand or Indonesia, the South Korean military relies solely on allocation of budget by the government, and, thus, it did not have any autonomy in institutional, financial and technological resources.

**Taiwan**

Finally, in Taiwan, the relationship between state and armed forces originally resembled the party-military relations in many communist countries. Founded in 1924 as the Nationalist Party’s (Guomindang) armed forces, the National Army played a crucial role in enforcing the political agenda of party leader Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland. However, following defeat by the Communist and the GMD’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the military was modernized and became the main instrument for enforcing party rule against the local Taiwanese population. During the Martial Law period from 1949 to 1987, the military played the major role in internal regime security (Kuehn 2008). This was reflected in a strong representation of military officers in civilian institutions of party and state, such as the party’s major decision-making bodies, the
public services and state-owned enterprises and, especially, the prevalence of military officers in the National Security Council (NSC) and the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) within the Ministry of National Defense (MNC), which was responsible for monitoring and uprooting the political opposition, border control, censorship, domestic intelligence-gathering, overseeing the local administration and judiciary, and coordinating the civilian police services (Tien 1989, 111). Though there were institutional mechanisms for party control in place such as the political commissar systems (i.e., the “Political Warfare Section”, cf. Moody 1992, 19-71), the army enjoyed broad autonomy in matters of national defense and internal security as defense related agencies such as the Ministry of National Defense (MND), the NSC, and the GMD’s Military Affairs Committee remained packed with active duty military officers (Kuehn 2008).

From the late 1960s on, however, the military power slowly declined. Although military and party institutions remained closely connected and the military retained its prerogatives over internal security, defense affairs and internal affairs, the following decades saw the steady decline of military power and the rise of civilian technocrats within the party. As a result of successful economic policies, the importance of coercion for upholding political stability decreased and hence the weight of the military as an instrument for regime security was reduced. At the same time, the extension of the Taiwanization of party and state into the military after the transition of power from Chiang Kai-shek to his son Chiang-kuo eased the internal cleavage between the Taiwanese islanders who felt excluded from regular promotion patterns and the minority of Chinese mainlanders who had long monopolized ascension into the military leadership positions (Kim Insoo 2008). Therefore, when President Chiang and his successor, native Taiwanese Lee Teng-Lee Teng-hui, initiated the transition to democracy in the late 1980s, the tradition of military subordination under the president and the party elite was robustly established. Throughout the gradual and carefully prepared transition, the military remained neutral and played no active role .

| Table 2. Summarizing initial conditions and institutional legacies in civil-military relations |
|-------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| **Origin of the authoritarian regime**          | Indonesia      | Philippines    | South Korea    | Taiwan         | Thailand       |
| Military Coup by senior officers               | Military Coup  | Civilian auto   | Factional      | Revolutionary  | Military Coup  |
|                                                | by senior      | golpe           | Military Coup  |                | by senior      |
| officers                                       | officers       |                |                |                | officers       |
| **Type of authoritarian regime**                | Civilized      | Civilianized   | Non-hierarchical | Civilianized  | Hierarchical  |
| military regime                                | military regime|               | military regime|               | military regime|
| **Transition substantially affected by military** |
| Yes                                             | Yes            | Yes             | No              | Yes            |
| **Substantial divisions in**                    | Yes            | Yes             | No              | Yes            |
Ultimately, these differences between regimes in their relations to their military establishments (strong military dominance in South Korea and Thailand, weaker in Indonesia and the least powerful in Taiwan and the Philippines) and the contrasts in the behavior of the armed forces during the transfer of power (least active in Taiwan, decisive in the Philippines), translated into different initial conditions and institutional legacies which strongly affected the course of civil-military relations in the post-transitional era. These factors influenced the leverage of civilian authorities over the military, constrained the menu of strategic actions from which both civilian and military elites were able to select their strategies when interacting with each other. However, as the following analysis will demonstrate, there is no simply correlation between historical factors, paths of transition and patterns of authoritarian civil-military relations on the one side and the outcomes of reforms in civil-military relations. Contrary to what many observers had predicted, South Korea and Indonesia turned out to be unexpected cases of success, while Thailand and the Philippines did not achieve the kind of progress in ensuring democratic civilian control, that seemed possible in the mid and late 1990s.

**Civilian Control in Post- Transitional East Asia**

In order to assess the degree of civilian control over the armed forces in the five countries reported on here, this section applies the conceptual framework developed in Section 2. For the sake of brevity we limit our analysis to the most relevant differences and similarities between the cases, focusing especially on those states occupying the extreme ends of the spectrum.ix

**Elite Recruitment and Public Policy**

In Taiwan, civilian dominance over these core areas of civilian control had already been established when democratization started in 1987. In spite of a strong representation of senior military officers in all major government and party structures, the armed forces had not constituted an alternative channel for political ascension nor was the military able to control political decision-making. During the early years of democratization, however, it seemed as if the armed forces’ political influence was increasing. Confronted with opposition from the conservative Mainlander faction in the KMT Central Committee, President Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000) decided to appease and co-opt the military, naming former Army general and long-term Chief of General Staff Hau Pei-tsung prime minister in 1990. Making Hau head of government did
not lead to any significant or lasting increase of military influence, though. First of all, Lee was able to do away with many of the military’s institutional means of influencing policy, for instance by reforming the National Security Council, a formerly military-dominated quasi-governmental agency which had the power to veto the budget bill, into a mere presidential advisory body (Lo 2001, 152-6; Swaine 1999, 15). Furthermore, Hau Pei-tsun retired in 1993, marking the end of even the last remnants of direct military influence on elite recruitment and public policy decision-making (Fravel 2002, 63-7). Both Lee and his successor, Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), strengthened the government’s position vis-à-vis the military by promoting professional soldiers and increasing the share of native Taiwanese in the military leadership. This proved an important asset in counterbalancing conservative elements in the officer corps, gradually reducing the military’s potential to oppose changes in public policy (Shambaugh 1996, 1292; Lee 2007, 210-21). Even in regard to foreign policy and the highly sensitive topic of relations with Mainland China, there is no empirical evidence whatsoever to suggest undue political involvement of or confrontation with the military. The litmus-test for civilian supremacy came in 2000, when Chen Shui-bian, a stout proponent of Taiwan independence and critic of the military was elected President. Following Chen’s election, then-Chief of General Staff Tang Yao-ming publicly pledged loyalty to the new President, emphasizing that the military respected the core principles of democracy (Hsueh 2003).

In South Korea, the transitional government of President Roh Tae-woo (1988-93), himself a Hanahoe member and former coup-plotter, refrained from seriously reforming civil-military relations (Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006, 252-4). After inauguration, Roh consolidated his authority over the military by a serious of changes in key positions (Y.M. Kim 2004, 128), while Hanahoe continued to receive preferential treatment in promotion compared to non-Hanahoe officers. While this approach helped to shield the fragile democracy from possible military adventurism, it did nothing to strengthen civilian control.

In contrast to his predecessor, President Kim Young-sam (1993-98) paid high attention to civil-military relations from the very beginning of his presidential term. The transition from Roh to Kim was accompanied by a large-scale circulation of military posts, which allowed previously marginalized officers to ascend to positions of military leadership. (Kim Insoo 2008, 21). Relying on a network of loyal military supporters who mainly came from his native Pusan and South Kyongsang region, Kim capitalized on existing regional sentiments in the armed forces to neutralize military opposition and strengthen his own position (Jun 2001, 131). In addition, Hanahoe was further weakened when Kim’s administration purged senior members from the officer corps and transferred all mid-ranking officers belonging to the faction to units along the Military Demarcation Lines, „far away from their previous posts near Seoul“ (Kim Insoo 2008, 74). The once powerful faction was ultimately marginalized when Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo together with thirteen other generals were put on trial in 1996 (Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006, 151). Accompanying these moves of depoliticization, military representation in cabinet, National Assembly and state enterprises was significantly reduced (see Table 3).
Table 3. Military representation in cabinet, national Assembly and state enterprises in South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recruitment Ratio of Retired Military Officers in the Cabinet (%)</th>
<th>Recruitment Ratio of Retired Military Officers as Executives of State Enterprises (%)</th>
<th>Ratio of Retired Military Officers in the ROK National Assembly (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rhee Syngman (1948-1960)</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Myon (1960-1961)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Government (1961-1963)</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park Chung-hee (1963-1979)</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993)</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Young-sam (1993-1998)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Dae-jung (1998-2002)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Croissant 2004; Moon and Rhyu 2011.

However, even after the neutralization of Hanahoe and the significant reduction of military influence over the political center, concerns remained regarding the conditional loyalty of the officer corps to the democratically elected government. Thus, as with Taiwan, the election of former dissident Kim Dae-jung as President (1998-2002) was widely seen as the event marking the consolidation of civilian dominance over the political center. Not only did the military abstain from interfering with Kim’s election, they also acquiesced to the new Presidents “Sunshine Policy” of taking a more conciliatory stance towards North Korea (Saxer 2004, 386).

In the Southeast Asian nations, the results of reforms in these two areas of civilian control have been mixed. In Indonesia, abolishing military representation in parliament (DPR, MDPR), and especially in subnational administrative positions such as governor posts, and revoking the military’s dual function doctrine (dwifungsi) that justified the military’s role in politics were key demands of the democracy movement. Once the power struggle between the regime and the democratization movement was decided in favor of the later, the military leadership overall remained neutral throughout the transfer of power, and its leaders repeatedly stressed that they had no desire to interfere in the democratization process. Under pressure from pro-democracy groups, political parties, the media and “reform-minded” ABRI officers, the military leadership officially replaced dwifungsi in 1999 (Said 2006). The so-called “New Paradigm” stipulated the formal separation of the police from the military, the suspension of Kekaryaan (the practice of promoting active-duty military personnel to non-military posts), a reduction (and, in the end, abolition) of representation of the armed forces in the national legislature, as well as the promise
that soldiers would honor the principle of political neutrality (Rabasa and Haseman 2002, 25-31). Furthermore, in a highly symbolic act, ABRI was renamed Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), which had been the name given to the Indonesian armed forces during the war for independence from Dutch colonialism.

Today, active-duty officers no longer hold political positions or staff the central government’s bureaucracy. Reserved military representation in parliament was abolished in 2004, and active military officers are not allowed to serve as cabinet ministers since 1999. While retired officers accounted for a significant part of the first two democratic cabinets (16% under Wahid and 12% under Megawati), this percentage has also dwindled down to about 6 per cent under President Yudhyono (Voelkel and Chambers 2010). In addition, since democratization in 1999, all ministers of defense have been civilians. The Ministry of Home Affairs and the State Intelligence Agency were also turned over to the civilians in 2009 (Mietzner 2011). Most important, because it previously was a TNI-stronghold, even the number of retired military personnel in local government dropped from 80 per cent in the early 1970s to below 10 percent in 2010 (ibid.).

Table 4. Military representation in the legislature (DPR), cabinet and governor posts in Indonesia (1967-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recruitment Ratio of (ret.) Military Officers in the Cabinet (%)</th>
<th>Recruitment Ratio of Military Officers as Governor (%)</th>
<th>Ratio of (ret.) Military Officers in the DPR (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967-1999</td>
<td>31.3(^a)</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>17.3(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2004</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2014</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Voelkel 2011; Sebastian and Isingdarsh, unpublished draft.


However, military influence in local and provincial elections has been pronounced. Since former soldiers have been less successful as candidates in recent elections (Mietzner 2009, 347), the military now instead gives local commanders the autonomy to choose candidates to support (Honna 2006, 95). Moreover, while military influence in policy-making at the national level seems to be marginal, military commanders often participate in decision-making at the local levels (ibid: 83) and pull funding that would otherwise be available for civilian purposes (Jansen 2008, 446). This growing influence on local politics as an (unintended) result of decentralization in the early 2000s also undermines effective abolition of dwifungsi (Voelkel and Chambers 2010). Other remaining problems include the unfinished reforms of the territorial command structure and the thorny issue military businesses and off-budget funding of military units (for more detail, see Mietzner 2011; Mietzner and Misol 2012).

In the Philippines, the demise of the Marcos regime in February 1986—facilitated by intramilitary conflicts and the military’s refusal to use coercion over protests—set the state for
contestation between radicalized military factions and civilian elites. From 1986 to 1989, members of RAM attempted to seize power in a series of seven unsuccessful military coups. After coming into office, President Corazon Aquino made bold moves to change the direction of Philippine politics, retiring “overstaying generals”, signing cease-fires with the communist insurgents and the Moro National Liberation Front, harboring “leftist” advisers in the presidential office, and establishing a human right commission to investigate and publicize military abuses (Selochan 1998). These policies triggered the series of abortive coups, mutinies and military revolts in the first three years of the new administration. The last coup attempt of December 1989 almost succeeded if it had not been for the intervention of the U.S. It was only when a large-scale replacement of military leadership brought the AFP under control of Fidel Ramos, Chief of Staff under Aquino, and after President Aquino abandoned most of her reformist policies that the rouge elements within AFP could be neutralized (Hedman 2001; Kim Insoo 2008, 28).

Aquino’s successor, Fidel Ramos (1992-98), was more successful. As a former senior military officer, Ramos managed to maintain the support of most of the AFP officer corps. In order to prevent other coups, he promoted loyal officers to key military command positions and retired military officers to important posts in the national bureaucracy, the government and two of the state’s most profitable cash cows (Gloria 2003; PCIJ 2011). This, however, had an ambiguous impact on the dynamics of civil-military relations. On the one hand, co-opting the “Ramos Boys” and encouraging military officers to run in elections, strengthened the President’s personal authority and reduced the military’s disposition to intervene (Hutchcroft 2000, 243). On the other hand, it increased the AFP’s influence on policy-making and elite recruitment. Furthermore, it set the example for all following governments, who continued to appoint supporters to key military commands and co-opted powerful military leaders into high government positions in their efforts to protect the civilian administration against coup threats (Gloria 2003, 28-9).

While seemingly successful in the short run, this approach had the opposite effect in the long run, perpetuating and increasing the politicization of the officer corps and promoting political activism by the military. This was clearly demonstrated in 2001 when AFP senior commanders voiced their support for Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and joined a popular uprising against President Joseph Estrada. Estrada’s fall symbolizes the military’s rise to a power moderator in Philippine politics. It is, thus, not surprising that the Arroyo government (2001-2010) had been repeatedly battered by military adventurism (Hutchcroft 2008). In order to keep the military’s loyalty, Arroyo had to court military favor, playing the rank and file with subsidized housing, increasing benefits and pay rises. Distributing promotions and employing a “revolving door” policy in appointing generals to the Chief of Staff position (with a total of five Chiefs in only 30 months time), she surrounded herself with favored high commanders. During the Arroyo administration, the practice of appointing scores of retired military officers to the country’s strategic executive offices and civilian bureaucracy, which started under the Ramos administration (1992-98), became endemic (Gloria 2003; Hernandez and Kraft 2010). The cooptation of military officers into government posts greatly strengthened “the influence and participation of the military in running the country’s state affairs” (Gloria 2003, 33). This, in turn,
has led to the expansion of military roles which enabled soldiers to assume civilian functions and exert considerable informal control over national and local administrations (Brillo 2007).

In contrast to the Philippines, where civil-military relations had worsened during the transition to democracy, developments in the first decade after democratization in 1992 actually seemed to indicate a significant decline of the Royal Thai Armed Forces’ dominant political role (Surachart 2001:77). For instance, after 1992, the participation of active duty officers in the cabinet was put to an end and the representation of military officers in the Senate was greatly reduced (see Figure 3). Furthermore, the military’s prerogatives in foreign policy issues were reduced and civilian authority over most other policy fields improved. With the adoption of a new constitution in 1997, the civilianization of the parliamentary system seemed to have made considerable progress. In fact, under the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006), it seemed that the military’s political power over elite recruitment and policy-making was finally contained (Croissant, Voelkel and Chambers 2011).

**Figure 3. Ratio of military representation in Senate and cabinet in Thailand (1932-2010)**

*Note: 1st to 23th Senate during the period 1932-1991; 24th to 27th Senate is period 1992-2006; 28th and 29th Senate is 2007-2010. 1st to 27th cabinet is 1932-1992 (August); 28th to 34th cabinet is September 1992 to 2005; 35th to 38th cabinet is 2006-2010. Numbers include retired and uniformed military and police officers. Source: Chambers 2010a.*

The 2006 coup reversed this trend. Following the military-appointed interim government of retired General Surayud (2006-7), Thailand returned to civilian government. But under a democratic façade, the military continues its strong influence on government formation and policy-making. Clearly, the military still expects to have the “right” to intervene in any of the government’s policy decisions, whenever it believes it necessary for its own benefits or to defend nation or monarchy. Military leaders helped to bring down a pro-Thaksin government in 2008, and cobbled together another multiparty coalition under Prime Minister Abhisit (2008-2011).
Moreover, the number of soldier-Senators also ascended again—from two percent in 2000 to 15.3 percent in 2008 (Chambers 2010: 58-64). Even the newly elected pro-Thaksin government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (since July 2011) needed to put a military man, General Yuttasak Sasiprapa, in charge of the Ministry of Defense.

**Internal security**

The post-authoritarian developments in this area of civil-military relations are diverse. In Korea and Taiwan, democratically elected governments have been largely successful in eliminating the military’s internal security functions but in Thailand and the Philippines, civilians failed, while Indonesia is located somewhere between the states occupying the extreme ends of the spectrum.

In Taiwan’s martial law era (1949-87) and South Korea’s military-authoritarian regime, the military was responsible for organizing and coordinating internal security agencies. The Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) had been in charge of media censorship, border control and immigration, and had supervised the civilian police force and the local judicial system (Tien 1989:207-10). Immediately after Martial Law had been lifted (1987), military jurisdiction over civilians was abolished. In 1992, the Taiwan Garrison Command was dissolved and its duties were transferred to civilian agencies. The civilian police took over the Command’s law-enforcement agencies, customs and immigration control were transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, and the ministry-level Government Information Office and the Ministry of Transport and Communication were assigned with censorship and media regulation (Hung, Mo, and Tuan 2003:187-8).

In Korea, the military Defense Security Command (DSC) and the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) had been assigned to monitor and control both military and civil organizations including political parties, students, labor unions, and NGOs (Jun 2001:136-9). After transition to democracy, President Roh Tae-woo replaced the DSC leadership and renamed it the Military Security Command (MSC) in an effort to distance himself from his former role as head of that agency. Both the DSC/MSC and the ANSP withdrew its members from the National Assembly in 1988. A year later, the rank of MSC commander was downgraded from three-star to two-star general, the agency was significantly downsized; and MSC’s civilian surveillance bureau was finally abolished (Moon and Kang 1995:185-6; Moon and Rhyu 2011). Subsequent administrations completed the separation of the military from internal security and domestic intelligence (Saxer 2004: 391). Finally, under Presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) the ANSP was put under civilian directorate.

Confronted by numerous insurgencies, Southeast Asian armies have always enjoyed extensive roles in providing internal security. For example, in the authoritarian era, Indonesia’s President Suharto had routinely relied on the army to control political parties, trade unions, students, religious leaders and newspapers (Rabasa and Haseman 2002: 35-8). In addition, the military had been the primary provider of domestic intelligence and approximately two-thirds of the army’s battalions had been spread out into smaller units throughout the entire country to maintain public order (Wandelt 2007). In the Philippines, the armed forces had been involved in domestic
security operations since independence in 1946, fighting local criminals, Huk rebels, Moro insurgents, and communist guerrillas in the countryside. Furthermore, in the early 1970s the AFP had played a critical role in executing martial law and later in keeping President Marcos in power (de Castro 2005). Similarly, Thailand’s armed forces had run counter-insurgency operations against the communists in the 1960s and 1970s and, more recently, against Muslim insurgents in the nation’s three southernmost provinces.

Given these legacies of military involvement in counter-insurgency and persisting problems with ethno-religious separatism and political extremism, it is unsurprising that military officers have been reluctant to give up their involvement in internal security even after transition to democratic rule. In recent years, however, TNI has lost much of its extensively defined internal security role (Mietzner 2011) The Indonesian National Police (INP) was separated from the military organization in 1999. Since then, the police is responsible for internal security, although “grey zones” remain, where roles are poorly defined. (Wandelt 2007; Pohlman 2010) In addition, Bakorstanas, the domestic security agency of the New Order regime coordinated by the military has been disbanded (ibid.).

In Thailand, immediately following the end of the military regime in May 1992, the Army was stripped of its command over the Capital Security Command, a constabulary military unit assigned with the restoration of public order in times of national emergency (Murray 1996: 190-1). However, during Thaksin’s term of office, the military’s internal security role again expanded considerably. For instance, the army was called upon to deal with protests in rural areas and played a pivotal role in the “war on drugs” in 2003.

Under the post-2006 political order, maintaining internal security and protecting state, nation and monarchy from internal threats clearly is the exclusive domain of the military. The new Internal Security Act (ISA) greatly strengthened military leverage vis-à-vis other civilian actors and, simultaneously, weakened parliamentary control (Chambers 2010, 66-73). The junta, the so called “Council for Democratic Reform”, created a number of special operation units tasked with quelling political protest. In addition, it re-established army control of the ISOC (Internal Security Operations Command).The military’s heightened control over ISOC has given soldiers the power to obstruct political opposition, which they did during the “Red Shirt” demonstrations in 2009 and 2010. The military also exercises extensive control over the media, with 245 of the countries approx. 500 radio stations in their hand and “one o the harshest” internet crime laws in the world, enacted by the military-appointed Surayud government (Pasuk and Baker 2009, 309-310). Moreover, the revised Internal Security Act of 2007 empowers the military to arrest and detain citizens without a judicial warrant and soldiers acting under the ISA are exempt from the prosecution of human rights abuses. The letter of ISA, however, can be invoked without necessitating the declaration of a state of emergency (Human Rights Watch 2007).

In the Philippines, President Corazon Aquino attempted to improve civilian oversight of the military’s intelligence and constabulary functions. On paper, the new government introduced important reforms such as the establishment of a Human Rights Commission, the separation of
politics and armed forces and new monitoring powers for Congress (Hernandez 2007, 86-7). Moreover, the intelligence services were restructured and responsibility to oversee the activities of the National Intelligence and Security Authority was transferred to the President’s national security advisor.

Nevertheless, major problems persisted. One of the thorniest issues was the precise division of labor between the police and the military as 95 per cent of the civilian police manpower consisted of transferred former PC personnel (Teodosio 1997, 31). Moreover, the political elite seemed oblivious to the possibility that continuous military deployment in internal security operations could make officers less amenable to civilian control. With the revival of a renewed Communist insurgency in the 2000s (Santos 2010) and the Philippines’ contribution to the “War on Terror” in Mindanao and elsewhere has led to an expansion of military prerogatives in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism without adequate civilian surveillance and parliamentary oversight (Hernandez 2002, 41; Cruz de Castro 2005, 17-8; Robles 2008). Despite repeated allegations from national and international organizations regarding extra-judicial killings of left-wing political activists and the targeting of civil society groups under the pretext of fighting communist front organizations, such military behavior appears to continue with impunity (Hernandez 2007, 87; Hernandez and Kraft, 2010, 126-129). Many incidents presumably involved members of armed auxiliary groups under command of the AFP and the Police, such as CAFGU and CVOs (Melo Report 2007; Kraft 2010.xi

National Defense and Military Organization

During the authoritarian era, defense policy-making and military organization were exclusive domains of the armed forces in Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand. In Taiwan and the Philippines, military autonomy had been more limited because of the pre-eminent political role of civilian Presidents Chiang Ching-kuo and Ferdinand Marcos (Miranda 1992: 11; Swaine and Mulvenon 2001). However, even in these countries, civilian influence in external defense issues had been rather ad hoc and unsystematic and lacking institutionalization. Given these traditions it comes as no surprise that post-authoritarian governments throughout the region found it equally difficult to establish full authority over national defense affairs.

In Taiwan, the institutionalization of civilian control in these areas was not accomplished until 2002, when the National Defense Act and the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense came into effect (Swaine 1999; Lo 2001). In this under-institutionalized civil-military environment, the top brass was able to repeatedly prevail in conflicts of interest with President Lee Teng-hui, for instance actively thwarting attempts for military reform and preventing the civilianization of the defense ministry. To be sure, following high profile procurement scandals in the early 1990s, some advances were made in enhancing legislative oversight of military affairs, e.g., increasing the transparency of the procurement processes and reducing the classified segment of the defense budget. Despite such progress, however, civilian governments have found themselves unable to significantly increase their say in military affairs until the two defense laws were implemented (Kuehn 2008, 875-6). Following this legislation, the number of civilians in the
defense ministry was increased, the command structures were reorganized, and defense policy-making was made more accountable (Chase 2008). With Today, in spite of the military still enjoying considerable clout in defense policy-making and the defense ministry remaining under the leadership of a retired general, the military is neither able to single-handedly dominate defense policy nor bypass oversight and direction by the President and the parliament (Stokes 2006).

In South Korea, reforms were equally cumbersome. The Roh administration failed to implement military reforms beyond a limited opening of defense spending for legislative oversight in 1991 (Croissant 2004, 371). Hence, defense policy remained a domain of active and retired military officers until President Kim Young-sam’s strong-handed policies enforced the reduction of military autonomy. For example, in 1993, his administration investigated a series of large-sum procurement scandals as well as corruption cases involving a number of high ranking officers. This not only put military issues under heightened public scrutiny but also set the precedent for more transparency and improved civilian oversight (Saxer 2004:394). Kim also restructured the defense bureaucracy and strengthened the defense ministry vis-à-vis the general staff (Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006:255). Building on these achievements, President Kim Dae-jung took another important step in expanding civilian control of external defense affairs when he installed the civilian-dominated National Security Council (NSC) as a presidential advisory body regarding security policy-making and coordination (Jun 2001:134).

When Roh Moo-hyn (2003-2008) was elected president, he could build on these reforms to realize his far-reaching ideas for defense and military reform. The NSC ultimately became the primary defense decision-making agency with the effect of reducing the role of the military and even the civilian defense bureaucracy to one of “bystanders when it comes to real influence in defense policy-making” (Bechtol 2005: 625). Furthermore, the new president had the reform of the personal management system and the military education at the top of his priority list. Beginning in 2005 his administration introduced fresh programs such as military politica education, higher education for officers at civilian institutions and international training programs, and the reorganization of leadership principles in order to strengthen the acceptance of democratic civilian control” (Kim K. 2009:158). Moreover, Roh continued a new style of personal management and military promotions introduced by President Kim Dae-jung, that was not based of favoritism or nepotism—as Park, Chun, Ro Tae-woo and, to some extent, Kim Young-sam did—but based on institutionalizing general rules and procedures which opened career chances for military officers. Promotion criteria shifted from seniority rule which had generally favored nepotism and favoritism to merit-based promotion system initiated by Kim Dae-jung, which further strengthened the acceptance of democratic civilian control among military officers (Moon and Rhyu 2011).

In comparison to Taiwan and South Korea, civilians in Thailand achieved little substantial progress in curtailing military autonomy or enforcing their authority over national defense policy. Even before the military coup of 2006, civilians had almost no influence in defense policy-making, leaving all national defense issues to the military. With regard to military organization,
the armed forces successfully shielded institutional autonomies from civilian influence and actively defied civilian incentives to military reform. When Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai in 1997 became the first civilian defense minister in 20 years, he was unable to implement most military reforms in the way they were intended. For instance, plans to improve military efficiency and civilian oversight by reforming military promotion procedures, reorganizing the command structure, and cutting the vast number of generals without duties were blocked by military veto. Only in instances in which civilian incentives for defense reform corresponded with the military’s own goals, e.g. in reducing troop strength, could civilians hope to realize their plans (Ockey 2001: 198-203). Hence, at no time in the democratic period, were civilians ever able to effectively steer military issues, such as the defense budget, weapons acquisition programs, arms deployment policy, force structure, and education and training. After Thaksin became Prime Minister in February 2001, any efforts in extending civilian influence over external defense affairs ended. In his attempt to secure military support, Thaksin gave the armed forces free hand to self-manage its internal affairs and summarily approved procurement plans and a high increase in defense spending (McCargo and Ukrist 2005:151-7).

The 2006 coup, unsurprisingly did not contribute to improved civilian authority over military organization and defense policy. Rather, soldiers have informally pressured civilian governments to augment military budgets and the military regained control over promotions and personal management (Chambers 2010: 76-82). Also, the civilianized National Security Council under the Prime Minister is paralleled by a military dominated Defense Council in the Ministry of Defense, thereby creating institutional redundancies that undermine civilian control (ibid.: 73-76). Though the prime minister technically controls the annual appointments of senior military officers, actually using these nominal powers would run the risk of triggering a military coup d’état (Chambers 2010b).

As in Taiwan and South Korea, extending civilian leverage over military affairs has been the hardest part of civil-military reforms in Indonesia. Nevertheless, some progress had been made in enhancing civilian influence and increasing transparency. For instance, Presidents Wahid and Megawati appointed the first civilian defense ministers since the 1950s and the defense ministry for the first time outlined an official security threat assessment in its 2003 publication of a Defense White Paper. Other than this, however, the Wahid and Megawati governments failed to achieve substantial progress (BICC 2006, 2-4). Day-to-day oversight by the defense ministry remained ineffective due to the lack of needed resources, institutions and expertise (Wandelt 2007, 269). Moreover, Wahid consistently intervened in the promotion process to favor “reformist” generals. These moves, however, tended to arouse resistance rather than broad military support for defense reform and ultimately led to the army’s backing of Wahid’s impeachment. Megawati, who came into office as a result of this impeachment, was thus indebted to the army leadership and within the next twelve months had effectively abandoned almost all previous reforms (Malley 2008). Any effort toward increasing civilian influence over the military, however, has been challenged by the practice of military off-budget founding that has not changed much since the transition to democracy in 1999. It is believed that the military receives
no more than one-third of its funds from the national budget (Soesastro 2003). The lion’s share of its funds come from various revenue-generating activities such as legitimate military-owned businesses, collaboration with private businesses, but also involvement in illicit activities. This poses significant restraints on the ability of the civilian government to effectively control the military as it is impossible to know who in the TNI gets what, how much, from whom and what for (Sukadis and Hendra 2005). Though in September 2004, Parliament did pass a law on the TNI that included several provisions related to military financing and prohibited military business activities, a “government initiative to take over military businesses (which culminated in the signing of a presidential degree on the issue in 2009) proved ineffective as it excluded foundations and cooperatives, which make up the large bulk of TNI’s assets. In the same vein, the government did little to tackle the problem of TNI’s involvement in moonlighting and outright illegal activities” (Mietzner 2011). Related to this, the government also failed to increase the legal accountability of officers and soldiers for their actions, both on and off duty (ibid; for detail see Human Rights Watch 2006).

Historically, national defense had never been a top priority for policy-makers in the Philippines. Given the comprehensive defense agreement with the United States and the military’s focus on internal security, civilians had no incentives to build the institutional framework to formulate defense policies and to control the military’s internal organization (Selochan 1998, 62-4). Furthermore, Marcos had abolished all formerly existing institutions and oversight instruments, leaving his personal influence as the only civilian means to control defense and military policy (Hedman 2001, 172-80).

The 1987 constitution laid a solid foundation for increasing civilian participation in defense issues, entitling the President to be commander-in-chief of the AFP, and conferring to Congress the powers to appoint high ranking officers, to decide on the defense budget and to investigate military affairs (Hernandez 2002: 33-4). In addition, following the recommendations made by the presidential commission (“Feliciano Commission”) for the investigation of the 2003 Oakwood mutiny, in which a group of 300 officers had occupied a mall and hotel complex in Makati city to protest against the allegedly corruption Arroyo government, the administration took some cosmetic steps to initiate reforms in the security sector. For, example, President Arroyo appointed a civilian Secretary of Defense and a full-time security advisor (Hernandez 2005, 4).

However, a closer look suggests that these institutional changes have not significantly increased civilian influence in defense decision-making and military affairs, allowing only a very superficial and crude form of control. Indeed, the military still dominates all defense-related agencies, including genuinely civilian bodies. Lacking civilian experts, former military officers make up the bulk of the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency personnel (Hernandez 2002, 43). Therefore, thus far, all major programs for military reform and modernization have been designed by the military, with Congress deciding on these plans and the military pushing for approval. This pattern of civil-military relations not only prevents the development of stable and institutionalized defense
decision-making, but also impedes constructive cooperation between civilians and the military leadership, resulting in frustration and possible civil-military conflict (Cruz de Castro 2005).

It is important to note, however, that neither the failure of the “AFP Modernization Program” (passed by Congress in 1997) nor the missed opportunity to implement deep-reaching reforms recommended by the Feliciano Commission was the result of military resistance against civilian intrusion into the AFP’s internal affairs. Rather, the “problem” was one the civilian side (de Castro 2011) since Congress has successfully asserted itself against military demands for higher defense budgets and force modernization (de Castro 2005, 7-11; de Castro 2011). Even though there is broad consensus among civilians in the Philippines about the need to professionalize the AFP. Among other things, this entails an end to arbitrary military appointments and promotion which, since 1935, is based on the principle of seniority, the militarization of the machinery of the state, corruption and to interference in military matters based on political considerations. But professionalization would also enhance the autonomy of the military and, if politically unchecked, could increase its tendency to intervene in the affairs of the state. Hence, elected politicians in the legislative and executive branches of government since 1986 have been unwilling to qualitatively reduce their connections with and reliance on the military establishment.

The following Table 5 summarizes the results of this section. It illustrates the specific balance between the strength and bargaining power of civilian political institutions on the one side, and the political strength of the military on the other in the five different decision-making areas A to E as of December 2010. It reveals that civilian control in East Asia is a complex phenomenon that defies rash generalizations. While democratization has brought major changes to civil-military relations in all five cases, only in Taiwan and South Korea have civilians succeeded in firmly enforcing their control over all five decision-making areas in civil-military relations. In both countries, the chances for the military’s reintervention in politics appear to have become more remote than in most other third-wave democracies outside of Europe.

In contrast, in Indonesia and, especially, in the Philippines and Thailand, the military has shown itself more resilient in guarding its prerogatives in the post-authoritarian era. However, what Indonesia has achieved in the past thirteen years was more than Indonesia could hope for when it embarked on an uncertain democratic transition in 1998. Although some major problems remain, especially the need to dismantle the military’s territorial command structure; and to place TNI’s involvement in the economy under civilian oversight, civilian control over the military is currently stable. While the reform of civil-military relations is far from complete, it is generally believed that the chance and possibility for Indonesia’s military to once again re-establish its role as the most powerful institution has become increasingly slim.

Philippine civil-military relations have, since 1986, permitted formal civilian control over all five decision-making areas. Informally, however, soldiers have successfully kept their influence over internal security and military internal affairs, and even expanded their roles into elite recruitment and national defense. Thailand, however, is a clear case of failed civilian control. The democratic façade of the post-2007 parliamentary system notwithstanding, civilian governments...
are unable to exert a substantial degree of control over the military. Many observers – Thai and international alike – agree that de facto, the military can exert a veto on every political decision (see Chambers 2010a, 2010b; Freedom House 2011, Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2012).

### Table 5. Assessment of the Balance Between the Decision-Making Power of Civilian Authorities And the Military (as of 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>S. Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) Elite recruitment</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Public policy</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Internal security</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) National defense</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
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<tr>
<td>(E) Military organization</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Notes: R = Military dominates decision-making power in this area
  Y = Significant limits on civilian decision-making, but military does not dominate
  G = Civilians dominate decision-making power in this area

### What creates civilian control?

What account for differences in civil-military relations and the status of civilian control after the transition to democracy? Why did civilians succeed in enforcing their supremacy over the military in South Korea, Taiwan and—to some extent—in Indonesia while the failed in Thailand and the Philippines? From a comparative perspective, this is the substantial core problem for civil-military relations in general. However, scholars have extensively written about this question, there is substantial disagreement for what actually creates stable and institutionalized civilian control. In the “old” (Forster 2002) theoretical thinking about civil-military relations, Samuel Huntington’s theory of civilian control, outlined in The Soldier and the State (1957) was long considered as the „dominant theoretical paradigm“ (Feaver 2003, 7; see also Cohen 2002, 1). However, several scholars have recognized major problems with Huntington’s theory of military professionalism.xii As a reaction to this, some scholars have developed new and innovative theoretical approaches for the study of civil-military relations and civilian control of the military (mostly) in new democracies (for an overview see Croissant et al. 2011b; Bruneau and Matei 2012) As Kuehn and Voelkel (2011) note, most of these theoretical frameworks can be grouped into one of two categories:
1) Theories belonging to the first category focus on the ‘environment’ of civil-military relation. They argue that it is mainly a single—or a combination of—structural or ‘environmental’ factors on which civilian control ultimately depends. Those are either the political values and norms of either the armed forces itself or the broader society as such (cf. Stepan 1988, Fitch 1998, Loveman 1999, Mares 1998), structures of the internal or international threat environment into which civil-military relations are embedded (Desch 1999), structural conditions such as the level of socioeconomic development and the levels of political mobilization and institutionalization of a given society (Alagappa 2001), or the institutional legacies of the authoritarian regime and the path to transition or the institutional setup of the state (Agüero 1995; Pion-Berlin 1997).

2) The approaches in the second category do not refer to structural factors but they explain military retreat to the barracks and the subsequent emergence or failure of civilian control as the outcome of strategic interactions between civilian and military actors (for example, Hunter, 1997, Geddes 1999, Lee 2009).

Obvious, the difference between the two categories is the relative importance scholars attach to ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ in constructing their explanations (Kuehn and Voelkel 2011). Theories belonging to the first category confront the problem that environmental variables—macro-social and macro-political factors, institutions as man-made “lower order structures’ (Easton 1990) or ideational factors—doubtlessly affect civil-military relations, but they only become relevant through the concrete actions of civilian political actors and military leaders. In other words: there is no direct causal connection between structures, ideas or institutions and the establishment or failure of civilian control. At the same time, ‘agency’ does not happen in vacuum, but is influenced at least to some degree by ‘structure,’ that is a more or less large collection of more or less stable environmental factors—be they the human-made results of prior agency, such as the institutional legacies of the authoritarian regime, or the ‘material’ surroundings in which the interaction between civilians and the military take place, such as the international system. Theoretical frameworks in the second category, however, almost completely neglect the environment or structural contexts.

The challenge, then, is to integrate ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ into a coherent framework (ibid; see also Pion-Berlin 2011). This paper cannot discuss the various methodological and theoretical questions related to this debate and how the civil-military relations literature uptill now has dealt with it. To align structure and agency, Croissant et al. (2011) have suggested to understand civilian control over the military in new democracies (or, for that matter, the lack thereof) as the outcome of a complex interplay between structural factors and contingent human agency. Building on insights from Harold Trinkunas (2005), they focus on the political entrepreneurship and strategic actions of civilians: the crafting of civilian control of the military ultimately depends on the ability of civilians to “break” existing patterns of civil-military relations and to introduce new institutions which ensure the supremacy of civilians in political decision-
making. These strategies aim at coopting, recruiting, appeasing or intimidating military officers into supporting the enforcement and institutionalization of civilian control (see also Trinkunas 2005, 10).

However, civil-military interaction does not take place in a historical vacuum (Bacevich 1998: 452). While it is the conduct of political actors which explains the extent to which civilians succeed in institutionalizing civilian control, it is the environmental context presents the resources and opportunities to actors (Hay 2002, 65-6). In order for civilians to be able to successfully implement specific strategies of control over the military, they must have sufficient resources. Therefore, actors will have to take into consideration the environment in which their strategy is to be realized as the actual choice and its outcome depends on the resources at the actor’s disposal. Civilian politicians can develop different strategies to tame the military within a given context, with each strategy requiring different resources for its implementation. Context themselves are „strategically selective“, meaning that they will favor certain strategies over others. At the same time, politicians can develop different control strategies within similar contexts and structural environments.

Following Trinkunas‘ argument, Croissant et al. (2011b) assume that the success or failure of civilian control depends to a large extent upon the political skills of civilians: although the outcome is strategically selected for, it is by no means inevitable and unintended consequences may be frequent. While we observe systematically structured outcomes, what Padgett and Ansell (1993) call “flexible opportunism” and what Adam Sheingate (2003) labels “political entrepreneurship” is crucial.

Based on their approach, this paper argues that both structural and agential factors loom high in the evolution of post-transitional civil military relations in all five countries reported on here. While Croissant et al. (2011) have discussed the relationship between several structural factors and the strategy choices of civilians, akin, how structure and agency align, they refrained from any specific hypothesis on which particular variables precisely relate to choices and their outcomes because, as they argued, how factors matter depends, among other things, on the perception of actors, their skillfulness, political will, preferences, and adaptability. Moreover, different factors interact, one moment reinforcing each other, the next moment cancelling out their effects. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of civil-military relations in East Asia suggest that at least three sets of variables deserve closer scrutiny (see also Croissant and Kuehn 2009; Mietzner 2011; Voelkel 2011; Moon and Rhyu 2011; Kuehn 2008; 2011)

First, institutional legacies of the authoritarian era and the mode of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy also seem to matter for the success or failure of crafting civilian control (Agüero 1995; Beeson 2008). From this perspective, Taiwan stands out as the country that had inherited a relatively strong degree of civilian authority over the military already before transition started. Other Asian countries have not been so fortunate. The militaries in Korea and Thailand possessed strong traditions of political interventionism which were deeply inscribed into the officer corps’ worldview. Furthermore, in the Philippines, the mode of transition facilitated the pathologies that resulted from the de-institutionalization of civil-military relations.
during the Marcos regime. Similarly, the specific modes of transitions to democracy in Indonesia and Thailand left many features of military supremacy untouched. However, legacies of authoritarian rule do not predetermine the post-transitional patterns of civil-military relations, but are rather “filtered” through the specific path to democracy (Agüero 1995, 28-30), as is demonstrated by the trajectory of civil-military relations in South Korea and Indonesia.

Another factor that seems to be of importance for the development of civil-military relations in East Asia is the threat environments. The course of civil-military relations in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines gives credence to the argument “that challenging internal threat environments, combined with few external threats, can seriously undermine civilian control of the military” (Desch 1999, 111-2). Undoubtedly internal conflicts represented the most serious threat to territorial integrity and national security in all three countries. Persistent internal conflicts not only made the civilians dependent on the military’s coercive power and, thus, inhibited the reduction of military prerogatives in internal security and other areas. In addition, the inability of elected governments to provide for peaceful means of settling social conflicts undermined the legitimacy of the civilian actors and the democratic institutions, providing the breeding ground for the extension of military influence and interventionism.

More or less the same is true for Thailand where the expanding insurgency in southern Thailand has already made many ranking Thai military officials feel uneasy about the Thaksin government’s policies, including promotion and key placement in the armed forces of relatives and friends of the Prime Minister ahead of those whose turn at promotion was rightly due. Although the inability of the government in dealing effectively with the unrest in the South was not the main reason for taking power, it certainly contributed to the downfall of the government by alienating a segment of the military from the civilian leadership (Croissant 2007).

Conversely, over the past five years or so, armed secessionist threats, communal and religious violence in Indonesia have drastically declined and, in turn, internal stability did significantly improve. While this has certainly strengthened civilian authority and government legitimacy (cf. Mietzner 2011), it remains somewhat unclear how much this change in the internal threat environment is really reflected in the military perception of its missions, roles and relationship with civilian authorities.

In Korea and Taiwan, the combination of clearly defined external threats and the absence of domestic insurgencies seemed to have provided a domestic and international threat environment that facilitated civilian supremacy. The lack of internal challenges to state power reduced the role of the military as provider of regime stability, allowing for the successful cutback of its formerly pronounced internal security role. The existence of a clearly defined existential threat to national survival (North Korea and the People’s Republic of China, respectively) motivated the military to focus on its core function, channeling its organizational resources toward defense against the external enemy. At the same time, “with the advent of the post-Cold War, improved inter-Korean relationship and the relaxation of external threat allowed the civilian leadership to undertake a bold move to restructure the military for the direction of strengthening the civilian control of the military” (Moon and Rhyu 2011).
Third, the empirical evidence seems to indicate an almost circular relationship of civilian control and consolidation. On the one hand, the degree of civilian control has important effects on the prospects of democratic consolidation. On the other hand, the course of consolidation of the democratic system at large influences the prospects for civilian control of the military. With peaceful democratic transitions driven by a combination of civil society, international pressure, and elite negotiations, followed by almost a decade of relative political stability and continued buoyant economic growth, South Korea and Taiwan have become shining examples of democracy in the third wave of democratization. In such circumstances, establishing civilian supremacy was much easier than in Thailand and the Philippines, where civilian political institutions are much weaker, and the legitimacy of the democratic regime is contested. In the latter countries, civilian political institutions and the legitimacy of the political regimes are much weaker, which renders civilian control more difficult. In fact, the contrast between Thailand and the Philippines on one hand, and Indonesia on the other supports this view. While one may rightly view the Indonesian transition as, at the very least, a partial success story, the reality of democratization in the other two Southeast Asian nations is rather different. Both have had mass-mobilization and popular uprisings against elected governments. In Thailand the result was a full scale coup in 2006; in the Philippines the military backed civilian takeover of 2001 can be viewed as a “people power putsch” (Thompson 2011; Arugay 2011).

In Indonesia, by contrast, there has been no major extra-constitutional threat to the government since 1999. Obviously, there are many weaknesses in Indonesian democracy, particularly in terms of government efficiency, rule of law and collusion among elites (Mietzner 2012). But despite these shortcomings, the stabilization of the civilian polity especially, has led to an increasing marginalization of the armed forces from the power center. Perhaps most significantly, Indonesian democracy benefits from a comparatively well developed civil society and political party system (cf. Croissant and Voelkel 2010; Hicken and Kuhonta 2011), and inclusionary coalition politics by Indonesia’s political elite which create good opportunity structures for civilians to hold the upper hand over the armed forces when decisions about the role of the military in the new democracy are made (Croissant 2011; Mietzner 2011). Furthermore, conditional civilian control in Indonesia was supported by the democratic regimes’ ability to produce and maintain public support, civilian consensus on the need to keep the military out of politics, and an active civil society that provided politicians with additional monitoring and information about military affairs (ibid; Croissant, Voelkel, and Chambers 2011).

In the Philippines and Thailand, the reality is rather different. Especially the role played by the military in the downfall of President Estrada in 2001 produced far-reaching consequences for civil-military relations in the Philippines. For example, Carolina Hernandez (2005) argued that not only did the events in January 2001 and the Oakwood Mutiny of 2003 set back the process of democratizing civil-military relations in the Philippines, but it also showed that civil-military relations remained essentially the same as that existing prior to 1986. This was characterized by an enlarged military role—including responsibility against domestic armed threats to the government and national development functions. Fragile political legitimacy of the incumbent
administration, weak civilian oversight institutions, poor socioeconomic conditions, and armed conflicts provided the foundations for an increased military involvement in government.

The crisis of democracy is particularly evident in Thailand. However, the resurrection of the military as the dominant political force in 2006 seems rather to be a consequence than a cause for democratic stress in Thailand. Even before the recent coup, the first one in fifteen years, Thai democracy was showing severe symptoms of erosion and steady weakening by those elected to lead it. Instead of consolidating the democratic gains of the 1990s, the Thaksin years were characterized by increasingly authoritarian governance, and deepening polarization between opponents and supporters of the Thaksin government which clearly indicated the existence of strong centrifugal forces in the country (Thitinan 2008). The failure of democracy was a consequence of incapacity of the political system to accommodate these social and political tensions. The main shortcoming has been the weak organized social bases for mass parties and especially the lack of adequate representation of the interests of the urban working class and rural voters. Simultaneously, the legitimacy of the political aspirations and preferences of those segments of Thai society was not fully accepted by the political elites. Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai party attempted to fill this vacuum since the late 1990s. When Thaksin menaced the prerogatives of royalist soldiers, the Palace and the Bangkokian elite, these groups cobbled together a coup coalition against him (Croissant 2008; Thompson 2011).

However, this already leads us to the argument that structural contexts cannot completely explain if a new democracy will establish civilian control over the armed forces. Rather, the case studies show that the ‘agency’ of civilian decision-makers plays an important role to account for the diverging patterns of civil-military relations. The cases highlight that it was strategic action, prioritization, timing and careful sequencing by civilians, who took advantage of upcoming opportunities, and utilized them for restructuring civil-military relations which has enabled civilians in Korea and Indonesia to overcome past legacies of military intervention into politics. In both countries, civilians strategically chose their actions in order to maximize their leverage over the armed forces. Strategic action also explains the differences between these two successful cases. In Korea, President Kim Young-sam aggressively pushed the military out of politics by outright purges of those politicized members of the officer corps who had dominated the country’s political system since the first coup in 1961. Kim, however, benefited from beneficial environmental factors, which provided the political and institutional resources necessary for the successful utilization of such strategies, such as:

1. already existing mechanisms to prevent the military from intervening in governmental affairs, that were conducive to civilian monitoring and controlling the military and eventually depoliticizing it (Moon and Rhyu 2011);

2. consolidated and unified presidential authority on military administration, especially personnel management (Moon and Rhyu 2011): Authoritarian presidents from Park to Chun and Roh had decided all promotion for the middle-range officers and the high-ranks of
generals; the same authority belonged to President Kim Young-sam. This gave him the institutional resource to use the military promotion system to purge the military without interference from legislature or military;

(3) factional tensions within the military which could be utilized to balance military power and strengthen the president’s own position vis-à-vis the military. As a result of the systematic discrimination against non-Hanahoe officers during the Chun Doo-hwan regime, the vast majority of military officers simply “had nothing to gain from the status quo” and therefore they did nothing to defend Hanahoe from when the civilian government attempted to oust its members from the military (Kim Insook 2008).

The successes in securing civilian control in post-authoritarian Indonesia result mainly from the prudent approach toward the military by which civilian governments were able to overcome the rather disadvantageous ‘contexts’ of civil-military relations, including the entrenched traditions of the military’s political influence. In contrast to South Korea, civilian presidents in Indonesia mostly relied on softer maneuvering, and kept the military at bay by skillfully recruiting loyal supporters into the high echelons of the military leadership. This, however, hampered the stronger institutionalization of civilian control and perpetuated the established mechanisms of informally regulated civil-military relations. For one, the military accepted reforms only because Interim President Habibie (1998-99) had cultivated strong personal relations to controversial senior military leaders such as General Wiranto (Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006, 257-61). Second, the military itself decided on the scope and contents of depoliticization and the redefinition of its political role. The “New Paradigm”, for example, was conceived and implemented by so-called “intellectual generals” (including the current president) with civilians playing hardly any role in the process (Honna 2003, 164-7). Furthermore, Habibie’s successors did not follow up on his first steps, so that under Presidents Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati (2001-04) little progress in strengthening civilian control was made. Rather, Megawati’s policy of relying on personal connections to the military leadership and promoting trusted officers to government positions contributed to a return of military influence in policy-making and implementation (Kingsbury 2003:240). As a result, civil-military reform ground to a halt. In fact, existing problems in military reform in Indonesia seem to be caused more by civilian unwillingness (or inability) to press for substantial reform than by militaries actively resisting civilian attempts to reduce military influence in political and civilian affairs.

The cases of the Philippines and Thailand show that civilian ‘agency’ needs not necessarily lead to strong civilian control. Philippine Presidents Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010) placed loyalists atop the state’s most lucrative cash cows, consolidated their personal control over centralized patronage networks and co-opted military officers into the civilian sphere which allowed them to marginalize the most radical military factions and, in turn, enabled officers to articulate their corporate and private interests. Partially, this strategy of co-option has been successful. While it helped to protect civilian administrations
against coup threats and destabilization efforts, this approach did not reduce politicization of the AFP. Instead, it contributed to the militarization of the government apparatus and the decision-making process, giving the AFP wide-ranging influence in key policy areas. Hence, it significantly restricted the elected authorities’ effective power to govern.

But appeasement and compensation strategies were good only in the short term. The complete lack of any attempt to sanction military insubordination by apprehension, trial, and incarceration of suspected mutineers and coup plotters delivered the message that, in the Philippines, military adventurism will not be dealt with severely (Gloria 1999; Brillo 2007). Appeasement also included the boosting of military benefits and “buckling” to military preferences regarding the conduct of counterinsurgency operations (Dalangin-Fernandez 2007). Furthermore, also the Melo Commission and the UN Human Rights Rapporteur highlighted AFP involvement in extra-judicial killings of civilians, not a single soldier accused of violating human rights was successfully prosecuted for human rights violations (Hutchcroft 2008, 147).

Another example of how civilian strategies and the lack of political entrepreneurship can actually undermine reforms in civil-military relations is the AFP modernization program. As de Castro (2005: 18) aptly notes: “The traditional political elite in the Philippine Congress have little interest in military or strategic affairs. They instead focus their attention or efforts on accumulating resources and patronage—two crucial components of their control over local and national politics.” According to him, “socio-political forces such as the political elite’s attitude vis-à-vis defense matters and reforms, their control of the legislature, and their efforts to make the armed services subservient to their whims at the expense of military professionalism […] hinder any meaningful reform in the AFP” (op cit., 19).

The case of Thailand also serves as a reminder that the problem of restructuring civil-military relations is not exclusively on the military side. As the collapse of civil-military relations and democracy in Thailand demonstrates, militaries find it easier to block transitions from military autonomy to civilian supremacy if important civilian groups desert the pro-democracy coalition. In addition the case of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin’s handling of civil-military relations between 2001 and 2006 points to the fact that keeping the military out of politics is only one half of the story. The other half is to protect the military from abuse as a vehicle became a vehicle for advancing partisan interests by government leaders. Immediately after becoming Prime Minister, Thaksin began to transform the military into his personal power base by granting the armed forces a large range of old and new prerogatives. In an attempt to appease and co-opt the military, Thaksin recruited 50 generals into influential advisory positions, increased the military budget, summarily approved the military spending list for the 2005-13 period, and restored the army’s influence in foreign policy (McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 134-57). At the same time, he repeatedly interfered with the annual military promotions, systematically assigning supporters, family members, and Military Academy classmates to key military positions (Ukrist 2008, 127). Likewise, Thaksin increased the military budget, lifted the embargo on military procurements that had been in place since the 1997 financial crisis, and approved the entire army’s spending list for the 2005-13 period (Asia Times, April 7, 2005). In addition, the lower house—despite the fact that it had
the formal right to scrutinize defense policy—“did not take any steps to empower itself to be an informed and authoritative actor concerning military affairs” (Surachart 2002, 1-2). This was in part because members of parliament did not have the expertise, resources and institutional capacity in military and security affairs (ibid.). More important, however, there was no premium for them to develop the competence to conduct debates on military affairs. In the short run, meddling with the military’s internal affairs and his way of co-opting generals, rather than confronting them worked well for the prime minister.

While in the short run this strategy enhanced Thaksin’s leverage over the armed forces, in the end it had disastrous consequences for civilian rule in Thailand. Thaksin’s efforts to co-opt the military were viewed by many officers as a threat to the unity and integrity of the armed forces and as a challenge to the monarchy (Ukrist 2008, 139). In the eyes of the putschists, the September 2006 coup was a last-ditch defense against the consolidation of Thaksin’s personal regime which would have neutralized the military as an autonomous political force.

Conclucion

What can be learned from this analysis? We propose three sets of conclusions.

1) In terms of the conceptualization of civilian control, the analysis has shown that civilian control means more than the absence of military coup or other forms of open intervention. By distinguishing different “areas” of civil-military relations, a systematic and nuanced analysis of the different states of civil-military relations and their development during time can be drawn. Not only does this allow us to differentiate between cases but it makes it also possible to differentiate within cases. This is particularly important in cases in which the balance of decision-making power between civilians and soldiers varies between different areas of civil-military relations, like Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Therefore, one conclusion of this analysis is, that not only do the democratizing states in East Asia do not converge on a single pattern of civil-military relations but even within the cases, there is much variation.

Such differentiations notwithstanding, it seems fair to conclude that South Korea has achieved civilian control after Kim Young-sam in 1993 was elected the first genuine civilian president in over thirty years. Today, democratically elected authorities and institutions in Korea effectively control all matters of civil-military relations, including military mission profiles, personnel management, procurements and military organization. Similarly, in Taiwan, civilian control is firmly established and the prospects are good that it will survive come high water or hell.

In Indonesia, civilian control is also rather stable, as the TNI today has neither influence on the selection of the political leadership nor on the making and implementation of national policies—even though President Yudhoyono’s control over the military remains under-institutionalized and mostly dependent on his network of patronage and loyalty inside the military. Although most observers content that civilian control over the Indonesian military is
currently stable, “it is not rooted in a strong institutional foundation. In other words, it remains vulnerable to possible fluctuations in the quality of Indonesia’s young democracy as well as the distinct personalities of its top leaders” (Mietzner 2011).

The experiences of Taiwan, Korea and Indonesia contrast with the failed institutionalization of civilian control in Thailand and the prolonged crisis of civil–military relations in the Philippines. In Thailand, elected governments have thus far not been able to end the military domination of any of the five areas. Under the current political order, the military acts like a self-proclaimed guardian of king and nation. Even following the end of direct military rule in late 2007, soldiers have continued to exert great power, and control horizontal and vertical prerogatives, which reach far beyond defense and military organization. Then, what explains the difference between Thailand and the Philippines? In other words: why is it that in the Philippines all military rebels so far have failed to topple the government, while in Thailand they succeeded? The answer to this question seems clear: Despite the many failings of democracy in the Philippines, most of the relevant civilian factions stick to the established, oligarchic elite consensus. There is almost universal denial by civilian elites and the citizens that the overthrow of the executive by the military is not a legitimate act. This certainly is one of the main reasons why the Philippine military (in contrast to its peers in Thailand) “does not really seek to capture political power for itself (despite all the instances of attempted coups), and instead institutionally (through the upper ranks of the military leadership) aligns itself with certain political factions” (Hernandez and Kraft 2010: 130). It is this “symbiotic relationship” (ibid.) between civilian and military elites which allows civilian rule to survive. In Thailand, however, there has been no cohesive civilian anti-coup-coalition. On the contrary: in 2006, segments of the Thai population and elites, including some social activists, civilian politicians and “civil” society leaders formed, presumably with support from royalist circles, a military-civilian coup coalition to overthrow the civilian government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, thereby granting legitimacy to the military under certain circumstances to act as “moderator” (Nordlinger 1977).

2) Reiterating what has previously argued, agential enterprise akin to what Padgett and Ansell (1993) call “robust action” and “flexible opportunism” and what Adam Sheingate (2003) calls “political entrepreneurship” is crucial: To overcome challenges and obstacles in institutionalizing civilian authority over the military, civilian agents must take advantage of the opportunities and resources provided by structural contexts and utilize them to develop appropriate strategies of controlling the military. While agents in different Asian countries develop different strategic responses, especially the example of Korea and—to a lesser extent also Indonesia—suggest that personnel management and promotion policies, divide-and-conquer strategies, civilian acquiescence and the legitimization of civilian supremacy are the most crucial element in what may be labeled as creative and shifting combinations of soft and robust control strategies.

On the other hand, as the experiences of South Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan demonstrate, “flexible opportunism” on the side of civilians can also mean not to pursue “big bang reforms” in civil military relations including the prosecution of authoritarian crimes as long as the distribution of political power favors the military. In South Korea, for example, transitional
justice was not tackled until almost one decade after the transition to democracy, while Taiwan is among those few cases in the third wave of democratization in which the issue of transitional justice has never been on the political agenda (Wu 2005: 6).

Instead, the institutionalization of civilian control in young democracies is best viewed as a gradual and incremental process, consisting of analytically distinct sequences, or “generations.” However, in all cases analyzed in detail in this paper, reforms in civil-military relations have been complicated by the lack of civilian infrastructure beyond the government apparatus, weak electoral incentives for civilians to learn about the political management of the armed forces and the lack of civilian capabilities and capacities to manage the security sector.

3) The case studies in this paper also demonstrate that it is not sufficient to focus exclusively or predominantly on the military side. Sometimes the “problem” is the civilians. The case of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin’s handling of civil-military relations between 2001 and 2006 points to the fact that keeping the military out of politics is only one half of the story. The other half is to protect the military from political abuse and the partisan demands of government leaders (Watts 2002).

Finally, based on our findings, we are able to draw some tentative conclusions about possible future trajectories in civil-military relations in East Asia. It seems plausible to assume that at least the Philippines and Thailand will most probably be plagued by further instances of military assertion and a lack of civilian control for some time to come. Given the deep entrenchment of the militaries in the respective political systems, the manifold problems of consolidation of democracy in general, the persistence of internal conflict and the incompetence or inaptitude by civilian governments with regard to military reforms, civilians will most likely neither have sufficient capabilities nor compelling incentives to confront the military and diminish military decision-making power in the political arena. Accordingly, any significant extension of civilian influence over the security sector in these two countries remains unlikely.
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Notes

i The conceptual and theoretical discussions in this paper draw on Croissant et al (2010, 2011a, 2011b). Some empirical observations and arguments have been presented in Croissant and Kuehn (2009) and Croissant, Voelkel, and Chambers (2011). Another version of this paper has been presented at a Research Seminar at the East West Center at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu. The research in this paper is part of a research project sponsored by the German Research Fund (DFG) with the author as principal investigator. I would like to thank the participants at the East-West-Center for their helpful comments as well as my collaborators in the research project—David Kuehn, Philip Voelkel and Paul Chambers—for their suggestions, comments and input. The paper has greatly benefitted from their collaboration.

ii The understanding of East Asia in this paper includes the ten ASEAN-member countries and East Timor, North and South Korea, the PR China and Taiwan, Mongolia and Japan (see also Shin and Tusalem 2009).

iii The terms ‘armed forces’ and ‘military’ are used interchangeably in this paper. ‘Military’ refers all permanent state organizations and their members, authorized by law, to apply coercive power in order to primarily defend the territory of the state against external threats. ‘Civilians’ are all organizations of the state apparatus that are not attached to the military which have the authority to formulate, implement and oversee political decisions. This includes especially the legislative and executive branches, as well as the individual members of these institutions (Edmonds 1988). In the real world, this analytical differentiation sometimes seems blurred. In Israel, for example, there is the prevalent practice in civil-military relations known as „parachuting“, where resigned military leaders join the top echelons of political parties and cabinets (Etzioni-Halevy 1996: 406-413). In South Korea (1987) and Indonesia (2004) former military officers were elected as presidents. However, as long as former military officers do not achieve office through military appointment, blackmailing or use of force, but are elected in competitive elections (usually as candidates of civilian political parties), they can be considered ‘civilian’ politicians. I thank Hans Born for raising this issue.


v A former senior military officer appointed Prime Minister, who was not accountable to the elected House of Representatives, led the government. Meanwhile, the popularly elected House of Representatives (Lower House) had to share its political powers with an appointed Senate (Upper House), whose members came primarily from the ranks of the state bureaucracy and the Royal Thai Armed Forces (Lihkit 1992; Chai-anan 1995).

vi See for more detail, Murray (1996).

vii During the 1963 presidential campaign, General Park had ordered Major Chun Doo-hwan to found an organization among the KMA graduates. Chun expanded his fraternity among his own classmates (KMA’s class eleven of 1955) to include the junior classes and named it the “Hana” (group of one) faction. Eligibility criteria were restricted according to class (about ten or twelve graduates from each class), regional origin (Taegu and North Kyongsang province), and unanimous approval by current members. In 1979, the group had about 240 members or 4.4 per cent of the total number of KMA graduates since 1955, all from the KMA.
graduation classes 1955 to 1980, ranging from second lieutenants to major generals. (Kim Insoo 2008: 59, 124)

viii Those were the only military forces that the Korean president could use under the ROK/US Combined Forces Command without the potential interference of the U.S. military (Kim Insoo 2008)

ix Detailed accounts of how civil-military relations have developed since the transition from authoritarianism can be found in Croissant et al. (2012).


xi Armed auxiliary groups are vital counter-insurgency operations by the Philippine military and police. There are two groups of armed auxiliaries organized by state authorities in the Philippines today: Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU) and the Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVOs). CAFGU are under military command, CVOs serve under the authority of the national police (Kraft 2010: 186-188).

xii While the critics are legion, Bruneau (forthcoming) summarizes their arguments into four essential criticisms: (1) the tautological nature of Huntington’s argument about the relationship of professionalism and control; (2) the use of selective data and disparate factual evidence; (3) the failure of Huntington’s approach to provide either empirically valid theoretical explanations or practical guidance for the reform of civil-military relations in democratic and democratizing countries. Bruneau notes the „exclusive focus on civilian control of the armed forces” (p. 8) as the fourth major shortcoming of Huntington’s work. Not surprisingly, the author of this paper on civilian control in emerging democracies in Asia respectfully disagrees. In my opinion, civilian control is the core, albeit not the only, problem in civil-military relations

xiii As Kuehn and Völkel (2011) point out, the ‘agency-structure problem’ lies at the heart of all theories of civilian control (see also Pion-Berlin 2011).

xiv For a general discussion of the structure and agency problem in social science and especially in the study of democratizations see Dessler (1989).

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