The third Smart Talk was held on July 9, 2009 with Professor Mike Mochizuki (Elliot School, George Washington University) presenting on the topic of “Reconciling Rivals, War, Memory, and Security in East Asia.” A panel of leading experts actively discussed the issues raised by Professor Mochizuki in his presentation. Professor Mochizuki explained about the difficulties faced by East Asia in overcoming the conflicts in memory politics. He was keen to show not just the differences and conflicts between countries but also within countries, with specific focus on Japan. Touching upon Professor Mochizuki’s knowledge of the topic, the panel discussed ways of overcoming the conflicts in memory politics and assessed the difficulties faced by the countries in the region including the United States. A number of suggestions and ideas were also put forward as Professor Mochizuki and the panel sought ways to resolve the conflicts.

**Smart Talk Panel Members**

Chaesung Chun (Professor, Seoul National University)
Jun-Hyeok Kwak (Professor, Korea University)
Nae Young Lee (Professor, Korea University)
Sook-Jong Lee (President, East Asia Institute)
Yong Wook Lee (Professor, Korea University)

**The transcript of Smart Talk 3 is as follows:**

**PRESIDENT SOOK-JONG LEE:** Thank you for joining us for Smart Talk 3. We are pleased to have here today Dr. Mike Mochizuki. And as you know, Dr. Mochizuki is right now serving at the Elliot School of the George Washington University, and before he joined the Elliot School, he worked at the Brookings Institution.

Dr. Mochizuki said that he is almost finishing his new book titled *Reconciling Rivals: War, Memory, and Security in East Asia*. So, he is going to present the thesis of his new book, and we will hear comments or discussions with scholars here.

**PROFESSOR MIKE MOCHIZUKI:** I don’t know whether I will present the basic thesis of the book itself, because it is an edited volume and there are many different points of view. One of the purposes of the book, *Reconciling Rivals*, was to try to cross-cut not just the national divide but the ideological divide, especially within Japan. I firmly believe that one of the obstacles to reconciliation between Japan and its East Asian neighbors is not just that there may be differences in historical narratives between countries, but there is a division within Japan itself about historical memory.

Its contested memory is something which starts immediately from the post-war period. To the extent that there was any kind of consensus and commonality in the Japanese discourse in the early post-war period, it was, as you’ve, I’m sure, read many people arguing this point, it was the “victim” narrative. So, both the left and the right embraced this “victim” narrative. But, by the 1960s, I think that there was a move to finally challenge the “victim” narrative and to begin to
start the perpetrator aspect of it. In popular culture, I will say, it even predates the 60s—in the late 1950s there are movies made by filmmakers, some of them are leftists that talk about the tragic consequences of Japanese imperialism. I do not accept some of the conventional wisdom that Japan suffered from "collective amnesia." It was much more that Japan suffered from "schizophrenia" about history.

In the book, one of the things that I examine systematically is the difference between East Asia and Western Europe. In particular, I look at the process of reconciliation between France and Germany and compare that with the dialogue and maybe the lack of reconciliation between Japan and South Korea. Of course, there are many reasons for the differences. The geopolitical situation, of course, is something that is often talked about. The lack of a multilateral security organization, like NATO, in Northeast Asia, and U.S. settling for security bilateralism and all of those things, I think, are important in terms of context.

But in the course of my research, it became very apparent that, unlike some of my friends who make the argument that the United States, by choice, opted for security bilateralism in Northeast Asia and, by choice, adopted the collective security organization in Western Europe. It is clear that after the Korean War, the United States' preference in Asia was not security bilateralism but a multilateral collective defense pact. After the Korean War, John Foster Dulles embraces the idea of a Pacific pact and goes around the Pacific to try to drum up support for this. The interesting thing is that rather than the security organization being the driver of memory politics, it is memory politics that affects the security organization. Both Australia and the Philippines wanted the United States to be engaged militarily in the Asia-Pacific region and wanted a formal defense relationship with the United States. But, they were adamant against a multilateral security organization like NATO, which would mean that Australians would have to help defend Japan, or Filipinos would have to help defend Japan. Some of the documents that I've read uses explicitly the words, "the Australians hate the Japanese for what they did," or "the Filipinos hate the Japanese for what they did." So, of course, it makes sense from the perspective of the Cold War for the United States to defend Japan, but Australians cannot defend Japan, and Filipinos cannot defend Japan. Then, when John Foster Dulles goes to Japan, he finds that even in Japan, they don't want this multilateral security organization. So, we then settle for security bilateralism. You all know the story about the Japan-Republic of China negotiations on the peace treaties, so that those would be concluded basically hours before the San Francisco Peace Treaty goes into effect, and the long negotiations between Japan and the ROK. So, although I believe the Cold War, coming to East Asia, may have played a role in not providing a positive context for historical reconciliation that you have in Western Europe, I would also emphasize that it was the memory issue that prevented the development of a multilateral security organization. I think this is something that is important for the present day.

In addition to these contextual factors, for me, a critical factor is domestic politics in Japan, the difference between the domestic politics in Japan and the domestic politics in Germany. For the first decade, although in Germany there was a greater effort to promote reconciliation, both countries embraced primarily a "victim" narrative. But, what changes the discourse in Germany are the young politicians, and Willy Brandt was one of them, in the Social Democratic Party. They felt that the Adenauer approach, while positive, was still inadequate, that the perpetrator narrative had to be firmly implanted in the discourse and educational programs, and that there has to be much more forthright gestures of contrition. So, that was the one of the key goals of the Social Democrats. They come into power in the mid-1960s, and they stay in power until the early 1980s. In that 16 year period, they fundamentally change the national discourse about history, so that when the Christian Democrats come in and there is a nationalist agenda, even the Christian Democrats and Helmut Kohl have to accept the contrition frame of reference. Rather than the kind of backlash we see in Japan, the contrition
paradigm is a source of national pride, rather than masochism, as it is called in the Japanese case.

But the problem with Japan is that the Liberal Democratic Party stays in power and, to the degree that Japan engages in acts of contrition, it is not because there is a robust political force from within Japan, but because there are diplomatic pressures. For example, the United States' leaning on Foreign Minister Shiina to give the tepid apology to Koreans, and the apology that was given in the context of normalization of relations between Japan and the PRC. So, many of the gestures of contrition are not because there is an internal relooking of history, or there is such a division, but because there is external pressure. And that external pressure, I think, sets it up for a backlash.

Finally, it is in the early 1990s when you have a change in Japanese politics. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) falls from power, and it's that time that you really see, I think, moves towards addressing history, starting with Prime Minister Hosokawa, who, without any equivocation, answers in a press conference that Japan launched a war of aggression. To the outside observer, it is almost common-sensical, but at the time, this was a debated issue within Japan. Then, when Prime Minister Hosokawa goes to Korea, he gives an extemporaneous apology that goes far beyond anything the Foreign Ministry expresses. The other act of contrition that emerges out of this change in Japanese politics is the Kono Statement on the comfort women. That happens, if you look at it, on the last day of the Miyazawa government, after the LDP has been defeated. It is not right in the middle of the Miyazawa government. So, it's like, for example, an American president, after an election, the lame duck period, you do all the things that you couldn't do because they were unpopular. Well, Japan snuck it in. Or, you have the Murayama statements. The problem with all of these is that although there was domestic support for those initiatives, there was also a lot of domestic opposition, and there's a backlash.

Then, the LDP comes back in power and now we are at this stage today. The big difference with Germany is that, although the progressive opposition mattered in Japan to a certain extent, it never stayed in power long enough to change the discourse. I recently wrote a review essay at Jennifer Lynn's book, which will appear in your journal, and I made this point. Now, Jenny Lynn then countered that I was making a tautological argument and I think she misunderstood what I was arguing. I argued that it's the Social Democrats in Germany that stayed in power to change the discourse and then once there's a new national consensus, you don't find the support for a backlash, whereas in Japan, the Social Democratic phase was so brief and so weak and they were never a majority party that it was vulnerable to contestation. Now, Murayama Danwa does stand because it was a cabinet decision, a kakugi kettei, but now some people are attacking it. The Kono Statement on the comfort women was more vulnerable because, although this was enunciated by the chief cabinet secretary, it did not have the force of kakugi kettei, a cabinet decision. That's why I think Prime Minister Abe, before he became Prime Minister, was in this movement to try to overturn this.

So, I think one of the problems that remain in Japan, if Japan is really going to be able to address this, it needs to overcome this divide and achieve some consensus. Ideally, it will be great if the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), in coalition with the Social Democrats, could stay in power for sixteen years. I think that will really make the difference. But I feel that the possibility of that may not be that great, even though I'm hopeful that the DPJ will win.

Therefore, the more realistic alternative is to try to find some middle ground, because I think most Japanese understand that Japan did a lot of wrong things in East Asia. But, they also think that the war with the United States, in some ways, was justified as an act of self defense, and they feel that colonial rule in Korea, as bad as it was, there may have been some positive things. And I guess, for me, the big question is whether that kind of consensus in the middle provides a potential foundation for reconciliation, for example, Korea. Or, for Koreans, is it necessary for Japan's view of history to go all the way to where progressive democrats and social democrats are. So this is one of
the big things that I’m watching and I stress the importance of these domestic variables in this book.

Now, the other issue is the role of the United States. I want to leave plenty of time for discussion rather than taking up a lot of time for my presentation. I was able to download Gi-wook Shin’s working paper that just came out, and I read it with great interest, because that was essentially the topic of my presentation at the Northeast Asia History Foundation. So I thought it might be helpful in this meeting to give you what I feel I agree with and what I may have slightly different views from Professor Shin. First of all, I think he’s written a terrific paper and I know he says it’s a preliminary draft, but it seems like a pretty polished piece to me, so I hope it gets a lot of play in Asia as well as Western countries.

I agree fundamentally with four points in his essay. One, the United States has both a responsibility, and sometimes I think he seems to suggest that it has moral responsibility, as well as an interest in historical reconciliation in East Asia. Given the end of the Cold War, the rise of China, the uncertainties on the Korean peninsula, and now the American embrace of East Asian community building, the history issue is, I think, a strategic interest. It may not be number one or number two, but I think it’s up there in the top five as a strategic interest. I also agree with Professor Shin that since the United States played a role in some of these historical problems it also has a responsibility.

Secondly, I completely agree with Professor Shin that the United States should approach this issue from a perspective of self-reflection and self-criticism. And that is definitely lacking. It’s either the attitude that the United States is an innocent bystander, but somehow the United States is on a high moral ground and push Japan to do something. That kind of attitude can only lead to a kind of repulsion from, especially the Japanese conservative camp. So, the United States needs to take a self-reflective and self-critical perspective. In his essay, Professor Shin emphasizes the issue of atomic bombings and the fire bombings as one area. I think, especially in the dialogue with Korea, the United States needs to recognize its role as the enabler of imperialism, first enabling the Japanese imperialism but also Untied States itself being an imperial power. Over and over again, I bristle when American leaders keep saying that the United States was not an imperial power. I remember Colin Powell giving an address at George Washington, and he says United States was never an imperial power. The self-delusion of that kind of statement, to me, is appalling and as long as United States takes that attitude, it cannot play a constructive role in historical reconciliation, especially with the Japanese.

And then this gets to my third point that I agree with Professor Shin is that, despite the alliance relationship between the United States and Japan, historical reconciliation is still problematic. It is very thin and in fact precisely because of the Cold War alliance interest, a lot of those issues were swept up under the rug. So, if the United States is going to engage this issue, it has got to understand that there is a historical issue between Japan and the United States and they deal with the Tokyo trial, the atomic bombing, and even the imperial responsibility issue.

Having said all of this, I agree again with Professor Shin that the United States should get more involved. One area of difference is that I think the United States has already been involved but in a more reactive, ad hoc way. I believe that Professor Shin is right that the United States needs to get involved in a more systematic way.

Okay, well those are the things that I agree with. What are the things where I may have a slightly different view? In his essay, first, he acknowledges, but then ends up criticizing John Ikenberry’s point that the United States should push Japan on the history issue while supporting Japanese security normalization and regional security cooperation. I think Professor Shin is absolutely right in this critic, in the sense that it is very risky if Japan sees the United States as taking the side of Korea or China on some of these historical debates. But I think Ikenberry’s more important point is that the United States needs to actively promote security understanding and cooperation between Japan and Korea. First and foremost, between Japan and China would be good too, but I think the United States needs to move
beyond the “hub and spokes” security architecture to a softly multilateral security architecture. In a sense, we’re bringing back the dream of a Pacific pact without the formalism of the Pacific pact. And what’s interesting is that both the Philippines and the Australians were the ones who were opposed to the Pacific pact, and those countries’ reconciliation has gone much further. But then, to bring the ROK into this is also important. I was meeting a friend from KIDA (Korea Institute for Defense Analyses) here, and he was telling me there was a meeting of the defense communities of Japan, the U.S., the ROK and Australia. I think the meetings went on right now to promote this kind of security cooperation. Now, this is not dealing with the history issue directly but indirectly it has an impact, because the history issue can lead to misunderstanding about long-term strategic intentions. As part of historical reconciliation, we have to create this more conducive strategic environment and regional multilateral alliance relations, I think, are the key. So we are kind of creating a kind of context that existed in Europe in the 1950s.

The second issue where I might have a slightly different take than Professor Shin is regarding his very bold ideas about redress and compensation regarding forced labor. He gives a good analysis of the German experience on the slave labor fund and I think that was absolutely right on, but he comes to conclusion that perhaps what the United States should do is to press for reinterpretation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to allow individual claims. Right now, Japan seems to be hiding behind the Peace Treaty, so he’s saying let’s have the United States press for reinterpretation. I feel that is precisely the wrong way to go, because that would be extremely problematic for the U.S.-Japan relations, and what the Japanese fear most is a flood of claims that are uncontrolled. If you look at the German slave labor initiative, there was a lot of fear and anxiety among Germans about this and even outright opposition, but what was important was that there was all this litigation and that this initiative would then end that. And this was not just Germany doing something but this was a multilateral diplomatic initiative. All parties kind of understood that this settles this. This is very different from the Asian Women’s Fund, which was a unilateral effort by Japan, which then led to a response that was not positive, and you know, for justifiable reasons. The German slave labor fund was a multilateral diplomatic initiative with the United States playing a role. What was also critical was not the amount of money—the amount of money was very little per person and the criteria for eligibility were made purposefully lax so that a lot of people could do this—but the key thing was acknowledgement, contrition and education. Now, Japanese will say, “Well, we don’t want to open this up because it’s going to get all this money, and people are going to cheat on us.” Well, this German example addresses that and that’s why I disagree with Professor Shin that if you change the interpretation of the Peace Treaty, it feeds into the fear that the Japanese have. I think that if the political situation in Japan changes, we should seriously consider working out a multilateral solution. This really has to be multilateral and the Republic of Korea has to be part of this package and probably China has to be. The problem is that this is also going to raise issues of compensation for atomic bombing victims, but I think that some way of addressing that might be possible.

Okay, the third issue that Professor Shin takes up is the issue of shared history. And he gives, I think, a very fair account of the experience of developing shared history, but then he basically sees that this is a very difficult thing. And the problem I had with his characterization of shared history is that implicit in this was to achieve some kind of regional consensus on history - so it’s really kind of an agreement on history. And in Europe, you could say that you moved in that direction, but even there I’m not sure. And for me, a shared history is not agreement. And in my essay in the Journal of East Asian Studies, I restate those studies by your institute. I borrowed heavily from Susan Dwyer’s notion of a realistic process of reconciliation where developing shared non-accusatory history is not agreement, but would follow the following steps. The one is you get out as much of the facts as possible and you try to distinguish between fact and interpretation. Now, some
facts you may never know but there are certain things that are obvious falsehoods, and so what you do is you kind of eliminate the most egregious distortions. As part of this kind of ‘fact-collection’ and evaluation process, I think there should be international as well as domestic pressure for Japan to release more information. Japanese scholars complain over and over about the lack of documents that Americans have released, that Koreans have released. But then there are documents that have been released and have not been evaluated. And we should take advantage of the Asian Historical Center that was established in Japan through Prime Minister Murayama initiative in this process of ‘fact-collecting’ assessment and eliminating the most egregious distortions.

And then based upon that factual evaluation, then you figure out what are the plausible range of narratives that might be consistent. So there may not be agreement, but what you do is you narrow the differences. And then in the final stage, rather than negotiate a single interpretation, you identify and eliminate a set of interpretations that are mutually coherent. And so former adversaries will share a range of historical view from which they can agree to disagree. And hopefully over time, the lines of debate and disagreement will begin to transcend nationality with greater frequency. And I think in this process, there has been more comparative research. I think Professor Shin is right that we should not mechanically apply the German model, but the German model is very complex so I think it can be applied in a more complex manner. But I think it is also important to look at other cases. If we’re going to talk about reconciliation about colonialism between Japan and Korea then maybe we should look at other cases of colonial rule of France and Algeria for instance. I think other experiences would be helpful in establishing certain international standards of appropriate and expected behavior for historical reconciliation. So I definitely think that there is much more that could be done on the shared history issue.

Now another point where I have a slightly - it’s not a disagreement - a slight disagreement of view is on the societal, transnational dialogue. I generally agree that state to state reconciliation is not sufficient and in many respects, we’ve had different rounds of state to state reconciliation. Though I believe that scholar to scholar dialogue in trying to work out the norms of shared history – although that is important - in the final analysis it’s not scholars who shape popular conceptions of history. They get it from popular culture – from films, novels, comic books, TV programs. And what they find lacking in historical dialogues is broadening of the group in terms of these discussions; so in some ways Professor Shin is too quick to dismiss the societal level. It’s not just NGOs, and I definitely understand some of the problems that activist groups may have, but I don’t mean to exclude them, but I don’t see the NGOs as the magic bullet in solving this, but I think it’s absolutely important to get the producers of popular culture into these discussions.

And finally, my last point and this is more to Professor Shin, and I would definitely like to get your views. As I see it, we’re now in a ceasefire, or truce, in memory wars; leaders for their own material and political interests have basically called the ceasefire. And the danger is that because of this, there may be complacency – with history issues. But as I see it, this is a more of a great opportunity, the stars are really aligned in Japan and the US, and South Korea and that it is really important to take advantage of that, to invest in institutional network of developing dialogues and I would like to hear more about what the EAI is doing now. The reason why I came to the Northeast Asia History Foundation is that I wanted to learn more about their work as well.

My belief is that the United States under President Obama is as close to being self-reflective and self-credible and yet seeing this as a measure of kind of national pride as we’re going to get. Now of course there have been criticisms of President Obama’s speech in the Middle East for example. But this is about as good as it’s going to get, and so we need to take advantage of this demonstration. And so that United States can play more constructive role. In Japan, I think with the debacle of Abe Shinzo’s administration with the Nakugawa Soichi’s drunken stupor and I
think Aso Taro is collapsing. Neo-nationalism may have peaked in Japan; it hasn't died, it's still there. And I think the Democratic Party of Japan will win at least a plurality, if not a majority, for a government. There are of course neo-nationalists within the DPJ but I think generally, the center of gravity in that party is pro-reconciliation, much more than the LDP. And so Japan is much more hospitable.

And South Korea I like to engage and get your views on this, I was thinking when was the last time I came to Korea? It was a decade ago. I came about four or five times before then and one of my first trips here I visited the Independence Memorial Hall and I went there again this time. I noticed that there were many changes in the exhibit – the general tone was much less nationalistic. Then I went to the National Museum – and there it was very interesting, that although it talked about much of conflicts and rivalries of kingdoms with China and Japan, that although there was that, there was also a lot of economic and cultural exchanges with Japan. And the influence that Korea had on Japan, and the mutual benefit. You know it seemed as a historical narrative that laid the foundation for community building, so it was a much more transnational than I remember when I came here in 1989.

So again, I think in South Korea, the climate seems to be much more hospitable. With China, I don't know, I think it's more difficult but I think if Japan, Korea, and the U.S. could lead the way in this, then I think it gives, if not pressure, for them to move forward on the Chinese front. I think a lot of effort should be placed on a trilateral initiative and institution building in terms of historical reconciliation. To do everything - I think - is difficult, we got to be able to do it amongst the three of the same alliance system, and if you can't do it there, then I think it will become much more difficult if there is geopolitical rivalries that seem to undermine. So let me stop here and I'd love to get your reactions. Thank you very much.

PRESIDENT LEE: Thank you Dr. Mochizuki. Before we get into more serious questions let me ask two short questions. Many people predict that the DPJ will be likely to win the elections, but you said it was very unlikely.

PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI: No, it's likely that they would become the number one party, but not necessarily a single party majority. It would be much better if it's a single party majority.

PRESIDENT LEE: Okay, and follow up question I think, you're known to be quite close to the leadership in DPJ.

PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI: Yeah I pretty much know all the leaders.

PRESIDENT LEE: So I'd like to hear what they are really thinking about this past history issues. They're like on a more abstract level, rather than just diplomatic gesture – but more philosophical or more value-added approach. If you can characterize them.

PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI: Well I think instinctually… and I talked Mr. Hatoyama at quite length and then Mr. Kan, only shortly with Mr. Okada, instinctually they believe that dealing with this history issue more forthrightly is in Japan's own national interest. You know it's not a matter of we need to do this because Asian countries are asking this, but if Japan is to have influence in Asia, then they have to do this. They feel that the neo-nationalist have it backwards – they want greater Japanese influence in Asia and yet they're doing precisely the things that would stir up negative views of Japan. So instinctually they have that which I think is very positive. And Mr. Hatoyama himself has several years ago, supported a project to look at history but not much has been done on that. Now the not so good news is that I was just in Tokyo before coming here, and my understanding is that they're trying to finalize the manifesto for the upcoming election and understandably they're focused on the domestic issues because that's what's really going to matter. So they really haven't developed a consensus on foreign policy, and on US-Japan alliance issues. So those things are still in flux, and also the history
issue is kind of not the top priority and I’m not so sure if the history issue’s ever even going to be addressed in the manifesto.

There have been some books that are written about the DPJ’s policy issues and they refer to the history issue in a very positive light but I’m not sure if it’s going to be in the manifesto. And the other thing is that some of my friends in the DPJ are neo-nationalists, and they form study groups with LDP counterparts that the Nanjing massacre is a fabrication. So you have that contention. But the other is that if you have Diet members who are not well known like Mr. Fujita who’s an upper house member who has really embraced this forced labor issue, the POWs, and what he’s been doing is asking questions which the cabinet is required to answer. And it was through his efforts I think that an apology was extended to American POWs. And an apology or recognition about the forced labor issue, he has been promoting that. So at the lower levels, I think there has been some activism and at some point if they do come into power, they would have to grapple with this issue. Next year, the hundredth anniversary of the annexation treaty of Korea, and of course, this is a big event in Korea – and so the question is can this be used as an opportunity to further reconciliation or will this be a cause for friction, and I’m hopeful that if it’s a Democratic Party of Japan they would use this as a positive light. Now, I heard some proposals from the Northeast Asian History Foundation about what they would like to see and my answer was that even with the DPJ, it’s too ambitious because it starts off that “Japan would recognize Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo”. It starts with that! If Hatoyama’s willing to do that, that would be great and courageous, but he would lose power and get killed.

**PROFESSOR JUN-HYEOK KWAK:** Before getting into my questions, I would like to introduce my research agenda. I’m teaching political philosophy at Korea University which means I’m a theory person.

**PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI:** Oh great.

**PROFESSOR KWAK:** One of my research projects that I’m conducting now is about inherited responsibility, why we are in charge of something that was done by the previous generation. So it is pretty relevant to what we’re doing right now. And I am going to proceed with a project on historical reconciliation and nondenominational reciprocity between East Asian countries so I think your talk was pretty interesting, especially on the part you mentioned your developing or thinking some kind of historical reconciliation not only in that level of kind of state-to-state, but also you’re talking of some kind of connections in societal level which means—probably you’re trying to say something about a public sphere between these countries.

**PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI:** Exactly.

**PROFESSOR KWAK:** But I think even if we agree that the societal level is very important, it would be a more forward-looking reconciliation, not talking about compensation or what happened in the past. However, we should say something about who’s going to reconcile with whom. And how to reconcile is some of the people in conflict with another. I couldn’t see this in your talk, and you’re talking about very interesting interpretations—how to interpret, how to develop this reconciliation. However I couldn’t see any sophisticated process through we could make a real kind of reconciliation, so my question is that is there any principle through which we can develop and reach between countries in conflict. And if you say, societal level, who’s in and in what way?

**PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI:** This is a very important question and I’m still wrestling with this. I’ve been reading some of the philosophical literature, there’s this book called *Closing the Books*. At some point, you have to close the books. First of all, let me say that when I talk about reconciliation, the way I conceptualize it is that there is no endpoint—we will reconcile or whatever. It’s an ongoing, almost never ending process. So just because you have this compensation fund on slave laborers that has ended the
litigation but if you remember the title… So it’s a continuing thing, and what it is, is that… “Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future Foundation”… that’s the name of the program, it’s not some kind of compensation. It’s “Remembrance, responsibility, and the future” - so it’s not to say that ‘ok we’re reconciled, we paid your money, and we’ve given you apology so now let’s move on’. It’s that the people of today, they didn’t commit it, but they have collective responsibility, that they have responsibility to remember it, and this continues on into the future. So there’s this foundation that kind of continues into the future so it’s never ending.

Secondly, I would say it’s a two way process. It’s not just a perpetrator doing something but the victim also has to acknowledge this, and began to accept the sincerity of the opposite side. I think it’s too often it’s been missing of that, is at the superficial level. Finally, the responsibility of who, who is responsible for this is? I think is the German case to me is quite instructive. In Japan, the responsibility – this is the irony – although many Japanese reject the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, in the end, that was where the responsibility was. That absorbed the Japanese society of responsibility. And that is reproduced over and over again. For example, I felt that the Yomiuri Shimbun effort was a very positive thing and we had one of the editors who wrote this would come to the Center to give a talk, and I told him that although it’s great, I’m not satisfied with it because essentially, it’s kind of like the Tokyo War Crime Trials. Tojo, Kono were the bad guys, and there were some Zaibatsu people too. But basically, there was this cabal, yet there’s no sense of society, and in Germany too, that was a part of this. But when Hitler’s Willing Executioners came out, and the thesis of this broad responsibility, there was a fear that Germans might be repulsed by that. But rather they embrace it. And so that’s ultimately when we talk about societal, Japanese society needs to become aware that even average Japanese was part of this. And so far, they were so overwhelmed by the “victim” scenario. And so that’s the ambition and if there are certain principles of reconciliation it is that the responsibility as a society for this. And then when you deal with societal responsibility, then it becomes much more complicated, you could be responsible by being in the neighborhood. And you are responsible in the sense because you are a beneficiary of that. There is an inter-generational responsibility, but then the final thing is that the signaling that Japan has changed. See, I think that’s the part that the previous Japan does not exist. Or there’s an awareness of the previous Japan and the remembrance of that so that you will make sure it will not exist. Of course the Japanese say that look at the Peace Constitution. But the problem with that there isn’t an awareness of what happened before. They just simplified the positives without understanding the negatives and I think that has to be addressed. And when you look at the wartime, Korea and Japan was much more complicated history and in many ways, I think that discussion about collaborators in Korea helps open the way for much more complex view of what responsibility is. Right now at the Sigur Center we are doing a project on war crimes trials. One Korean friend asked “are you going to deal with Koreans who are tried and executed for war crimes committed on behalf of Japanese Imperial Army?” And so those are some of things of responsibility, so we need to address that and understand that. So I don’t have clear principle but those are some of the things that I’m groping with. So ultimately we have to get into societal responsibility. The imperial responsibility is also an issue. Even conservatives in Japan told me that we missed our chance because when the Emperor was absolved of responsibility, then everyone got off the hook. Because they all thought they did it for the Emperor. So you can't retry that.

One of the things we are trying in the project is that – one person is writing an essay on the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. Looking in to the procedure and legal argumentation and she has chapter on Tojo and the guilt, so we asked her to do the hypothetical, that if it was both Tojo and Hirohito on trial, given the evidence at the time, would Hirohito be convicted or not.

PROFESSOR KWAK: One thing I was so struck by Japa-
Chinese public and sentiment was this. I met some scholars, well trained persons but they don't want to talk about historical reconciliation or some kinds of issues like comfort women case.

PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI: Why don't they?

PROFESSOR KWAK: I don't know. Actually I tried to persuade them to have some kind of comfort women conference next year for that issue. So I was at Waseda University, I met some people however no one actually tried to get any idea. Why we have to talk this at this moment? So my question is that who is going to work on that societal level kind of historical reconciliation? Scholars? Japanese scholars don't want to say anything about that.

PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI: Yeah, right. Well, there have been some Japanese scholars who have devoted much of their career on this. Like Tanaka Yuki was so credible and there are others and what is not known, and I told Japanese diplomats this: if you go to Asian Women's Fund website you will see a number of working papers because the government commissioned studies about comfort women as, first the foundation for the Kono Statement. But also the Kono Statement stated there has to be more research. And so there was research. And there are all these papers that are written in Japanese. And I talked to the diplomat at the Japan embassy at Washington who was in charge of stopping the House of Representative resolution. First of all he did not even know of those papers and then secondly, I said, “Why don't you translate them?” And show that the Japanese government is making the best effort to find out to exactly what happened. And then he told me he did not have any money and he said “can you go to an American foundation?” And I said this is in your national interest to do that. But these are all Japanese scholars, so there are Japanese scholars who are willing to do that. And so I think to engage them and broaden the circle. Some like Tanaka Yuki who are much more critical of the state. He's not welcome at these State functions. But there are others who are more mainstream who have written some very good essays. If I had money at the Sigur Center I would get people to translate that. But I really think that it's the responsibility of the Japanese government.

PROFESSOR YONG WOOK LEE: Actually, I have one question and one comment, the question is about that you mention that now some DPJ members recognized that it's Japan's national interest to have historical re-conciliation with Asian neighbors. My question was why did it not happen in 1940s and 1950s? And then you mention that because Japan's DPJ members that Japan needs to maintain influence in Asia and the precondition for that is to make historical reconciliation but that means that maybe you mention the importance of domestic memory politics. I think that's very important, but also you need to pay attention to security/economic relations.

Actually maybe Japan figured that in the 40s and 50s that it didn't need Asian neighbors. And then now, China and Southeast Asia and others, rising Asia so in other words this external security/economic relations is maybe a driver for the politics of historical memory I want to know what you think.

Second comment is that I read a paper about the making of a common historical text book about Japan, Korea and China. What's missing is their discussion on modern times, modernity and their treatment of so-called Western imperialism. Japan needs to face its own imperialism.

But Asians, our own interpretation of modernity, is it good or is it bad? They kind of missed this.

Asians, for their own historical reconciliation need to face how we interpret Western influence, Western modernity. That way you know that maybe open the road for Japan, China and Korea.

Japan may have done something good in Korea even during tough times. Actually all this discussion should be linked to Western expansion, 1970s.

PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI: Well on the first issue, the thing we often forget is that the Liberal Democratic Party
in the 1950s had an interest. It is not deep reconciliation but thin reconciliation with Southeast Asia and Australia. And so look at the diplomatic trips by Kishi Nobusuke. He makes two trips, he goes to Australia, so he understands that Japan has to repair the damage. With that the commercial relationships begin to develop. He also does that with South East Asia. The Philippines refused to sign the San Francisco Peace treaty. And there were all the settlements that had to take a place. Kishi saw that he wanted to have much more equal relationship with the U.S. and one way of doing that would be to have one foot firmly on the ground in Asia. So he did that in Southeast Asia and Australia and Ikeda Hayato continues that. I think the LDP saw that. The other is on China. And here with Japan and ROC there is reconciliation. Now, Japan did not go to all the way and the ROC goes a long way because of their strategic interests, but they developed that. One of the things is that Japan did not want to go too far with reconciliation with the ROC because they wanted to leave open the possibility with relations with the PRC. But there the Cold War divide prevents them from doing that. So then the big question is Korea. Why didn't Japan do that?

My reading of Yoshida when I looked at this, I think there were two things.

I think first, he was a traditional imperialist. And he had nothing to apologize for with colonial rule over Korea. Those genes are all the way to Aso Taro. So basically Japan was right on that.

And the number one issue he was concerned about with Korea was what to do with the repatriation of Koreans. And that's, even in terms of the negotiations in the 50s, for normalization, that's the issue. It was not about historical reconciliation.

And the second is, interestingly, there is a strategic reason for not reconciling with Korea because the fear always is that Japan will have to get involved in the security of the Korean Peninsula. That was reason why he refused the Pacific pact idea. Because he thought this was the American way to get Japan to participate in the Korean War. Those two things kept Japan from moving, whereas the same kind of logic would push Japan in the direction of Southeast Asia and Australia.

Now the other question is, why then didn't the Social Democratic Party, the socialist party push this issue in the 50s. And here, the leader of socialist party goes to China. I read that speech and it's a speech about American imperialism, and the Cold War thing and how Japan should be against the U.S. Alliance. There's nothing about an apology towards China. You would've thought, you could've said Japan was horrible in all this. One reason for this, I think is that the Social Democratic Party was not just an enabler but a supporter of Japanese militarists. And so their hands are dirty in this and they would rather not talk about it. And it's not really until the 1960s that they kind of overcome that and then they start having compensations, study groups and dealing with the history and the social democrats in Germany, credentials as being an opponent of Nazism is clear so I think that explains it.

And in the 1960s Japan goes on for normalization of relations with Korea because of the economic interest.

**PROFESSOR CHAESUNG CHUN:** Three brief comments maybe I am repeating the questions.

You just talked about strategic context of historical reconciliation. I think that is very important because as you know debate of history is up to scholars it is about the evidence and discussion. History text book and history education is quite political, because it forms the national identity.

So if there is no reason why South Korea and Japan or China wants to have common regional strategic identity for peace, then even though we have many humanitarian people in these regions we cannot find a strategic motive to push these people into the historical reconciliation. So we have to put this agenda into more strategic contexts and is there any future orientated strategic region we start historical reconciliation? So it is not really about the past. It is about the future. So I wonder if we can find that among there three or four countries.

Second one is even though we have vast strategic
common interest we should have common values you know. Across history there is always dialogue between the past and the present. So if we don't have common lens or common value through which if we look at the history for example liberalism or if I can make the world regionalism not cosmopolitanism. If we have some common view of the region, then ok, let's make this region as a democratic alliance for example including China and North Korea. And then against this value system we can look at historical happenings. Then we can have some historical common ground which you can find the basis for reconciliation.

Third factor is generational factor you know South Korea youngsters they are nationalist but in some sense they are also cosmopolitan. They are quite interested in Africa's famine problems for example. So in the future context of historical reconciliation it will be viewed differently by these youngsters. So we have to think about changing identity between Korean young people and Japanese young people rather than you know old people who really remember what happened in the past. So they will youngster will remember past that some kind of myth or drama. So, how to use those arising identities and how to form a common identity? It might be important.

PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI: So three questions, one in terms of the strategic interest and I think it hinges a lot on the attitude towards China. And, you know kind of broad strategic picture is how do we deal with the rise of China. And if our view about dealing with the rise of China is that we need to balance, and then maybe if China is threatening then we should contain China. Then, some might argue, that the historical reconciliation, at least between Japan and China, may not be good. And I’ve heard neo-nationalist in Japan say, "Well, it's good, if the Chinese leadership criticize the visits by the Prime Minister to Yatsu-kuni, that's good because that gets young people angry and they will become more anti-Chinese."

So if you’ve already decided that containing China is the preferred option, then I think there is, there isn't this history problem at least between Japan and China. And, it might be useful. But, I think, as I you know, still firmly believe that both America and Japan feel that an engagement policy to try to stabilize and to overcome, you know, the historical track record of power transitions leading to hegemonic conflicts. If you still believe that, then there is a strategic imperative to promote historical reconciliation because power transitions are hard enough to manage just based on material capabilities, and they could lead to security dilemmas. And then if you have the distortions, I mean just from a rational actor point of view is hard, but then if you have the distortions that are caused by emotional, in the kind of rational calculation, then I think, it almost becomes nearly impossible to manage the security dilemma, and so therefore, there is a strategic imperative to manage.

Now on the Korean issue. I think from the American and Japanese perspective, there was a concern that, to use Victor Cha’s term, Korea might become “unanchored,” and would drift towards China and one of the things that might cause this is the dispute or drive this is the dispute on history between Japan and Korea. From a strategic perspective that is sub-optimal for the United States and therefore we need to prevent that. And then the other is that it would be embarrassing if two allies had a military clash over a territorial dispute. So I think, that fear has given us a motivation. Then, the final, and I think this is somewhat weaker at least from the American perspective, a little bit stronger on the Japanese side, but the notion of an East Asian community. If that is seen as a positive strategic objective that we should work towards, then the history issue is a major obstacle and so you’ve got to clear that. So the economic interactions can only take you so far. It's not just an economic community but a community where war is unthinkable. Then you need this historical reconciliation. And I don't know to what extent Korea is now says this is what we really want in the future. I think the Japanese are more inclined to this. The United States the least inclined but I think they are becoming more positive.

To move towards common values issue and I know Gill Rozman has been working with this notion of liberal-
ism, and I am not sure – I read some of his papers in draft form – what a liberal view on past history in East Asia is. I think at a minimum it would stress things like human rights. So a liberal reaction would be comfort women – that's a horrible thing. But what about fire-bombings and atomic-bombings? What is the liberal perspective of that? One can argue that what liberalism means that you do what is necessary to preserve democracy, and that was necessary. Or liberalism means the ends don't justify the means so I think it's ambiguous.

The other thing is – I think in terms of atrocities. What the liberal view on atrocities might be. It's not that liberal states don't commit atrocities but it may be more what liberal states do when you have atrocities. And what Garry Bass argues "to stay the hand of vengeance" that normally you can just shoot them but you have to go through a trial. But then liberal states might want to try war criminals of other states, but do liberal states accept trials for their own? So this is the big test – why doesn't the United States join the International Criminal Court? So I guess there are real limits in my mind to liberalism, at least even the United States, which has a self perception as being the epitome of the liberal state, its track-record is dubious. So I am not sure about the liberal lens.

Regionalism, I guess I see it as leading towards community building. I don't know if regionalism in this community building, you need to have explicit kind of agreement on particular values, possibly. For the United States, its conception is the agreement on political values. But do societal values, social values, does that become part of this regional thing? Most extreme form would be this notion of Asian values. So collective interest over individual interest; tension with liberalism; or are there values, economic values? I am not sure that the discussion on Asian values or community building has really engaged that. It's more kind of "we don't like and there is something American value standard, while admirable, there are a lot of things we don't like." But I don't think there has been a positive annunciation of that and whether there was an effort to promote them.

On the identity, I like the concept of identity. It's attractive. But every time I try to wrap my hands around it, I am not sure what it is. What is the identity of youth? When I look at Japanese, it doesn't come up. They are just trying to… they are living in a state of half-anime, insecurity. They don't think when I wake up, "oh, I'm Japanese and this is the motherland." And I think this is precisely what Abe was frustrated about. It's that there isn't enough of that. I can wrap my hands around a state program to try to shape the national identity, and I think that was what Abe was trying to do. But whether or not there is some kind of clear national identity out there that the Japanese embrace, I'm not certain. It's almost like a black. That to me was – this is what I learned from reading Murakami Huruki's works in underground. For me, when I see a kind of interest in Kobayashi Yoshinori, it's not that "wow, Japanese young people are embracing this narrative." It's more like reading pornography. It's titillating, that's it. It doesn't lead to then I'm going to go and sign up to the Japanese Defense Force so I can project the Senkaku Islands. The public opinion poll: What if Japan were attacked? Japanese young people say they will either surrender or flee. This is why the Japanese nationalism, the rise in Japanese nationalism – I wrote an essay an American interest on this -- it's kind of agitation. You are not going to make fun of me. It's that kind of attitude and that's it. It doesn't lead to political action. My hunch is that it's different in Korea. Koreans are willing to fight and die for their country.

**PROFESSOR NAE YOUNG LEE:** I am a director of the Center of Public Opinion. Amid North Korea's second nuclear test and threats from North Korea, we asked the same question. 'When North Korea attacks, are you willing to defend or sacrifice for the defense of our nation?' About 60 percent said 'yes' but among the young generation, less than that. The trend is similar. My sense is that Korean young people are still nationalistic and have sense of patriotism but an increasing number of Korean students are becoming similar. They don't care about it. I think it is part of globalization. The trend is similar but still Korean stu-
PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI: Probably Japan is on the lower end and I think that is what creates a sense of crisis.

PROFESSOR LEE (N): Yes, here is similar. A sense of preemption is embraced in all generations. The young generation doesn’t have any idea on sense of threat from North Korea because they don’t have the experience of war and the old days of poverty. Is there any question? Let me ask you a question. Our project team name is the identity group or identity concept.

PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI: I would love to hear how you define identity and how you measure either qualitatively or quantitatively. I mean how do you know that this is an identity when you see it?

PROFESSOR LEE (N): As you mentioned, the concept of identity is very ambiguous. But, as you know, our whole project is funded by the MacArthur for Asian security issues. Among the three divisions, one team is trying to do research on identity. It means that regional identity is maybe overlapping with national identity. How do you create a kind of regional identity as you can find in European cases? The assumption is if the East Asian people share some common identity, maybe to some extent our conflict or rivalry can be reduced. Maybe in the European case, that is true. Maybe beside some of the economic interest, or functionalist explanation, creating the European Union, many constructivists focused on identity in the European Union and overcoming all the obstacles and hurdles.

Obviously in East Asia, at this point, we do not have a clear common identity. Whether there is a small territory issue, or textbook issue, or nationalistic animosity or sentiment to become clear and thin the level of regional identities disappear. So then a question is how can we create it or some common identity in East Asia? Maybe that concept is relevant.

There are many ways we have tried to measure common values or common identity by asking some questions to public survey. We plan to conduct a cross-national survey. We have done many ways in cross-national survey such as soft power and the image of each other. But always the public survey is the limited value measure on the perception or thinking of each other. But still that’s the only way to objectively gaze the different perception or the image of each other. So I would hear whether there would still be a sense of security in East Asia Security. But the concept of identity is relevant and then how to measure the identity. So far we tried to find some way to do our research. That is the one question so I would like to hear your feedback on the overall idea.

Second question is, from my limited experience with Japanese intellectuals, I feel Japanese intellectuals, or government policy makers or even some journalists tend to think that some of historical reconciliation work should be done mainly because neighboring countries strongly ask. It is a responsive work rather than more active tasks Japanese society should deal with. When you mentioned some of the new leaders have much positive perception or idea of historical reconciliation, because they understand that without historical reconciliation, Japanese national interest would be damaged. But still that understanding is very reactive rather than proactive. When there is no national interest involved, then they believe that historical reconciliation can be delayed. Still the assumption is that. So it means that the IRist believe that historical reconciliation in Japan or in any of the country is not to resolve the conflict between two countries. It showed ability or capability of one country of their past wrongdoing. So many intellectuals in China, Korea wonder if Japanese society, especially ordinary people, understands past history. My sense is the level of education and teaching of history is very limited in public schools in Japan. Also Japanese intellectuals try to avoid this. So, historical reconciliation should be done because neighboring countries strongly request it. In that way some kind of self-reflection cannot be done within that context. Is there any way to more practical search for persuading historical reconciliation? To do so maybe I think
more a new way of education or public education on history issue or the understanding why historical reconciliation is needed in Japanese society – not just for neighboring countries but for Japanese society itself. Maybe without historical reconciliation or historical reflection, Japan cannot be a leader in this region or Japan cannot be a genuinely democratic society. That kind of new understanding is critical but my view is remote from that ideal situation. You mentioned new leaders have a new sense but still there is a limit.

PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI: Excellent questions. On the issue of identity, and something more than national identity and regional identity, and what might be the basis of that, in reading the constructivist literature and the way they talk about the European identity, I remember Katzenstein when he says that Germans think themselves as Europeans first rather than Germans. So what is Europe beyond a kind of a place? Is it a set of values, or a set of institutions, or a notion of common history that shared tragedy of two world wars? I guess I am not certain what a European identity is because every now and then you see nations coming up against. It is not that nations have disappeared. So I think there are certain symbols of Europeans and definitely the Euro is a major symbol. The institution of European parliament, etc. those are symbols. I guess what I find missing in Asia are commonly agreed symbols what Asia is. There are the raw materials of creating such things, whether it would be cultural - some people talk about the “chopstick culture” or Confucianism – but if you are trying to construct a regional identity, I am not sure that I see a kind of ideologist creating this: the whole notion of pan-Asianism. It's not being generated. In a sense it is defined in negative terms. Perhaps the most vigorous activist on behalf of this Asianism might have been Mahatir (bin Mohammed). But it's a response to kind of Western. It's a negative but who are the Pan-Asian thinkers? You have them more in the previous time. That's why I find this notion of regional identity kind of hollow and at this point there is no content to it. I don't see any thinkers. Maybe there is someone in Korea but I don't know of it. So I am very skeptical.

Much more powerful to me is American Neo-cons, who want to say that it's not an Asian identity but it's a coalition of democracies. So let's divide Asia so we have democratic Asia versus non-democratic Asia. At least I know what it is, but I don't know what an Asian version of Asian identity is at all.

Now on the national interest: Just because national interest drives reconciliation policies, I don't think it is necessarily reactive. I think these are different dimensions. One can be reactive because of a national interest respective or you can be proactive. For example, the Schuman Plan, which was, I think, critical for European reconciliation and France, Germany steal and coal community and if you read his rationale, it brings tears to your eyes because what it's basically saying is that by having this steal and coal community, it makes war impossible. It's the ultimate confidence you measure. If any effort to mobilize the war would take place, it would have to utilize, its common. That's the beginning of security community building. That was proactive and it was based on national interest. I feel that if there isn't a national interest reason, then there isn't a strong motivation. And I think in Japan, it has been reactive because most Japanese felt that there wasn't a strong national interest – so it was a very mild national interest. And in some sense, it's because Japan could rely upon the United States. They could get isolated in Asia but it still had the United States. But now, that's no longer possible. So I think it's becoming a stronger motivator there.

I think what you are trying to get out is something more noble that a country pursues reconciliation because there is moral imperative. It's a self-respect that by doing this, you can find look through in the mirror and not feel bad about yourself. And I think that would be great. But there are some leaders who feel that way. I think Billy Brandt was such a person. There are certain leaders who feel that way. But I think they are pretty rare in terms of visionaries. And I don't see that in the Japanese case. I can't find too many people like that in the elites. I think Ienaga
Saburo was a person like that. When I look at politicians, there are very few, maybe Murayama was like that, and Kono Yohei is another. But it's very week. In the end, it's tied to some enlightened version of national interest rather than to do it as kind of a moral imperative.

For me, the puzzling thing about that is that moral imperative comes not from national calculations but it has some religious aspects to it. What I find missing when I studied reconciliation in Europe, of course, people like Schuman were critical and they were visionary but below religious organizations had reached out to heal the wounds of war – catholic organizations, protestant organizations. The deafening silence in North East Asia to me is puzzling: where are the religious organizations? What about the Christian groups? Now you can say in Japan, Christian groups are minority but they were very active in stopping the Yasukuni Shrine Bill. There is a vibrant Christian community in Korea. Isn't there a dialogue, or what about Buddhism? Buddhism teaches us compassion and forgiveness. Why can't they reach across? I ask that question at a conference in Tokyo when I was just there last week and no one could give me an answer, except just to say that these organizations are kind of nationally. But that begs a question, why is that? Because I think, that provided this kind of moral motivation beyond a national interest, which we are seeing.

Now, reflection on his Korean democracy: I delivered a paper kind about America. One Japanese friend cynically said, “you better be careful because what conservatives will say is that ‘okay, the Japanese will follow the American model rather than a German model.’” I don't think democracies are good at reconciliation. They make progress on some things but on other things, democracies are self-righteous about their cause. So I think it's extremely difficult. Now I hope the United States will move in this direction. There was a conservative friend of mine, who is very critical of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, and when Abu Ghraib happened he wrote an essay. This is a test about the United States’ willing to stand up for its principles. I’m hopeful that the U.S. can look at its own history as a democracy and kind of established the high standard. But in mind the U.S. has not established a high standard.

One conservative academic says what Japan should do is to look at the global standards of what they do and find the median and just do above it. And if you find that, it's a pretty low bar and in some sense Germany is unusual. And it's unusual because, as my Jewish friend says, the Holocaust is singular, it's unique. Some people might disagree with that but that's the self-perception. An American historian said that historians agreed that the U.S. war against Mexico was horrible and totally unjustified but what American politician would then apologize to Mexico for the war against Mexico?

So the Japanese response is they can understand what Koreans are asking the Japanese to do but it's a very high standard. We wish we could do it but there are a lot of people who can't. What country – it's always Germany – but what other country does it? I always look at France and Algeria. There is an apology but then Sarkozy goes to Algeria and it's all the ambiguity of a Japanese statement towards Korea.

PROFESSOR LEE (N): Okay, is there any other question? Thank you for your wonderful presentation and excellent questions and frank opinion.

PROFESSOR MOCHIZUKI: I'm firmly committed to reconciliation but I guess one of the things is to understand how challenging it is. We need to understand this.