Roundtable Discussion of Richard J. Samuels’s *Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan*

T. J. Pempel, Sheldon Garon, Junko Kato, Yves Tiberghien, and Richard J. Samuels

Richard Samuels’s book *Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan* raises a number of important issues concerning political leadership and the role individual leaders can play in a nation’s history. The book won the 2003 Marraro Prize from the Society for Italian Historical Studies and the 2004 Jervis-Schroeder Prize for the best book in International History and Politics, awarded by the International History and Politics section of the American Political Science Association. This is a roundtable involving four critical essays and the author’s response. Discussion centers on the book, its methods, its broader applicability, and the ways in which it dovetails with other intellectual concerns, particularly as these apply to contemporary East Asia.

**KEYWORDS:** Japan, Italy, leadership, politics, history, political choice

**Politics and Personalities**

*T. J. Pempel*

The contemporary history of East Asia pulses with the names of individual leaders—Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Park Chung Hee, Mahatir Mohammed, Chiang Kai-shek, Ferdinand Marcos, Sukarno, Lee Kwan Yew, Yoshida Shigeru, Kim Il Sung, to name only a few of the more prominent. Such personalities are commonly credited with having played titanic roles in shaping their respective countries and, in
some cases, East Asia as a whole. While analysts would be hard pressed to examine the political history of most Asian countries without according considerable attention to individuals like these, it is equally true that each of these individuals operated within highly specific historical circumstances; each had to confront specific socioeconomic structures and global political forces as well as domestic structures of class, economic endowments, and so forth. As Marx famously alleged in the Eighteenth Brumaire, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it under circumstances of their own choosing.”

Richard Samuels’s book *Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan* addresses head-on this central tension between the role of individuals and the broader structural constraints under which they operate and thus has broad implications for the study of Asian politics and of politics more generally. Like his prior contributions, Samuels’s book offers an exceptionally rich and archivally driven mixture of history and politics, an explicitly comparative content, and a level of lengthy detail that can be frustrating to any reader in search of a takeaway message of twenty-five words or less. As a consequence of the book’s inherent richness as well as its potential applicability to the broader problem of leaders and political history in East Asia, the book deserves close scrutiny.

The problem Samuels tackles—that of individual leaders and their capacity to shape historical events—grapples with the classic tension between structure and agency. For Samuels, the focus is on agents as individuals rather than interest groups, parties, masses of protesters, churches, or the other collective actors that played a critical role in shaping the political history of Japan and Italy. And it is here that the book makes its most positive contributions and also faces its greatest difficulties.

The role of the individual as shaper of history has a long and highly diverse lineage. Thomas Carlyle gave us his theory of the Great Man in History. Henry Kissinger offered a compelling political biography of Bismarck that argued persuasively for the impact of his personal decisions on the history of Prussia and even more broadly on Europe. E. H. Carr argued that an outstanding individual is at once a product and an agent of the historical process. Erik Erickson examined the personal psychological complexes of Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther, showing how their individual interior struggles resonated with the collective psychological dilemmas of the times in which they lived. This psychological congruence between leader and general public allowed Gandhi and Luther to resolve their own personal psychological problems on a
much grander, cosmic scale. For Samuels, the most instructive student of leadership is Machiavelli, whose work was devoted to exploring the tactics by which the clever leader could gain and hold power.

This book and its problematique is one with which I have struggled for some time. That creativity is a trait of the most astute political leaders is beyond question. In one memorable example from the political novel *The Last Hurrah*, the central character, Frank Skeffington, a crusty machine school mayor, modeled on Frank Curley of Boston, provides a quick guide to his creativity as he deals with a classical situation of pressure group politics. The city plans to erect a statue in a public square. Skeffington describes the pressures he faces to honor very different people. Irish constituents have mobilized to demand a statue of St. Patrick; the Italians want Christopher Columbus; women’s groups insist on honoring Susan B. Anthony; while the powerful Catholic pastor in the neighborhood would be most delighted with a statue of himself. Skeffington’s politically naïve nephew asks which group’s demand the mayor will finally meet. Chuckling aloud at his own cleverness, Skeffington declares that he will erect a statue to none of those being promoted. Instead, he announces gleefully, the statue will be of Mother Cabrini, “a female Catholic Italian saint. . . . Let’s see any one of them oppose her!” he exults triumphantly.

The Skeffington approach mirrors that of Machiavelli—or Bill Clinton. Only the most feckless politician responds to competing pressures by allowing a complete victory to one group at the expense of other powerful competitors. Political success demands the capacity to generate creative alternatives that will keep most groups minimally satisfied while alienating as few as possible. In the jargon of political science, this involves finding “win sets” not previously seen. The skillful leader creates a synthetic solution to some particular problem that does not simply respond to one or another competing pressure but offers a resolution that opens new ground but still wins support. John Waterbury examines the critical character of leaders’ choices and capacity to build reform coalitions from contesting interests as a way to achieve economic adjustments. In other cases, the leader’s creativity may involve some mixture of co-optation or expropriation of ideas raised by potential opponents, the kind of tactics analyzed by Daniel Treisman in his work on Argentina and Brazil.

Tactical flexibility and creativity are vital political skills widely recognized by practitioners as well as political analysts. But any individual’s long-term impact almost always rests on more than short-term tactical cleverness. In what ways does a single individual create the
kind of long-term legacy that puts his or her unmistakable stamp on history? How does the individual influence what Charles Tilly has called “big structures, large processes, and huge comparisons?”

It is on this point that leadership studies face their greatest difficulty: demonstrating how any country’s particular history would have been different had another individual faced the same situation or how some other individual would most probably not have made similar choices. Ultimately, establishing the causal connection between a specific individual and a set of historical outcomes is too often simply assumed rather than demonstrated by students of “great leaders”; they were visibly around when things happened so they must have been personally responsible for the outcomes that occurred on their watch. But actually establishing their causal impact is more difficult than demonstrating correlation between officeholder and action. This is the major puzzle that most students of leadership must confront, and that Samuels tackles head-on.

For Samuels, the causal key to establishing the impact of particular leaders lies not simply in their idiosyncratic ingenuity, nor in the ways they stretch their structural constraints, but more fundamentally in their ability to create an institutional legacy they then bequeath to history. Samuels stresses the fact that the successful leader may well be a revolutionary in creating new institutions, but equally important is the one who redeployed heterogeneous “fragments” or bricolage from the past to recreate the future. In both cases, however, personal impact on a nation’s destiny comes from implanting institutions that can “lock in” a leader’s preferences for the country’s future.

How different leaders manage to stretch their particular constraints and create such institutions is the central subject of Samuels’s book. For him, three strategies predominate—inspiration, material interest, and fear. And the different leaders he examines typically rely on different mixtures of all three.

Methodologically, the book relies on a series of paired comparisons of specific leaders in the two countries at roughly similar points in time while analyzing the particular choices each made in the face of roughly similar historical constraints and opportunities. Despite the disdainful responses Samuels notes that he found in interviewing both Japanese and Italian leaders when he suggested it, the two countries in fact have experienced many roughly similar historical circumstances—late modernization, a period of liberalism and growth in the 1920s, fascism, being on the losing side in World War II, economic devastation, foreign occupation, subsequent economic recovery, Cold War alliances
with the United States, one-party conservative dominance, among a
host of other similarities.

Yet such similarities should not obscure the many differences in
how the two countries dealt with these and other historical parallels.
Samuels argues convincingly that, among other things, the two modern-
ized in different ways, showed two different faces of fascism, and had a
postwar political center more open to capture by the ideological right in
Japan but by the ideological left in Italy—and that these differences
were the result of particular choices by particular leaders. To underscore
the ways in which the Japanese and Italian trajectories diverged,
Samuels pairs leaders who catalyzed or resisted political change despite
“great forces”; leaders who despite similar constraints had what he calls
“different conversations with history”; and those who made choices that
were not overdetermined. Some twenty-three leaders are examined in
depth, typically in pairs. They include men present at the nineteenth-
century modernization efforts of both countries; those who played key
roles in the rejection of liberalism and the adoption of corporatism in the
1920s–1930s; Mussolini who is seen as individualistically authoritarian
in Italy while Japanese authoritarianism was state-driven; and those who
played key roles in shaping the post–World War II and post–Cold War
trajectories of both countries.

The book is basically convincing in its overall argument. At the same
time, I would raise two broad criticisms. First of all, history helps. The
analysis showing linkages between key individuals and the institutional
legacies they left behind is far more convincing when one can examine
50–100 years of historical evidence about the long-term power of individ-
ually created institutions such as the Meiji Constitution or Japanese indus-
trial policy. It is more difficult to be convinced of the specific role and the
long-lasting impact of contemporary leaders such as Achille Occhetto and
Silvio Berlusconi or Ozawa Ichiro and Ishihara Shintaro. The more con-
temporary the leader the shorter his or her institutional legacy actually is,
and hence the more difficult it is to establish their impacts convincingly.
These particular individuals may prove—eventually—to have exercised
substantial impacts on the political history of their countries, but those
impacts are more difficult to assert with confidence as they continue to
play their parts actively and with uncertain results.

In fairness, Samuels treats these individuals as laying out potential
national choices, rather than having already put in place the institutions
that will ensure specific directions. But there is little to ensure that cur-
rent national choices as articulated by the leaders on whom he focuses
will not be outshone in two or three years by someone creating new, as yet unseen, choices—the national equivalent of Skeffington’s Mother Cabrini—that might eventually win out. Ultimately, his methodology makes it highly problematic to assess the impact of leaders who are only midway through their parts rather than those who have long since left the stage but for whom the applause or the boos continue to resonate.

Quite obviously, Japan’s current prime minister, Koizumi Junichiro, provides the perfect case of someone who today looks to be playing a major and personally significant role, but who might well prove to be one of Japanese history’s many fireflies. The same is surely true of others grabbing regular headlines today, whether Li Ka-shing, Hu Jin-tao, or Kim Jong II. In each case, their legacies may well prove to be subject to who follows each of them and how much their successors abide by the constraints to which they fall heir—or the courage and capacity with which they themselves challenge what are bound to be still embryonic institutions.

The second question is less methodologically difficult, but inevitably an issue in any study of leaders and individual personalities: Why study one particular individual and not another? For the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan, Samuels gives us Kishi Nobusuke but not Tanaka Kakuei, who was in fact the architect of LDP patronage, one who shifted power from bureaucrats to politicians and also the one who most successfully co-opted the policy agenda of Japan’s then seriously challenging political left.

Samuels concentrates on Ozawa and Ishihara but not Murayama Tomiichi, despite the fact that many would say Murayama single-handedly sold out the agenda of the left and eviscerated Japan’s only major opposition party. And for those who would stress the increasing role of non-Japanese in shaping corporate reforms in that country, a case could be made for an examination of Carlos Ghosn of Nissan, who may well have created a new pattern of corporate organization that shifts Japanese business models in fundamental ways.

These criticisms notwithstanding, the book is monumental and challenging. It offers a potentially vital method by which to examine the impact of individuals on history—focused comparisons of different leaders who faced roughly similar situations in their countries, but whose different choices paved the road to alternative futures. Moreover, even if one does not fully accept Samuels’s interpretation of the impact of each and every individual, the overall historical sweep of the book, as well as the sensitive and in-depth portraits of the leaders he
studies, makes this a book that will reward any careful reader, even one who draws different conclusions.

T. J. Pempel is II Han New Professor of Political Science and director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California–Berkeley. His most recent books include *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region* and *Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific*.

**A Historian’s Take**

*Sheldon Garon*

Richard Samuels’s *Machiavelli’s Children* has emerged as one of the most inspiring, oft-cited books in the fields of Japanese politics and history alike. In his focus on leadership in both Japanese and Italian history, the author moreover returns us to an earlier age of the grand historical, comparative analysis of political economies. One thinks of Barrington Moore’s magisterial *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* and the several comparative studies of fascism. Yet to say that Samuels “returns” to this tradition understates the novelty of his book. The scholars who crafted these earlier analyses discussed the “Japanese case,” yet they generally lacked a deep understanding of Japanese history and politics (and, unlike Samuels, they could not read Japanese sources). Samuels significantly advances the study of comparative political economy by prominently inserting the Japanese case, the modern world’s first non-Western power and industrial economy. In addition, he may be the first Japan-centered scholar to write a genuinely comparative history. He treats the Japanese and Italian cases equally, relying on archival and secondary sources written in Italian as well as Japanese. Samuels inspires us to recognize that students of Japan are in an exceptional position to contribute to the study of other polities and global phenomena. Japan specialists, after all, have the “comparative advantage” of being able to master Western cases (and a European language or two) more easily than scholars of the United States and Europe might master Japanese and Japan. Thus far, however, few have broken out of the confines of “Japanese studies,” as Samuels does so admirably in this fine book.
Among its achievements, *Machiavelli’s Children* has spawned a productive discussion among political scientists and historians over the interpretation of key developments in Japanese political history since the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In my capacity as a historian of modern and contemporary Japan, I would like to comment on four aspects of Samuels’s analysis.

**The Utility of Comparison**

It is refreshing to see Japan historically compared to a European nation-state that is *not* Germany. Popular histories often depict Japan as having followed German models and, indeed, the problematic German path of development from the late nineteenth century until 1945. The problem with such comparisons is that they generally begin with the wartime Axis between Nazi Germany and authoritarian Japan, and then read the theme of Germanic “abnormality” back on to all of prewar Japanese development from the Meiji era. By comparing Japan with Italy, Samuels instead argues that Japan faced the “normal” problems of emerging nations in the late nineteenth century. Italy and Japan both struggled to catch up to the leading powers, define national identity, and cope with issues of modernity and democracy. Samuels here makes an important contribution to situating Japan within a more global context. He also stimulates us to consider comparisons between Japan and several other European powers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During those years, all the powers were, in a sense, playing catch-up—engaged in the contest to transform themselves into mobilized nation-states, reinvent national identities, and leapfrog their rivals (including the British, who believed themselves to be losing ground to Germany).

Samuels also demonstrates the value of rigorous comparison in his critique of Alexander Gerschenkron’s influential thesis on the economics of “late development” (p. 87). The prevailing scholarship has commonly applied the term *late developer* to Meiji-era Japan not only as a label but as an explanation. That is, Japan’s penchant for state intervention in the economy and its hostility to foreign investment are invariably linked to its late development, vis-à-vis the free trade British. Samuels persuasively challenges such explanations, observing that leaders of the so-called late developers made very different choices. Like Russia, Argentina, and Egypt, late-nineteenth-century Italy depended on foreign capital in its industrialization. Japanese oligarchs, by contrast, eschewed all foreign loans from 1873 to 1897, choosing to finance the critical first
phase of economic development from domestic capital and taxation. These choices, in turn, require explanation.

The Importance of Leaders

Samuels is equally bold in arguing that “leaders matter” throughout modern Japanese history. In so doing, he writes against the grain in Japanese history, where the scholarship has variously explored the interplay of ideas, culture, social relations, institutions, and external events. His call to spotlight the phenomenon of leadership is certainly welcome, but I would caution against confining our analyses to great leaders, as Samuels has done. It may be possible to study only the top leaders during the Meiji era (1868–1912), when a small body of oligarchs prevailed. However, by the 1920s, leadership had become more diffuse, and we would do well to research the thought and behavior of many midlevel leaders who played important roles in changing policies and institutions. These would include higher civil servants, politicians, intellectuals, and societal activists. The question is, did these people exercise leadership as Samuels defined the term? That is, did they overcome constraints and set new courses? I would argue that occasionally they did. An alliance between the relatively liberal leaders of the Kenseikai and the Home Ministry’s reformist “social bureaucrats” during the 1920s, for example, contributed to the enactment of universal manhood suffrage and advanced various social and labor policies.14

In the effort to highlight the influence of the great leaders, Samuels may have similarly overstated the role of the Meiji oligarchs in setting Japan on the “brutal road” that culminated in authoritarianism and World War II. He writes: “It was a remarkably short distance from the Meiji Constitution of 1890 to the Japanese garrison state of the 1930s” (p. 65). Choices made by the oligarchs Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, he argues, would constitutionally constrain the development of liberal government in the ensuing decades while creating a dangerously independent military. Samuels articulates a venerable scholarly position here, but I do think he overlooks the dynamism within Japanese society after the 1890s, as well as the complex mix of domestic and external developments that affected Japan’s course in ways unanticipated by the Meiji oligarchs. As Andrew Gordon has shown in his account of “imperial democracy,” new social forces and a mass media arose after 1900 to challenge the elite’s political order.15 Moreover, transnational currents—notably democracy after World War I and fascism during the 1930s—powerfully recast Japanese politics. Accord-
ingly, the 1930s system should not be regarded as a return to the illiberalism of the Meiji leadership, but may be more usefully interpreted as a new type of mass-based authoritarianism that ironically built upon the democratic and populist developments of the 1920s. Some Japanese historians intriguingly discuss this phenomenon in terms of “democracy without liberalism” or “grass-roots fascism.” In short, when we consider the complex and unpredictable mix of these social, intellectual, and geopolitical developments, there would seem to be obvious limits to ascribing political outcomes to the decisions made by a few leaders some three decades earlier.

Similarly, with respect to the independence of the military, Samuels tends to draw too straight a line between Yamagata’s efforts to insulate the military from politics and the military’s willful disregard of civilian cabinets in the 1930s. Under Yamagata, other oligarchs, and their protégés, the military rarely (or successfully) challenged the government’s authority prior to the late 1920s. The high command’s eventual assertion of independence drew in part from the constitutional ambiguity and institutional arrangements established by the Meiji leadership, but it also derived from contingent developments, such as the ascendancy of General Tanaka Giichi in party politics, instability in China, the Great Depression, and right-wing furor over the London Naval Treaty (1930).

**Which Leaders Are to Be Profiled?**

Samuels sets himself the ambitious task of pairing Japanese and Italian leaders, a highly original method that superbly illuminates similarities and differences in leadership in the two cases. One can only marvel at how well he has chosen his couples. Nonetheless, the question arises whether, in a given case, the analysis would change had he chosen other leaders.

In the first instance, Samuels compared the two prominent prime ministers, Giovanni Giolitti and Hara Takashi (Kei). Unquestionably this is a useful binary in illustrating the ruling parties’ contrasting responses to the rise of social movements, particularly labor, in the two nations during the 1910s and 1920s. Whereas Italy’s Giolitti chose to accommodate and integrate organized labor, Japan’s Hara opposed working-class enfranchisement and would not extend de jure rights to organize and strike to workers (although he did generally reduce levels of official suppression). As an alternative to Hara, however, Samuels might have compared Giolitti with Hamaguchi Osachi, prime minister from 1929 to 1931. Far more than Hara, Hamaguchi resembled European liberal lead-
ers, like Giolitti or Lloyd George, in his determined efforts to offer significant social policies and politically appeal to mainstream trade unionists.\textsuperscript{17} It is noteworthy that Hamaguchi ultimately failed in his objectives, not because of his weaknesses as a leader, but because his bold reforms united his foes in the military, business community, and civilian right (indeed, he was mortally wounded by one critic). A discussion of Hamaguchi’s failure would only enhance Samuels’s comparative inquiry into why some strong leaders succeed in overcoming political and institutional impediments while others do not.

We might also question the focus on Kishi Nobusuke, one of postwar Japan’s leading prime ministers and political figures. On several levels, Kishi is an excellent choice, for he exhibits the “transwar” continuities in Japanese leadership (he had earlier served as an influential wartime bureaucrat and minister in the Tojo cabinet). Kishi is also effectively presented as a key architect of institutional corruption in postwar conservative politics. Yet Samuels overplays Kishi as a mainstream conservative politician in other respects. After all, in 1960, the mainstream of the Liberal Democratic Party rejected Kishi’s uncompromising campaign to eradicate the Japan Socialist Party. Instead the LDP turned to more moderate leaders like Ikeda Hayato, Miki Takeo, and labor minister Ishida Hirohide, who preferred to negotiate “social contracts” and other understandings with the labor movement and the two socialist parties.\textsuperscript{18} These politicians, in a sense, effected Giolitti’s type of inclusiveness in Japan a half-century later. Accordingly, it might have been useful to profile Ikeda Hayato, as well as Kishi. To be sure, Nakasone Yasuhiro, the maverick prime minister of the 1980s, achieved some aspects of Kishi’s vision when he succeeded in crippling the left wing of the socialist movement. Nonetheless, under conservative governments in the last four decades, the political economy of Japan—though not formal political rule—resembles the Italian case to a surprising degree. In contrast to the US mode of winner-takes-all, the Japanese political system continues to distribute an array of goods (e.g., employment-maintenance measures) to labor and many other relatively weak economic groups, such as small farmers or small retailers.

\textit{The “Normal Nation”}

Finally this book might have gone further to compare the postwar meanings of “normal nation” in Japan, as well as in Italy. Samuels makes the excellent point that in postwar Italy, “normality” has been defined as becoming more European (or, historically speaking, more
Western European). This would be a fine opportunity to consider Japan’s very different position vis-à-vis its own neighborhood, Asia. The contrast could not be starker. To those Japanese elites who urge their country to become a normal nation, “normal” generally implies that Japan ally itself more closely with the United States and culturally distance itself from the rest of Asia (much as the publicist Fukuzawa Yukichi called for a “departure from Asia” in the 1880s). The anti-Asian inflections of “normality” are strongest today among the new nationalists associated with efforts to revise Japan’s history curriculum. As I read the Japanese Society of History Textbook Reform’s “New History Textbook,” the definition of the “normal nation” possesses a history that significantly predates the 1990s. Under this definition, Japan behaved as a normal nation before World War II, when it had the status of a great power—allied to Britain, administering colonial and imperial interests in East Asia, and in the same league as the United States, France, and others. Thus, from the perspective of Japanese nationalists, to be a “normal nation” today connotes that Japan should not have to apologize to Asian peoples it once ruled because Japan before 1945 was simply doing what “normal” powers normally did—annexing disorganized, less “civilized” polities and establishing defensive lines of interests.

When we consider that influential members of the Liberal Democratic Party and even ministers of state still subscribe to this view of Japan’s recent past and its present, the current Japanese debate over becoming a “normal nation” has some disturbing aspects, to say the least. With respect to this and many other issues, Samuels’s masterful Machiavelli’s Children compels us to think more comparatively about Japan while paying closer attention to the importance of leaders in determining the course of nations.

Sheldon Garon is professor of history and East Asian studies at Princeton University. He is the author of The State and Labor in Modern Japan, which won the 1988 J. K. Fairbank Prize, and Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life.
Richard Samuels’s book raises one of the most interesting and challenging questions in the social sciences as well as in the humanities. As T. J. Pempel noted above: How much of a difference do individuals make in politics, economy, and history? Or are individuals constrained by the circumstances into which they are placed? Thus, should one focus on historical contexts and/or political economic situations rather than on individuals? Political scientists and, more broadly, social scientists seem to shy away from the study of the individual. “The new institutionalism” supports the importance of broadly defined “institutions,” including historical contexts, formal institutions, behavioral and procedural patterns, norms, and values. Would “the new institutionalism” be opposed to this book’s focus on individuals? Without directly answering this question, I want to argue that excellent scholarship strikes a subtle balance between individuals and their circumstances, regardless of what we call them—history, institutions, structures, contexts, and so on. Scholars differ in how they strike the balance that is closely related to their focus of analysis.

Let me start by commenting on rational choice theory, which allegedly has a way of analyzing individual behaviors that is different from the one in this book. Although the book makes a point of the distinctiveness of choices made by different individuals (especially the capability for political manipulation by leaders), rational choice theory applies the same rationality assumption to different individuals. In other words, the “methodological individualism” of rational choice theory pays little attention to individual distinctions; rational choice theory starts the analysis from actors who are rational in the same way and as a result assumes that any “rational actor” would behave similarly in comparable circumstances. This therefore assumes away the problem that many structural contexts may not have particular and determinant outcomes—what are defined as equilibria.

Rational choice theory takes a very different view of individuals than does this book’s focus on leadership. Nevertheless, it is useful to highlight how this book’s approach might still resonate with game theory. Let me use the example of the application of game theory to the analysis of
the arms race between two countries. In international relations, to analyze the competition and consequences in an arms race, a prisoner’s dilemma game or a game of chicken is applied. As is well known, in the prisoner’s dilemma, the best solution is the cooperation of both countries in stopping an arms buildup. The dilemma here is because it is better for both to continue the arms buildup regardless of whether one side stops or continues it. This rational strategy results in a continued race that is worse for both sides than cooperation in arms reduction. In a game of chicken, each country wants to outwit the other and continue to build up arms while making the other stop. However, if both countries continue to build up arms while expecting the other to stop, the result is a head-on collision that is not only worse than cooperation, but also fatal. This difference in the two games may be better illuminated by considering real cases. If both countries would continue an arms race and then their economies became exhausted by a heavy military burden, it would obviously have been better for both to cooperate to stop the buildup—this is a prisoner’s dilemma game. If an intensified arms buildup would cause an overall nuclear war and a nuclear winter, it is better to make either of them back down—this is a game of chicken.

If we try to gain realistic implications from game theory, the players here are leaders of the two countries who rationally choose the best strategy. The explanation of reality, however, is never exhausted in game theory. What is noteworthy here is that game theory makes an assumption about how players perceive real situations at the beginning of analysis: individual perception is not the subject of their analysis. If leaders who face a prisoner’s dilemma wrongly assume that they are playing a chicken game, their choice of strategies would prove to be erroneous. The reverse also could be true. The leaders’ capability to judge political reality and to make choices never loses its importance, regardless of the theoretical refinement of rational choice. More important, leaders may well be able to change contingencies—if the terms used in game theory change the payoff structure of the games. Such capability and behavior are analyzed and understood outside the confines of rational choice. In this regard, following the footprints of individuals in history is not only compatible with rational choice theory but is also complementary. A focus on individuals helps us to understand reality better by exploring individual perceptions and choices of behaviors on which rational choice theory assumes.

Although Samuels pays close attention to and carefully describes the historical context in which the Italian and the Japanese leaders were found, he emphasizes the distinctive choices they made, especially
their skillful political manipulation. In this regard, he refutes two different views of individuals: one of rational choice, which regards individuals as “rational,” that is, otherwise with no face and no name, and the other of new institutionalism, which analyzes individual behavior in terms of institutional constraints. For him, the differences and distinctions made by leaders are more suitable to explain and understand political economic phenomena in history. Although I could accept this claim in general, I wonder how obvious the claim is in each historical case. Basically, we have no way to give a definite and specific answer to “what if?” questions in history. However, Samuels’s book tempts us to make such counterfactual assumptions and to examine historical cases based on them. If Cavour had lived longer, would early Italy have followed a different path? If Yoshida had died during World War II, would postwar Japanese politics have been the same? Or if those had been so, would someone else have assumed their roles? This kind of counterfactual thought experiment or reasoning results from the book because the author has succeeded in convincing us of the importance of leadership. Now one is curious to know to what extent and in what degree leaders could make differences in history.

The second question is related to a comparative framework. Samuels picks Italy and Japan as comparable countries that were late-comers, both in industrialization and democratization, and thus their leaders were devoted to seeking power, wealth, and identity for their countries. In their quests for power, wealth, and identity, Samuels specifies factors common to both countries, such as late democratization and industrialization, weak liberalism, emergence of fascism, recurrent corruption, and so on. However, despite these parallels, the two countries manifested different dynamics of contemporary political economy. For example, Japan still enjoys the one-party predominance of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, whereas the Italian Christian Democratic rule was thwarted by disclosures of political corruption followed by alteration of left and right coalition governments. Also, Japan has suffered from a prolonged recession since the early 1990s, but Japan was known for its good economic performance throughout the postwar period up to the early 1990s, while Italy has been rarely regarded as such. Do these differences derive from differences in their leaders?

One way of demonstrating the importance of political manipulation is to contrast different consequences in the same contexts, that is, by comparing differences that leaders can make from the same conditions. Does Samuels’s comparison of Italy and Japan adopt this strategy? This is not entirely clear from his book. In a nutshell, I would like
to ask the author why he selects the cases of Italy and Japan, instead of other cases, to demonstrate the importance of political manipulation. Another way of illuminating the importance of political manipulation is finding the same consequences in different contexts. In this strategy of investigation, countries that are very different are compared. For example, does the comparison between Italy and the United Kingdom or the comparison between Japan and the United States enable us to find more or fewer Machiavellian offspring? These would be expected to provide different arguments and conclusions from those found for a comparison between Italy and Japan. It may be too demanding to ask him to delve into this point. However, I am very curious about the strength and limit of his approach to compare countries focusing on their similarities in contrast with an alternative strategy for comparison focusing on differences between cases.

Junko Kato is professor of political science at the University of Tokyo. She is author of *The Problem of Bureaucratic Rationality* and *Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State*, as well as numerous publications in Japanese and English.

**Political Space and Alternative Views**

*Yves Tiberghien*

*Machiavelli’s Children* is a magisterial work of unprecedented reach encompassing two centuries, two distant countries, and a full range of political issue areas from identity building, state building, to political economy and foreign policy. At one stroke, it reorganizes recent Japanese history and reshapes our knowledge of Japanese politics. It uses the lens of a systematic comparison with Italy’s pathway to bring forth some fascinating new insights on modern Japan. In this piece, I summarize a few of the main contributions of the book before turning to four open questions raised by the book.

**A Few Major Contributions**

Richard Samuels makes a major contribution to the fields of Japanese politics and comparative politics by bringing political leadership back to the center of political analysis. He emphasizes the refractive and manip-
ulative power of dominant leaders. This approach is particularly ground-
breaking and original in the case of Japan, given the commonly held
assumption that Japan is a leaderless polity, ruled by bureaucrats, inter-
est groups, and political factions. One of the only books written on polit-
ical leadership in Japan emphasized the mere function of such leaders as
shadow coordinators. In light of the pathbreaking general election of
September 11, 2005, and masterful top-down leadership exhibited by
Koizumi Junichiro, Richard Samuels’s analysis may be prescient!

In addition, Samuels systematically unfolds a virtually untried
comparison between Japan and Italy—an “odd couple” by his own
admission—and sustains it over two centuries and across an amaz-
ingly wide range of issues. This comparison highlights significant over-
all similarities between the two trajectories, yet also the crucial role of
individual leaders in the shaping of distinct pathways at critical junc-
tures. Thus, Samuels is able to rely both on the method of similarity
(different contexts, similar outcomes, as in Chapter 2) and on the
method of difference (similar trajectories, yet divergent outcomes in
response to distinct leaders, as in Chapter 3).

While brilliant in itself and carefully executed, this comparison
does carry a few challenges. In particular, three variables appear par-
ticularly hard to control for: race, international positioning, and Euro-
pean integration after 1950. On the first dimension, it is clear that Japan
faced an uphill battle from the start given its status in Western eyes as
a “noncivilized” nation and the real possibility of outright colonization
by a Western power, dire conditions that Italy never faced. True, Italy
was plagued by regular interventions by its large neighbors and faced
countless difficulties until its final unification in the nineteenth century.
These conditions remain different from potential colonization and
racial theories of superiority that threatened Japan in the same period.

On the second count, Italy never made it to a true great power on
the international chessboard, unlike Japan. From 1905 and her resound-
ing victory over Russia, Japan came to dominate Asia and to shape, to a
large extent, the agenda in the Asia-Pacific region. From the late 1950s,
Japan embarked on an economic miracle that quickly made it the second
largest economy in the world. Both of these realities meant that Japan
was playing a bigger game than Italy after 1905. Its autonomy was
potentially greater, yet the stakes were also greater. In other words, a dif-
ferent international position may have played a major role in explaining
different choices made by the two countries. Finally, Italian politics
became highly embedded in the process of European integration after
1950, a dimension that clearly differentiates a more isolated Japan. Once
the choice was made to join the Steel and Coal Community in 1951, Italy’s choices in the realm of political economy became heavily constrained by the process of European integration. This further reduced Italy’s space of autonomy relative to Japan.

On the empirical side, several chapters present truly masterful depictions of major periods of Japanese history. An example is the fascinating analysis of three conflicting strands of state building in Meiji Japan under the concomitant leadership of Ito Hirobumi (constitutional choice), Yamagata Aritomo (bureaucratic empowerment and military buildup), and Okubo Toshimichi (industrial policy). Other highlights are the establishment of corporatism in the interwar period (Chapter 5), Yoshida Shigeru’s strong role in establishing Japan’s postwar strategic position (Chapter 8), or Kishi Nobusuke’s major impact on the post-1955 LDP-led system of party politics (Chapter 9). My favorite moment, however, relates to the fascinating story of Nissan in the interwar period presented in Chapter 5 (pp. 146–151). Samuels emphasizes the crucial role played by Ayukawa Yoshisuke, Nissan’s president, in the colonization of Manchukuo. By 1942, Samuels emphasizes, Nissan was clearly plagued by poor performance, due to overinvestment and its inability to attract foreign capital. How interesting and ironic is it to read these pages in the light of Nissan’s similar situation in 1998 and its ultimate takeover by Renault!

The remainder of this essay raises a few interesting and open questions regarding Samuels’s analysis.

**The Large Question: Political Leadership, Political Entrepreneurship, and the Conditions for Political Space**

The big question raised by this grand book is the assessment of the true conditions under which political leadership may be a crucial variable.

Markedly, Chapters 2 and 3, and to a second degree Chapter 8, make the most forceful argument in favor of political leadership. The roles played by Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo or by Count Cavour in Italy are essential in shaping emerging state structures and foreign relations in both Japan and Italy. Likewise, De Gasperi and Yoshida Shigeru make a huge difference in the final outcome. In comparison, the post-1955 years seem less dramatically shaped by political leaders. The 1955 political realignment in Japan is overdetermined, and Kishi Nobusuke comes out as amazingly cunning and influential, but probably not indispensable for post-1955 party politics in Japan. Ozawa Ichiro makes a difference in hastening the fall of the LDP, yet the 1993
hitch turns out to be both overdue and temporary. Ozawa or Kishi pale in comparison to Ito, Yamagata, and Okubo. Similarly, the role of political leadership in shaping political economy is most visible in Chapter 3 (Meiji period). The role played by Muto Sanji and Kishi Nobusuke in the interwar period comes second. No leader stands out in the postwar period. In sum, leaders matter in some phases and not in others. Knowing the conditions that enhance leadership capacity may be a key issue.

Out of these observations come several possible hypotheses to complete Samuels’s analysis; it seems that political leadership matters most at the time of state building and institutional foundation, or during great national crises. This is when choices are most underdetermined. In turn, in subsequent phases, a degree of path dependence may constrain the options that leaders have. Choices are then institutionalized and shape the choices of future leaders. Second-generation leaders are more constrained than first-generation leaders. The window of political autonomy may decrease gradually from generation to generation. This is particularly true in the field of political autonomy.

Moving into a more stable period (post-1950), one may identify some leaders and prime ministers who made more of a difference than others (Kishi Nobusuke, Tanaka Kakuei, Nakasone Yasuhiro, Hashimoto Ryutaro, Obuchi Keizo, Koizumi Junichiro). Contrasting these with others, one may propose conditions under which political leadership matters more: ceteris paribus, leadership is more likely to make a difference when the prime minister enjoys a high degree of in-party political autonomy and when his or her party is dominant in the political system; in addition, the availability of tools to counter entrenched political resistance may make a difference in enabling leadership.

Finally, political leadership may be embedded in a cycle of action-reaction. The leader pushes and shapes forces, but always faces political resistance. Knowing when political resistance is reduced or can be encircled matters as much as knowing about political leadership per se. This tension between parties and political leaders (theorized by Robert Michels) is already present under Hara Kei.

**Alternative Hypothesis: Frank Dobbin and the Establishment of Industrial Policy**

Interesting questions arise from a comparison with Frank Dobbin’s analysis of railroad policies in the nineteenth century. The Japan presented by Samuels in Chapter 3 fits neatly within one of Frank Dobbin’s categories: economic sovereignty located in the central state and top-
down industrial policy. Ultimately, Dobbin attributes such industrial policy choices to traditions of political life: political culture, rationalized meaning systems, organizational structures in place such as an elite civil service, and existing state practices in military and political life.

Following this logic, one could say that, independently from Okubo Toshimichi’s presence, the industrial policy choices of the Meiji period were rooted in a preexisting bureaucratic structure emerging out of the samurai culture and existing norms (low status of merchants in society, division of social capital). If this earlier social and institutional structure was crucial in shaping the choices made by Japan’s Meiji leaders in the late nineteenth century, Okubo’s role may be overdetermined in *Machiavelli’s Children*.

A comparison between Japan and France may further emphasize the impact of preexisting elite structures and cultural norms. Chapter 3 on the establishment of economic models in the late nineteenth century provides an example. The Japanese experience of state-sponsored industrial development, railroad construction, and state–private sector cooperation corresponds closely to the experience of France under Napoleon III (1849–1871), an experience that the Japanese must have observed from a distance. The common elite mold present in Japan, whereby the political elite, the bureaucracy, and the emergent private entrepreneurs (Shibusawa Eiichi) are all of a common (samurai) background and share a common vision, is exactly the same in France (to this day). In France, the common mold is not a military one but one shaped by class and by elite schools. In this sense, the common samurai vision may serve as a crucible that unifies these three groups. It may make political leadership less radical than it could (it corresponds to expectations of the elite group) and more likely to gain the adherence of the rest of the elite. France and Japan part ways in the 1930s when new elites in Japan (the military and its middle ranks of peasant origin) challenge the orderly samurai vision and bring a more radical view.

This comparison between France and Japan brings out the underlying institutional and cultural conditions that may have shaped the actions of political leaders. Despite distinct political leaders, France and Japan adopted relatively similar approaches to political economy in the late nineteenth century.

*The Postwar Period: Smaller and More Negative Leaders*

Post-1950s leaders such as Kishi Nobusuke, Ozawa Ichiro, and Ishihara Shintaro appear to leave a much smaller historical footprint than their
forebears. In some ways, they strike as having a more secondary role, as being more reactive and negative than earlier leaders. These leaders play a role in deconstructing systems or adjusting them on the margins, rather than in leading institutional change. Leaders like Fuwa Tetsuzo and Ishihara Shintaro place constraints and markers on the sides of the political system but do not fundamentally affect its core.

In contrast to these, Tanaka Kakuei is the great absent. Wasn’t the masterful “streetwise” politician, the builder of the Japanese archipelago, and the consolidator of the LDP, in effect, the last great leader of the post-1955 system (until Koizumi Junichiro)? Tanaka single-handedly structured the LDP’s support networks (including the network of postal masters and construction companies) and tipped the balance of power toward politicians and away from bureaucrats in crafting budgetary policy.

These observations on post-1955 leadership lead to a few important questions. What explains the smaller impact of post-1955 political leaders than of those in the earlier section of the book? What explains the absence of any leader in the political economy arena after Muto Sanji in the interwar period? This omission seems particularly glaring given the fact that Japan’s postwar history is almost defined in terms of the country’s unusual economic performance. Is political economy more subject to domination by interest groups? Does democracy or a particular form of party system constrain political leaders more?

**Application to Japan of the Late 1990s and Early 2000s**

Extending Samuels’s analysis to the present period in Japan yields further fascinating insights. In fact, Samuels himself emphasized in a separate article the critical role played by Nakasone Yasuhiro in alliance with the leader of Keidanren in pushing privatization reforms in the 1980s. One can further extend the analysis after 1997 and emphasize the new rise of political leadership under Hashimoto Ryutaro, Obuchi Keizo, and Koizumi Junichiro. The study of conditions for leadership autonomy in the face of systematic resistance by interest groups and political parties (including LDP) becomes the crucial focal point. The reaction and influence of interest groups may have concealed the continuation of leadership during the 1980s and 1990s. As soon as a leader managed to break the stranglehold of these interest groups (Koizumi Junichiro in 2005), leadership came back to the fore as a dominant force.

In light of these leadership-induced post-1997 changes, one may partially disagree with Samuels’s ultimately bleak assessment of recent
changes: “Japan resisted change, while Italy embraced it” (p. 296). Japan is currently in the midst of major institutional change and corporate restructuring sponsored by the state. In fact, it is the very success of political leaders such as Hashimoto, Obuchi, Yosano, and Koizumi that may be turning the tide in today’s Japan.

Yves Tiberghien is an Academy Scholar at Harvard University and professor of political science at the University of British Columbia. The author of a number of articles on Japan and comparative political economy, his forthcoming book is entitled The Politics of Invisibility: Globalization, State Mediation, and Corporate Restructuring.

Response to Critiques of Machiavelli’s Children

Richard J. Samuels

In our business, there can be no greater compliment to an author than having colleagues—particularly distinguished ones such as these—read and comment on one’s work. It goes without saying that their thoughtful efforts must be repaid with a thoughtful response.

As Kato notes, this book is an attempt to pull the disciplinary pendulum back after it seemed to get stuck somewhere close to 90 degrees from center—far from the balance that she has asked for between agency and structure, rationality and psychology. Political science, psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology—and, as Garon notes, even history—have pushed the study of agency and leadership to the margins. Deductive theory building is a good thing, but it has come at excessive cost. If this thick narrative history has helped reorient social science scholarship toward agency and, in particular, toward the unapologetic use of proper nouns, I should be quite pleased.

Machiavelli’s Children tries to avoid the Scylla of the “great men in history” approach as well as the Charybdis that posits individuals as substitutable vessels for irresistible and inevitable change. While scholars sometimes grudgingly acknowledge the independence of ideas, we also tend to stress the boundaries that constrain choice. To be sure, these constraints—the scripts and menus that are inherited or constructed artifacts of structure and culture—are real. It is critical to be aware of the limits to agency. But, constraints can change over time, both in scope and in scale. And, importantly, they can be changed by
individuals skilled enough to make their political space more capacious. This “stretching” of constraints and its consequences for subsequent choice is what *Machiavelli’s Children* is centrally all about. To borrow the language of rational choice, leadership is very much about expanding opportunity sets and creatively crafting bargains. On the historical evidence, both choices and equilibria are multiple.

We can all agree that collected stories do not simply “add up” into explanations. It is important to discover regularities that persist over time. But we cannot “theorize” agency the way we can theorize structure. Theory without context (a disciplinary transgression) is particularly unsatisfying, and context without proper nouns is particularly problematic. Context and theory must be balanced.

This points to the issue of history’s “long arc,” raised by Garon. Rather than compare one country to another over so long a period of time, perhaps separate comparisons on particular topics could have provided greater analytical leverage. Japanese welfare policy might better be compared to Sweden’s, and an understanding of Italian regional planning might be better served with comparisons to France.

But, as my critics have noted, *Machiavelli’s Children* is concerned less with functional comparison than with system change. Only by examining change over long periods can one understand long-term effects of shifts in developmental trajectories. The “long arc” is designed to reconcile the nomothetic and ideographic impulses in political analysis. I did this the way that I did in the belief that it is only when one has accumulated data (in this case “thick, descriptive” data) from multiple cases that one can understand if systems create new “paths” based on increasing returns that are terribly difficult to reverse, or if these paths are merely temporary detours. The evidence suggests that path dependence notwithstanding, most possibilities never fully disappear—indeed, they multiply.

The relationship between necessity and invention (*Machiavelli’s Children* introduces a reversed maternity) holds out the promise of supplying a useful perspective on how to evaluate leadership effectiveness (virtuosity), as well as the chance to relate agency and structure diachronically. And the matched-pair approach to comparative leadership was designed to circumvent, or at least try to control for, the counterfactual exercise all historians engage in—at least tacitly. The whole point is that the book is about possibilities, not about determination or necessity.

To get at the full range of possibilities that leadership might generate, scholars can, and should, take up the challenge of theorizing
agency, as Pempel identifies the problem above. If agency is a process of stretching constraints, then one cannot theorize about the conditions of successful agency without theorizing about the conditions under which structure can be made to change through the exercise of leadership. Structures, being social constructions, are intermittently “softened up” and are more amenable to being stretched or destroyed. That is when “opportunities” arise for transcending inherited structures through the exercise of leadership. And that is our collective theoretical challenge. I think of this as taking John Kingdon’s work the next step.29

Kato correctly notes that I have picked a fight with two approaches that are usually busy arguing among themselves: historical sociology and rational choice. Political scientists relying on sociological theories have focused on the way rules, institutions, and power relations—to take three important “structures”—resist or transform individual preferences. Under structural assumptions, political choices can change only when accepted political rules change, but there is no mechanism to account for the change. Thus, sociological models, like anthropological and psychological ones, raise the same difficulties for analysis of choice. Historical institutionalists assert that the sequence and path of historical events can matter as much as events themselves. But given that their sights are trained on institutions and paths, they have trouble keeping the individual in view.

But historical institutionalism and its sociological antecedents are only one response to the analytical challenge presented by the great forces of personality, structure, and culture. Another, generated out of economics, has been more influential. Like sociology, economics presumes limits to individual choice, and the great force in liberal economics is “self-interest.” Economics is premised upon the competition of individuals for limited resources. It is not at all surprising that microeconomics has translated well into political science, since utilities used to “measure” self-interest are frequently in conflict. But economic notions of self-interest care more about individuals as data points than as actors. Utility is presumed in order to test models; it is not an object of testing itself. Machiavelli’s Children does not abandon the powerful idea of utility, but by placing it in historical context it tries to expand its range.

Different scholars have different criteria for when they feel confident about making generalizations. Mine is inductive, built from multiple histories of individuals making choices—and, in particular, of individuals sorting through equally plausible options. Mussolini’s deci-
sion for alliance with Hitler is one good example. Hara’s choice not to co-opt the left (he went in the opposite direction of Giovanni Giolitti) is another still.

While I concede to Pempel and Tiberghien that there is no point in trying to determine whether an effective leader will happen to be available to seize any given “window of opportunity,” it is still worth thinking prescriptively about structural and process innovations that would increase the chances that such leaders would be available to recognize opportunities. Such prescription need not be written off as “normative”; it can be based on positive theory about tendencies in political recruitment, electoral systems, systems of advocacy within government, and the organization of the executive branch, inter alia.

Both Tiberghien and Kato seek clarification about whether the differences or the similarities in the Italian and Japanese cases are more important. This is a fair but limiting question. Machiavelli’s Children builds the chance to travel beyond Mill’s methods of agreement and difference. We might do well to avoid becoming wed to the implausible insistence that either the similarities or the differences are the most appropriate object of comparative study. By examining each without privileging either, we can identify relationships (and causes) otherwise missed or assumed away. Italian and Japanese similarities are deep. But there is no a priori reason to believe that their “parallel exceptionalism” is any deeper or more systematically consequential than their “irreconcilable differences.” In an important methodological sense, these similarities and differences may be irrelevant except insofar as they provide us a window on how creative leaders use them. One of the central findings of this study is that neither the similarities nor the differences were as overdetermined as most social science has posited.

Indeed, this—the need to explore leadership within “normal politics”—is very unfinished business. Kato allows as how this is not inconsistent with rational choice, and I agree. With Garon, Tiberghien, and others I do wonder whether the results of Machiavelli’s Children are biased in two ways: by focusing on leadership choices at moments of “punctuated equilibrium” and by focusing on “great leaders” at the expense of appreciating the choices made by bureaucrats and citizens. It is entirely possible that the leaders who emerge at moments of exogenous shock—war, ideological collapse, and depression (Cavour, De Gasperi, and Occhetto in Italy and Ito, Yoshida, and Fuwa in Japan)—enjoyed far greater degrees of freedom than those who had to operate before the constraints had lifted or after they had settled back down. As noted above, there surely are moments when structures are “softened.”
But we also see how, despite similar constraints, resources, and goals—and during similar moments of disequilibrium—some individuals find novel and appropriate solutions to problems, while others do not. Yoshida Shigeru and Alcide De Gasperi are great examples. Each saw possibilities for relations with the hegemonic United States (the “mother of all constraints” during the Cold War) that no one else perceived. We can think of them as Pempel’s “Skeffingtons” in this comparison.

The point is that these individuals and others who may not have succeeded as well often do more than select different alternatives from a set menu of possible choices: they construct new alternatives altogether. Their “normal” political work expands the set of options. I could have done more to illuminate this point, and am glad my critics have.

This is related to Tiberghien’s hypotheses about “action-reaction.” The “actions” I am most intrigued by are those of bricoleurs—creative conservatives (to borrow Pempel’s wonderful phrase). These are folks who understand what George Orwell meant in 1984 when he wrote: “Who controls the past, controls the future and who controls the present controls the past.” They pick up shards of the past to legitimate choices that will take them to a desired future. The result, as Tiberghien anticipates, is that following generations of leaders are constrained. All leaders operate within constraints; it is just that some navigate within them better than others.

My critics have raised the issue of what countries are best compared to Japan. Tiberghien thinks France is a good foil. And it is. Garon points out that many prefer the German case, which he rejects. Either would have suited this project well because either would have enabled an escape from the shopworn comparison of Japan to the United States. Like many others, I had grown frustrated by the extent to which we have assumed we could say something important about either Japan or about politics generally by comparing Japan to the United States. Japan is, as Garon says, better compared to “normal” late developers.

It is not only the choice of countries that might have been different or better, it is the choice of the leaders themselves. Tiberghien, Garon, and Pempel join several reviewers of the book who argue that there were different or better individuals to select. Garon asks about the pre-war prime minister Hamaguchi Osachi. Pempel and Tiberghien ask about the postwar prime minister Tanaka Kakuei and about the economic elites during the Cold War. I could not take up all the comparisons that might have made sense. To the extent possible, I wanted to
hold structural differences constant and focus on how individuals sorted through and developed different choices. In reconstructing the “scripts” of real people I tried to understand their sense of what was possible and why some saw possibilities others did not. Paired comparisons enabled me to closely examine “multiple equilibria.” My logic was: if leaders make choices among multiple—or better yet, equally plausible—alternatives, then assumptions about single correct choices and the limitations of great constraints are less compelling.

Still, the palette may have been too narrow. I very much wanted to include Doko Toshio or industrial policy gurus, like Arisawa Hiromi or Sahashi Shigeru. But, I found them more conventional and less transformational. Doko, as important a leader as he was, did not “stretch” the constraints of the postwar economic rules terribly far, and I was hunting for those who did—or at least for those who tried and failed—like Ozawa Ichiro.30

I do regret, though, that I wrote Machiavelli’s Children before it became clear that the most able leader of postwar Japan had yet to emerge. And this speaks to Tiberghien’s point that my assessment of recent change may have been too bleak. In 2005, Koizumi Junichiro took popular opposition to the Iraq War and transformed it into unprecedented levels of support for the SDF. He will be credited with transforming broad-based reluctance to tamper with the constitution into unprecedented majority support for revision. He will be remembered for turning apathy about postal reform into the cudgel of a centralized kantei that finally beat back bureaucratic dominance. He will be remembered for purging the LDP of the machine politicians who have been feeding at the public trough, thereby transforming voters’ expectations of politicians. And if the parties split and recombine, Koizumi will be remembered as the leader who realigned Japanese politics. That leaders such as Koizumi continue to matter in unexpected ways is the whole point.

Notes


2. This was done in an “author meets critics” roundtable, held at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in Chicago in April 2005. This contribution represents the revised essays of that roundtable’s five participants.


17. See Garon, State and Labor in Modern Japan, chap. 5.


23. See Chapter 2, pp. 53–85.


