

PREPARING FOR A PEACEFUL **UNIFICATION OF KOREA**

한반도 평화통일을 위한 국제협력







행사명	"한반도 평화통일을 위한 국제협력" 컨퍼런스
Title	"Preparing for a Peaceful Unification of Korea" Conference
일시	2015년 11월 13일(목), 09:30 ~ 17:30
Date/Time	09:30~17:30, November 13(Fri), 2015
장소	서울웨스틴 조선호텔 그랜드볼룸(1F)
Venue	Grand Ballroom(1F), The Westin Chosun Seoul
주최 Host	대통령직속 통일준비위원회, 통일부 Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation(PCUP), Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea
주관	동아시아연구원
Organizer	East Asia Institute
공식언어	영어 (한국어-영어 동시통역 제공)
Language	English (Simultaneous Interpretation: English-Korean)

모시는 글 · Invitation



대통령직속 통일준비위원회에서는 2015년 11월 13일에 한반도 통일준비와 국제사회의 협력을 도모하기 위한 첫 번째 국제회의를 마련하였습니다. 이번 국제회의는 대한민국 통일부와 함께 통일준비위원회가 공동으로 주최합니다.

"한반도 평화통일을 위한 국제협력"을 주제로 진행되는 이번 회의에서, 통일준비위원회는 해외 전문가들과 함께 한반도 문제의 현황과 평화통일의 과제 및 바람직한 남북관계 개선 방향 등에 대해 논의할 것입니다. 뿐만 아니라 각계 전문가들과 한반도 평화통일 환경을 조성하기 위한 아이디어를 모으고, 통일준비위원회의 활동과 노력에 대한 국제사회의 지지와 협력을 이끌어내는 자리가 될 것입니다.

평화통일의 염원과 국제사회의 지혜가 함께 모이는 이 자리에 여러분의 많은 관심과 참여를 부탁 드립니다.

정 종 욱

대통령직속 통일준비위원회 민간 부위원장

홍 용 표

통일부 장관

It is with great pleasure that we invite you to the first International Conference of the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation (PCUP) to be held in Seoul, the Republic of Korea on November 13, 2015. This conference has been organized by the PCUP in collaboration with the Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea.

The main theme of the conference is "Preparing for a Peaceful Unification of Korea." This conference will be a platform for the PCUP and other participants to discuss the current situation, challenges, and plausible trajectories of advancement between the two Koreas.

The PCUP will seek to share the ideas promoting a peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula and to garner international support for the PCUP's endeavor.

CHUNG Chong Wook

Vice Chairperson to the PCUP

HONG Yong-Pyo

Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea

모시는 글 · Invitation



동아시아연구원은 대통령직속 통일준비위원회·통일부와 함께 한반도 평화통일 준비에 대한 국제적 지지를 얻고 국제사회와 구체적 협력 방안을 모색하고자 "한반도 평화통일을 위한 국제협력" 컨퍼런스를 열게 되었습니다. 오늘날 세계는 21세기적 비전을 모색하면서 다양한 분야에서 교류와 협력의 폭을 넓히고 있습니다. 그러나 한반도에서는 지난 70년간 분단상황이 고착되면서 남북한 사이 냉전적 대결과 갈등이 계속 되고 있습니다. 남북한관계의 부침을 넘어서서 미래의 통일을 위해 준비하는 노력을 더 이상 게을리 해서는 안되겠습니다.

남북한 사이 경제적, 사회적 통합과 궁극적인 통일한국의 길은 남북한 당시자만이 아니라 동북아 나아가 동아시아의 평화와 번영에도 크게 이바지할 수 있다는 것이 우리의 생각입니다. 이번 국제회의에서는 미국, 중국, 일본, 유럽의 전문가들과 함께 동북아 정세와 한반도 통일 준비, 북한 경제개발에 대한 지원, 북한 접경지역의 평화적 이용에 대해 논의합니다. 한반도 통일의 염원이 실현의 행로에 한 걸음 다가갈 수 있도록 여러분의 큰 관심과 참여를 부탁 드립니다.

이 숙 종 동아시아연구원 원장

The East Asia Institute in cooperation with the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation and Ministry of Unification will hold an international conference entitled "Preparing for a Peaceful Unification of Korea" with the goal of garnering international support and cooperation for the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. In today's world, as we search for a vision for the 21st century, exchange and cooperation has widened in many fields. However, division of the Korean Peninsula has become permanent over the last 70 years and Cold War style competition and tension continue to define the relationship between the two Koreas. We cannot continue to neglect the efforts needed to overcome the ebb and flow of inter-Korea relations and prepare for future unification.

We believe that the path toward ultimate unification and the combining of the two Korea's economies and societies is not an issue for only North and South Korea as unification will greatly contribute to peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and all of East Asia as well. During this international conference, experts from the U.S., China, Japan, and Europe will discuss the current situation in Northeast Asia and preparation for unification of the Korean Peninsula, supporting economic development in North Korea, and North Korea's peaceful use of the border area. We kindly request your attendance and interest as we take another step along the path towards realizing the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

LEE Sook-Jong

President of the East Asia Institute

프로그램

일시 2015년 11월 13일(금), 09:30~17:30 **장소** 서울웨스틴 조선호텔 그랜드볼룸(1F)

시간	프로그램	
09:00 - 09:30	참가자 등록	로비(1F)
09:30 - 10:30	◆개회식 개회사 정종욱 대통령직속 통일준비위원회 민간 부위원장(한국) 축사 정의화 국회의장(한국) 기조연설 한승주 前 외교부 장관(한국)	
10:30 - 12:00	◆제 1세션: 동북아 정세와 한반도 통일 준비 사회 하영선 동아시아연구원 이사장(한국) 발제 전재성 서울대학교 교수(한국) 토론 프랑수아 고드몽 유럽외교협회(ECFR) 선임연구위원(프랑스) 션 딩리 푸단대학교 교수(중국) 스콧 스나이더 미국외교협회(CFR) 선임연구위원(미국)	그랜드볼룸(1F)
12:10 - 13:30	♦오찬	오키드(2F)
13:30 - 15:10	◆제 2세션: 북한 경제개발과 남한 및 국제사회의 지원 사회 김주현 현대경제연구원 고문(한국) 발제 김병연 서울대학교 교수(한국) 토론 후카가와 유키코 와세다대학교 교수(일본) 마커스 놀랜드 피터슨 국제경제연구소 부소장(미국) 유리 시고브 "비즈니스 피플"지 워싱턴 대표(러시아)	
15:10 - 15:30	휴식	
15:30 - 17:10	◆제 3세션: 접경지역의 평화적 이용 사회 김재창 한미안보연구회 회장(한국) 발제 정태용 연세대학교 교수(한국) 토론 최재천 국립생태원 원장(한국) 아이눌 하산 유엔 아시아·태평양 경제사회위원회 거시경제정책 국장 노먼 뉴라이터 미국과학진흥회(AAAS) 수석고문(미국) 장 폴 페덱 세계자연보호기금(WWF) 본부 국제협력국장(스위스)	그랜드볼룸(1F)
17:10 - 17:30	◆폐회식 폐회사 이숙종 동아시아연구원 원장(한국)	

Program

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Date 09:30~17:30, November 13(Fri), 2015 **Venue** Grand Ballroom(1F), The Westin Chosun Seoul

Time	Program	
09:00 - 09:30	Registration	Lobby(1F)
09:30 - 10:30	◆ Opening Ceremony Opening Remarks CHUNG Chong Wook Vice Chairperson, PCUP (Republic of Korea) Congratulatory Remarks CHUNG Ui Hwa Speaker, National Assembly(Republic of Korea) Keynote Address HAN Sung-Joo Former Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of Korea)	
10:30 - 12:00	◆ Session I: Preparing for Korean Unification amid a Changing Northeast Asia Moderator HA Young-Sun Chairman, East Asia Institute (Republic of Korea) Presenter CHUN Chaesung Professor, Seoul National University (Republic of Korea) Panelist Francois GODEMENT Director, Asia/China Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations (France) SHEN Dingli Professor/Associate Dean of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University (China) Scott SNYDER Senior Fellow for Korea Studies & Director of the Program on U.SKorea Policy Council on Foreign Relations (United States)	Grand Ballroom(1F)
12:10 - 13:30	♦Luncheon	Orchid(2F)
13:30 - 15:10	◆ Session II: Assisting North Korea's Economic Development Moderator KIM Joo-Hyun Advisory, Hyundai Research Institute (Republic of Korea) Presenter KIM Byung-Yeon Professor, Seoul National University (Republic of Korea) Panelist FUKAGAWA Yukiko Professor, Waseda University (Japan) Marcus NOLAND Executive Vice President and Director of Studies, Peterson Institute for International Economics (United States) Yury SIGOV U.S. Bureau Chief, "Business People" Magazine (Russia)	
15:10 - 15:30	Break	-
15:30 - 17:10	◆ Session III: Peaceful Cooperation in the Border Areas Moderator KIM Jae Chang Chair, Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies (Republic of Korea) Presenter JUNG Tae Yong Professor, Yonsei University (Republic of Korea) Panelist CHOE Jae Chun President, National Institute of Ecology (Republic of Korea) Aynul HASAN Director Macroeconomic Policy and Development Division, UNESCAP Norman P. NEUREITER Senior Adviser, American Association for the Advancement of Science (United States) Jean-Paul PADDACK Director, of International Business Development, World Wide Fund for Nature (Switzerland)	Grand Ballroom(1F)
17:10 - 17:30	◆ Closing Ceremony Closing Remarks LEE Sook-Jong President, East Asia Institute (Republic of Korea)	



정 종 욱 대통령직속 통일준비위원회 민간 부위원장 CHUNG Chong Wook Vice Chairperson to the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation (PCUP)

대통령 직속 통일준비위원회 민간 부위원장인 정종욱 박사는 미국 예일대학교에서 정치학 박사 학위(1975년)를 받고 김영삼 정부 시절 대통령 외교안보 수석비서관을 거쳐 1996년부터 약 2년 반 동안 주중대사로 근무했었다. 정종욱 박사는 과거 외교부, 통일원, 국방부의 자문위원과 대통령 직속 21세기 위원회 (간사)위원 등을 역임했으며 현재는 서울대학교 사회과학대학 정치외교학부 명예교수 겸 국립 인천대학교 정외과 석좌교수로 재직중이다. 또한 2015년에는 국무총리와 함께 광복70주년 기념사업추진위원회 위원장으로 임명되어 활동하고 있다. 저서로는 신중국론, 미국은 우리에게 무엇인가? Maoism and Development, Major Power and Peace in Korea 등이 있다.

Chong Wook Chung, after a brief teaching career in the United States in the mid1970s, has for over 16 years taught at his alma mater, Seoul National University, where he also served as Director of
Center for International Studies. In 1993, he joined the government, first as Senior Secretary for National Security and
Foreign Policy to President Kim Young Sam and later as Korean Ambassador to the People's Republic of China. He was
President of the Korean Association for the Study of Socialist Systems, senior member of the Presidential Commission for
the 21st Century, and advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Unification, and Ministry of National
Defense. He is currently an emeritus professor of political science and international studies at Seoul National University,
and a distinguished professor at Incheon National University. In July 2014, he was appointed as Vice Chairman of
Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation; President Park Geun-hye is the Chair of the Committee. Also, along
with Prime Minister he co-chairs the Commission to Commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the Liberation of Korea.
He has written extensively on foreign and security affairs, particularly on China-related issues. His publications include
Maoism and Development, Major Powers and Peace in Korea, and Korea's Option in a Changing International Order. He
obtained a doctorate degree in political science from Yale University in 1975.



홍용표 통일부 장관 **Hong Yong-Pyo** Minister of Unification of the Republic of Korea

홍용표 장관은 현재 대한민국 통일부 장관이다. 2015년 3월 통일부 장관에 임명되기전, 그는 청와대 외교안보수석비서관실 통일비서관 및 한양대 교수로 재임하였다. 또한 그는 제18대 대통령직인수위원회외교·국방·통일분과 실무위원, 민주평화통일자문회의 상임위원, 한국국제정치학회 연구이사, (사)경실련통일협회 운영위원장을 역임하였다. 홍 장관은 1987년과 1989년에 연세대학교 정치외교학과 학사 및 정치학 석사학위를 취득하였고, 1996년 영국 옥스퍼드대학교에서 국제관계학 박사학위를 취득하였다.

Dr. Hong Yong-Pyo is Minister of Unification of the Republic of Korea. Before his ministerial appointment in March 2015, he held the position of Secretary to the President for Unification at the office of the president. He was a member of the Standing Committee of the National Unification Advisory Council. His professional career spans over a decade in academic research and teaching as Professor at Hanyang University, and Research Director at the Korean Association of International Studies. He also served as working-level member of the subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, National Defense and Unification of the 18th Presidential Transition Committee, Chairman at the steering committee of the Korean Reunification Society of the Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice. Dr. Hong received his B.A. and M.A. in Political Science from Yonsei University in 1987 and 1989, respectively. He later completed his Ph.D. in International Relations at the University of Oxford in 1996.



정 의 화 국회의장 **CHUNG Ui Hwa** Speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea

정의화 의장은 현재 대한민국 제19대 국회 국회의장이다. 정의화 의장은 1996년 15대 국회의원으로 정치에 입문한 후 국회 재정경제위원회, 외교통상통일위원회에서 의정활동을 하였고 한나라당 최고위원, 비상대책위원회 위원장 등 주요 당직을 역임하였다. 또한 18대 국회 후반기에 국회 부의장을 거친 후 19대 국회의장으로 취임, 대화와 통합, 상생의 정치를 통해 국민에게 신뢰받는 국회를 만들기 위해 노력 중이다. 국회의원으로 선출되기에 앞서 부산대학교 의과대학을 졸업하고 연세대학교 의과대학에서 석사, 인제대학교 의과대학에서 박사학위를 취득하여 신경외과 전문의로 일하였다.

Ui Hwa Chung is the Speaker of the 19th National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. He entered politics in 1996 as the 15th member of the National Assembly and thereafter served as the Chairperson of the Finance and Economy Committee, member of the Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee, member of the Supreme Council, chairman of the Emergency Measure Committee, and various other prominent posts. After serving as the Vice Speaker of the 18th National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, he became appointed as the 19th Chairman of the National Assembly and has since worked strenuously to foster a National Assembly that is reputable for dialogue and interaction and politics of coexistence in order to earn trust of the citizens of Korea. Before he became elected as a member of the National Assembly he graduated from Busan National University, College of Medicine and earned his Master's degree from Yonsei University, College of Medicine and doctoral degree from Inje University, College of Medicine and worked as a neurosurgeon.



한 승 주 외교부前 장관 **HAN Sung-Joo** Former Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Republic of Korea

현재 고려대학교 정치외교학과 명예교수, 재단법인 국제정책연구원 이사장, 전직으로는 외무부 장관(1993-94), UN 사무총장 특별 대표(사이프러스 담당, 1996-97), UN르완다 인종학살 조사위원(1999), 주미대사(2003-2005)를 역임하였다. 한승주 교수는 서울대학교를 졸업(1962)하고 UC Berkeley에서 정치학 박사 학위 (1970)를 취득하였다. 고려대학교에 재직하기 이전에 뉴욕시립대학교 부교수(1970-78)로 재직하였으며, 미 콜럼비아대 초 빙교수 겸 록펠러형제기금 명예연구원1986-87), 스탠포드 대학교 교환교수(1992, 1995)를 역임하였다. 저서로는 Korean Diplomacy in an Era of Globalization (1995), Korea in a Changing World (1995), Changing Values in Asia (1999) [남과북 그리고 세계] 등이 있다.

Professor Han Sung-Joo is Chairman of the International Policy Studies Institute of Korea. He is also a Professor Emeritus at Korea University. Prof. Han previously served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1993-94), UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus (1996-97), a member of the UN Inquiry Commission on the 1994 Rwanda Genocide (1999), Chairman of the East Asia Vision Group (2000-2001), Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States (2003-2005), and Acting President of Korea University(2002, 2006-2007) Prof. Han is a graduate of Seoul National University (1962) and received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley (1970). Previously, he taught at City University of New York (1970-78) and was a visiting Professor at Columbia University (1986-87) and Stanford University (1992, 1995). He was also a Distinguished Fellow at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (1986-87). His English publications include Korean Diplomacy in an Era of Globalization (1995), Korea in a Changing World (1995), and Changing Values in Asia (1999). He has many publications in Korean, including Nam Gwa Puk, kurigo Sekye (The Two Koreas and the World) (2000).



하 영 선 동아시아연구원 이사장 **HA Young-Sun** Chairman, East Asia Institute

하영선 이사장은 현재 동아시아연구원 이사장 및 서울대학교 명예교수를 겸임하고 있으며 대통령 국가안보자문단 위원, 통일준비위원회 민간위원이다. 서울대학교 외교학과를 졸업하고, 동 대학원에서 정치학 석사학위를, 미국 워싱턴대학교(University of Washington)에서 한국 핵 문제로 국제정치학 박사학위를 받았다. 미국 프린스턴대학(Princeton University) 국제문제연구소 초청연구원, 스웨덴 스톡홀름 국제평화연구소(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 초청연구원, 서울대학교 정치외교학부 교수, 서울대학교 국제문제연구소장, 미국학연구소장, 한국평화학회 회장을 역임했다. 〈조선일보〉와 〈중앙일보〉에 "하영선 칼럼"을 7년 동안 연재하였으며, 연행 연구 모임, 전파 연구 모임, 정보세계정치 연구회, 동아시아연구원 모임 등을 이끌며 한국 국제정치학의 길을 개척해 왔다. 최근 저서 및 편저로는《1972 한반도와 주변4강 2014》(2015)、《한반도 신뢰프로세스 2.0: 악제.관여,신뢰의 복합추진》(2014)、《2020한국외교 10대과제:복합과 공진》(2013)、《신시대 한일협력 7대과제》(2013)、《하영선 국제정치 칼럼 1991—2011》(2012)、《근대한국의 사회과학 개념 형성사 2》(편, 2012)、《복합세계정치론 : 전략과 원리 그리고 새로운 질서》(편, 2012)、《역사 속의 젊은 그들》(2011)、《북한2032: 선진화로 가는 공진전략》(2010)、《21세기 신동맹·냉전에서 복합으로》(2010)、《한일신시대를 위한 제언공생을 위한 복합 네트워크의 구축》(2010) 등이 있다.

Young-Sun Ha is Chairman of the board of trustees at the East Asia Institute. He is also a professor emeritus of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Currently, Dr. Ha is serving as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group and the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation. He was the Co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era, the Director of the Center for International Studies and American Studies Institute at Seoul National University, the President of the Korea Peace Studies Association, and a research fellow at the Center for International Studies at Princeton University, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm. He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and holds a Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Washington. His recent books and edited volumes include: Korean Peninsula among Big Powers 1972 vs 2014 (2015) Trustpolitik 2.0 on the Korean Peninsula: Complex Policy of Deterrence, Engagement, and Trust(2014), Toward 2020: Ten Agendas for South Korea's Foreign Policy (2013), A New Era for Korea-Japan Relations: Seven Tasks for Bilateral Cooperation (2013), Young-Sun Ha on International Politics: A Collection of Columns from 1991 to 2011 (2012), The History of Social Science Concepts in Modern Korea I & II (2009 /2012), Complex World Politics: Strategies, Principles, and a New Order (2012), Young Pioneers in Korean History (2011), The Future of North Korea 2032: The Strategy of Coevolution for the Advancement (2010), The Emergence of Complex Alliances in the 21st Century (2010), and A New Era of Complex Networks in Korea-Japan Relations (2010).



이숙종 동아시아연구원 원장 **LEE Sook-Jong** President, East Asia Institute

이숙종 원장은 동아시아연구원 원장과 성균관대학교 행정학과 및 국정관리대학원 교수를 겸임하고 있으며 대통령 국가안보자문단 위원, 대통령직속 통일준비위원회 민간위원이다. 외교부, 통일부와 한국 국제협력단(KOICA)에서 정책 자문으로 활동하고 있으며, Council of Council, Trilateral Commission 등 다국적 정책 연구 네트워크에 참여해왔다. 세종연구소 연구위원, 미국 브루킹스연구소(Brookings Institution) 동북아연구소 객원연구원, 존스홉킨스대학교 국제대학원(Johns Hopkins University, SAIS) 교수강사, 독일 German Institute for Global and Area Studies 방문교수 등을 역임하였다. 주요 연구분야로는 다자주의, 민주주의와 시민 사회 등이 있으며, 한국, 일본 및 동아시아 지역에 초점을 두고 있다. 최근 저술로는 "Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea's Role in the 21st Century" (공편, Palgrave, forthcoming), "South Korea's Middle Power Activism and its Retooling of Public Diplomacy"(2015), 《2013 대통령 성공의 조건》(편, 2013), 《글로벌 개발협력 거버넌스와 한국》(편, 2012), "South Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy" (2012), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (공편, 2011) 《일본과 동아시아: 지역협력과 공동체 구상》(공편, 2011), 《세계화 제2막: 한국형 세계화의 새 구상》(공편, 2010) 등이 있다. 이숙종 원장은 미국 하버드대학교(Harvard University)에서 사회학 박사학위를 받았다.

Sook-Jong Lee is the President of the East Asia Institute, an independent, non-profit think tank based in Seoul. She is also a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University. Currently, Dr. Lee holds a number of advisory positions in the South Korean government, including the Presidential National Security Advisory Group, Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation and advisory councils for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). Dr. Lee also participates as member of the Trilateral Commission, Council of Councils, and many other transnational networks on research and policy studies. Her research interests include global governance, democracy, and NGOs, focusing on South Korea, Japan, and other East Asian countries. Previously, Dr. Lee was a research fellow at the Sejong Institute, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, a professorial lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, and a visiting fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies. Her recent publications include "Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea's Role in the 21st Century" (eds. Palgrave, forthcoming), "South Korea's Middle Power Activism and its Retooling of Public Diplomacy" (2015), Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013), Korea's Role in Global Governance for Development Cooperation (eds. 2012), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (eds. 2011), Japan and East Asia: Regional Cooperation and Community Building (eds. 2011), and Toward Managed Globalization: The Korean Experience (eds. 2010). Dr. Lee received her B.A. from Yonsei University, and M.A. and Ph.D. in sociology from Harvard University.



전 재 성 서울대학교교수 **CHUN Chaesung** Professor, Seoul National University

전재성 교수는 서울대학교 정치외교학부 교수로 재직 중이며, 동아시아연구원 아시아 안보연구센터 소장과 서울대 국제문제연구소장을 겸임하고 있다. 전재성 교수는 서울대학교 외교학과를 졸업하고 미국 노스웨스턴대학교(Northwestern University)에서 정치학 박사학위를 취득하였다. 전재성 교수의 주요 연구분야는 국제 정치이론, 국제관계사 등이며, 최근 논저로는 《정치는 도덕적인가: 라인홀드 니버의 초월적 국제정치사상》(2012)《동아시아 국제정치: 역사에서 이론으로》(2011), "구성주의 국제정치이론에 대한 탈근대론과 현실주의의 비판 고찰"(국제정치는 총〉(2010), "유럽의 국제정치적 근대 출현에 관한 이론적 연구"(국제정치논총〉(2009), "강대국의 부상과 대응 메커니즘: 이론적 분석과 유럽의 사례"(국방연구)(2008) 등이 있다.

Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at East Asia Institute. He is a professor of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University and director of Center for International Studies at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun is also serving as an advisory committee member for the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and Ph.D. in international relations from Northwestern University. His research interests include international relations, security studies, South Korean foreign policy, and East Asian security relations. His recent publications include Is Politics Moral? Reinhold Niebuhr's Transcendental Realism (2012), Theory of East Asian International Relations (2011), and "The Rise of New Powers and the Responding Strategies of Other Countries" (2008).



프랑수아 고드몽 유럽외교협회(ECFR) 선임연구위원

François GODEMENT

Director, Asia/China Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)

프랑수아 고드몽은 파리정치대학의 정치학 교수 및 유럽외교협회(ECFR) 선임연구위원을 겸임하고 있으며 아시아센터 연구원, 카네기국제평화재단 비거주자 선임 연구원이다. 또한 프랑스 외무부 정책 계획부서의 외부 자문가를 맡고 있으며, 고등사범학교(파리) 및 하버드 대학원을 졸업하였다. 동양언어와 문명의 프랑스 학사관의 교수이자, 1995년 유럽위원회의 아시아태평양안보협력회의의 공동 설립자이며, 아시아 태평양 지역의 정치적 변화및 국제 관계의 전략을 다루는 독립 연구 기관인 아시아 센터를 2005년에 설립하였다. 최근 저술로는 대서양학문지에 발표된(유럽 중국 관계: 불시착인가?》(2011), 유럽 외교 관계 이사회의(중국: 유럽의 고군분투》(2011),《교차로의 중국》(2012),《Que veut la Chine? De Mao au capitalisme》(2012), 《시진핑의 중국》(2013),《갈라진 아시아: 유럽에 끼치는 영향》(2013),《China on Asia's mind》(2014),《프랑스의 아시아 회귀》(2014) 등이 있다. 또한 2012년도에《Que veut la Chine? De Mao au capitalisme》으로 그 해 최고의 지정학서를 기념하는 브리엔 상을 수상하였다.

Francois Godement is Professor of political science at Sciences Po in Paris, Director of the Asia and China programme at the European Council on Foreign relations, research associate at Asia Centre, and non resident Senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also an outside consultant to the Policy Planning Directorate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Francois Godement is a graduate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure de la rue d'Ulm (Paris) and was a postgraduate student at Harvard University. A long time professor at the French Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations, he founded Asia Centre in 2005, an independent center for research on Asian issues as they intersect global debates. He co-founded in 1995 the European committee of CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific). He recently published « Europe's Relations with China: Lost in Flight? » Transatlantic Academy Paper Series, GMFUS, Washington DC, May 2011; (with Jonas Parello-Plesner and Alice Richard) China: the Scramble for Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2011, China at the crossroads, European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012, Que veut la Chine? De Mao au capitalisme, Paris, Odile Jacob, October 2012 (forthcoming in English at Rowman & Littlefield), Xi Jinping's China, European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2013, Divided Asia: The implications for Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2013, "China on Asia's mind" (2014) and "France's 'pivot' to Asia" (2014). Francois Godement received the first Brienne award for the best geopolitical book of the year after publishing Que veut la Chine? De Mao au capitalisme, Paris, Odile Jacob, October 2012.



선 딩리 푸단대학교교수 SHEN Dingli Professor/Associate Dean of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University

션 딩리는 푸단대학교 국제학 연구소의 부학장이자 교수로 재직 중이며, 국제 안보, 중미 관계, 중국의 외교와 국방 정책, 미국과 "Semester at Sea"를 강의하였다. 주요 연구 분야는 중미 안보 관계, 지역 안보, 국제 전략, 군축 협정과 핵무기 확산방지, 중국과 미국의 외교와 국방 정책이다. 중국 남아시아학 협회, 상하이 국 제학 협회, 상하이 미국학 협회, 상하이 UN 연구협회 부회장을 겸임하고 있으며, 1989년 푸단대학교에서 물리학 박사학 위를 받았다. 1989—1991년 프린스턴 대학교에서 군비 통제에 관한 연구를 이끌었으며, 1996년 아이젠하워 펠로우였고, 2002년 UN 사무총장 코피 아난의 전략 계획을 자문하였다. 아시아 소사이어티 글로벌 의회에서 활동하였으며, 상하이와 항주 지방자치단체로부터 상하이 컨벤션 대사 및 항주 컨벤션 대사로 임명되었다. 저술 활동으로는 17개 공동 집필서와 2,000개의 논문 및 기사가 있다.

Shen Dingli is a professor and associate dean at Fudan University's Institute of International Studies. He has taught international security, China-US relations, China's foreign and defense policy in China, the US and the "Semester at Sea" Program. His research and publication covers China-US security relations, regional security and international strategy, arms control and nonproliferation, foreign and defense policy of China and the US etc. He is Vice President of Chinese Association of South Asian Studies, Shanghai Association of International Studies, Shanghai Association of American Studies, and Shanghai UN Research Association. He received his Ph.D. in physics from Fudan in 1989 and did post-doc in arms control at Princeton University from 1989-1991. He was an Eisenhower Fellow in 1996, and advised in 2002 the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for his strategic planning of second term. He is on the Global Council of Asia Society, and is appointed by Shanghai Municipality and Hongzhou Municipality as both Shanghai Convention Ambassador and Hongzhou Convention Ambassador. He has co-edited 17 books and published over 2,000 papers and articles worldwide.



스콧 스나이더 미국외교협회(CFR) 선임연구위원

Scott SNYDER

Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign Relations

스콧 스나이더는 미국외교협회(CFR)의 한국학 선임연구위원 및 한미 정책 부서장을 겸임하고 있으며, 아시아 재단의 한미 정책 센터를 설립하였고, 한국 지부 대표 및 국제 관계학 선임연구위원, 미국 국제전략문제연구소 태평양 포럼에서 선임연구위원으로 역임하였다. 또한, 미국 평화 연구소에서 아시아 전문가로 활동하였으며, 아시아 소사이어티의 시사 프로그램 이사를 역임했다. 북한에서 활동하는 인도주의적 단체 및 NGO에 자문하였으며, National Committee on North Korea자문위원회 공동의장을 역임하였다. 최근 저서 및 편저로는 《한일 정체성 분쟁: 동아시아 안보와 미국》(2015), 《중견국으로서의 한국: 국제 안건에 대한 기여도》(2015), 《중국의 부상과 한반도: 정치, 경제, 안보》(2009), 《변화의 북한: 정치, 경제 그리고 사회》(2013) 등이 있다.

Scott Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Prior to joining CFR, Snyder was a senior associate in the international relations program of the Asia Foundation, where he founded and directed the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and served as the Asia Foundation's representative in Korea (2000-2004). He was also a senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS. Snyder has worked as an Asia specialist in the research and studies program of the U.S. Institute of Peace and as acting director of Asia Society's contemporary affairs program. He has provided advice to NGOs and humanitarian organizations active in North Korea and serves as co-chair of the advisory council of the National Committee on North Korea. Snyder has edited and authored numerous books on Korean politics and foreign policy. His most recent books include The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States (with Brad Glosserman, 2015) and China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security (2009). Recent books he edited include Middle-Power Korea: Contributions to the Global Agenda (2015) and North Korea in Transition: Politics, Economy, and Society (co-edited with Kyung-ae Park).



김 주 현 현대경제연구원 고문 KIM Joo-Hyun Senior Advisor, Hyundai Research Institute

김주현 박사는 지난 11년간 현대경제연구원의 원장으로 있다 지난해부터 동 연구원의 고문으로 일하고 있다. 대외적으로는 통일준비위원회의 경제분과 위원장으로 있다. 김박사는 미국 아리조나 주립대학에 서 재무분야 박사학위를 받았으며 거시경제와 금융분야를 주로 연구해왔다. 최근엔 주로 한반도 통일과 북한 경제개발에 대하여 연구를 하고 있다. 지난 2007년 이후 전경련과 대한상의의 자문위원으로 활동하고 있다.

Kim, Joo-Hyun is a Senior Advisor of the Hyundai Research Institute where he had been the President and CEO for last 11years. Currently he is also serving as a head of Economic Subcommittee of Presidential Committee of Unification Preparation. He got his Ph.D. from the Department of Finance at the College of Business of Arizona State University, U.S.A., in Aug 1989. Doctor Kim specializes in financial market and macro economics. His current research interests is about the development of north Korean economy and the unified economy of Korean Peninsula. Also, he has acted as a member of The Advisory Committee of The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry since Jul 2007.



김 병 연 서울대학교 교수 KIM Byung-Yeon Professor, Seoul National University

김병연교수는 서울대 경제학부 교수로 재직하고 있으며 서울대 통일평화연구원의 부원장, 서울대 경제학부 BK21 플러스 사업단 단장을 겸직하고 있다. 그의 연구 관심분야는 체제이행과 응용계량경 제학이며 주로 구사회주의 국가들과 북한을 대상으로 연구하고 있다. 그는 서울대학교에서 학사, 석사학위를 취득한 후 영국 옥스포드대학교에서 경제학 박사 학위를 수여받았다. 서울대 부임 이전에는 영국 에섹스대학과 서강대 교수로 재직하였다. 그리고 그는 옥스포드대, 캘리포니아주립대(버클리), 우드루윌슨센터, 핀란드 중앙은행의 이행경제연구소, 모스크바의 이행기경제연구소, 히토츠바시대학, 교토대학의 방문교수/연구원으로 연구하였다. 김병연 교수는 Journal of Comparative Economics, British Journal of Political Economy, Economics of Transition, Journal of Economic History, Economic History Review, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 등의 국제학술지에 논문을 게재하였으며 북한 경제 관련으로 다수의 논문, 북챕터, 책을 저술하였다. 그는 영국경제사학회 수여 T. S. Ashton Prize, 한국경제학회 수여 청람상을 수상하였으며 한국연구재단의 인문사회분야 우수학자로 선정되었다. 그는 2011~2012년 국민경제자문회의 위원을 역임하였으며 현재 통일준비위원회 전문위원(경제분과 간사), 통일부 정책자문위원, 외교부 자체평가위원직을 수행하고 있다.

Byung-Yeon Kim is Professor in Department of Economics, Seoul National University (SNU) and Vice Director of Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at SNU. His research interests lie in the fields of transition economics and applied econometrics, in particular with reference to North Korea as well as former socialist countries. He received B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and D.Phil. from the University of Oxford. He has held faculty positions at University of Essex and Sogang University. He has been a visiting researcher at University of California at Berkeley, University of Oxford, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Bank of Finland Institute of Transition Economies, and Institute of Transition Period in Moscow, Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, and elsewhere. He published a number of articles in international journals such as Journal of Comparative Economics, British Journal of Political Economy, Economics of Transition, Journal of Economic History, Economic History Review, and Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. He wrote more than a dozen of book chapters, books, and journal articles on the North Korean economy. He has been awarded with T. S. Ashton Prize (Economic History Society), Chungram Award (Korean Economic Association) and Distinguished Researcher in Humanities and Social Sciences of Rep. of Korea (National Research Foundation). He had been a member of National Economic Advisory Council (2011-2012) and is currently a member of the Committee for Unification Preparation, Policy Advisory Committee for Ministry of Unification and Evaluation Committee for Ministry of Foreign Affairs.



후카가와 유키코 와세다대학교 교수 FUKAGAWA Yukiko Professor, Waseda University

후카가와 유키코 교수는 현재 와세다 대학교 정치경제학부 교수 및 케임브리지 대학교 아시아-중동학/개발 센터의 방문 교수를 겸임하고 있다. 와세다 대학교에서 학부를 마친 후, 예일 대학교에서 국제 개발 경제학 석사학위를, 와세다 대학교에서 경영학 박사학위를 받았다. 주된 연구분야는 동아시아의 경제개발로 특히 한국의 산업, 무역 정책이다. 아오야마 가쿠인 대학교와 도쿄 대학교 교수진으로 합류하기 전에 일본무역진흥기구와 장기신용 은행 연구소에서 활동하였으며, 재무성의 외환위원회, 경제산업성의 산업구조위원회 등 정부를 위한 다양한 컨설팅과 고문으로 활동하였다. 또한 2013년도에 "새로운 시대를 위한 한일 공동연구"의 경제부 의장을 역임하였으며, 와세다 대학교 아시아학 연구소의 손열 교수와 함께《후기 외환 위기 속의 동북아시아와 한일 관계》 (2013)를 공동 저술하였다.

Yukiko Fukagawa is currently a Professor, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University and a Visiting Fellow, Faculty of Asia and Middle East Studies/ Development Center, Cambridge University. After undergraduate program at Waseda, she studied at Yale University for MA in International Development Economics, and finished Ph.D. program at Waseda Graduate School of Business Studies. Her major interest lies in economic development in East Asia, especially Korea, including their industrial/trade policies. She worked for Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) and Long-Term Credit Bank Research Institute (LTCBR) before joining the faculty member of Aoyama Gakuin University and the University of Tokyo before coming back to Waseda. She engaged in many consultation and advisory activities for the government, such as the Committee for Foreign Exchange in the Ministry of Finance, the Committee for Industrial Structure in the Ministry of Economy and Industry etc...She served as the Chairman of Economic Section in "Japan-Korea Joint Study for the New Era" project opened in 2013. Her recent publication includes Northeast Asia and Japan-Korea Relations in Post Financial Crisis (2013), co-ed with Yul Sohn, Institute of Asia Studies, Waseda University.



마커스 놀랜드 피터슨 국제경제연구소 부소장

Marcus NOLAND

Executive Vice President and Director of Studies, Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)

마커스 놀랜드는 피터슨 국제경제연구소 부소장과 동서문화센터 선임연구원을 겸임하고 있으며, 미국 대통령실 경제고문위원회의 수석 경제학자 및 예일 대학교, 존스홉킨스 대학교, 서던캘리포니아 대학교, 도쿄 대학교, 사이타마 대학교 (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies), 가나대학교, 한국개발연구원에서 연구 및 강의하였다. 저서 및 편저로는 《김정일 이후의 한국; 세계화 속의 산업 정책: 아시아로부터의 교훈》, 《북한의 기근: 시장, 원조 그리고 개혁》, 《변화의 증언: 북한 난민에 대한 통찰》, 《북한에 대한 관여: 국정 경제 운영의 역할》,《저주의 당면: 천연자원 관리의 경제학과 지정학》이 있으며,《종말 피하기: 두 한국의 미래》는 오히라 기념 상을 수상하였다.

Marcus Noland is Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center. He was a Senior Economist at the Council of Economic Advisers in the Executive Office of the President of the United States, and has held research or teaching positions at Yale University, the Johns Hopkins University, the University of Southern California, Tokyo University, Saitama University (now the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies), the University of Ghana, and the Korea Development Institute. Noland has authored, co-authored, or edited numerous books including Korea After Kim Jongil; Industrial Policy in an Era of Globalization: Lessons from Asia (co-authored with Howard Pack); and Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform, Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea, and Engaging North Korea: The Role of Economic Statecraft, (all co-authored with Stephan Haggard). His book, Avoiding the Apocalypse: the Future of the Two Koreas, won the prestigious Ohira Memorial Prize. His latest book, co-authored with Cullen Hendrix, is Confronting the Curse: The Economics and Geopolitics of Natural Resource Governance.



유리 시고브 "비즈니스 피플"지 워싱턴 대표

Yury SIGOV

US Bureau Chief, "Business People" Magazine

유리 시고브 박사는〈비즈니스 피플지〉워싱턴 대표이고, 남아프리카공화국, 나미비아, 앙골라에 있는 유엔에서 대변인, 제네바 유엔 본부에서 커뮤니케이션 고문,〈모스크바 뉴스〉에서 지국장과 해외 특파원,〈Argumenty and Facty〉에서 해외 에디터로 활동했으며,〈Writing international news〉와 미국 매릴랜드 대학교의 연구원을 역임했다. 국제학과 외교 정책 박사학위를 받았으며, 아시아 태평양 지역, 중국, 일본, 한반도, 중동, 중앙 아시아와 카스피안의 외교정책, 동부와 서부의 정치적, 경제적 관계에 관하여 국내외 언론에 정기적으로 투고했다. 최근 저술로는《아시아의 카스피안 입구》,《미지의 카자흐스탄》,《세상의 지붕 아래에서》,《다양한 얼굴의 말레이시아》,《금부처의 나라에서》,《세계 여덟 가지 기적》、《브라질: 나라, 사람, 정책》,《남아프리카공화국: 오늘과 내일》、《인도네시아의 도전》、《핵의 벨은 누구에게 울리는가?》등이 있다. 또한 비즈니스, 무역, 대중 매체가 세계 정치에 미치는 영향, 금융시장, 국제 비즈니스에서의 이슬람의 역할, 정치 경제 이슈, 개발 도상국들의 외교 정책, 국제 통상, 인도적, 사회적 문제들에 중점을 두고 50개국이 넘는 나라에서 10,000개 이상의 기사를 투고했다.

Dr. Yury Sigov is the US Bureau Chief in Washington of "Business People" magazine. Previously, Mr. Sigov worked as a Spokesman for the UN in South Africa, Namibia and Angola, and communication advisor in the UN HQ office in Geneva, Switzerland. During his professional career, he worked as a foreign correspondent and Bureau Chief of "Moscow News" in London, Hong Kong and Washington D.C. From 1988-1991, in Moscow he was the foreign editor of Argumenty and Facty, the largest weekly in the world with the circulation of 33 million copies. Mr. Yury Sigov holds a PhD in International Affairs and Foreign Policy. He participated in numerous international forums and conferences on foreign policy affairs, energy, media and international issues. Regular contributor to international and regional media on Asia-Pacific region, foreign policy of China, Japan and Korean peninsula, the Middle East, Central Asia and Caspian, political and economic relations between East and West. In 1992, Mr. Yury Sigov was a Fellow of Reuters News Agency program "Writing international news" in London and Hong Kong, and in 1993 was he was Hubert Humphrey Fellow at the University of Maryland, USA. Author of numerous monographs and books: "The Caspian Gates of Asia" (Azerbaijan), "Unknown Kazakhstan", "Under the roof of the world" (Tajikistan), "Multi-faced Malaysia", "In the country of Golden Buddha" (Thailand), "The Eights Miracle of the World" (about Singapore), "Brazil: country, people, policy", "South Africa: today and tomorrow", "Indonesian challenge", "Whom the nuclear bell is ringing?" (about current status of nuclear arms in the world) and others. He has more than 10,000 articles published in more than 50 countries, with an emphasis on business and trade issues, mass media influence on world politics, financial markets, role of Islam in international business, political and economic affairs, foreign policy of the developing countries, international commerce, humanitarian and social problems.



김 재 창 한미안보연구회 회장 KIM Jae Chang Chair, Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies

저는 1962년 육군 사관학교를 졸업 후 32년 동안 군에 복무한 후, 1994 년 육군 대장으로 예편하였습니다. 제가 맡았던 주요 보직은 보병 제9사단장, 합참 작전국장, 제6군단장, 국방부 정책실장, 그리고마지막으로 한미연합군 사령부 부사령관 겸, 지상구성군 사령관이었습니다. 영관시절, 미국 해군대학원에 유학하여 OR/SA를 전공하여, 석사학위를 받았습니다. 군에서 전역한 후, Fletcher School에서 국제관계를 전공하여 석사(1998) 및 박사학위(2002)를 받았습니다. 1999년 말, 일시 귀국하여 국방 개혁위원회 위원장으로 국방정보화 업무를 수행하였으며, 2003년부터 2012년까지 연세대학교 국제학 대학원에서 국제관계를 강의하였습니다. 동시에 2003년부터 지금까지 한미안보연구회의 공동의장으로 일 하고 있습니다.

General(R) Kim, Jae Chang had served in the Korean Army for 32 years until he was retired from active service in April 1994. His major assignments include commanding general of 9th Infantry Division, Director of Operations in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanding General of 6th Corps, Assistant Minister for Policy, and Deputy Commander in Chief of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command. He graduated from the United States Naval Postgraduate School, majoring Operations Research and System Analysis, and got the degree of Master of Science in March 1976. After his retirement, he studied in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Boston, majoring International Relations, and got the degree of Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) on May 17, 1998 and the degree of Ph.D. on November 2, 2002. From November 1999 to December 2001, he served as the Chairman of the Committee for the Defense Systems Reform, Ministry of National Defense. He taught students at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University, as a visiting professor between 2003 and 2011. Since 2003, he has served as the co-chairman of the Council on ROK-US Security Studies.



정 태 용 연세대학교 교수 JUNG Tae Yong Professor, Yonsei University

정태용 교수는 현재 연세대학교 국제대학원 교수 겸 연세대 지속가능발전연구원 Institute for Global Sustainability (IGS) 부원장으로 재직 중임. 그 전에는 KDI 국제정책대학원 교수를 역임하였으며, 아시아개발은행, 세계은행 등에서 기후변화, 에너지 등의 전문가로 근무를 하였음. 한국 정부 주도로 만든 글로벌녹섹성장 기구 (GGGI)의 부소장으로 재직을 하기도 하였음. 세계은행 근무 전에는 일본 환경성이 설립한지구환경전략연구기관에서 기후변화 담당 연구부장을 역임하였으며, 한국의 에너지경제연구원 연구위원을 거쳤음. 서울대학교 학사, 미국 뉴저지 주립대학에서 경제학 박사를 받았으며 미국 에너지부 연구원의 초빙연구원, 일본 국립환경연구소 겸임연구원, 교토대학 초빙연구원 등을 역임하였음.

Mr.Tae Yong Jung is currently a professor at the GSIS and Deputy Executive Director of Institute for Global Sustainability (IGS), Yonsei University. Before he joined GSIS, He was a professor at the KDI School of Public Policy & Management. Prior to the current position, he was a Principal Climate Change Specialist at the Asian Development Bank. He was seconded to the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) located in the Republic of Korea as the Deputy Executive Director. Before ADB, he was working at the World Bank. He was also formerly the Project Leader in Climate Policy Project at the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) of Japan and Senior Fellow and Director at Korea Energy Economics Institute. Educated at Seoul National University (BA) and at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (MA and Ph.D.), he was a Visiting Researcher at the US National Energy Laboratory, the Joint Global Change Research Institute, University of Maryland and a Joint Research Fellow at the National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES), and a Visiting Fellow at Kyoto University Japan.



최 재 천 국립생태원 원장 **CHOE Jae Chun** President, National Institute of Ecology

최재천은 하버드대에서 에드워드 윌슨 교수의 지도로 생물학 박사 학위를 받았다. 하버드대 전임강사, 미시건대 조교수, 서울대 생명과학부 교수를 거쳐 이화여대 에코과학부 석좌교수로 일하고 있다. 현재 국립생태원 초대 원장과 생물다양성협약(CBD) 의장을 맡고 있다.

He received his PhD in Biology under the guidance of E. O. Wilson at Harvard University and taught at the University of Michigan and Seoul National University. He is currently serving as University Chair Professor at Ewha University, Founding Director of National Institute of Ecology and President of Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).



아이눌 하산 유엔 아시아·태평양 경제사회위원회(UNESCAP) 거시경제정책 국장

Aynul HASAN

Director, Macroeconomic Policy and Development Division, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)

아이눌 하산은 유엔 아시아·태평양 경제사회위원회(UNESCAP)의 거시경제정책 국장 및 아시아 태평양 개발 저널의 편집장을 겸임하고 있으며, 유엔 아시아·태평양 경제사회위원회(UNESCAP)의 플래그십 발간물 "아시아·태평양 지역의 경제·사회학적 조사"의 코디네이터이다. 유엔 아시아·태평양 경제사회 위원회(UNESCAP)의 개발정책국과 개발도상국협의 국장 및 캐나다 국제개발단(CIDA)에서 경제 고문을 역임하였다. 또한 유엔에 참여하기 전 15년간 캐나다에서 교수를, 미국 존스홉킨스 대학교(Johns Hopkins University)에서 방문교수를 역임하였다. 48개가 넘는 국내외 저널의 논문 및 저서를 편찬하였으며, 캐나다 맥마스터 대학교(McMaster University)에서 거시경제와 화폐경제. 계량경제를 전공으로 경제학 박사학위를 받았다.

Dr. Aynul Hasan is Director, Macroeconomic Policy and Development Division at UNESCAP. He holds a doctoral degree in Economics from McMaster University, Canada. His areas of specialization have been macroeconomics, monetary economics and econometrics. He joined UNESCAP in 1998 and headed Development Policy and LDC Coordination Unit. He is the coordinator of ESCAP's flagship publication the "Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific Region" since 2010. Prior to joining the United Nations, he taught for 15 years as full Professor of Economics in Canada. He spent 1990-91 as Visiting Associate Professor at the Johns Hopkins University, USA. From 1994 to 1996, he was seconded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to work as Economic Advisor in Pakistan to support the country's social action programme. Dr Hasan has published extensively over four dozen articles, monograms and books in international and national journals. He is also the Chief Editor of Asia Pacific Development Journal



노먼 뉴라이터 미국과학진흥회 수석고문 Norman P. Neureiter Senior advisor, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)

노먼 뉴라이터(Norman P. Neureiter)는 미국과학진흥회 수석고문으로 미국 노스웨스턴대학교(Northwestern University)에서 유기화학 박사학위를 받았다. 엑슨(Exxon) 자회사에서 6년간 연구 활동 이후, 미국 국립과학재단(National Science Foundation)에서 U.S.—Japan Cooperative Science Program을 감독하였다. 국무부에서 U.S. scientific attache, 백악관 과학기술국에서 international affairs assistant, Texas Instruments Asia(TI Asia)에서 부사장을 역임하였다. 2000년에는 최초로 미국 국무장관의 과학기술 고문으로 임명되었고, 2004년 미국과학진흥회에서 초대 과학기술안보정책(Science, Technology and Security Policy) 소장을 역임하였다. 주요 연구분야로는 과학외교(Science Diplomacy), 과학과 국제안보(Science and International Security), 과학기술의 국제 협력(International Cooperation in Science and Technology) 등이 있다.

Norman P. Neureiter has a Ph.D. in organic chemistry from Northwestern University. After six years of research with an Exxon subsidiary, in 1963 he joined the National Science Foundation to direct a cooperative science program with Japan initiated by President Kennedy. Joining the Department of State in 1965, he served four years abroad as U.S. scientific attache—first in Germany and then in Poland. In 1973 he moved to the White House Office of Science and Technology--playing a role in President Nixon's breakthrough diplomacy with China and the Soviet Union, which included some unprecedented cooperative science initiatives. He joined Texas Instruments (TI) in 1973 where a 23-year career culminated in the position of Vice President, TI Asia, based in Tokyo. Retiring in 1996, he was appointed in 2000 as the first Science and Technology Adviser to the U.S. Secretary of State. In 2004 he joined the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) to direct a center dealing with science and security, but later focused on science diplomacy. Much of his professional life has been spent in international science engagement in the belief that such cooperation can be an effective instrument of a constructive foreign policy.




장 폴 페덱 세계자연보호기금(WWF) 본부 국제협력국장 Jean-Paul PADDACK

Director, International Business Development, World Wide Fund for Nature(WWF) International

장 폴 페덱은 세계자연기금(WWF)의 국제비즈니스개발 사무국장 및 프랑스 지부 이 사회 임원을 겸임하고 있으며 세계자연기금(WWF) 한국본부 공동 이사장이다. 또한 마다가스카르 생물다양성 기금의 설립 이사이며 세계자연기금(WWF) 프랑스의 사하라 보존 기금의 이사 및 BACoMaB 신탁 기금의 이사이다. 세계자연기금(WWF) 인터네셔널의 Global Initiatives의 사무국장과 Smart Fishing Initiative의 이사장, 프랑스 환경보호 NGO단체인 Noé Conservation의 재무국장, 세계은행(World Bank) 아이티 사무소의 공공 투자 프로그램 임원 및 세계자연기금(WWF)의 마다가스카르 지역 대표를 역임하였다. 아시아개발은행(Asian Development Bank), 아프리카개발은행(African Development Bank), 유럽 위원회(European Commission), 지구환경기금(GEF)과 세계 은행(World Bank) 등 많은 다자간 국제 기구와 합작하여 세계자연기금(WWF)의 정책과 자금 기획을 담당하였으며 2014년 한국 DMZ 위원회의 자문 위원으로 임명되었다. 조지타운 대학교 외교학과를 졸업하고 존스홉킨스 고급국제학대학원(SAIS)에서 석사학위를 받았다.

Jean-Paul Paddack is Director for International Business Development at WWF International. He also serves as Co-Chairman of WWF-Korea, newly established in March 2014, and is a Board member of WWF-France. He has 25 years of international development and management experience in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. He has worked with the World Bank (1989-1990) working on Haiti's Public Sector Investment Programme in the agriculture sector, and USAID (1991-1997) in the Africa Bureau working in West and Central Africa, and Madagascar. He joined WWF International in April 1997. From 1997 to 2007, Jean-Paul was WWF's Regional Representative for Madagascar and the Western Indian Ocean region, leading WWF's largest field operations office with a team of 750, and conservation programmes in Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius and Comoros. From 2007 to 2011, as Director of Global Initiatives at WWF International, where he was responsible for the launch and coordination WWF's "Global Initiatives" portfolio, including priority footprint and biodiversity conservation initiatives; he was Chairperson of the Smart Fishing Initiative from 2008-2010, WWF's global sustainable fisheries campaign. He also coordinated WWF's policy and funding with bilateral and multilateral aid agencies -- including the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Commission, European bilateral aid agencies, as well as the GEF and World Bank. In December 2011, Jean-Paul Paddack was named Director for International Business Development, responsible for public and private partnerships, strategy and planning, as well as resource mobilization in new markets for WWF, focusing on Asia (Republic of Korea and Taiwan) and the Middle East (Gulf). As Co-Chairman of WWF-Korea, Jean-Paul Paddack drives WWF-Korea's programmatic agenda focused on ecological footprint issues, including climate change and renewable energy, sustainable fisheries, as well as illegal wildlife trade and species conservation. He is also in charge of the membership programme which aims to recruit over 35,000 members over the next five years.

Jean-Paul Paddack is a founding Board Member of the Madagascar Biodiversity Fund, a joint-partnership between Conservation International, the Government of Madagascar and WWF. The Foundation, created in 2005, is the fastest growing environmental trust fund in Africa, and has a capital of over \$55 million, and an additional \$22 million in the pipeline. He has advised other environmental funds, including the one established in Botswana. He also served (until 2015) as Treasurer of the French conservation NGO, Noé Conservation. Jean-Paul Paddack is a Trustee of WWF-France, the Sahara Conservation Fund, and is a Board member (since October 2015) of the BACoMaB Trust Fund which provides financial support to the Banc d'Arguin National Park and marine coastal conservation initiatives in Mauritania. In January 2014, he was appointed as a member of the Advisory Committee of the Korea DMZ Council. A graduate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service (SFS, 1987), he received his Master's degree from Johns Hopkins University's Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS, 1990). As a member of WWF International's Management Team, Jean-Paul Paddack has participated in several executive management training programmes at IMD Lausanne Business School. Jean-Paul is a dual national of France and the USA.





한승주 前 외교부 장관

HAN Sung-Joo Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea



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외교부 前 장관

HAN Sung-Joo

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea

Division Management and Unification: Korea vs. Germany Han Sung-joo

1. Preface

The German unification for 25 years still evokes admiration and envy among the Koreans. Before Germany was unified, the relationships between East and West Germany and those between North and South Korea had shared both similarities and differences. Both countries were divided by the occupation of separate Allied powers in the wake of World War II. Both countries turned into fields of East—West confrontation while being incorporated into the postwar alliance systems. Nevertheless, neither country abandoned their hope for unification for several decades after the division. In neither case, the surrounding powers seemed eager to have them unified. The neighbor countries to Germany feared that it might be reborn as a strong unified nation, whereas the countries around the Koran Peninsula were concerned about the possibly unstable aftermath of unification and the possibility for a unified Korea falling into some other nation's sphere of influence.

At the same time, there have been several differences between the German and Korean divisions. Five such differences stand out. For one thing with the national division, while the Koreans were inflicted with what might be called "victim's complex," the Germans had what might be called a "guilt complex." Koreans had the sense that they had done nothing wrong to deserve the tragedy of division but were simply the victim of power politics and backdoor understanding between the powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union. In contrast, the Germans recognized and accepted the fact that their national division was the result of what pre-World War II Germany had done; the invasion of neighboring countries, persecution of some ethnic groups, particularly the Jews, and precipitation of World War II.

Secondly, during the period of national division, while the DDR, East Germany, was under effective control and protection by the Soviet Union and so posed no serious military threat on West Germany by itself, North Korea was a constant security threat to South Korea, what with an all-out military invasion of the South which resulted in the Korean War, smaller scale military provocations including commando attacks, or what with military build-up, development of nuclear weapons and missiles of various kinds, and subversive activities.

Third, while the fervor and activist movements for unification came mainly from younger generations and politically leftist sectors in Korea, the relatively subdued and passive calls and desire for reunification tended to derive from the older

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generations and more from the conservative sectors.

Fourth, while West Germany was an important member and active participant of multilateral regional and security organizations such as the European Community and NATO, South Korea's main security link to the outside world was a bilateral alliance with the United States and it enjoyed no membership in regional organizations or communities. So when the unification came to Germany, the East Germans were prepared to join not only their Western brethren, but also the European Community and NATO, thereby diluting the sense that East Germany was being taken over by West Germany. Finally, after 45 years of the German division and 70 years of Korean division in 1945, there is a big difference in the nature of the relationship between East Germany and North Korea on the one hand and the Soviet Union and China on the other, their respective benefactors and guardians. In 1990, the Soviet Union was a declining and disintegrating empire, in need of economic help from the outside after overspending in arms build-up and competition with the West, and in the process of internal transition from autocracy and dictatorship to perestroika and glasnost. In 2015, China is a rising economic power still under an effective one party rule, challenging the domination of the United States and territorial status quo in East Asia, even as it has a strong interdependent relationship with the West and even though it has its own share of risks of rapid economic growth and self-aggrandizement. Nonetheless, East Germany was still under firm control of the Soviet Union and North Korea has been struggling for self-reliance and determination.

2. Status of North-South Korean relations

Roughly speaking, since the end of the Korean War in 1953, inter-Korea relations have gone through seven different phases with various degrees of hostilities and engagements. The post-Armistice period of 1953-1960 can be characterized as one of internal recuperation from the war in both Koreas and estrangement between the two Koreas. It was a period of a military stalemate with each militarily aligned with the major supporting powers, namely the United States on the part of South Korea and the Soviet Union and China on the part of North Korea. It was also a period of diplomatic competition whereby in a starkly bipolarized world both Koreas established and nurtured diplomatic ties with the countries belonging to one (Western) or the other (Soviet) blocs at the exclusion of the other. The so-called non-aligned bloc provided a field of completion for both recognition and votes at the United Nations on resolutions favoring one or the other of the two Koreas.

The second phase (1960-72) is one in which South Korea witnessed the emergence of a military government and North Korea became increasingly belligerent toward South Korea with occasional military (although small-scale) provocations both to South Korea and its ally the United States. A selected list of such provocations would include the 1968 raid attempt of the Presidential mansion by a North Korean armed commando group, the 1968 capture of the USS Pueblo, and the 1969 shoot-down of an EC-121 reconnaissance plane. These provocative acts were committed as the attention and energy of both South Korea and the United States was diverted to the war in Vietnam.

The third phase (1972-1984) could be characterized as one of co-existence in that a series of dialogue got started as the two governments tried to use inter-Korea dialogue for the consolidation of power in their respective home fronts. The first one of the dialogues occurred as the Red Cross societies of the North and the South met from 1972 through 1973 and discussed possibilities for reunion of families separated by the war. The inter-Korea "Joint Declaration of July 4th, 1972, pledged first to resolve Korean issues by Koreans without the outside intervention of other powers, second to resolve disputes by peaceful means without resorting to military means, and third, work toward a grand unity of all the Korean people. Afterward, both sides set up the North-South Coordinating Committee to discuss reconciliation and unification, but the dialogue was suspended in 1973 as the North refused to deal with the South.

Dialogue sputtered through the fourth phase (1984-1992) despite the North Korean attempt at assassination of the visiting South Korean president when the North Korean regime planted and exploded a bomb at the Aungsan Mausoleum

Keynote Address

in Rangoon, Burma in 1983. The North-South dialogue in the mid eighties began as Seoul accepted Pyongyang's proposal to provide relief goods for flood sufferings in the South. As a result of Red Cross talks, art performance troupes and some fifty families mutually met with families and relatives living in the other part of Korea. The dialogue in the mideighties was the one that could not surpass a certain level because of limitations pertaining to North Korea and distrust between the North and the South. The dialogue started mainly out of extra-dialogue motivations of the North such as recovering international image that had been tarnished by the Rangoon bombing, enhancing the image of Kim Jong II as successor to Kim II Sung, and the like. Faced with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the unification of Germany, North Korea felt obliged to reckon with South Korea which was broadening its diplomatic horizon starting with the hosting of the 1988 summer Olympics and thus engage with South Korea in a serious bilateral dialogue. It resulted in such landmark agreement as Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation (1991), and Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (1992) Agreement.

But the apparent lunge toward reconciliation was superseded by another, fifth, phase of estrangement (1993-1998) as North Korean nuclear weapons program became a focal issue of contention. Furthermore, the passing of the "great leader" Kim II-Song ion 1994 made it impossible for North Korea engage the South in any positive and active way. In the absence of the deceased father, his son and the designated successor, Kim Jong-II needed time to consolidate his position at home and re-figure his policy and strategy toward the South.

The sixth phase (1999-2008), that of "Sunshine Policy", was ushered in when Kim Dae-Jung, a long-time advocate of engaging the North became president in 1999. After his term of five-years was over, another "Sunshiner" president, Roh Mu-Hyun succeeded Kim for the next five-year term until 2008. The ostensible purpose of Kim Dae-Jung's Sunshine Policy toward the North was three-fold: One, to achieve peace by promoting cooperation, understanding and confidence. Two, to help North Korean people improve their economic conditions so that they can overcome hunger and dire poverty. Three, to induce North Korea to open itself to the outside world and enable the society to change so that ultimately both political and social conditions could improve. Improved relations between North and South Korea culminated in an inter-Korea summit meeting when President Kim Dae-Jung visited Pyongyang in June, 2000, and met his counterpart Kim Jong-II. The result was a large scale economic assistance to North Korea and increased exchange of people, goods and services between North and South Korea.

Despite the ten-year period of "Sunshine" relationship between North and South Korea, North Korean military posture visà-vis South Korea not only did not become less aggressive or threatening. In fact, with the collapse of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework in 2002, North Korea openly stepped up its nuclear and missile programs with the effect of making the security situation in Korea more dangerous and threatening. In South Korea, criticism of the "Sunshine Policy" which presumably helped finance North Korea's nuclear and missile programs mounted. Thus, when the conservative government of Lee Myong-Bak took office in 2009, the Sunshine policy was replaced by a more balanced policy which was less unconditional, one-sided and indulgent toward North Korea.

The seventh, and the current phase (2009-) of North-South Korean relationship can be characterized by continuing advancement of North Korean nuclear weapons program, a deteriorating economic condition of the North, the start of a third generational dynastic succession process, discontinuation of dialogue and the consequent decrease in exchange, trade and economic assistance between North and South Korea, and the perpetration of provocative acts on the South by North Korea. The phase is also witnessing China seeming to take a more "protective" attitude toward North Korea lest it should collapse on its own weight of poverty and intransigence, and the strengthening of U.S. commitment to and security relationship with its allies, South Korea and Japan.

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3. Possibility for duplication?

Despite these differences between the divided Germany and Korea, however, South Koreans were hopeful after German unification that they could duplicate the German path to unification. On the other hand, German unification provided North Korea with both incentives and perhaps means to prevent a similar process from taking place on Korean Peninsula.

In fact, North Korea had plenty to worry at the time of Germany unification: The Soviet empire was disintegrating; Both China and the Soviet Union officially recognized the Republic of Korea and established diplomatic relations with it, while the United States and Japan did not reciprocate for North Korea; the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a détente; China and the United States agreed on an rapprochement; and North Korea opposed the application of the German formula to Korea.

In that sense, German unification brought about retrogression rather than progress in the short term in the North—South Korean relationship by stiffening the North Korean attitude. This is a very tragic irony for a divided country. That is to say, the stronger the aspiration of one side for unification is and the louder the clamor for unification is, the lesser becomes practical opportunities or possibilities to achieve it as the other side takes the aspiration as a desire to take over and therefore is threatening. While both North and South Korea clamor for unification, neither side would think of turning over power to or sharing it with the other in the name of unification. Under such circumstances, unification by either side would mean to absorb or subjugate, if not conquer, the other. Whereas North Korea's reference to unification meant to South Koreans a North Korean takeover of the South, the South Korean reference to unification sounded to the North to signify absorption of North Korea by the South, thus evoking the fear and resistance from Pyongyang.

What made North Korea worry was not only German unification. As a result of transformations in socialist states since 1989 and the promotion of Nordpolitik by South Korea, most of them established diplomatic relations with Seoul. Pyongyang of course showed negative responses to the establishment of diplomatic ties by its allies with Seoul and recalled most of its international students from Eastern Europe and the USSR. North Korea, one of the most closed, if not the most closed, regimes in the world could not but be influenced by the transformation of socialism. As a means to prevent a regime change, North Korea chose to develop WMDs including nuclear weapons and missiles and to further insulate itself from outside influence.

Only during the 10-year period from 1998–2008 of South Korea's Sunshine Policy, North Korea chose to engage South Korea as the latter was eager to provide the former with extensive economic assistance. With the election of Lee Myungbak as President and the return to power of the Grand National Party in 2008, however, South Korea's experiment with the Sunshine Policy had come to an end, and a policy of pragmatism and balance, which emphasized reciprocity, conditionality, and measured engagement with the North became an official policy of the South Korean government.

North Korea on its part was dissatisfied with the less generous and less indulgent South Korean government attitude following the more generous Sunshine Policy years. Since then, North Korea conducted three nuclear weapons tests and pursued what it named the byongjin policy, described as a parallel policy to become a nuclear weapons state while simultaneously reviving its economy.

In the meantime, the Park Geun-hye government that succeeded the Lee Myung-bak government pretty much continued the preceding government's "measured engagement policy" but with greater emphasis on cooperation with North Korea and search for "unification," which would supposedly bring a "bonanza" to Korea and its neighbors. The problem has been that the Park government had to overcome two hurdles to get positive results from its policy for promoting unification. One is the need to overcome North Korea's suspicion that Park's unification overtures are nothing less than a call for "unification by absorption," that is, by the German formula. The other is that it had to find a formula by which North Korea would suspend and then abandon its nuclear weapons program and refrain from conventional provocations.



4. Persuading major powers

Another important task for the Korean government is to persuade the four major powers, i.e., China, the United States, Russia and Japan, that have strong interest in how the situation on the Korean Peninsula develops, that Korean unification, when and if it comes, will actually be in accord with their respective interests rather than being against them. So, how will Korean unification affect their interests? One can think of both positive and negative interests of the major powers on Korean unification.

Let's first talk about the interest of the United States. There are some positive reasons why the United States will think Korean unification to be in its own interest as well.

Positive Reasons:

- 1. War in or over Korea less likely
- 2. North Korean threat (WMDs, missiles, etc.) and provocations removed
- 3. Emergence of a unified Korea as a powerful ally
- 4. Korea's increased dependence on the United States in the short term—need for economic and security support from the U.S.
- 5. Expansion of democracy, market economy

But there are some possible reasons why the U.S. could think Korean unification to be against its interest:

- 1. Weakening of rationale, necessity for the U.S.-Korea alliance
- 2. Korea' possible move closer into Chinese sphere of influence
- 3. Decrease in U.S. influence over Korea
- 4. Further deterioration of relations between Korea and Japan

Next, let's have a look at opposing reasons Japan may have for Korean unification.

Positive reasons:

- 1. North Korean threat (nuclear weapons, missiles, etc.) removed
- 2. Expansion of "free world" (democracy, market economy)
- 3. Korean preoccupation in internal matters during unification process
- 4. Increased need for Japanese support and help

Negative reasons:

- 1. Emergence of a powerful neighbor
- 2. Removal of Japan's rationale for militarization (against North Korean threat)
- 3. Loss of opportunity for "divide and rule" between North and South Korea
- 4. Possibility for a unified Korea to move closer to China

Russia may as well have contending reasons for welcoming or being reluctant for Korean unification.

Positive Reasons:

- 1. Increase in economic opportunities (gas, railroads, transportation, trade, investment, etc.)
- 2. Weakening of the U.S. alliance system
- 3. Assumption of a key role in the unification process

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Negative Reasons:

1. Loss of opportunity to "fish in troubled waters" (between North and South Korea) Possibility for increased Chinese influence over Korea

5. China's interests and reasons for its stance

Then finally, is the Korean unification for or against Chinese interest?

Positive Reasons:

- 1. Reduced burden of North Korea
- 2. Absence of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles threat
- 3. Expanded economic relations and opportunities with a unified Korea
- 4. Removal of a rationale for U.S.-Korea alliance and U.S.-Japan-Korea coalition

Negative Reasons:

- 1. Loss of a buffer zone
- 2. Economic loss in the three Northeastern provinces
- 3. Possible influx of North Korean refugees
- 4. Possibility of continued presence of U.S. bases and troops in southern part of a unified Korea
- 5. Appearance of a competitor (unified Korea)

A key factor in Korean unification would be what China thinks would portend for its own interest. What kind of calculus is China making in actuality about unification of the Korean Peninsula, and what role is it expected to play? Although we often speak of "China's thinking," no unified consensus seems to exist among the experts in China's North Korea policy directly concerning unification. Their views seem to diverge into several ramifications:

First is that China has to render unconditional assistance to its blood ally of North Korea and safeguard its security. China wants to demonstrate its clout to other developing nations and keep Pyongyang within its sphere of influence by protecting the DPRK. Second is to maintain the present policy of shielding North Korea on the one hand and of recommending cooperative relations with Japan, South Korea, and the United States on the other. The PRC wants to make the Pyongyang regime undertake reforms and refrain from provocations with a view to preventing military conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. Third is to exercise stronger pressure on North Korea, partake in international sanctions, and abandon the defense of Pyongyang if necessary.

Among these three alternatives, that is to say (1) to assist North Korea unconditionally to preserve the regime and system, (2) to induce opening and change while helping it, and (3) to pressure and abandon it if necessary, the PRC government's current North Korea policy may be seen as the second, i.e. to encourage reforms, opening, and restraint from provocations while supporting the preservation of the DPRK and its regime survival.

China's North Korea policy, however, is detected to have begun moving, though little by little, toward the third alternative, a policy of mounting pressure on North Korea. This is deemed to have a close relationship with China's calculation of interests in Korean unification.

China thinks it would get the following short-term benefits should the Korean Peninsula be unified under the South Korean auspices:

First, if the peninsula is unified, China will be relieved from the burden of economic aid and military assistance for North Korea that has so far been greatly onerous.

Second, being relieved from hostilities and confrontations on the peninsula between North and South Korea, the PRC



will become free from danger of military clashes and war it considers to be against its own interest. Such a perception is not unrelated to the fact that the DPRK has lately stepped up the development of nuclear weapons and missiles thereby increasing threats to China from possibilities for nuclear arms attacks and nuclear accidents in North Korea.

Third, when unification under South Korea's initiative is premised, China will not only further expand and vitalize its economic relations that are already vibrant with the South but seize opportunities to secure its economic interests in the North Korean region in a stable manner.

In a longer term, Beijing may hope for the following benefits from Korean unification:

First, unification will contribute to the peace and stability not solely on the Korean Peninsula but also in Northeast Asia at large.

Second, an economic sphere and market of South and North Korea combined under a unified government will not merely offer a greater economic opportunity for China but contribute to regional integration as well.

Third, a unified Korea will obviate the justification (appropriateness) and necessity for external powers' (U.S.) military engagement and presence regardless of developments in Sino–American relations. At the same time, the rationale for a ROK–U.S.–Japan trilateral alliance to contain and encircle China will be weakened.

Despite such positive short- and long-term implications, China also expresses apprehensions over negative consequences and impacts from unification of the Korean Peninsula.

In a short term, China is concerned as follows:

First, should the peninsula destabilize in the vortex of unification, innumerable refugees will flow from North Korea into China. While crossing the Yalu River and entering the border zones of China's two Northeast (Jilin and Heilungkiang) provinces, North Korean refugees will flow along the sea lanes to land on the Liaoning, Tianjin, Shandong coasts. The massive influx of refugees will not only impose a tremendous financial burden on China but constitute threats to regional security. The refugee problem will also be a thorny issue in relations with a unified Korea.

Second, unification of the Korean Peninsula will cause a direct negative impact on economic relations between China and North Korea. It will particularly give rise to an enormous trouble to economic relations with China's three Northeast Provinces which account for 70 percent of China—North Korea trade.

Third, livelihood and properties of the Chinese, e.g. businesses, restaurants, shops, apartments, such infrastructure as roads and ports, and joint venture enterprises can suffer a loss from social unrest and disorder in the unification process. In medium and long terms, China has the following concerns over the consequences of unification:

First, China will lose the presence of North Korea which can serve as a "buffer" to the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia.

Second, China's economic foothold in North Korea may shrink and weaken as South Korea will replace it. Although China–North Korea trade (approximately \$6.5 billion in 2013) may not be termed as a big share of China's annual external trade since it corresponds to an extremely miniscule portion (0.155% or 1/600) out of its total trade volume (\$4.2 trillion), Korean unification would deal a sizeable blow at Liaoning and Jilin Provinces, in which Dandong and Yanji would suffer more severely.

Third, there are uncertainties contained in such issues as alliance relationship (the ROK-U.S. alliance) and foreign troops' presence in a unified Korea.

As seen above, I have compared and enumerated China's positive as well as negative points of view on unification of the Korean Peninsula. Let me now further elaborate on the issues I mentioned last regarding Chinese views on the ROK–U.S. alliance and the U.S. forces stationed in Korea.

Originally until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, China had maintained a positive, or at least tolerant, position to consider as "necessary evil" not only the ROK–U.S. alliance but the U.S.–Japan alliance. The reason was that the U.S.–Japan alliance not merely had an effect to restrain Japan's rearmament (and nuclear armament) but played a role

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as well in checking the military power of the Soviet Union, China's rival. In particular, the fact that the ROK–U.S. alliance plays a role in deterring North Korea's provocations on the Korean Peninsula constituted a reason for China to admit its usefulness.

As the Cold War ended and the Soviet threat largely died down, Beijing began to disparage the U.S. alliance system in Northeast Asia as a Cold War legacy while judging that the ROK–U.S. and U.S. ¬¬–Japan alliances targeted China.

China also stays vigilant against the possibility for such current bilateral arrangements as ROK–U.S. and U.S.–Japan alliances with the United States as their hub to develop into a NATO-type multilateral alliance. We, therefore, can see that China has wariness over the prospect for a unified Korea to join such a multilateral alliance system.

Showing sensitive responses as well to the U.S. provision of extended deterrence ("nuclear umbrella") to Japan or South Korea, China retains an opposing position to it. China obviously thinks that the United States, by providing its nuclear deterrent to Japan and Korea, offsets or cuts in half China's own nuclear deterrent.

From an objective perspective, however, neither the U.S. extended deterrence nor the ROK–U.S. alliance is always disadvantageous to China. I think this is true both at present and even after Korean unification. The nuclear deterrence and the ROK–U.S. alliance, along with the U.S.–Japan alliance, will have an effect to continue to bind Japan as a nonnuclear state. There is no doubt that they will obviate the need for arms expansion by evoking a reunified Korea's confidence in its security, and even arms reduction can further be expected as well. Furthermore, they will also enable the United States to play a peacemaker's part in maintaining peace between its allies of Korea and Japan even after unification let alone now. At the same time, Korea will be able to assume a useful role as a constructive mediator for cooperation between the United States and China by maintaining close relationships with both great powers.

As far as the U.S. forces in Korea are concerned, China may expect that the justification or necessity could either diminish or disappear for the U.S. troops to stay on the Korean Peninsula after unification. At the same time, China would demand that the U.S. forces should never advance north of the present military demarcation line, even if the ROK—U.S. alliance is maintained and the U.S. troops continue to be stationed after unification. This may not be unacceptable to the ROK or the United State, although it is foreseen in the U.S. position that a certain level of direct U.S. military role is indispensable in the process of dismantling North Korea's weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear arsenal and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In consideration of long- and short-term interests as well as positive and negative reasons for China to be in favor of or against Korean unification, it may be worthwhile to keep in mind China's "Red Lines."

First, South Korea and the United States must agree that the U.S. troops would not advance north of the Demilitarized Zone.

Second, the United States must not install a new military base north of the DMZ.

Third, as the ROK Army's activities in North Korea do not belong to a category of a war, they are beyond the scope of U.S. wartime operational control even before the OPCON is transferred. Such activities, therefore, must be regarded as ROK Army's unilateral operation in the North. The ROK Army must avoid areas bordering China and retreat after disarming the North Korean army. Fourth, South Korea and the United States must share with China the information including the "exclusive" information on North Korea.

Fifth, when securing North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biochemical arms and their delivery systems), the ROK-U.S. allies must allow international organizations such as the United Nations and IAEA to take charge of the procedures.

Sixth, a unified Korea must pledge to be a nonnuclear weapon state.



6. Conclusion

All the above interests of the major powers in Korean unification having been mentioned, it can be said just like the case of German unification that possibilities for unification of the Korean Peninsula would increase as the United States could actively support Korean unification, Japan's unfavorable reactions could be assuaged, and China could accept Korean unification as palatable.

It would prove nearly impossible to convince China or Japan without active cooperation and support from the United States. In promoting unification, it is essential for South Korea to consult and coordinate quietly but proactively with its four major neighboring powers.

German unification was not initially welcomed by some of its neighbors including France and Great Britain as they regarded it to be against their interest. They were ultimately persuaded, mainly by the United States, to change their stance. It turned out that German unification ultimately turned out to be in the interest not only of the larger European Community and the individual countries in it but also of East European countries including the Soviet Union, later Russia. The unified Germany is the main source of energy and leadership in European integration, providing economic resources and serving as a bridge between the integrated Europe and the rest of it including Russia.

In the case of Korea, regardless of what each country considers Korean unification to be for or against its own interest, there are several selling points for a unified Korea. For one, it will be a sure way to solve the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia at large.

Secondly, a unified Korea will surely contribute to peace and stability of the region by removing a critical source of tension and conflict.

Third, a unified Korea would become an economic powerhouse that would contribute to expanding economic scale, vitality, and activities in the region. It can also accelerate regional integration, peace, and prosperity by becoming a major basis and source of political and economic cooperation.

That is why all the interested parties, not only Koreans, should support and be in favor of Korea unification. /End/

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The Diplomacy of Korean Unification:

Positives and Negative Reasons, Policies

Han Sung-Joo

November 13, 2015
Unification Preparation Committee
Seoul, Korea

Contents

- 1. Korea and Germany: A Comparison
- 2. Phases of Korean Division (1953 2015)
- 3. Four Major Powers & Korean Unification
 - 4. Prospects for Two Triangles
 - 5. China's Thoughts
 - 6. Unification and Major Issues
- 7. National Reconciliation & Restoration of Sameness
 - 8. Conclusion

Korea and Germany:

A Comparison

Similarities

- Post-World War II Phenomenon
- Fields of East-West Confrontation and Cold War
- Neighbors reluctant to see unification

Korea and Germany:

A Comparison

Differences

Koreans Germans Victim's complex
Guilt complex

ermans 🙀 Guilt comple

North Korea
East Germany

Constant threat to the South Effective control of the USSR

Korea's young → Fervor and passion for unification **Korea's older & conservative** → Subdued and passive

West Germany

Member of NATO, European Community

South Korea Only bilateral alliance with the United States



Korea and Germany:

A Comparison

Differences (continued)

East Germany in 1990

Benefactor/guardian USSR was a declining empire

North Korea in 2015

Benefactor/guardian China is an economic powerhouse amidst selfaggrandizement

After German Unification...

South Korea Wished to duplicate the experience

North Korea Worked to prevent duplication

Phases of Korean Division I

1953-

- Post-war internal recuperation
- · Military alignment with major powers
- · Diplomatic competition

1960-72

- Military government in SK
- · NK's beligerance & provocations
- · The war in Vietnam

Phases of Korean Division II

1972-84

- · Consolidation of power on each side
- · Inter-Korean dialogue & co-existence
- "Joint Declaration" (1972)

1984-92

- · End of the Cold War
- · SK's diplomatic broadening
- · NK provocations continue
- "Basic Agreement" (1991) & "Joint Declaration" (1992)

Phases of Korean Division III

1993-98

- · NK nuclear weapons program
- · Kim Jong-Il's emergence as leader

1999-2008

- · "Sunshine Policy"
- Inter-Korea summits & exchange
- NK stepping up nuclear weapons & missiles program

Phases of Korean Division IV

2009present

- SK's return to balanced NK policy
- Deteriorating of NK economics
- Kim Jong Un as 3rd gen leader
- Dialogue discontinued
- · Decrease in exchange & assistance
- NK provocations continue
- NK pursuing parallel development of nuclear weapons & economy
- · China's ambivalence toward NK

U.S. Policies & Interests

Positive Reasons

- Removal of possibility for war on the Korean Peninsula
- Elimination of North Korean threats (nuclear weapons, missiles) & provocations
- Emergence of a powerful ally
- Increased need for U.S. economic & security cooperation
- Expansion of democracy & market economy



Negative Reasons

- Weakening of rationale for U.S.-Korea alliance
- Possibility for Korea's hedging policy between U.S. & China
- Possibility for Korea absorbed into Chinese sphere of influence
- Decrease in U.S. influence vis-à-vis Korea
- Worsening of Korea-Japan relationship

Japan's Interest in Korean Unification

Positive Reasons

- Elimination of threat from North Korean nuclear weapons & missiles
- Expansion of the "free world" (shared values of democracy & market economy)
- Korean preoccupation with unification & integration: increased need for Japan's support



Negative Reasons

- Emergence of powerful neighbor & competitor
- · Loss of rationale for rearming
- Loss of opportunity to "divide & rule"
- Possibility for Korea to tilt toward China within the triangle

Russia's Interest in Korean Unification

Positive Reasons

- Expansion of economic interest (gas pipelines, railroads, etc.)
- Possible weakening of U.S. alliance system in the Far East
- Expanded Russian role in Korean unification process
- Removal of North Korean nuclear threat



Negative Reasons

- Loss of opportunity to "fish in troubled waters"
- Loss of opportunity to expand role amidst North-South Korean competition
- Possibility for China's increased role & influence on a unified Korea

China's interest & policies

Positive Reasons

- Unburdening of North Korean threat (economic, political, diplomatic, nuclear) & military clashes
- Expansion of economic relations with a unified Korea
- Weakening of rationale for U.S.-Korea alliance & U.S.-Japan-Korea coalition
- Emergence of counter-weight to Japan
- Reduction of war possibility on the Korean Peninsula



Negative Reasons

- · Loss of buffer zone
- Economic loss for 3 Northeastern provinces
- Possibility for large-scale refugee influx from North Korea
- Possibility for continued U.S.-Korea alliance & stationing of U.S. troops in Korea
- Emergence of a competitive power in Korea

Chinese Expectations

- Unified Korea's hedging policy between China & U.S.
- Unified Korea's closer relationship with China than with Japan
- Conflict between continental & maritime coalitions not likely to emerge



China's Thoughts

- 1. Unconditional support for DPRK: help maintain regime & system
 - 2. Induce North Korea to reform, open, change, & refrain from provocations
 - 3. Increase pressure on North Korea & abandon it if needed
 - → Current Policy: #2 moving slowly to #3

China's Positive Interests in Korean Unification

Short-term Interest

- Less burden of economic & military support
- 2. No more danger of military clash or war
- Securing of economic relations & interests with unified Korea



Mid- to Long-term Interest

- Contribution to peace & stability in Northeast Asia
- Formation of economic sphere & market with North & South Korea combined
- Removal of rationale for outside (U.S.) forces' military intervention or boots on the ground

China's Negative Interests in Korean Unification

Short-term

- North Korean refugees entering China
- Negative impact on economy of Northeastern provinces
- Possibility for Chinese
 personnel & assets in North
 Korea to be jeopardized



Mid- to Long-term

- Possible reduction & weakening of Chinese leverage on North Korea
- Reduction of economic relations between North Korea & 3 Northeastern provinces
- Uncertainty of unified Korea's alliance relationship & status of foreign troops there

China's Attitude toward Korea-U.S. Alliance

- Initially regarded it as a "necessary evil"
- In the wake of U.S.' "containment of China" policy, China began to denigrate U.S. alliances (with Japan & Korea) as relics of the Cold War.
- Guards against emergence of a multilateral alliance such as NATO
- Opposed to U.S. policy of providing nuclear umbrella or extended deterrence policy
- Has no more value as a means to prevent Japan from nuclear arming

China's thinking?

- Japan is going that direction any way
- U.S. will deny Japan any way

Peaceful & autonomous (minor U.S. involvement) Federation or Confederation? For regional integration

China's "red line"

1. No U.S. forces north of DMZ

(some autonomy for

North Korea)

- 2. No U.S. bases north of DMZ
- 3. No OPCON for U.S. in unification process
- 4. Share information with China
- 5. No militarization of China-Korea border area
- 6. Multilateral (UN, IAEA) management for dismantling WMDs & missiles
- 7. No nuclear weapons for a unified Korea
- 8. Respect for existing treaties & agreements (with North Korea on territories)

Changes in Chinese Attitude

- More active study & examination by China on Korean unification
- Other factors (economics, diplomacy, security, political risk, etc.) than "buffer zone" seriously considered
- China's interest in guarantees (red lines) & conditions



China Values Process Over Results

- Chaos & instability in North Korean society
- North Korean refugee issue
- · Possibility for armed clashes
- · U.S. military's infiltration into North Korea
- Need to assuage China's fears & satisfy expectations (e.g., respecting preexisting agreements) as much as possible



 German example: U.S. will be crucial in persuading neighboring countries (especially China & Japan) with divergent interests

Unification & Major Issues: Human Rights

- UN General Assembly & 3rd Committee adopted resolution on North Korean human rights (of 189 countries, 20 voted against & 53 abstained).
- Resolution was submitted to Security Council & became an agenda item in early 2015 (Amb. Oh Joon's speech).
- China & Russia voted against the resolution because of human rights issues in their own countries (oppose UN intervention on domestic issues).
- The issue pushes China & Russia to side with North Korea, while hampering the South's efforts to gain their cooperation on unification.
- South Korea in dilemma to actively pursue North Korea's human rights issues at UN on one hand, but also having to make sure it doesn't become reason for China & Russia to go against unification efforts.

Unification & Major Issues: Nuclear Proliferation

Five strategies so far

- 1. Prevent NK from conducting further nuclear weapons/missile tests
- Bring NK to the negotiating table (e.g., Six-Party Talks)
- 3. Threaten NK with tougher economic sanctions by the UN Security Council
- 4. Threaten NK with punishments beyond UN sanctions
- 5. Offer NK inducements (e.g., economic assistance, security guarantee)

→ So far, NONE effective

Going forward

- → Must reevaluate the "strategic patience" approach, since it hasn't worked
- → U.S. & South Korea to cooperate & coordinate with China, Russia & Japan (because NK nuclear program threatens them as well)



National Reconciliation & Restoration of Sameness (I)

- Dec. 2014 Brookings Institution lecture on the divided Korean Peninsula, national reconciliation, & restoration of sameness
- German unification analyzed: amidst very little animosity between East & West Germans, 3 problems arose in the reconciliation process:
 - 1. Reversion of private assets in East Germany
 - 2. Punishment for the employees of Stasi & other East German institutions of oppression
 - 3. Discrimination between Wessies & Ossies
- · A unified Korea would have similar problems with differences.
- A unified Korea will be less burdened by the issues of reversion of private assets.

National Reconciliation & Restoration of Sameness (II)

Why is the **reversion of private assets** less a problem for unified Korea?

- Smaller number of claims: East Germany had more than 2 million claims, whereas North Korea had 420,000 property confiscations for which there has been only 5,000 claims.
- Land ownership documents & land registers are mostly lost.
- Most original land owners passed away during 70 years of separation (35 years for Germany), & inheritance procedures had been inadequate.
- Public sentiment prefers symbolic compensation to original owners as opposed to full restoration of ownership.

National Reconciliation & Restoration of Sameness (III)

- Germany punished oppressive organizations on a selective & limited basis.
- Germany's Wessies & Ossies discrimination was more reverse discrimination as more benefits were granted to East Germans.
- 30,000 North Korean refugees currently in the South are expected to play a role in the restoration of sameness.
- The refugees' accomplishments in unification depends upon their level of success in integrating into South Korean society.

Conclusion

Fine-tune interests of surrounding major powers

Korea-China-U.S. & Korea-China-Japan triangles are key

U.S. role is critical in assuaging concerns &providing guarantees

Important to steer "China's thinking" to a pro-unification stance

Wisdom needed in responding to discourse on NK human rights.

Reevaluate strategies toward NK's nuclear program

German example may not apply to all issues related to unification

Korea must consult & coordinate quietly but proactively

Communicate selling points for a united Korea





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동북아 정세와 한반도 통일 준비

Preparing for Korean Unification amid a Changing Northeast Asia

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Session 1

발제 | Presenter

전재성

서울대학교 교수

CHUN Chaesung

Professor, Seoul National University

Concept Paper	

Preparing for Korean Unification amid a Changing Northeast Asia Chaesung Chun

To elaborate South Korea's strategy of reunification and make it consistent with North Korea Policy

- South Korean policy of preparing for reunification under the current administration succeeded in reviving South Korean's desire for the unified Korea, in declaring South Korea as a legitimate main actor for reunification to the international society, and in emphasizing the need to prepare for reunification long before it happens. Now we need a multi-staged efforts to make reunification realizable, being coherent with a broader North Korea policy
- North Korea, fearful over being absorbed by South Korea, continues to develop nuclear weapons, and seeks to pose security threat to the South with a variety of provocative means.
- Kim Jung Un seems to have consolidated his power by purging several factions of opponents, but too severe personification of power damages policy effectiveness, ruining the mechanism of reflecting meaningful policy suggestions from below. It will take time for Kim Jung Un to realize that Byungjin strategy is inherently unachievable, because economic development will not be possible without outside economic assistance, which is blocked by the possession of nuclear weapons. Then, North Korean leadership turns to inter-Korean reconciliation to save the economy possibly by negotiating for denuclearization. By this moment, South Korea needs to maintain adequate measures with international society to put pressure on North Korea to give up the current version of Byungjin policy.
- North Korea proposes to open a negotiation for a peace treaty. North Korea will request a negotiation for nuclear arms reduction, not denuclearization. Also the termination of joint military drill between ROK and the United Staes, and the withdrawal of USFK will be on the table. As these are unacceptable, South Korea needs to propose the peace structure based on denuclearization of North Korea, mutual arms and tension reduction, regular military dialogue, and gradual and peaceful reunification.
- Under Trustpolitik, South Korea should deliver its benign intention to engage with the North, to establish mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations, and to go for peaceful coexistence in a parallel fashion. Trust can build up by both Koreas' gradual efforts for reassurance, and more effectively with high audience costs and credibility. South Korea, as a democratic polity, can reassure North Korea of its non-aggressive intention with various ways of raising audience

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costs. In return, South Korea needs to ask North Korea to show also a genuine intention to develop inter-Korean relations with its own way of raising audience costs.

To deepen strategic dialogue with China for denuclearization of North Korea, and reunification of the Peninsula

- China has maintained a cooperative stance toward South Korean and the United States with a common policy objective of denuclearizing North Korea. However, China sympathizes with North Korea's security concerns. Too strong emphasis on pressure and sanctions by South Korea and the United States without serious concern for the North Korean question as a whole may drive China to seek diplomatic normalization with North Korea in the future. Particularly as the U.S. China specialists tend to put more emphasis on China threat these days, North Korea's strategic importance to China may grow.
- South Korea's assumption that strategic partnership with China motivates China to consent to Korean reunification under South Korean initiative may be too hasty. China recently announced its position to agree to Korean reunification in a peaceful and independent manner to North Korean leaders as well, showing that China does not favor particularly South Korea in the unification issue.
- South Korea needs to deliver its benign intention for coexistence with the North, and a renewed proposal for peace structure, and persuades China to put more pressure on North Korea for denuclearization.
- Only when North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons despite South Korea's genuine efforts to engage with North Korea for the time being, and persuasion by China, thereby to strengthen the ROK-US military alliance, China will start to rethink its North Korea policy from the ground.
- China will pay special attention to South Korea's move between the United States and China to be assured that reunified Korea will not be antagonistic to Chinese interests. Then, South Korea's current move in Northeast Asia will directly relate to future Chinese position toward the reunification issue.

To find a common ground to deal with North Korea, South Korea needs to prepare an effective plan and share it with the United States.

- What worries the United States worries are that 1) South Korean efforts to engage with North by opening up economic and social relationship will drive North Korea away from denuclearization; 2) South Korea may depend heavily, and unavailingly upon China, thereby weaken South Korea's commitment to the alliance with the United States. Washington will retain its stance of strategic patience and combine policy of pressure, sanction, and diplomacy.
- To dispel the U.S. worries, South Korea should find a package of delivering benign intention to the North with the prospect of peaceful coexistence, and partnering with China precipitating North Korea's strategic decision by putting more pressure.

South Korea's vision for reunification should be supported by effective middle power diplomacy between the United States and China.

- Ungrounded, but rising criticism on South Korea's "opportunitistic" diplomatic move between the United States and China in both countries will hurt seriously South Korea's reunification policy. It is critical to persuade two great powers that the reunified Korea will serve both countries' interests than the status quo on the Peninsula.
- Coevolution between the United States and China may be possible by a strong, normative commitment toward military

Session 1

balance, a healthy combination of economic interdependence and institutional balancing, and sharing common vision for the future Asia.

- Korea, when reunified, will try to contribute to lessening strategic distrust between these two countries, and ultimately to multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

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Preparing for Korean Unification amid a Changing Northeast Asia

Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University, East Asia Institute)

2015. 11. 13.

SOUTH KOREA'S STRATEGY OF REUNIFICATION SO FAR

- reviving South Korean's desire for the unified Korea
- declaring South Korea as a legitimate main actor for reunification to the international society
- emphasizing the need to prepare for reunification long before it happens

NORTH KOREA'S STRATEGY

- fearful over being absorbed by South Korea, to develop nuclear weapons
- to pose security threat to the South
- to open a negotiation for a peace treaty
- too severe personification of power in NK, damages policy effectiveness, ruining the mechanism of reflecting meaningful policy suggestions from below of provocative means.

MULTI-STAGED EFFORTS FROM NOW ON

- Under Trustpolitik, South Korea should deliver its benign intention to engage with the North
- To verify North Korea's true intention of coexisting with the South and the international society
- to establish mutually beneficial inter-Korean relations, peaceful coexistence
- Trust can build up by both Koreas' efforts for reassurance
- with high audience costs and credibility., South Korea, as a democratic polity, can reassure North Korea of its non-aggressive intention

SOUTH KOREA'S CHINA POLICY

- China has maintained a cooperative stance for denuclearizing North Korea.
- China sympathizes with North Korea's security concerns.
- Too strong emphasis on pressure and sanctions by South Korea and the United States without serious concern for the North Korean question may drive China to seek diplomatic normalization with North Korea

SOUTH KOREA'S CHINA POLICY

- With US-China rivalry, North Korea's strategic importance to China may grow.
- China recently announced its position to agree to Korean reunification in a peaceful and independent manner to North Korean leaders as well
- China does not favor particularly South Korea in the unification issue.

SOUTH KOREA'S CHINA POLICY

- South Korea needs to deliver its benign intention for coexistence with the North, and peace structure
- South Korea should persuade China to put more pressure on North Korea for denuclearization.
- Only when North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons despite South Korea's genuine efforts, China will start to rethink its North Korea policy from the ground.

SOUTH KOREA'S CHINA POLICY

- China will pay special attention to South Korea's move between the United States and China to be assured that reunified Korea will not be antagonistic to Chinese interests.
- South Korea's current move in Northeast Asia will directly relate to future Chinese position toward the reunification issue.

SOUTH KOREA-US COOPERATION

- US worries:
- 1) South Korean efforts to engage with North by opening up economic and social relationship will drive North Korea away from denuclearization
- 2) South Korea may depend heavily, and unavailingly upon China, thereby weaken South Korea's commitment to the alliance with the United States.

SOUTH KOREA-US COOPERATION


- Washington will retain its stance of strategic patience and combine policy of pressure, sanction, and diplomacy.
- South Korea should find a package of 1) delivering benign intention to the North with the prospect of peaceful coexistence, 2) partnering with China precipitating North Korea's strategic decision by putting more pressure.

SOUTH KOREA'S MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY

- rising criticism on South Korea's hedging, or "opportunitistic" diplomatic move between the United States and China
- It is critical to persuade two great powers that the reunified Korea will serve both countries' interests than the status quo on the Peninsula.
- To establish mini-lateral and regional multilateral mechanism for regional security cooperation and Korean reunification
- To seek middle power initiative with like-minded country, and cooperate with Japan, and Russia

SOUTH KOREA'S MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY

- Coevolution between the United States and China may be possible by
- 1) a strong, normative commitment toward military balance
- 2) healthy combination of economic interdependence and institutional balancing
- 3) sharing common vision for the future Asia.
- Korea, when reunified, will try to contribute to lessening strategic distrust between these two countries, and ultimately to multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia.



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MEMO



토론 | Panelist

프랑수아 고드몽

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François GODEMENT

Director, Asia/China Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)

Talking Point	

Prospects for reunification and the regional balance François Godement

North Korea is a graveyard of its partners and opponents' policy initiatives. Think Denuclearization of the Peninsula in 1991 (Roh Taewoo), 1994 Agreed Framework (Bill Clinton), Sunshine Policy in 1998 (Kim Dae-Jung), 2000 North-South Summit (Kim Young Sam), EU visit in 2001, Koizumi visit in 2002, Six-Party Talks in 2003, Joint Statement of 2005, 2001 Chinese proposal of bilateral and six-party talks (Hu Jintao), 2002 "leap day" agreement (Obama). North Korea retains nuclear and ballistic capacities, and reunification is nowhere in sight. No one has been immune from these policy fiascos, not even China that suffered a setback when Kim Jong-un removed by force leaders more amenable to China in 2013.

No wonder therefore that South Korea has hovered between different paths to contain North Korean policy, let alone to achieve reunification. And yet, in a deeper historical sense, reunification has become the only possible ending of a 70 year family autocracy — even though the regime has allowed slivers of modernization, the economic, military and human gap with all of its neighbours is increasing, not decreasing. But when?

Therein lies all the difficulty for a policy with the regional parties traditionally involved in the balance on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul has alternatively relied on the United States, opened a line to Pyongyang as it also sought to overcome past legacies with Japan, declared a role as a future regional "balancer" in an effort to appear more neutral to China, furiously criticized China and then tilted towards China as it did in the final year of Pres. Lee Myun-bak and with President Park Geun-hye. Even Russia has reappeared as a potential partner, although both Seoul and Moscow appear unready to challenge the political gauntlet (in Washington for the ROK, in Pyongyang and possibly China for Russia).

The policy of the ROK cannot be stable because there can be no reliable prediction of where North Korea may be heading. If a regime collapse is imminent, then an entente with China and the United States is the top priority. But should the reunification be a much more protracted regime transition, in fact saving North Korea's economy for a long phase, the direct bilateral relations are highly desirable, and China, whose economic influence offers a way out for North Korea, is not the most desirable partner. If denuclearization is a realistic goal, then a regional détente policy involving the three other regional powers is the most desirable option. If nuclearization continues, then the US hedge is the only security option for South Korea – although over the past twenty-five years, Seoul has been more of a restraining hand on the

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use of force by Washington than a firebrand. Damaging North Korea is equivalent for the ROK to damaging one self and opening the door to huge unknowns, human, financial and geopolitical, nit to mention the impact on the democratic process.

Of the various scenarios above, a long regime transition appears as the most stable option. Unfortunately, that requires a form of security guarantee for the regime – and a degree of nuclearization is still the best option it has. Capping that option rather than putting the genie back in the bottle appears as a realistic option. Since a nuclear capacity is a serious threat to all neighbours, the option of a long transition with a residual capacity can only be maintained if North Korea opens up for mutually profitable relations with the three main regional partners – China, Japan, Russia in addition of course to the ROK. If allowed a degree of open power balancing, the regime may be less fearful for its survival and allow for more changes, given also that no one of these partners (ROK) seeks to establish a dominating influence. China, which did just that, has been shunned in spite of the important economic links and dependence of North Korea under a sanction regime.

This is a Burmese option — with a nuclear twist that will cause many to reject that scenario, but has a more effective denuclearization policy been identified in the last three decades? The alternative is to wait for fate to run its course, e.g. surrender to unpredictability.

Session 1

토론 | Panelist

션 딩리

푸단대학교 교수

SHEN Dingli

Professor/Associate Dean of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University

Talking Point	

Preparing for Korean Reunification

Shen Dingli, November 10, 2015

Division of the Korean Peninsula poses a key security challenge of the East Asia. It is a negative remnant of the Cold War.

However, the internal drive for unification of the peninsula has remained strong. Both South and North governments have shared the same objective for eventual reunion of all people on the entire peninsula.

The external wind has turned around. With China's rapid rise, China is less sensitive to the "strategic value" of Pyongyang for its own security. The recent Xi-Ma meeting in Singapore has indicated China's capacity in commanding its own future despite the challenge of Taiwan's internal politics.

Meantime, given the complexity of its relations with Washington, Beijing is now having more competence to manage such a multi-faceted relationship. As the consequence, China is now able to attach the string of denuclearization on its relations with the North. Despite a short-term frustration, this new stance may enhance Beijing's long-term impact on Pyongyang.

Three critical factors are at stake to prepare for reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

The North's nuclear factor. It is obvious that denuclearization has remained the objective of the Six Party Talk, but it is also clear that one has to be realistic that it is a long-term process. In the interim, various stakeholders have to deal with a nuclear North Korea for the moment. The South needs to be able to engage in such a counterpart and tap such a process to promote the unification, rather than the opposite way around.

China's more effective role. Although China has attached its denuclearization string on the North, such a policy has yet to be proven as effective. A potential summit between the two sides in 2016 in Beijing is likely to offer an important

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opportunity to adjust their relationship toward a positive direction — improving their partnership without delinking the string. China shall learn how to live with the nuclear neighbor while effectively shaping its contour toward both denuclearization and unification.

Northeast Asia security landscape. The distrust between China and the US obviously hampers the chance of the Korean Peninsula, for various geostrategic reasons. China's rise and the US concern, as well as the US "rebalancing" and China's response, all complicates the security dynamics of East Asia, including Korean Peninsula. Seoul is both caught in between, but also presented an opportunity to help bridge the divide. This warrants great wisdom of the Republic of Korea.



토론 | Panelist

스콧 스나이더

미국외교협회(CFR) 선임연구위원

Scott SNYDER

Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign Relations

Talking Point	

Preparing for Korean Unification Amidst a Changing Northeast Asia Scott Snyder, Council on Foreign Relations

President Park's consistent and active emphasis on Korean unification has drawn generally positive attention and inprinciple support from American analysts and from the international community, but accompanying that support is a desire to know more specifically how Korea is planning for unification and what the US can do to support those plans.

- The activities and progress of the committee is being watched with great interest among Korea specialists.
- Managing peaceful Korean unification will require coordination above all, starting with U.S.-ROK alliance planning.
 Much of that effort is already well underway on the military side, but is not yet sufficiently matched by political-level coordination.
- There is likely to be an inherent asymmetry in responding to Korean contingencies between American top level officials
 who have rarely thought practically about Korean unification and Korean counterparts who have been dreaming of
 Korean unification.
- The U.S. commitment to Korean unification as a policy objective was stated formally for the first time in the U.S.-ROK 2009 Joint Vision Statement, but beyond rhetorical support it is doubtful that the United States has concrete plans for how to support this objective.
- U.S. public support for South Korea's defense is at historic highs and the image of South Korea among the American public is stronger than ever before. Americans desire a peaceful process of addressing Korean tensions and strongly prefer diplomatic over military approaches. But viable diplomatic measures are limited by DPRK non-cooperation.

In light of limited diplomatic options for achieving North Korea's denuclearization, there is considerable frustration and little hope in Washington about how to effectively deal with North Korea.

- The U.S. Congress prefers stronger sanctions based on the Iran experience, as demonstrated by three different sanctions bills currently circulating on Capitol Hill.
- There is bipartisan agreement that a nuclear North Korea is unacceptable, as most recently reiterated by President

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Obama in his joint press conference with President Park last month.

- The conventional wisdom is that Byungjin is unsustainable and that North Korea must choose between nuclear weapons and economic prosperity. DPRK begs to differ.
- Because U.S. officials trust President Park, there is space for South Korea to take much greater initiative in engaging
 with North Korea. There remains an expectation that such engagement will be pursued following close coordination
 with Washington, but South Korea should feel more than welcome to take the policy lead with U.S. support.
- A shared dilemma for policy makers remains how to pursue engagement effectively while simultaneously maintaining requisite pressure on North Korea to pursue denuclearization.

The Obama administration, together with the Park administration, continues to seek China's cooperation in restraining North Korean provocative behavior and desires for China to increase pressure on the North to bring Pyongyang back to denuclearization talks.

- China understands the U.S. view that Six Party Talks will only have value if North Korea commits to denuclearization, but prefers to see active diplomacy as a hedge against increased tension.
- The U.S.-China agenda has grown exponentially more complicated in recent years, with many serious issues contending for top-level policy attention. North Korea remains important but struggles as a top-level issue for policy coordination between Washington and Beijing. This is a further rationale for why South Korea should try to promote a coordinated effort to examine North Korea together with Washington and Seoul.
- South Korea may need China's assent for unification to proceed, but American analysts remain more skeptical than
 South Korean counterparts that Beijing will willingly cooperate toward such an end. Because China's cooperation
 will be limited (but worth pursuing), it will likely be necessary to engineer a fait accompli and then secure China's
 acquiescence.
- Thus far, South Korean discussions with China on unification appear to have been premised on the continuation of the U.S.-ROK alliance, but it doubtful that China accepts this premise.
- China's main strategic alternative to a North Korean buffer strategy will be a unified Korean buffer strategy premised
 on the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Evidence that China is ready to abandon North Korea will be accompanied by
 intensified pressure on Seoul to end the alliance and maintain a "friendly" relationship with Beijing.
- U.S.-China cooperation will be important as the core of regional ratification arrangements necessary to "bless" Korean unification if indeed it is achieved.

Increasingly, there is an assumption that peaceful denuclearization and peaceful unification are beyond our grasp, but few want to precipitate conflict/instability. We need more active and realistic planning that includes the possibility/likelihood of collateral damage and how to minimize it in the course of achieving unification.

There is also a need for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between leadership/regime/system instability as part of the unification discussion. The current discussion does not differentiate sufficiently and thus can be misleading about the circumstances and feasibility of unification under different scenarios.

PREPARING FOR A PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA

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북한 경제개발과 남한 및 국제사회의 지원 **Assisting North Korea's Economic Development**

사회 **김주현** 현대경제연구원 고문 발제 김병연 서울대학교 교수

후카가와 유키코 와세다대학교 교수 토론

> **마커스 놀랜드** 피터슨 국제경제연구소 부소장 <mark>유리 시고브</mark> "비즈니스 피플"지 워싱턴 대표

Moderator KIM Joo-Hyun Advisory, Hyundai Research Institute **Presenter** KIM Byung-Yeon Professor, Seoul National University

FUKAGAWA Yukiko Professor, Waseda University Panelists

Marcus NOLAND Executive Vice President and Director of Studies, Peterson Institute for International Econom

Yury SIGOV U.S. Bureau Chief, "Business People" Magazine

발제 | Presenter

김병연

서울대학교 교수

KIM Byung-Yeon

Professor, Seoul National University

Assisting North Korea's Economic Development

Byung-Yeon Kim (Seoul National University)

1. Initial Conditions

- A. The current GDP per capita is less than 800 US dollars (less than 3% of S. Korea's).
- B. The economy is highly marketized (informalized).
 - i. Households rely on market activities for survival.
 - ii. The informal income is 70-90% of total household income.
 - iii. Some people accumulated a large sum of money by market activities and foreign trade.
- C. It is an open economy in terms of the share of trade in GDP.
 - i. It is 30-60% of GDP, which is similar to that of OECD average depending on the estimates of GDP.
 - ii. Most of trade is conducted with China.
- D. It is fairly decentralized due to the lack of financial resources to control over regions and different state institutions.
 - i. Firms are affiliated with different state institutions such as the Party, the military, and the cabinet.
 - ii. State institutions and regions need to seek for survival for themselves.

2. Binding Constraints

- A. Current constraints: Institution and country risk It is unlikely that N. Korean economy would achieve high and sustainable growth without a transition to a market economy and a normal state.
 - i. There is no third way of an economic system.
 - ii. The Chinese path was also based on transition to a market economy although the speed was gradual.
 - iii. Markets, capital, and technology will not be binding constraints if N. Korea makes a transition to a market economy and gives up nuclear weapons.
- B. Future constraints: Deficiency in infrastructure and human capital.
 - i. Infrastructure is ageing and inadequate.
 - ii. Cognitive skill of N. Koreans is estimated to be about 50% of S. Koreans' on the basis of cognitive test scores involving N. Korean refugees.

3. Suggested Programs for Economic Cooperation between the Two Koreas

A. Development plans for N. Korea were suggested by the S. Korean government, various institutions, and experts.

Main ones include:

- i. Support for health care for pregnant mothers and infants in North Korea through their first 1,000 days
- ii. Support for multi-farming complexes
- iii. Infrastructure-building projects (transportation and telecommunication)
- iv. Rajin-Khasan joint project
- v. International city around the Tumen River area
- vi. Expansion of Gaesung Industrial Complex
- vii. Resumption of Geumgang Mountain and Gaesung tour
- viii. Support or co-development of one of the Development Districts suggested by N. Korea

4. Evaluation of Suggested Programs

The following four criteria might be used to evaluate the suggested programs: Feasibility; Impact on N. Korean people; Effect on growth (short and medium-term); Influence on markets.

	Feasibility	N. Koreans	Growth	Markets
Health care		0	0	Δ
Multi-farming		0	0	0
Infrastructure	X	Δ – 0	Δ – 0	Δ - 0
Rajin-Khasan		Δ – 0	Δ – 0	Δ
Int'l city	X	Δ - 0	0	0
Gaesung Complex	0	0	0	Δ – Ο
Geumgang Mountain and Gaesung tour	0	Δ – 0	Δ	Δ - 0
Development district	Δ - 0	0	Δ - 0	Δ – 0

o: positive, △: neutral, X: negative or not-positive

5. Suggestions

- A. In terms of feasibility, one can consider a sequencing starting from Expansion of Gaesung Industrial Complex, Geumgang Mountain and Gaesung tour, and/or Development district.
- B. One may argue that impacts on N. Koreans should be considered as a priority. Health care support and multi-farming can be proposed.
- C. Infrastructure projects can be regarded as a way to overcome future binding constraints on growth.
- D. Programs B and C appear not to be so effective in overcoming the current constraint.
- E. The success of the experience of Chinese growth suggests the importance of the combined interests of local residents and local government officials for growth and transition. This indicates that the private sector, international NGOs, and the international community should play roles in this regard.

Assisting North Korea's Economic Development

Byung-Yeon Kim
(Seoul National University)

Outline of presentation

- Stylized facts on N. Korean economy
- Prospects of the N. Korean economy
- Constraints on economic growth
- Assisting development and promoting economic cooperation

Stylized facts on N. Korean economy

- N. Korean economy has been extremely inefficient from 1954 to 1989 even compared with former socialist countries.
 - Less efficient by a third compared with the USSR at the same stage of economic development.
 - Less efficient by two-thirds compared with market economy.
 - South Korea surpassed GDP per capita in the late 1960s contrary to a common belief (Kim, Kim and Lee, 2006).
- It experiences some recovery from the period of Arduous March but is still weak.
 - Average growth rate in the past three years is slightly higher than 1% (Bank of Korea) and 2.7% (my estimate).
 - However, GDP level is still 77-84% of the level in 1989.


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Comparison of GDP per capita

	S. Korea (2013)	N. Korea (2013)	China (2013)
GNI per capita (PPP)	33,791	1,667	11,868
GNI per capita (market ex. rate)	25,977	749	6,807

Sources: Kim (2014); World Bank(2014)

N. Korea's ranking in GDP per capita is 167th of 187 countries.




Stylized facts on N. Korean economy

- N. Korean economy is highly marketized (informalized).
 - · A majority of households rely on market activities for survival.
 - The informal income is 70-90% of total household income.
 - Some people accumulate a large sum of money by market activities and foreign trade. Private financiers called Donju are reported to finance some private businesses and government projects.
- N. Korean is an open economy in terms of the share of trade in GDP.
 - It is 30-60% of GDP, which is similar to that of OECD average.
 - · Most of trade is conducted with China.
- It is fairly decentralized due to the lack of financial resources to control over regions and state institutions.
 - Firms are affiliated with different state institutions such as the Party, the military, and the cabinet.
 - State institutions and regions need to seek for survival for themselves.

F



Share of Informal Income in Total Income of Households (%)



Source: Kim (2014)

※6

Informalization of the N. Korean Economy

	Participation rate in the official economy	Participation rate in the informal economy
Total sample	50.6	71.2
2009 Survey (%)	49.0	68.8
2011 Survey (%)	53.0	75.0
Difference (P-value)	0.55	0.22
Worker's Party membership		
Members (%)	84.2	71.9
Non-members (%)	43.8	70.6
Difference (P-value)	0.00***	0.84
Regions		
Hamkyungdo (%)	52.8	70.2
Non-Hamkyungdo (%)	47.6	72.5
Difference (P-value)	0.34	0.64
Education		
Up to high school (%)	49.4	69.2
College, University or above (53.8	76.3
%)	0.47	0.20
Difference (P-value)		7

Channels of Obtaining Food

	Share of respondents who identified this channel as the most important (1)	Average share of food obtained through this channel (2)	Consumption through the 1st channel [(3)=(1)*(2)]	Consumption trough the 2 nd channel (4)	Share of consumption through this channel (5)=[(3)+(4)]
Official channel (%)	23.5	70.9	16.7	7.7	24.4
Self-production (%)	15.5	70.6	10.9	5.0	15.9
Purchasing from markets (%)	61.0	85.9	52.4	7.3	59.7
Total	100.0	-	80.0	20.0	100.0
Total respondents		-	1,017		1

Source: Kim (2015)

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Reliance of State Firms on Markets

	The share of workers/inputs/out puts relying on markets	Details
Informal labor market	23.2%	8.3 workers pay on average 7 times as much as official wages
Informal input market	23.9 ~58.9%	Use of central planning: 41.1% Use of manager's personal connections: 19.8% Purchase from markets: 23.9% Contribution by workers: 15.2%
Informal output market	14.4 ~44.4%	Use of central planning: 55.6% Manager's personal connections: 21.9% Selling at markets: 14.4% To workers in lieu of wages: 8.1%

Kim (2015)

To what extent will the N. Korean economy grow?

- It is unlikely that N. Korean economy would achieve high and sustainable growth without a transition to a market economy.
 - There is no third way of economic system.
 - The Chinese experience was also based on transition to a market economy although the speed was gradual.
- The path of the economy depends critically on what policies North Korea will take and what scenarios will unfold.
 - Whether N. Korea will make a transition to a market economy
 - Whether S. Korea and N. Korea will be integrated economically
- Best scenario: Transition + Integration
- · Worst scenario: Reverse to socialism + No integration

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To what extent will the N. Korean economy grow?

Scenarios of Transition and Integration	Economic effects (annual growth rate of N. Korean economy)	Explanations
Transition and Integration	13.1% Sustainable	Kim (2014)'s estimates
Transition without integration	4 ~ 7% Sustainable	Lower than growth rates during Chinese transition
Limited transition without integration	0-4% Not-sustainable	Similar to the current policy
Reverse to socialism and no integration	-10 ~ -5% Not-sustainable	Elimination of markets and closed economy

The current binding constraint: Country risk (surveys of 176 firms in China)

	Trading Firms			Investment Firms			
Advantages Constraints			Advantages		Constraints		
Factors	Share (%)	Factors	Share (%)	Factors	Share (%)	Factors	Shar (%)
Market size in other countries	32.6	Frequent changes in policies	29.2	Abundance of natural resources	48.2	Frequent changes in policies	35.2
Low wages	23.2	Failure to meet the delivery date	17.5	Low wages	29.6	Implementation of policies in other countries	14.8
Abundance of natural resources	15.2	Implementation of policies in other countries	15.3	Stable labour supply	18.5	Difficulty in communicating with or visiting North Korea	9.3
Low production cost	13.8	Difficulty in communicating with or visiting North Korea	15.3	Market size in other countries	3.7	Shortage of electricity	7.4
Government support (low tariff/VAT refund)	8.0	Difficulty in controlling quality	11.7			Insufficient protection of investment	7.4
Stable labour supply	3.6	Government corruption	8.0			Government corruption	7.4
Others	3.6	Difficulty in settling claims	2.2			Difficulty in logistics	5.6
49		Others	0.7			Others	13.0
Total	100.0	Total	100	Total	100	Total	100

Source: Kim and Jung (2015)

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Future binding constraints: Infrastructure and human capital

- Inadequate infrastructure will be a main binding constraint for North Korea's economic growth.
- Human capital will be another important binding constraint.
 - Using Raven test results, Kim et al (2015) suggests that North Korean refugees' cognitive ability is about 50% of South Koreans'.
 - They also performed simple tests that require to count the number of "0" in tables randomly mixing 0 and 1. The results show that North Korean refugees' performance is 18% lower than South Koreans' and Chinese-Koreans.

Suggested Cooperation/development plans

- Support for health care for pregnant mothers and infants in North Korea through their first 1,000 days
- Support for multi-farming complexes
- Infrastructure-building projects (transportation and telecommunication)
- · Rajin-Khasan joint project
- International city around the Tumen River area
- Expansion of Gaesung Industrial Complex
- Resumption of Geumgang Mountain and Gaesung tour
- Support or co-development of one of the Development Districts suggested by N. Korea

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Evaluation of the Programs

- The four criteria are used to evaluate the suggested programs:
 - Feasibility
 - •Impact on N. Korean people
 - Effect on growth (short and medium-term)
 - Influence on markets

Evaluation of the Programs

	Feasibility	N. Koreans	Growth	Markets
Health care	Δ	0	0	Δ
Multi-farming	Δ	0	0	0
Infrastructure	X	Δ - Ο	Δ - Ο	Δ-Ο
Rajin-Khasan	Δ	Δ - Ο	Δ - Ο	Δ
Int'l city	X	Δ - Ο	0	0
Gaesung Complex	0	0	0	Δ - Ο
Geumgang Mountain and Gaesung tour	0	Δ - Ο	Δ	Δ - Ο
Development district	Δ-Ο	0	Δ - Ο	Δ - Ο

O: positive, Δ : neutral, X: negative or not-positive

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Suggestions

- To make the plan feasible, a sequencing of the different programs can be considered. It may start from Expansion of Gaesung Industrial Complex, Geumgang Mountain and Gaesung tour, and/or Development district.
- One may argue that impacts on N. Koreans should be considered as a priority. Health care support and multi-farming can be proposed.

Suggestions

- Infrastructure projects can be regarded as a way to overcome one of the future binding constraints on growth.
- The success of the experience of Chinese growth suggests the importance of the combined interests of local residents and local government officials for growth and transition. This indicates that the private sector, international NGOs, and the international community should play roles in this regard.

토론 | Panelist

후카가와 유키코

와세다대학교 교수

FUKAGAWA Yukiko

Professor, Waseda University

Changing International Cooperation for North Korea' Future

Yukiko Fukagawa (Waseda University)

1. Changed Financial Flows to Developing Countries: Late Comer's Advantage?

- 1) Outstanding role of private capital (FDI), decreased official aid
- 2) Emerging donors, Sovereign Wellness Fund, AllB/NDB BRICS
- 3) Non-DAC donors
- 4) Donor partnership (Sharing knowledge and network)
- 5) Industrialization, Skill transfer (ex. Kaizen program in Africa)

2. Changed Positions of the Neighbors

- 1) China as a virtual aid power (Economic cooperation)
 - --- Already top 5? (Maybe top 6 in 2013)
 - --- Not bounded by DAC accord
 - --- Commercialism ("Economic cooperation")
 - --- Geopolitical strategies (One Belt One Road, Silk Road)
 - --- Hardware orientation (Concentrated on infrastructure)
- 2) South Korea as a DAC member
 - --- MDG commitment and after?, DAC accord
 - --- Cooperation, not aid? (Kaesong, Mt.Kumgang)
 - --- DPRK as the economic frontier
 - --- Bitter experience in the chicken game
 - --- Integration hub: Rule of Origin of Kaeson in FTAs
- 3) Japan as a classic aid donor (Multi-national aid and Reparation)
 - --- Reparation for the "Northern half"
 - --- Assessment on the South
 - --- Multi-lateral approach (IMF/IBRD, ADB) and DAC accord (OECD)

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- --- New commercialism for the infrastructure projects?
- --- Partnership approach in procurement, skill transfer, "Kaizen"

3. Changed North Korea's Development Policies?

- 1) Marketization
- 2) Kaesong experience
- 3) Local approach (Increased special economic zones)
- 4) FDI-driven growth strategies?
- 5) Diversification from China?

4. Possible Assistance Rivalries

- 1) N. vs. S. Korea: Priority in economic development vs. Security affects South's presence, Internal politics in South
- 2) N. Korea vs. China: Never exactly follows "Opening and Reform"
- 3) S. Korea vs. China: Development initiative (Northeast Development Bank<AllB?), N-S balance diplomacy by China
- 4) Japan vs. S. Korea: Competition by shared ideas and regime, aid identity may stimulate historical issues
- 5) Japan vs. China: Infrastructure export, aid governance, Human security ideas.....

5. Coordination and Cooperation exercise among the Neighbors

- 1) Aid for healthcare and human security related issues (ex. Japan's experience in Vietnam, Should be under South Korean initiative)
- 2) Irrigation and other agricultural infrastructure, natural disaster prevention
- 3) Infrastructure building connecting economic zones (ex. Wonsan?)
- 4) Trade facilitation in JCK FTA framework: Electric Data Interchange, SPS, Standardization, Rule of Origin (Kaeson)
- 5) Energy cooperation prospects with Russia?

Session 2

토론 | Panelist

마커스 놀랜드

피터슨 국제경제연구소 부소장

Marcus NOLAND

Executive Vice President and Director of Studies, Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)

Talking Point	

Remarks on "Assisting North Korea's Economic Development" Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics and East-West Center

The main two unification scenarios are a protracted, consensual process and an abrupt collapse and absorption scenario similar to the German experience. Professor Kim's analysis assumes the first path. A 2014 Ilmin International Relations Institute survey of 135 "experts" found that the life expectancy of Kim Jong-un regime 10-20 years; a majority (64%) expect regime to fall from internal power struggle; and unification with the South is the final endpoint. These assessments imply that the consensus tends toward the abrupt scenario.

The East German experience of voluntary dissolution may not obtain. North Korea lacks the democratic traditions and civil society institutions which were preserved, at least in embryonic form, in East Germany. Given the political institutions and degree of militarization of North Korean society there is potential for sustained quasi-revanchist violent opposition which could derail economic rehabilitation and development. Prolonged violent opposition to South Korean rule would dampen all predicted economic benefits.

The marketization we observe in North Korea today is not the product of any planned reform but rather is a bottomup process driven by state failure. The state regards the market as a kind of semi-autonomous zone of social communication that could promote dissent, facilitate organizing, and potentially a pathway to wealth, status, and political power.

This point is important to understand the state's subsequent ambivalence toward the market and its inability or unwillingness to construct the institutions of a modern market economy. South Korea has compensated to this institutional weakness by creating enclaves such as the KIC, but these are second-best alternatives to true North Korean reform.

Deepening South Korean involvement also raises the issue of labor conditions in the North. Bilateral negotiations will be needed to achieve standards, anchored in both the South Korean constitution and existing international norms and covenants, providing for basic labor rights, recognition of labor organizations, and non-discrimination on the basis of songbun.

Critical issues in assessing unification costs and benefits include the clarification of property rights, cross-border factor integration, and the rapidity of technological convergence. Without clear property rights and dispute settlement

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mechanisms, there will be no investment, and without investment there will be no economic rehabilitation.

The good news is that unification would accelerate peninsular economic growth and dramatically reduce poverty. The public sector will be deeply involved, but private sector participation crucial—it possesses the capital, technology, and worldwide marketing and distribution networks necessary to rehabilitate the North Korean economy. The extent of direct US government participation is unclear, a function of the US's own fiscal uncertainties.



토론 | Panelist

유리 시고브

"비즈니스 피플"지 워싱턴 대표

Yury SIGOV

US Bureau Chief, "Business People" Magazine

Talking Point _	

Will economic cooperation with North Korea help to unification of Korean peninsula? by Dr. Yury Sigov

1. Economic engagement with North Korea through moral and philosophical values and assessments.

- A. Main idea of Republic of Korea in its relations with NK.
- B. Main purpose of US actions on Korean peninsula and the so-called six-party talks on Korea.
- C. Who needs a strong and unified Korea in the region? Bilateral inter-Korean philosophy, and how it could enhance economic engagement between two states.
- D. Inter-Korean dialogue including economic cooperation: dealing with this issue from the human, philosophical point of view, trying to "wear NK leaders' shoes" in trade and economic engagement, assessing soberly the current foreign policy of North Korea and its leaders' behavior.

2. Difficulties and deep-rooted stereotypes.

- A. Who reliably knows what exactly is going in NK? Lack of mutual trust and what kind of trust we are looking for? Between political leaders? Business circles? On people-to-people level?
- B. Economic engagement of NK and nuclear stance on the Korean peninsula inevitable connections and unavoidable consequences.
- C. Economic cooperation with NK and its purposefulness.
 - what would we like to achieve with this economic cooperation (to raise the per capita income of North Koreans, to help developing the North Korean economy, to bring NK into the economic global or regional financial and trade mechanisms, who would be the main trading partners of NK now, and who will be willing to use NK market in its own interest?)
 - practical economic engagement with NK: the only country, which would be interested in such economic engagement is South Korea. Would these economic efforts enhance the unification process of two Koreas?

3. Does North Korea need any outside economic engagement? - view form Pyongyang.

- A. NK view of economic engagement with foreign countries.
- B. Current economic priorities of NK government.
- C. Stubborn roadblocks in economic cooperation with NK. What kind of economic engagement with NK are we talking about?
- D. Current economic relations of NK with foreign countries (China, Russia, Mongolia, others). Meaningfulness of trade relations with NK for foreign business and practical benefits for both sides of such economic and trade cooperation.

4. Summary and practical suggestions.

- A. Any economic engagement of NK sounds attractive, theoretically workable, and deserving attention as one of possible tools of inter-Korean dialogue. However, in practical terms such cooperation will be enormously difficult, extremely costly, and will be politically motivated and meaningful only for one country- South Korea.
- B. All other "parties involved" including Russia, China, Japan or potentially Europe could continue contributing to this process, but only if they can get any real financial and economic profits.
- C Any potential foreign trade partner with Pyongyang will have very limited political interests in NK, and even less motivated to enhance the unification of the Korean peninsula.
- D. Outside economic engagement will hardly change the core of the economic and state system in North Korea. These changes may happen only under extreme circumstances such as foreign invasion, massive collapse of the state, hunger or any natural disaster. Meanwhile the economic openness of NK could happen only under the direct involvement of NK Number One. But any such openness will inevitably lead to corrosion of political system in NK and undermine the ruling elites grip on power in this country.
- E. Therefore any economic openness and outside engagement of NK will be a direct threat to the very existence of North Korean rulers. They will never come to this self-destruction nor they are able to cross the "line of logic" of spreading of market economy elements on North Korean territory.

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접경지역의 평화적 이용

Peaceful Cooperation in the Border Areas

<u>사회</u> 김재창 한미안보연구회 회장

발제 정태용 연세대학교 교수

<u>토론</u>____**최재천** 국립생태원 원장

아이눌 하산 유엔 아시아·태평양 경제사회위원회(UNESCAP) 거시경제정책 국장

노먼 뉴라이터 미국과학진흥회(AAAS) 수석고문 **장 폴 페덱** 세계자연보호기금(WWF) 본부 국제협력국장

Moderator KIM Jae Chang Chair, Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies

Presenter JUNG Tae Yong Professor, Yonsei University

Panelists CHOE Jae Chun President, National Institute of Ecology

Aynul HASAN Director, Macroeconomic Policy and Development Division, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pat

Norman P. NEUREITER Senior Adviser, American Association for the Advancement of Science

Jean-Paul PADDACK Director of International Business Development, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) International

발제 | Presenter

정태용

연세대학교 교수

JUNG Tae Yong

Professor, Yonsei University

YONSEI UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

An Instrument for Conflict Resolution in Northeast Asia


- DMZ World Eco-Peace Park


Tae Yong Jung

Professor

Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University







1. Vision & Principles DMZ WEPP's Collaborative System **Multilateral Cooperative Channels DPRK** · Korean War participating nations' active engagement under the UN flag Building trust in Multilateral relations under the UN between US China ROK and DPRK · Evolution from environment conservation peace park to Northeast Asia **ROK**

-> basis for conflict resolution and peace building

1. Vision & Principles

❖ Vision for DMZ World Eco-Peace Park for Conflict Resolution

Peace and life corridor

National commonalities between two Koreas

Symbol of anthropocentric peace and security

1. Vision & Principles Principles for DMZ WEPP

Zone of ecological treasure trove

Zone of cooperation


Zone of peace


2. Objectives & Directions

Objectives

- Symbolic Corridor for life and peace
- Road to construct global partnerships in a bid to shed light on Korean Peninsula trust building process politically, militarily and economically and contribute to building peace by lightening mounting tensions through regional cooperation

Directions





3. Steps to Develop WEPP as an Instrument for Conflict Resolution

- 'Consensus' building both domestically and internationally
- Participation of international organizations for Public-Private Partnerships(PPP)
- Dialogue with DPRK for DMZ WEPP

4. Peace Park: Examples



Condor-Kutuku Conservation Corridor Peace Park

- Territorial disputes between Ecuador-Peru with conflicting border line had lasted for 170 years
- 4 guarantor countries (US, Chile, Brazil and Argentina helped in reaching Peace Agreement including finalizing demarcation agreement.
 Dispute area was designated as demilitarized ecological park
- In support of Conservation International and International Tropical Timber Organization,
 Ecuador and Peru created a common management system for the Park

4. Peace Park: Examples




"Green Line" UN buffer zone in Nicosia, Cyprus

- Nicosia, capital of Cyprus, had been divided into north and the south, patrolled by the Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to end disputes between different ethnic groups
- Based on common interest in urban planning and environmental cooperation, local
 communities in dispute areas could build cooperation. A variety of stakeholders including
 local residents, international society, UN, academia engaged in tackling urban
 environmental issue from wastewater disposals and biodiversity conservation to urban
 planning. Continuous cooperation and interaction led to opening up the checkpoint and
 demolishing the walls between two countries



East Carpathians Biosphere Reserve, Slovakia/Poland/Ukraine

- a transboundary mountain biosphere reserve providing habitat for the largest populations in Europe of brown bear, wolf and lynx, as well as over one third of all European plant sp ecies.
- first trilateral biosphere reserve was designated in 1998, uniting the bilateral Polish-Slovak
 one (designated in 1992) with the Ukrainian part. In order to support the transboundary c
 ooperation, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine agreed on establishment of the Foundation for t
 he East Carpathians Biodiversity Conservation despite border conflicts between Poland an
 d Ukraine, and transformed the region into largest tourist site in the mid Europe



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МЕМО			
E-MILLE MANAGEMENT AND			
-			

Session 3

토론 | Panelist

최 재 천

국립생태원 원장

CHOE Jae Chun

President, National Institute of Ecology

Talking Point	

"Preparing for a Peaceful Unification of Korea" Jae Chun CHOE

The DMZ (Demilitarized Zone), a desperate refuge for wildlife at present, can play in the future a critically important role of biodiversity source for the entire Korean peninsula. Just as in Germany, however, the unification between the two Koreas may happen without much warning. If it happened in such a way, there is a good chance that we will fail to reserve it as a natural heritage.

The DMZ Forum, an international Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) established in 1997, has been working to designate the DMZ as a peace park. The late Nelson Mandela, participating in the DMZ Forum in 2004, suggested that we set aside the DMZ as a world peace park. In her speech to the U.S. Congress on 18 May 2013 President Park Geunhye announced a plan to establish a world peace park in the DMZ. Internationally, a peace park is understood as an ecological reserve, as it is in general takes the form of Transboundary Protected Area (TBPA). To my dismay, however, it was accepted as a peace memorial park in Korea and local governments began competing to win a contract to build a huge monument, visitor center, and so on. I began writing newspaper articles, giving public lectures, and making pleas to the government. Finally, President Park switched the term 'DMZ World Peace Park' with "DMZ World Eco-Peace Park' in her keynote speech at the 69th U.N. General Assembly on 24 September 2014. The inclusion of a word 'eco' has an enormous new implication. Now the issue of biodiversity conservation is firmly included in the plan for the future of the DMZ. President Park emphasized that this park would become the starting point to reconnect nature with a people divided into north and south for over 60 years.

At the CBD COP 12 held in Pyeongchang, Korea, in 2014, I declared that the DMZ is no longer a land of the Koreans only. I do not have the authority to make such declaration but believe that the DMZ now belongs to the humanity that shares the right to enjoy the benefits incurred by protecting biodiversity. This 'accidental nature reserve' will lose its merit as a rare repository of biodiversity, if the unification process is hastened without a proper preparation to protect its wildlife. Two railways, the Gyeongui and Donghae Railways, have already been reconnected in recent years. Many more railways and roads are waiting to be reconnected. Two more disconnected railways, and six national roads and as many as 6-8 provincial roads are the candidates. Roads through nature always lead to gloom and doom. The DMZ in fact is not that large an area. It is but a narrow strip of land 248 kilometers in length and only 4 kilometers in width. Ecologists have

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witnessed time and again that much biodiversity is lost if you cut up a natural habitat into smaller fragments. I demand in no uncertain terms that they be built in the form of an overpass or underpass. We have the technology. We only need the will. The DMZ must be protected as one large piece, if at all possible, not many cut-up pieces. The effects of such habitat fragmentation have been documented widely and thoroughly.

To achieve this daunting goal, I propose to (1) include the issue of DMZ conservation in the agendas of the North-South summit and (2) establish 'North-South Joint DMZ Eco-Peace Institute' to study together the ecology, economics, and politics of the DMZ and re-unification.



토론 | Panelist

장 폴 페덱

세계자연보호기금(WWF) 본부 국제협력국장

Jean-Paul PADDACK

Director, International Business Development, World Wide Fund for Nature(WWF) International

Talking Point	

"Preparing for a Peaceful Unification of Korea – Starting Peace from North Korea's Border Areas"

Korea's Biodiversity - Multiple Border Areas: North, South, East and West.

There are eight (8) species of Cranes (out of 15 globally) that occur in the Korean Peninsula, which migrate through the Korean Peninsula, including in the Anbyon plains in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), north of the DMZ, to name one of several important wetland in the DPRK. About 3,150 species of vascular plants inhabit the Korean Peninsula, and about 1/10th are endemic to the area. Seven genera of vascular plants are considered endemic to the Korean Peninsula. About 12,300 insects have been reported from the Korean Peninsula as well. (Peter Raven, sciencediplomacy.org, 09/09/2013). Nine percent (9%) of the plants recorded in the world occur in there. The charismatic Asian bear is still present, while the last sightings of tigers go back to the 1990s in the DPRK's norther border with China and Russia, and believed extinct in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula since the 1920s-30s. The waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula are rich in marine biodiversity, including important valuable migrating tuna populations. Thus, in order to effectively protect and manage the Korean Peninsula's environment and biodiversity, one needs to plan actions along the "five borders" — along the China-Russian border (e.g., for tigers), the three coastal facades of the Korean Peninsula (for wetlands and birds, & marine resources), & along the border of the biodiversity rich DMZ.

Ecoregional Vision, the "DMZ World Eco-Peace Park" and the Amur-Heilong Ecoregion.

When preparing an environmental conservation vision for the Korean Peninsula, it is important to think at an "ecoregional scale". WWF defines an ecoregion as a "large unit of land or water containing a geographically distinct assemblage of species, natural communities, and environmental conditions".

As noted above, it is important to think beyond the DMZ geography per se, however unique and rich in biodiversity — it is but a small part of a broader ecological unit. Further, the reference to the words "peace" and "DMZ", for some observers, tend to give a non-scientific connotation to this exciting "ecological" initiative. One should consider emphasizing the scientific underpinnings of this initiative, and offer a term for the future conservation area which captures the imagination of Koreans throughout the peninsula — the "Paektu/Baekdudaegan" mountain chain, or

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"Paektu/Baekdudaegan Protected Areas Complex". From a bio-geographical viewpoint, one must envision the future protected area complex along the Paektu/Baekdudaegan mountain chain, in its entirety, as one cohesive ecological unit composed of a network of conservation areas (including different IUCN protected areas categories). One or several core conservation areas could be located around the DMZ area. This broader vision of the ecoregion is key foundation of any future conservation work. Such a Protected Areas complex can evolve over time. If one considers the northern bio-geographical extent of Baekdudaegan, into China (called Changbai Mountain in China), the protected area complex could be a transboundary park conservation effort of high priority. Conservation initiatives across the China and Russia borders (Amur-Heiling ecoregion) for tiger conservation, could be extended to include the DPRK.

Livelihoods and Safeguarding the Environment.

As enshrined in the Sustainable Development Goals recently adopted by all parties at the United Nations in September, including the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, strong economies and poverty eradication can only be achieved by safeguarding the environment, protecting the ecosystems that sustain human well-being and mitigating climate change and its impacts. In order to protect the Korean Peninsula's rich biodiversity, the livelihoods of the Korean people must improve. We know that forest ecosystems provide shelter, livelihoods, water, fuel and food for millions of Koreans; healthy river basins are already experiencing severe water scarcity; and 1/3 of the largest cities in the 100 largest cities take their drinking water from protected areas. Any efforts to address unification and the environment, must also include improved livelihoods, particularly given that "from a population of 24.6 million, approximately 70 per cent (18 million) are food insecure and highly vulnerable to shortages in food production" (UNICEF), and persistent chronic and acute child malnutrition. Ensuring "buy-in" and support from local communities/populations increases chances of cooperation from these stakeholders as well as the success of conservation actions. Agriculture, therefore, needs to be a simultaneous focus of any conservation strategy. As rice production is an important staple in the diet of Koreans, consideration should be given to mobilising assistance in the areas of "intensive rice cultivation", or "SRI" using the French acronym. SRI was developed in Madagascar (where I lived 14 years, and integrated these SRI techniques into our protected areas/ conservation strategies) offers many advantages: The main advantages are; (a) saving seeds, (b) water savings of up to 50%, (c) improvement in soil health, (d) yield increases 20-30%, (e) shorter time to maturity, (f) higher outturn of polished rice when milled, (g) resistance to drought and storm damage.





