



KOREA GLOBAL FORUM 2014

Trust, Peace, and Prosperity
Path to Korean Unification

September 25(Thu)-26(Fri), 2014
Hotel Shilla Seoul

Korea Global Forum 2014

한반도국제포럼

Trust, Peace, Prosperity: Path to Korean Unification

신뢰, 평화, 번영 : 한반도 통일의 길

Day 1

International Expert Conference

전문가초청포럼

Thursday, September 25, 2014
Hotel Shilla, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Hosted by
Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea

Organized by
East Asia Institute

주최 : 대한민국 통일부 주관 : 동아시아연구원

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Welcoming Message 모시는 글



RYOO Kihl-jae
Minister of Unification



LEE Sook-Jong
President of EAI

Unification of the Korean Peninsula is a long-cherished desire of the Korean people. Given the unstable and rapidly changing state of affairs in Northeast Asia, there is a need to precisely grasp the situation and create an environment that is favorable to unification since we cannot predict when and how unification will take place. For this reason, we cannot emphasize enough on the importance of sharing the values of trust, peace and mutual prosperity between the two Koreas and countries throughout Northeast Asia. North Korea continues to conduct nuclear tests and threaten us with military provocations, but the ROK government is firm on its stance to improve inter-Korean relations by building trust between the two Koreas, establish peace on the Korean peninsula and gain support from the international community for peaceful unification.

Since 2010, the Ministry of Unification has been holding the Korea Global Forum in order to promote 1.5 track efforts to raise global awareness on Korean unification. This year, the Ministry of Unification and East Asia Institute are jointly hosting the Korea Global Forum 2014 under the topic of "Trust, Peace, and Prosperity: Path to Korean Unification," by bringing together government officials, scholars, and experts from around the world. Under your kind interest and support, we hope this forum succeeds in gaining greater support for Korean unification from the international community and putting together knowledge and insights that can contribute to Northeast Asian peace and development.

한반도 통일은 우리 민족의 오래된 염원입니다. 급변하는 동북아시아 및 세계 정세 속에서 우리는 언제, 어떻게 전개될지 모르는 한반도 통일에 대한 우호적인 환경을 조성할 필요가 있습니다. 따라서 한반도와 동북아시아에서 신뢰, 평화, 번영의 가치 공유가 그 어느 때보다 강조되어야 합니다. 우리 정부는 계속되는 북한의 핵실험과 도발 위협 속에서도 튼튼한 안보를 바탕으로 남북간 신뢰를 형성함으로써 남북관계를 발전시키고, 한반도에 평화를 정착시키며, 평화통일을 향한 국제사회의 일관된 협력과 지지를 이끌어 내고자 합니다.

통일부는 2010년부터 한반도 평화와 통일에 대한 국제적 공감대를 확산시키기 위해 한국을 비롯한 유관 국가의 정부인사와 민간 전문가가 참여하는 '한반도국제포럼'을 운영하고 있습니다. 올해는 동아시아연구원과 공동으로 해외 각국의 정부 관계자 및 민간 전문가들을 초청하여 "신뢰, 평화, 번영 : 한반도 통일의 길"이라는 주제로 2014년 한반도국제포럼을 개최합니다. 이번 포럼이 한반도 평화 통일에 대한 국제 사회의 지지를 확대하고, 동북아의 평화 발전을 위한 지혜를 모으는 자리가 될 수 있도록 많은 관심과 성원을 부탁드립니다.

류길재
대한민국 통일부 장관

이숙종
동아시아연구원 원장

Program

Day 1: International Expert Conference

Date: Thursday September 25, 2014, 10:30am – 5:00pm

Venue: Hotel Shilla, Yeong Bin Gwan (Ruby Hall, 1F)

10:30-11:00 **Registration**

11:00-11:10 **Welcoming Remarks**

LEE Sook-Jong, President, EAI (Republic of Korea)

11:10-11:30 **Keynote Speech**

RYOO Kihl-jae, Minister of Unification (Republic of Korea)

11:30-11:50 **Keynote Speech Q&A**

Moderator

LEE Sook-Jong, President, EAI (Republic of Korea)

12:00-13:20 **Lunch**

13:20-15:00 **Session I “East Asia’s Changing Regional Order and Korean Unification”**

Moderator

HA Young-Sun, Chairman, EAI (Republic of Korea)

Presenters

FUJIWARA Kiichi, Professor, University of Tokyo (Japan)

Frank JANNUZI, President and CEO, Maureen and Mike Mansfield
Foundation (United States)

Vasily MIKHEEV, Vice President, Institute of World Economy and International
Relations (Russia)

LI Nan, Research Fellow, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China)

Discussants

CHUN Chaesung, Chair, Asia Security Initiative Research Center, EAI;
Professor, Seoul National University (Republic of Korea)

James COTTON, Professor, University of New South Wales (Australia)

Barry DESKER, Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
Technological University (Singapore)

15:00-15:20 **Break**

15:20-17:00 **Session II "Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula: Current Outcomes and Future Tasks"**

Moderator

CHANG Dal-Joong, Emeritus Professor, Seoul National University
(Republic of Korea)

Presenters

Hans-Ulrich SEIDT, Inspector General, German Foreign Office; Former
German Ambassador to Republic of Korea (Germany)

YOO Ho-Yeol, Professor, Korea University (Republic of Korea)

Discussants

John EVERARD, Former British Ambassador to North Korea (United Kingdom)

KIM Kiwoong, Assistant Minister for Unification Policy, Ministry of Unification
(Republic of Korea)

Françoise NICOLAS, Director, French Institute of International Relations (France)

Georgy TOLORAYA, Head of Regional Projects Department, Russkiy Mir
Foundation (Russia)

SUN Zhe, Professor, Tsinghua University (China)

Day 2: Distinguished Public Lecture

Date: Friday September 26, 2014, 10:00am – 12:00pm

Venue: Hotel Shilla, Yeong Bin Gwan (Ruby Hall, 1F)

10:00-10:30 **Registration**

10:30-12:00 **Distinguished Public Lecture and Q&A**

Lecture

Kurt CAMPBELL, Chairman and CEO, The Asia Group; Former U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs (United States)

Moderator

LEE Sook-Jong, President, EAI (Republic of Korea)

프로그램

제1일 전문가초청포럼

일시 : 9월 25일 목요일 오전 10시 30분 - 오후 5시

장소 : 서울 신라호텔 영빈관 루비홀

10:30-11:00 등록

11:00-11:10 환영사

이숙종 EAI 원장

11:10-11:30 기조연설

류길재 대한민국 통일부 장관

11:30-11:50 기조연설 질의응답

사회

이숙종 EAI 원장

12:00-13:20 오찬

13:20-15:00 제 1 부 “동아시아 세력구조 재편과 한반도 통일의 함의”

사회

하영선 EAI 이사장

발표

후지와라 기이치 도쿄대 교수(일본)

프랭크 자누지 맨스필드재단 대표(미국)

바실리 미헤예프 국제경제 및 국제관계연구소(IMEMO) 부원장(러시아)

리 난 중국 사회과학원 연구원(중국)

토론

전재성 EAI 아시아안보연구센터 소장, 서울대 교수(한국)

제임스 코튼 뉴사우스웨일스대 교수(오스트레일리아)

베리 데스크 난양기술대(RSIS) 학장(싱가포르)

15:00-15:20 휴식

15:20-17:00 제 2 부 “한반도 신뢰프로세스의 성과 및 과제”

사회

장달중 서울대 명예교수

발표

한스-울리히 자이트 독일외교부 감사관, 전 주한 독일 대사(독일)

유호열 고려대 교수(한국)

토론

존 에버라드 전 주북한 영국 대사(영국)

김기웅 통일부 통일정책실장(한국)

프랑수아즈 니콜라 프랑스 국제관계연구소(IFRI) 아시아센터 국장(프랑스)

게오르기 톨로라야 루스키 미르재단 아시아-아프리카 국장(러시아)

쑨 저 칭화대 교수(중국)

제2일 명사초청강연

일시 : 9월 26일 금요일 오전 10시 - 오후 12시

장소 : 서울 신라호텔 영빈관 루비홀

10:00-10:30 등록

10:30-11:30 공개강연

커트 캠벨 아시아그룹 회장, 전 미국 국무부 동아태차관보

11:30-12:00 공개강연 질의응답

사회

이숙종 EAI 원장

Biographies of Participants

발표자 약력

International Expert Conference 전문가초청포럼

CHANG Dal-Joong • 장달중

CHUN Chaesung • 전재성

James COTTON • 제임스 코튼

Barry DESKER • 베리 데스크

John EVERARD • 존 에버라드

FUJIWARA Kiichi • 후지와라 기이치

HA Young-Sun • 하영선

Frank JANNUZI • 프랭크 자누지

KIM Ki Woong • 김기웅

LEE Sook-Jong • 이숙종

LI Nan • 리 난

Vasily MIKHEEV • 바실리 미헤예프

Françoise NICOLAS • 프랑수와즈 니콜라

RYOO Kihl-jae • 류길재

Hans-Ulrich SEIDT • 한스-울리히 자이트

SUN Zhe • 쉰 저

Georgy TOLORAYA • 게오르기 톨로라야

YOO Ho-Yeol • 유호열

Distinguished Public Lecture 명사초청강연

Kurt CAMPBELL • 커트 캠펠



CHANG Dal-Joong
Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University

장달중
서울대 명예교수

Dal-joong Chang is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Throughout his career Professor Chang has been teaching Northeast Asian Politics, Inter-Korean Relations, and Contemporary Korean Politics. Professor Chang has also been actively engaged in various advisory activities for national unification, security, and foreign policy. He is currently an advisory committee member for policy affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is now writing political columns for Daily Newspapers and is organizing various activities for inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. He was a Fulbright scholar and a two-time Japan Foundation Fellow. Before joining Seoul National University, he taught at Korea Military Academy and Sogang Jesuit University. He earned his Ph.D in Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley after having completed his B.A. and M.A. degrees at Seoul National University.

장달중 교수는 서울대학교 정치외교학과 명예교수이다. 동북아시아 정치, 남북관계, 현대 한국정치를 가르치고 있다. 또한 통일, 안보, 외교정책 분야에서 다양한 자문역을 맡아왔다. 현재 한국 외교부 정책자문위원으로 재직 중이다. 일간지에 정치 칼럼을 기고하고 있으며, 남북 대화와 협력을 위한 다양한 활동을 진행하고 있다. 장달중 교수는 풀브라이트 장학생이었으며, 일본재단 펠로우로 두 차례 선정된 바 있다. 서울대학교 재직 전에는 한국 육군사관학교와 서강대학교에서 강의했다. 서울대학교에서 학사와 석사 학위를 취득한 뒤, 캘리포니아 대학교 버클리(University of California, Berkeley)에서 정치학 박사 학위를 받았다.

CHUN Chaesung
Chair of the Asia Security Initiative Research Center, EAI
Professor, Seoul National University

전재성
동아시아연구원 아시아안보연구센터 소장
서울대 교수



Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at East Asia Institute. He is a professor of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University and director of Center for International Studies at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun is also serving as an advisory committee member for the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and Ph.D. in international relations from Northwestern University. His research interests include international relations, security studies, South Korean foreign policy, and East Asian security relations. His recent publications include *Is Politics Moral? Reinhold Niebuhr's Transcendental Realism* (2012), *Theory of East Asian International Relations* (2011), and "The Rise of New Powers and the Responding Strategies of Other Countries" (2008).

전재성 교수는 서울대학교 정치외교학부 교수로 재직 중이며, 동아시아연구원 아시아안보연구센터 소장을 겸임하고 있다. 전재성 교수는 서울대학교 외교학과를 졸업하고 미국 노스웨스턴대학교 (Northwestern University)에서 정치학 박사학위를 취득하였다. 전재성 교수의 주요 연구분야는 국제정치이론, 국제관계사 등이며, 최근 논저로는 《정치는 도덕적인가 : 라인홀드 니버의 초월적 국제정치사상》 (2012), 《동아시아 국제정치: 역사에서 이론으로》 (2011), "구성주의 국제정치이론에 대한 탈근대론과 현실주의의 비판 고찰" <국제정치논총> (2010), "유럽의 국제정치적 근대 출현에 관한 이론적 연구" <국제정치논총> (2009), "강대국의 부상과 대응 메커니즘: 이론적 분석과 유럽의 사례" <국방연구> (2008) 등이 있다.



James COTTON
Professor Emeritus, University of New South Wales

제임스 코튼
뉴사우스웨일스대 명예교수

James Cotton is Professor Emeritus of Politics, University of New South Wales, ADFA, Canberra. He graduated from Flinders and Durham Universities and from the London School of Economics (Ph.D., 1978). He was a Procter Fellow at Princeton University, and also studied at the Beijing Language Institute. He has held academic positions in Western Australia, Newcastle Upon Tyne, Singapore, the Australian National University, and Tasmania; he has held visiting professorships at the LSE and the University of Hong Kong. He made the first of six research visits to North Korea in 1986. He joined the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington DC, in 2009, and was Harold White Fellow, National Library of Australia, 2013. Prof. James Cotton was a foundation member of the Australian Foreign Minister's Advisory Council (1997-2003); he is a Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Relations and the Royal Asiatic Society. He is the author of over 200 publications. His most recent books are: (edited with John Ravenhill), *Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010* (Oxford University Press/AIIA, 2012); (edited with David Lee), *Australia and the United Nations* (Dept. Foreign Affairs and Trade/Longueville, 2012); *The Australian School of International Relations* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

제임스 코튼 교수는 호주 뉴사우스웨일스대학교(University of New South Wales) 명예교수이다. 코튼 교수는 플린더스대학교(Flinders University)와 더햄대학교(Durham University)를 졸업하고, 런던정경대학교(London School of Economics)에서 박사학위를 취득하였다. 프린스턴대학교(Princeton University)에서 프록터 펠로우(Procter Fellow)를 지냈으며 베이징언어대학(Beijing Language Institute)에서 수학하였다. 코튼 교수는 웨스턴오스트레일리아(Western Australia), 뉴캐슬어폰타인(Newcastle Upon Tyne), 싱가포르(Singapore), 호주국립대학교(Australia National University), 태즈메이니아(Tasmania) 등지에서 강의한 바 있으며, 런던정경대학교와 홍콩대학교에서 각각 방문교수를 지냈다. 코튼 교수는 1986년 첫 방문을 포함하여 총 6회 북한을 연구방문했으며, 2009년 미국 우드로윌슨센터(Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars) 펠로우, 2013년 호주 국립도서관 해럴드 화이트(Harold White) 펠로우로 활동했다. 또한 호주 외교부장관 자문위원회의 창립 회원이며, 호주국제문제연구소(Australian Institute of International Relations) 펠로우, 왕립아시아학회(Royal Asiatic Society) 회원이기도 하다. 최근 저서로는 *Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010* (2012), *Australia and the United Nations* (2012), *The Australian School of International Relations* (2013) 등이 있다.

Barry DESKER
Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University

베리 데스커
난양공대 라자라트남 국제연구대학원(RSIS) 학장



Ambassador Barry Desker is the Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (NTU). He is a Member of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, Singapore and a Member of the Board of Directors of the Lee Kuan Yew Exchange Fellowship. He is the inaugural Bakrie Professor of Southeast Asia Policy. He was the Chief Executive Officer of the Singapore Trade Development Board from 1994 to 2000 and was Singapore's Ambassador to Indonesia from 1986 to 1993 and was earlier appointed Deputy Secretary in the Administrative Service (Foreign Service Branch) from 1982. Ambassador Desker is currently also Non-Resident Ambassador of Singapore to the Holy See and Spain and Chairman of Singapore Technologies Marine. A President's Scholar, he was educated at the University of Singapore, University of London and Cornell University. He was awarded an honorary doctorate by Warwick University in 2012 and by the University of Exeter in 2013. His research interests include the WTO, terrorism and civil conflict in Asia, as well as regional economic and security issues. He has published most recently in the *Washington Quarterly*, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, *Survival*, *Internationale Politik*, *Asia Policy*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* and *The Pacific Review*.

베리 데스커 대사는 싱가포르 난양공대(Nanyang Technological University) 라자라트남(S. Rajaratnam) 국제연구대학원(RSIS) 학장이며 바티칸 교황청과 스페인 비주재 싱가포르 대사로 재직중이다. 데스커 대사는 싱가포르 소수자 권리 보호를 위한 대통령 위원회(Presidential Council for Minority Rights) 및 리관유 학술교류사업 이사회(Lee Kuan Yew Exchange Fellowship) 위원, ST마린(Singapore Technologies Marine) 회장으로 활동중이다. 데스커 대사는 1994년부터 2000년까지 싱가포르 무역 개발원(Singapore Trade Development Board) 대표이사, 1986년부터 1993년까지 주인도네시아 싱가포르 대사를 역임했으며 1982년 싱가포르 정부 외교담당 부차관을 역임했다. 데스커 대사는 싱가포르 국립대학교(National University of Singapore), 런던대학교(University of London), 코넬대학교(University of Cornell)에서 각각 대통령 장학생으로 수학하였으며 2012년 영국 워릭대학교(Warwick University)와 2013년 엑서터대학교(University of Exeter)에서 각각 명예박사학위를 받았다. 주요 연구 분야로는 WTO, 아시아 테러리즘과 민족 갈등, 지역 경제·안보 이슈 등이 있다. 데스커 대사의 최근 저작들은 *Washington Quarterly*, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, *Survival*, *Internationale Politik*, *Asia Policy*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* and *The Pacific Review* 등에서 찾아볼 수 있다.



John EVERARD
Former British Ambassador to North Korea

존 에버라드
前 주북한 영국대사

John Everard served in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office for twenty-seven years, working in Austria, Bosnia, Chile, and China (twice). He served as Ambassador three times, in Belarus, Uruguay and lastly in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 2006-2008. After his retirement from the diplomatic service in 2008 he was appointed Pantech Fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University from 2010-2011. During this time he contributed to various academic works, including a chapter in *Troubled Transition* (Stanford APARC 2012). He was then appointed as Coordinator of the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (dealing with sanctions on the DPRK). He withdrew from that position in November 2012 and has since written extensively for the media and broadcast, both on Korean issues and on international affairs generally. He published a book *Only Beautiful, Please* in 2012 that described his experiences of living and working in the DPRK and discussed some of the challenges presented by that country. John Everard holds an MA from Cambridge University, a diploma from Beijing University and an MBA from Manchester Business School. He is the only person to have participated in every session of the Korea Global Forum since its inception.

존 에버라드 전 대사는 27년간 영국 외교관으로서 오스트리아, 보스니아, 칠레, 중국 등지에서 근무했으며, 벨라루스, 우루과이 주재 영국대사 및 2006년부터 2008년까지 북한 주재 영국 대사를 역임했다. 2010년부터 2011년까지 미국 스탠퍼드대학교(Stanford University) 쇼렌스타인 아시아태평양연구소(Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center) 펜텍(Pentech) 객원 연구원을 지냈으며, 이후 2012년까지 유엔 안전보장이사회 대북제재위원회 전문가 패널(Panel of Experts) 조정관을 역임했다. 퇴임 이후 방송과 언론을 통해 한반도 문제 및 국제관계 분야에 대한 다양한 기고활동을 벌이고 있으며 주요 공저 및 저서로는 *Troubled Transition* (2012, 공저), *Only Beautiful, Please* (2012) 등이 있다. 에버라드 대사는 케임브리지 대학교(University of Cambridge)에서 석사학위를, 맨체스터 경영대학원(Manchester Business School)에서 MBA를 받았으며, 중국 베이징대학교(Beijing University)를 수료했다. 에버라드 전 대사는 한반도국제포럼 제1회 행사부터 현재까지 모든 세션에 참석한 유일한 참석자다.

FUJIWARA Kiichi
Professor, University of Tokyo

후지와라 기이치
도쿄대 교수



Kiichi Fujiwara is Director of the Security Studies Unit, Policy Alternatives Research Center, and Professor of International Politics at the University of Tokyo. A graduate of the University of Tokyo, Professor Fujiwara studied as a Fulbright student at Yale University before he returned to Japan at the Institute of Social Science (ISS). He has held positions at the University of the Philippines, the Johns Hopkins University, the University of Bristol, and was selected as a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center at Washington D.C. Prof. Fujiwara's works include *Remembering the War* (2001), *A Democratic Empire* (2002), *Is There Really a Just War?* (2003), *Peace for Realists* (2004) (winner of the Ishibashi Tanzan award, 2005; revised edition published in 2010); *America in Film* (2006), *International Politics* (2007), *War Unleashed* (2007), *That's a Movie!* (2012), and *Conditions of War* (2013).

후지와라 기이치 교수는 도쿄대학교 국제정치학과 교수로 재직 중이며 정책대안연구센터(Policy Alternatives Research Center) 안보연구소장을 겸임하고 있다. 도쿄대학교(University of Tokyo)를 졸업했으며 풀브라이트 장학생으로 미국 예일대학교(Yale University)에서 수학한 뒤 일본 사회과학 연구소(Institute of Social Science, ISS)에서 근무했다. 필리핀대학교(University of the Philippines), 미국 존스홉킨스대학교(Johns Hopkins University), 영국 브리스톨대학교(University of Bristol)에서 재직한 바 있으며, 미국 우드로윌슨센터(Woodrow Wilson International Center) 펠로우로 활동하기도 했다. 주요 저서로는 *Remembering the War* (2001), *A Democratic Empire* (2002), *Is There Really a Just War?* (2003), *Peace for Realists* (2004) (2005년 이시바시 단잔 상 수상작; 2010년 개정판 출판); *America in Film* (2006), *International Politics* (2007), *War Unleashed* (2007), *That's a Movie!* (2012), *Conditions of War* (2013) 등이 있다.



HA Young-Sun
Chairman, EAI

하영선
동아시아연구원 이사장

Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the board of trustees at the East Asia Institute. He is also a professor emeritus of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Currently, Dr. Ha is serving as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group and the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation. He was the Co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era, the Director of the Center for International Studies and American Studies Institute at Seoul National University, the President of the Korea Peace Studies Association, and a research fellow at the Center for International Studies at Princeton University, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm. He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and holds a Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Washington. His recent books and edited volumes include: *Trustpolitik 2.0 on the Korean Peninsula: Complex Policy of Deterrence, Engagement, and Trust* (forthcoming), *Toward 2020: Ten Agendas for South Korea's Foreign Policy* (2013), *A New Era for Korea-Japan Relations: Seven Tasks for Bilateral Cooperation* (2013), *Young-Sun Ha on International Politics: A Collection of Columns from 1991 to 2011* (2012), and *Complex World Politics: Strategies, Principles, and a New Order* (2012), *The Future of North Korea 2032: The Strategy of Co-evolution for the Advancement* (2010), *The Emergence of Complex Alliances in the 21st Century* (2010), and *A New Era of Complex Networks in Korea-Japan Relations* (2010).

하영선 이사장은 현재 동아시아연구원 이사장 및 서울대학교 명예교수를 겸임하고 있으며 대통령 국가안보자문단 위원, 통일준비위원회 민간위원이다. 서울대학교 외교학과를 졸업하고, 동 대학원에서 정치학 석사학위를, 미국 워싱턴대학교(University of Washington)에서 한국 핵 문제로 국제정치학 박사학위를 받았다. 미국 프린스턴대학(Princeton University) 국제문제연구소 초청연구원, 스웨덴 스톡홀름 국제평화연구소(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 초청연구원, 서울대학교 정치외교학부 교수, 서울대학교 국제문제연구소장, 미국학연구소장, 한국평화학회 회장을 역임했다. <조선일보>와 <중앙일보>에 “하영선 칼럼”을 7년 동안 연재하였으며, 연행 연구 모임, 전파 연구 모임, 정보세계정치 연구회, 동아시아연구원 모임 등을 이끌며 한국 국제정치학의 길을 개척해 왔다. 최근 저서 및 편저로는 《하영선 국제정치 칼럼 1991-2011》(2012), 《근대한국의 사회과학 개념 형성사 2》(편, 2012), 《북합세계정치론 : 전략과 원리 그리고 새로운 질서》(편, 2012), 《한일 신시대와 경제협력》(편, 2012), 《한일 신시대와 동아시아 국제정치》(편, 2012), 《한일 신시대와 공생복합 네트워크》(편, 2012), 《역사 속의 젊은 그들》(2011), 《변환의 세계정치》(공, 2007) 등이 있다.

Frank JANNUZI
President and CEO, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation

프랭크 자누지
맨스필드재단 대표



Frank Jannuzi joined the Mansfield Foundation as President and Chief Executive Officer in April 2014. He previously served as Deputy Executive Director (Advocacy, Policy and Research) at Amnesty International, USA. There he shaped and promoted legislation and policies to advance universal human rights, protect individuals and communities at risk, and free prisoners of conscience. From 1997-2012 Jannuzi was Policy Director, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he advised Committee Chairmen Joseph Biden and John Kerry on a range of security, political, economic, and human rights issues pertinent to U.S. relations with East Asia. During his tenure with the Foreign Relations Committee he also was a Hitachi Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations from 2006-2007, serving as a visiting lecturer at Keio University and a visiting scholar at the Institute of International Policy Studies in Tokyo. Early in his career he served for nine years as an analyst in the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Jannuzi holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Yale University and Master in Public Policy degree from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He has traveled throughout Asia and has written extensively on East Asia policy issues, including U.S. relations with Japan, China, and North Korea. He lives in Baltimore with his wife, Dr. Jennifer Martin, and their two daughters Zoe and Camille.

프랭크 자누지 대표는 현재 미국 맨스필드 재단 대표이사로 재직 중이다. 자누지 대표는 맨스필드 재단 부임 이전 국제엠네스티(Amnesty International) 미국 지부 참여 및 정책 연구 담당 사무차장으로 근무하면서 보편적 인권 신장, 위협에 처한 개인 및 단체 보호, 양심수 석방 등을 위한 입법 및 정책활동에 힘써왔다. 자누지 대표는 1997년부터 2012년까지 미국 상원 외교위원회(U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee) 동아시아·태평양 담당 정책실장을 역임한 바 있으며 조셉 바이든, 존 케리 당시 상원 외교위원장들의 동아시아 내 안보, 정치, 경제, 인권 분야 자문을 담당했다. 2006년부터 2007년까지 미국 외교협회(Council on Foreign Relations) 히타치(Hitachi) 펠로우를 지내며 일본 게이오대학교(Keio University) 방문 강사, 도쿄 국제정책연구소(Institute of International Policy Studies in Tokyo) 방문 연구원을 지냈다. 자누지 대표는 과거 미국 국무부 정보조사국(U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research)에서 9년간 분석관으로 활동하기도 했다. 예일대학교(Yale University)에서 학사 학위를, 하버드대학교 케네디 공공정책대학원(John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University)에서 공공정책 석사학위를 받았다. 자누지 대표는 아시아 전역을 다니며 일본, 중국, 북한을 비롯한 동아시아 정책 분야에 대한 광범위한 저술 활동을 해왔다.



KIM Ki Woong
Assistant Minister for Unification Policy Bureau

김기웅
통일부 통일정책실장

Mr. Kim Ki Woong is currently serving as Assistant Minister for Unification Policy Bureau at the Ministry of Unification. He has held various positions, including Director General of Inter-Korean Cooperation District Policy Planning Directorate, Director General for Intelligence and Analysis, Policy Planning Officer for Unification Policy Bureau, Director of Inter-Korean Dialogue Division | since 1990. He received his B.A. and M.A. in International Relations at Seoul National University.

김기웅 실장은 현재 대한민국 통일부 통일정책실장으로 재직 중이다. 그는 1990년 입부 후, 남북협력지구발전기획단장, 정세분석국장, 통일정책기획관, 남북회담본부 회담 1과장 등을 역임하였다. 김 실장은 서울대 외교학과를 졸업하고, 동 대학원에서 외교학 석사학위를 받았다.

LEE Sook-Jong
President, EAI

이숙종
동아시아연구원 원장



Sook-Jong Lee is the President of the East Asia Institute, an independent, non-profit think tank based in Seoul. She is also a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University. Currently, Dr. Lee holds a number of advisory positions in the South Korean government, including the Presidential National Security Advisory Group, Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation and councils for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). Dr. Lee also participates as member of the Trilateral Commission, Council of Councils, and many other transnational networks on research and policy studies. Her research interests include multilateralism, democracy, and civil societies, focusing on South Korea, Japan, and other East Asian countries. Previously, Dr. Lee was a research fellow at the Sejong Institute, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, a professorial lecturer at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, and a visiting fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies. Her recent publications include *Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea* (ed. 2013), "South Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy" (2012), *Korea's Role in Global Governance for Development Cooperation* (ed 2012), *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia* (eds. 2011), *Japan and East Asia: Regional Cooperation and Community Building* (eds. 2011), and *Toward Managed Globalization: The Korean Experience* (eds. 2010). Dr. Lee received her B.A. from Yonsei University, and M.A. and Ph.D. in sociology from Harvard University.

이숙종 원장은 동아시아연구원 원장과 성균관대학교 행정학과 및 국정관리대학원 교수를 겸임하고 있으며 대통령 국가안보자문단 위원, 통일준비위원회 민간위원이다. 외교부, 통일부와 한국국제협력단(KOICA)에서 정책 자문으로 활동하고 있으며, Council of Council, Trilateral Commission 등 다국적 정책 연구 네트워크에 참여해왔다. 세종연구소 연구위원, 미국 브루킹스연구소(Brookings Institution) 동북아연구소 객원연구원, 존스홉킨스대학교 국제대학원(Johns Hopkins University, SAIS) 교수강사, 독일 German Institute for Global and Area Studies 방문교수 등을 역임하였다. 주요 연구 분야로는 다자주의, 민주주의와 시민 사회 등이 있으며, 한국, 일본 및 동아시아 지역에 초점을 두고 있다. 최근 저술로는 《2013 대통령 성공의 조건》(편, 2013), 《글로벌 개발협력 거버넌스와 한국》(편, 2012), "South Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy" (2012), *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia* (공편, 2011) 《일본과 동아시아 : 지역협력과 공동체 구상》(공편, 2011), 《세계화 제2막 : 한국형 세계화의 새 구상》(공편, 2010) 등이 있다. 이숙종 원장은 미국 하버드대학교(Harvard University)에서 사회학 박사학위를 받았다.



LI Nan
Research Fellow, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

리 난
중국 사회과학원 연구원

Li Nan is an associate research fellow at the Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). He has been a Visiting Scholar at the Seoul National University, Brookings Institution, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, and Kim Il-Sung University (DPRK). Dr. Li is a graduate of the Renmin University of China where he earned his BA in International Politics & Political Science, MA in International Relations & Political Science, and Ph.D. in National Strategy. His research interests include U.S.-North Korea relations and China-North Korea relations. His main publications include *A Study of Contemporary Western Theories of Grand Strategy* (book), "U.S. Food Aid Policy towards North Korean and its Evaluation," (*The Journal of American Studies*, 2014), "US Policy towards DPRK Since the Nuclear Crisis of 2013," (Blue Book, the CASS Press, 2014) "Evaluating the Bush Administration's North Korea Strategy," (*Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies*, 2009) and "An Emotional and Strategic Partner: China's Humanitarian Aid to North Korea in the 21st Century." (The Brookings, 2013)

리난 박사는 중국 사회과학원 미국연구소 연구원으로 재직중이다. 서울대학교, 미국 브루킹스 연구소(Brookings Institution), 존스홉킨스대학교 국제대학원(Johns Hopkins University, SAIS), 북한 김일성대학교에서 방문연구원으로 활동하였으며 중국 런민대(Renmin University of China)에서 국제정치 및 정치학 학사학위, 국제관계 및 정치학 석사학위, 국가전략학 박사학위를 받았다. 주요 연구분야는 북미관계, 북중관계이며 저서로는 *A Study of Contemporary Western Theories of Grand Strategy* (book), "U.S. Food Aid Policy towards North Korean and its Evaluation," (*The Journal of American Studies*, 2014), "US Policy towards DPRK Since the Nuclear Crisis of 2013," (Blue Book, the CASS Press, 2014) "Evaluating the Bush Administration's North Korea Strategy," (*Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies*, 2009) "An Emotional and Strategic Partner: China's Humanitarian Aid to North Korea in the 21st Century" (The Brookings, 2013) 등이 있다.

Vasily MIKHEEV
Vice President, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (MEMO)

바실리 미헤예프
러시아 과학 아카데미 산하 국제경제 및 국제관계연구소 부원장



Vasily Mikheev is a Member of Russian Academy of Sciences from 2003. He is Vice President of IMEMO (Institute for World Economy and International Relations). He was Vice President of Institute for Far Eastern Studies, RAS, Director of Asia Security Program at Carnegie Moscow Office, Minister-Council at Russian Embassy to Lithuania, First Sectary at Soviet Embassy to North Korea, APEC Study Centers' coordinator for Russia. He is an author of around 300 publications including 7 individual monographs and 50 collective monographs. His most important books include: *Disbalances of Transpacific Area* (2014), *Comparison of the Soviet Union on the Eve of Collapse and North Korea* (2013), *Global Trends 2030* (2011, in Russian, English, Chinese), *China – Japan: Strategic Cooperation and Competition in Globalizing World* (2009), *China: Risks, Treats and Challenges to Development* (2005, in Russian and Chinese), *Homo-International: Theory of Social Development and International Security in Light of Man's Needs and Interests* (1999 – in Russian, 2003 – in English). He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations.

바실리 미헤예프 박사는 러시아 과학 아카데미 산하 국제경제 및 국제관계연구소(Institute for World Economy and International Relations, IMEMO) 부원장이다. 러시아 과학 아카데미 산하 극동 연구소(Institute for Far Eastern Studies) 부원장, 카네기 모스크바센터(Carnegie Moscow Center) 아시아 안보 프로그램 연구소장, 주리투아니아 러시아 대사관 고문, 주북한 구소련 대사관 1등 서기관, 아시아태평양경제협력체(APEC) 연구센터 러시아 담당 조정관을 역임했다. 미헤예프 부원장은 모스크바 국립 국제관계대학교(Moscow State Institute for International Relations)에서 경제학 박사 학위를 받았으며, 주요 저서로는 *Disbalances of Transpacific Area* (2014), *Comparison of the Soviet Union on the Eve of Collapse and North Korea* (2013), *Global Trends 2030* (러시아어, 영문, 중국어, 2011), *China Japan: Strategic Cooperation and Competition in Globalizing World* (2009), *China: Risks, Treats and Challenges to Development* (러시아어, 중국어, 2005), *Homo-International: Theory of Social Development and International Security in Light of Man's Needs and Interests* (러시아어 1999, 영어 2003) 등이 있다.



Françoise NICOLAS
Director, the Center for Asian Studies
The French Institute of International Relations

프랑수아즈 니콜라
프랑스 국제관계연구소 아시아센터 국장

Françoise Nicolas is a senior Researcher and Director of the Center for Asian Studies at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris, and an Assistant Professor in International Economics at Paris-East University (Marne-la-Vallée). She also teaches at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (Langues' O Paris) and at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po, Paris) and is an occasional consultant to the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs (DAF) of the OECD. She holds a Ph.D in international economics (1991) and an MA in political science (1985) from the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva, Switzerland). She has also studied at the University of Sussex (1980-81) and was a visiting fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore (1999) and at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) in Seoul (2004). Her research focuses on development Strategies in East Asia; FDI and growth; regional economic integration; emerging economies and globalization. Her latest publications include: "China's Direct Investment in the European Union: Challenges and Policy Responses", *China Economic Journal*, vol. 7. No 1, 2014, pp. 103-25; "Economic regionalism in East Asia: The End of an Exception?" in Tong Sarah (dir.), *Globalization, Development and Security in East Asia (Volume Two: Trade, Investment and Economic Integration)*, World Scientific Publishing, 2014, pp. 105-30).

프랑수아즈 니콜라 국장은 프랑스 국제관계연구소 (French Institute of International Relations: IFRI) 아시아 연구센터 국장 및 수석연구원, 마른 라 벨레 소재 파리-이스트 대학교 (Paris-East University, Marne-la-Vallée) 국제경제학 조교수로 재직 중이다. 또한 파리 소재 국립 동양언어문명연구소 (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales: INALCO)와 시앙스포(Sciences Po)에서 강의하고 있으며 OECD 금융기업국(Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs: DAF) 자문위원으로 활동하고 있다. 니콜라 국장은 1980년부터 1981년까지 영국 서섹스대학교(University of Sussex)에서 공부하였으며, 스위스 제네바 국제대학원(Graduate Institute of International Studies)에서 정치학 석사(1985년)와 국제경제학 박사(1991년) 학위를 취득하였다. 1999년 싱가포르 동남아시아연구소(Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 2004년 한국대외경제정책연구원에서 각각 객원연구원으로 활동했다. 주요 연구 분야는 동아시아 개발 전략, 해외직접투자와 성장, 지역경제통합, 신흥경제권과 세계화 등이며, 최근 저서로는 "China's Direct Investment in the European Union: Challenges and Policy Responses" (2014), "Economic regionalism in East Asia: The end of an exception?" (2014) 등이 있다.

RYOO Kihl-jae
Minister of Unification of the Republic of Korea

류길재
대한민국 통일부 장관



Dr. Ryoo Kihl-jae is Minister of Unification of the Republic of Korea. Before his ministerial appointment in 2013, he held the position of President of the Korean Association of North Korean Studies and was a member of the Diplomacy and Security Division at the Ideas for Korea. His professional career spans over two decades in academic research and teaching as Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, Professor at Kyungnam University, and Researcher at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies. He has also served as Policy Advisor to the Ministry of Unification, Standing Council Member of the National Unification Advisory, Policy Advisor for the President on Foreign Affairs and National Security. Dr. Ryoo received his B.A. and M.A. in Political Science from Korea University in 1984 and 1987, respectively. He later completed his Ph.D. in Political Science at the same university in 1995.

류길재 장관은 현재 대한민국 통일부 장관이다. 2013년 장관 임명 전, 북한연구학회 회장 및 국가미래연구원 외교안보분과 위원으로 활동했다. 류 장관은 지난 20년간 북한대학원대학교 교수, 경남대 교수, 경남대 극동문제연구소 연구원 등을 지내면서 북한학 관련 연구와 강의 활동을 활발히 하였다. 그는 또한 통일부 정책자문위원, 민주평화통일자문회의 상임위원, 청와대 외교안보수석실 정책자문위원 등을 역임하였다. 류 장관은 고려대학교에서 정치학 학사(1984년), 석사(1987년) 및 박사(1995년)학위를 취득하였다.



Hans-Ulrich SEIDT
Inspector General, German Foreign Office

한스-울리히 자이트
독일 외교부 감사관

Hans-Ulrich Seidt is Inspector General of the German Foreign Office. He is also member of the board and vice-chairman of the Dresden Cultural Foundation. Hans-Ulrich Seidt was Director General for Culture and Communication of the German Foreign Office from 2012 to 2014 and Germany's ambassador to Korea from 2009 to 2012. He served as Germany's ambassador to Afghanistan from 2006 to 2008. His diplomatic postings included Moscow, Nairobi, Brussels NATO and Washington D.C. During the Balkan wars Hans-Ulrich Seidt served from 1994 to 1997 as deputy director of the Special Task Force Bosnia (So-Bos) of the German government. Hans-Ulrich Seidt studied law, history and international relations at the universities of Tübingen, Geneva, Bonn and at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) in Paris. He passed both legal state examinations and received a Ph.D. in contemporary history and international relations from Bonn University. Hans-Ulrich Seidt taught international relations at the Otto-Suhr-Institute at the Free University Berlin. He is a member of the board of the Swiss Afghanistan Institute/Bibliotheca Afghana and received honorary doctorates from Valparaiso University (USA) and Chonnam National University (Gwangju Korea).

한스-울리히 자이트 대사는 독일 외교부 감사관으로 재직 중이며, 드레스덴 문화 재단(Dresden Cultural Foundation) 이사회 임원 및 부의장을 겸임 중이다. 2012년부터 2014년까지 독일 외무성 문화소통 국장을 역임했으며 2006년부터 2008년까지 주아프가니스탄 독일 대사, 2009년부터 2012년까지 주한 독일 대사를 역임하였다. 자이트 대사는 모스크바, 나이로비, 브뤼셀 NATO, 워싱턴 D.C. 등지에서 외교관으로 활동했으며 발칸 전쟁 당시, 1994년부터 1997년까지 독일 정부 보스니아 특별 대책위원회(So-Bos) 부위원장을 지냈다. 자이트 대사는 독일 튀빙겐대학교(University of Tübingen) 및 스위스 제네바대학교(University of Geneva), 독일 본대학교(Bonn University), 프랑스 국립행정학교(Ecole Nationale d'Administration: ENA)에서 법학, 역사학, 국제관계학을 공부했으며, 국가시험(Staatsexamen) 합격 이후 본대학교(Bonn University)에서 현대사와 국제관계학 박사학위를 각각 취득하였다. 이후 베를린자유대학 오토주어연구소(Otto-Suhr-Institute at the Free University Berlin)에서 국제관계학 강의를 했다. 스위스 아프가니스탄연구소(Bibliotheca Afghana) 이사회 임원이기도 하며 미국 발파레이소대학교(Valparaiso University)와 전남대학교(Chonnam National University)에서 각각 명예박사 학위를 받았다.

SUN Zhe
Professor, Tsinghua University

쑨 저
칭화대 교수



Sun Zhe is professor of the Institute for International Studies and director of the Center for U.S.-China Relations at Tsinghua University. He graduated from Fudan University and received his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University (2000). Dr. Sun has authored and edited many books on American government and US-China relations, including *New Thinking on Human Rights* (1992), *The Politics of Dictatorship* (1995), *Influencing the Future: the Institutional Transformation and Behaviors in Decision Making Process of the US Congress "2001"*, *Congressional Studies* (2002, 2003), *The Rise and Expansion: American Domestic Politics and US-China Relations* (2004), *American Studies in China: 1979-2005* (2007) and *The Congressional Politics and American Trade Policies towards China* (2007). Dr. Sun is a Shanghai Shuguang (Dawn) Scholar and a recipient of the State Council research funds. His previous positions include adjunct research fellow at the Office of Taiwan Affairs in the State Council, board member of the US-China Peoples' Friendship Association, and adjunct professor at the PLA Foreign Language University. Dr. Sun also serves as a consultant to several government departments. He was the spokesperson for the Boao Forum for Asia in 2002 and a column writer for *The Economic Observer*, *The Orient Outlook*, and other various Chinese newspapers. He has lectured widely in both China and in the United States and has appeared often as an expert commentator on CCTV, Shanghai TV, CNN, VOA, the Chinese News Net, Jianfang Daily, etc.

쑨저 교수는 현재 중국 칭화대학교(Tsinghua University) 국제관계학 교수 및 중미관계연구센터 소장으로 재직 중이다. 쑨 교수는 푸단대학교(Fudan University)를 나와 2000년 콜럼비아대학교(Columbia University)에서 정치학 박사학위를 받았다. 미국 정치 및 미중관계 관련 주요 저서·편저로는 *New Thinking on Human Rights* (1992), *The Politics of Dictatorship* (1995), *Influencing the Future: the Institutional Transformation and Behaviors in Decision Making Process of the US Congress "2001"*, *Congressional Studies* (2002, 2003), *The Rise and Expansion: American Domestic Politics and US-China Relations* (2004), *American Studies in China: 1979-2005* (2007), *The Congressional Politics and American Trade Policies towards China* (2007) 등이 있다. 쑨 교수는 현재 상하이 슈광(Shuguang) 스킨라이자 중국 국무원 연구기금의 지원도 받고 있다. 또한 국무원 대만 사무판공실 연구위원, 중미우호협회(US-China Peoples' Friendship Association: USCPFA) 이사회 임원, 중국 인민해방군 외국어대학교 부교수 등을 역임하면서 중국 내 여러 정부 부처에 자문위원으로 활동 중이다. 2002년 보아오 포럼(Boao Forum for Asia) 당시 대변인을 맡은 바 있으며, *Economic Observer*, *Orient Outlook* 등 중국 언론 매체를 통해 칼럼니스트로 활동 중이다. 중국과 미국 각지에서 강연한 바 있으며 CCTV, 상하이TV, CNN, VOA, Chinese News Net, Jian Fang Daily 등에 전문 논평인으로 참여하고 있다.



Georgy TOLORAYA
Head of Regional Projects Department, Russkiy Mir Foundation

게오르기 톨로라야
루스키 미르 재단 아시아·아프리카 국장

Georgy Toloraya holds the position of Executive Director of Russian National Committee on BRICS studies, a legal entity created under the auspices of Russian government for Track 2 activities. He is also Director of department at "Russkiy Mir" Presidential foundation, dealing with programs in Asia and Africa. Georgy is concurrently the East Asia section director at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is a professional diplomat (rank of Minister) with decades-long experience in Asian affairs, having served two postings in North Korea (1977-1980 and 1984-1987), then in South Korea as a Deputy chief of the Russian Embassy (1993-1998) and later as the senior Russian Foreign Ministry official (Deputy director-general) in charge of the Korean Peninsula (1998-2003). He later worked as the Consul General of Russia in Sydney, Australia (2003-2007). Prior to that he worked for trade promotion agencies related to Asia. Prof. Toloraya pursued a successful scholarly career, having graduated from MGIMO (Moscow University of International Relations) in 1978, earning a Ph.D. in 1984, Doctor of Economy degree in 1994 and a Full Professor degree in Oriental studies in 2002. He has published many articles and books on East Asia, collaborated as a part-time researcher with noted Russian academic institutes including the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), and taught Asian politics at MGIMO. In 2007-2008 he was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.

게오르기 톨로라야 박사는 루스키 미르 재단(Russkiy Mir) 아시아, 아프리카 국장으로 재직 중이며 러시아 국립 BRICS 연구위원회 사무국장, 러시아 과학아카데미(Russian Academy of Sciences) 산하 경제연구소(Institute of Economics) 동아시아 국장을 겸임하고 있다. 톨로라야 박사는 현재 장관급 외교관으로, 과거 주목한 구소련 대사관 서기(1977-1980 년, 1984-1987 년), 주한 러시아 대사관 공관차석(1993-1998 년), 러시아 외교부 한반도 담당 정책 심의관(1998-2003 년)을 역임하였고, 아시아 담당 무역진흥공사를 거쳐 주호주 러시아 총영사관 총영사(2003-2007 년)를 지냈다. 1978 년 모스크바 국립 국제관계대학교(Moscow University of International Relations: MGIMO)를 졸업한 뒤 1984 년 동 대학원 국제관계학 박사, 1994 년 경제학 박사, 2002 년 동양학 정교수 자격(Full Professor degree)을 취득했다. 톨로라야 박사는 동아시아와 관련된 다양한 논문 및 저서를 집필했으며 국제경제 및 국제관계 연구소(IMEMO) 등 여러 학술기관들과 협업하며 비상근 연구원으로 활동하고 모스크바 국립 국제관계대학교(MGIMO)에서 아시아 정치학 강의를 하는 등 다양한 학술활동을 펼쳐왔다. 2007 년부터 2008 년까지 미국 브루킹스 연구소(Brookings Institution) 객원 연구원을 지냈다.

YOO Ho-Yeol
Professor, Korea University

유호열
고려대 교수



Ho-Yeol Yoo is the former Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Korea University and currently a professor and director of North Korean Studies at Korea University. He has been responsible for teaching undergraduate and graduate students on inter-Korean relations as well as North Korean politics and foreign policy since 1999. Previously, he was a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) as director of the Unification Policy Division (1998), Office of Planning & Budget (1995-1997), and Information Management Division (1991-1994). Dr. Yoo was president of the Korean Political Science Association (KPSA) in 2013 and led other various academic associations such as the Korean Association of North Korean Studies (2008). He is a frequent policy advisor to the ROK government including the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Defense, and is currently the chairman in charge of politics, security and international relations of the National Unification Advisory Council, a constitutionally mandated institution for the ROK President. He is President of the Korea Policy Research Center, a private think-tank sponsored by the Ministry of Unification and co-chairman of the Citizens United for Better Society. He was also a visiting scholar at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University (2003-2004). Dr. Yoo's publications include *Socialism in North Korea: Construction and Frustration* (in Korean, 2004), *North Korean Policy toward Overseas Koreans* (co-authored in Korean, 2003) and *The North Korean Political System* (in Korean, 2000). Dr. Yoo graduated from Korea University with a B.A. and M.A. from the Department of Political Science and International Relations and received his Ph.D. in Comparative Politics from Ohio State University.

유호열 교수는 고려대학교 행정대학원장을 역임했으며 현재 북한학과 교수로 재직중이다. 1999년부터 지금까지 학부·대학원생들에게 남북관계, 북한정치, 외교정책 분야를 가르치고 있다. 유 교수는 통일연구원 연구위원으로 재직하면서 통일정책연구부장(1998), 기획조정실장(1995-1997), 학술정보관리부장(1991-1994)을 역임했다. 또한 2013년 한국정치학회 회장, 2008년 북한연구학회 회장을 역임한 바 있다. 유 교수는 통일부와 국방부 등 정부 정책 자문위원으로 활동하고 있으며, 헌법기관인 민주평화통일자문회의 정치안보국제분과위원회 위원장으로 재직중이다. 민간에서는 통일부 지원 싱크탱크인 사단법인 코리아정책연구원 원장 등으로 활동하고 있으며 바른사회시민회의 공동대표를 맡고 있다. 2003년부터 2004년까지 미국 오하이오주립대학교(Ohio State University) 방문학자를 역임했다. 주요 저서로는 《북한 사회주의 건설과 좌절》(2005), 《북한의 재외동포정책》(공저, 2003), 《현대북한체제론》(공저, 2000) 등이 있다. 유 교수는 고려대학교에서 학사 및 석사학위를 받았으며 미국 오하이오주립대학교에서 비교정치학 박사학위를 받았다.

Distinguished Public Lecture 명사초청강연



Kurt CAMPBELL

Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and Founding Partner, The Asia Group, LLC
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

커트 캠펬

아시아그룹 회장

前 미국 국무부 동아태차관보

Kurt M. Campbell is Chairman and CEO of The Asia Group, Chairman of CNAS and a Director for Standard Chartered Bank. From 2009-2013, he was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He received the Secretary of State's Distinguished Service Award and was recognized by the Queen with the Order of Australia and the New Zealand Order of Merit. Campbell was formerly the CEO of CNAS and director of the Aspen Strategy Group. He was the Senior Vice President and Kissinger Chair at CSIS, as well as an Associate Professor at Harvard's Kennedy School. He previously was DASD for Asia at the Pentagon, a director on the NSC Staff, and deputy special counselor to the president for NAFTA. Campbell is the author or editor of ten books and is writing author on the pivot. He received his B.A. from the University of California, a Certificate in music and politics from the University of Erevan, and Doctorate from Brasenose College at Oxford as a Distinguished Marshall Scholar.

커트 캠펬 박사는 아시아 그룹(The Asia Group)의 공동 설립자이자, 최고경영자 및 회장을 역임하고 있으며, 신미국안보센터(Center for New American Security) 회장, 스탠다드차타드은행 이사를 겸임하고 있다. 2009년부터 2013년까지 국무부 동아시아 태평양 차관보로 재직하는 바 있다. 국무장관 공로상을 수상했으며, 영국 여왕으로부터 오스트레일리아 훈장, 뉴질랜드 공로훈장을 수여 받았다. 또한 CNAS의 최고경영자, 아스펜전략그룹(Aspen Strategy Group) 소장, 국제전략 문제연구소(Center for Strategic and International Studies) 수석부소장과 키신저 체어(Kissinger Chair), 하버드대학교 케네디스쿨(Harvard's Kennedy School) 부교수로 재직하였다. 미국 국방부 아시아 차관보, 미 국가안전보장회의(NSC) 이사, 북미자유무역협정(NAFTA) 대통령 특별 고문 대리로 재직하였다. 캠펬는 10여권의 편저서를 가지고 있고, 현재 '아시아 회귀'에 관해 집필 중이다. 캘리포니아대학교(University of California)에서 학사학위를 취득했으며, 에레반대학교 (University of Erevan)에서 음악과 정치학 과정을 수료하였고, 옥스퍼드대학교 브레이즈노즈 칼리지 (Brasenose College, Oxford University)에서 마셜장학생(Distinguished Marshall Scholar)으로 정치학 박사학위를 받았다.

Presentation Materials

발표자료

Session 1
제1부

**East Asia's Changing Regional Order and
Korean Unification**

동아시아 세력구조 재편과 한반도 통일의 함의

Japan and Korean Unification:
Origins of Indifference
일본과 한반도 통일 – 무관심의 기원

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Japan and Korean Unification: Origins of Indifference¹

Kiichi Fujiwara
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The Agenda

The division of the Korean Peninsula remains among the cruel legacies of the Cold War that still stays with us today, leading to burning desires for the unification of the North and the South, a desire only too apparent among the Korean people. That desire, however, is not necessarily shared by her neighbors. The division of the peninsula is part of the East Asian status quo, and any change in the status quo entails the possibility of new vulnerabilities. Such anxiety is most clear in the case of China, where unification may lead to the advance of US forces to her borders.

Japan's position is ambiguous. On the one hand, we do not see much interest, let alone support, for the unification of Korea. On the other hand, we neither see anxieties nor resistance toward unification in the future. To put it bluntly, it is more accurate to describe Japanese attitude toward unification as indifference. How can this be?

In this paper, I wish to address the origins of Japanese indifference to the unification of the Korean peninsula. My purpose is to lay out a basic cognitive framework through which the Japanese have observed the developments in the Korean peninsula after the end of the Second World War.

From Empire to Nation-State

After the Meiji restoration, Japan started to build a myth of national unity that shares a unitary and integrated history, beautifully illustrated in Carol Gluck's *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton University Press, 1985). This process of nation-building coincided with an attempt to build an empire. Expansion into the Korean Peninsula and China was taken to be a 'natural' course of action in the time of Western colonialism; if the British and French can expand their colonial rule, why can't we? There is, however, a gap between a nation-state and an empire; while a nation-state takes pride in the integrity of an ethnic nation, an empire is, almost by definition, multi-ethnic. Japan before (and during) the Second World War was a strange combination of a nation-state that pronounces the integrity and supremacy of ethnic Japanese, on the one hand, and proclaims the "harmony" of Asian nations under the rule of the emperor, on the other.

The end of World War II shattered this combination of nation-state and empire. By losing all territories not inhabited by ethnic Japanese, Japan retreated from empire and, for the first time, became a nation-state. That transition accompanied the sudden change in the status of Koreans and Chinese living in Japan: those who were second-class subjects of the Japanese empire before and during the war suddenly lost their status as "subjects" and were classified as "aliens". Living as second-class subjects

¹Paper prepared for the Korea Global Forum, Sep.25-26, 2014. Please be advised that this is a revised and updated version of the paper submitted for the forum on 2012. Please do not quote without the author's permission.

was bad enough; now, as ‘aliens,’ former subjects of the empire who are not ethnic Japanese were stripped of all rights enjoyed by the Japanese.

A number of Koreans chose to leave Japan and move to the assumed paradise of North Korea, a move supported not only by the Red Cross but also by the Japanese police; as Tessa Morris-Suzuki points out, the exodus to North Korea was but a subtle form to ridding Japan of Koreans from her soil². The transition from an empire into a nation-state in Japan, then, was a transition from discrimination to a combination of discrimination and neglect of those other than Japanese.

Domestic Politics and Japanese Views on the Korean Peninsula

Japanese politics after World War II has been characterized by the cleavage between left and right, reflecting the Cold War and the legacies of allied occupation. The conservatives, who more or less kept political power in their hands, preferred an alliance with the United States not because of democracy but because of convenience, as the reliance on extended deterrence provided a cheap way of preserving national security. The left, on the other hand, hoped for an idealistic peace based on the Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which in reality was but a hope for isolationism from international affairs.

Japanese views on the Korean peninsula reflected this polarized political scene. The conservatives supported South Korea as a Western ally and as a proxy that will prevent the advances of North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union; the left supported North Korea precisely because DPRK opposed the West. In this context, the unification of the Korean peninsula became a cause for the left. For the conservatives, it was precisely the division, not unification, of the peninsula that kept Japan safe; the left, with their wishful thinking on the future of socialism, opposed the division because they supported the DPRK. In this light, it should not be difficult to understand why the Japanese advocates for Korean unification was almost totally limited to the supporters of North Korea; very few would support unification without taking a favorable view of DPRK.

To the extent that Japan’s view on the Korean peninsula reflected domestic political cleavages, the appeal for unification failed to establish a large audience in the Japanese public opinion, for the left was but a minority in the political setting. Here we can see a double marginalization of the status of Koreans in Japan, first marginalized as aliens, and further marginalized by their political persuasion. Moreover, the spectacular economic growth in the 1950’s and 60’s eroded the impact of the left in Japanese politics, which led to the erosion of support for a unified Korea. Unification became a lost cause because it was associated with the policies of DPRK.

Views on Unification after the End of the Cold War

The overall picture described above remained relatively unchanged even after the Russo-American Cold War came to an end. The demise of the Soviet Union went hand in hand with the demise of the left in Japanese politics, which took away support for Korean unification. The remaining few who expressed solidarity with democracy movements in South Korea, including Haruki Wada and others,

² Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. 2007. *Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan's Cold War*. Rowman and Littlefield

became less significant with the fall of military rule in the south. Support for unification in the Korean peninsula was a losing proposition, since it accompanied an implicit support for the DPRK.

While Japan maintained her indifference toward a unified Korea, South Korea experienced a virtual reversal on her views toward the North. With the fall of military regime, a democratic South Korea turned to the sunshine policy, and became heavily involved in the negotiations for normalizing ties with the North. Unlike in Japan, the call for unification was never a position monopolized by the left in Korea, for a great many Koreans suffered the fate of division. It was only too natural that Koreans, regardless of political persuasion, will long for an end to the separation that was inflicted upon the nation by the Cold War.

Abduction and Japan's Policy towards North Korea

The trouble here is that such developments in the South had little support in Japan. In the Japanese context, the fate of those abducted by DPRK from Japan is a far more important issue compared with Korean unification. The policy implications of the abduction issue, however, varied by time.

The initial approach was to negotiate with DPRK for the return of the abductees, as seen in Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang. This focus on diplomacy and negotiation, which necessarily involve some economic contribution to the DPRK, essentially shared common characteristics with a sunshine approach to the North. Koizumi's visit, however, ignited strong negative reactions from Japan, and when Tokyo refused to 'return' the abductees to North Korea, the relation between Tokyo and Pyongyang entered deep freeze.

The strained relationship over abduction led Tokyo to become a vocal opponent of negotiating with North Korea. The return of the abductees, an issue of paramount importance in Japan, overrode other concerns such as the development of nuclear devices and missiles. The only reason Japan did not become a spoiler in the Six Party Talks was because North Korea was successful in isolating herself.

The central importance of abduction in Japan – DPRK relationship is very much the case in Japan up to this day. The Abe Administration, however, has started to negotiate with the North Koreans so that Pyongyang may provide a list to abductees still living in North Korea. It is quite an irony that Mr. Abe, who strongly opposed a conciliatory approach to DPRK during the Koizumi Administration, is now taking that very conciliatory approach as a prime minister.

We have yet to see, and I still remain skeptical, if the current focus on negotiation will bear fruit. But one point seems to be quite clear: the Japanese interests on the Korean peninsula are dictated by the fate of ethnic Japanese. In other words, the indifference toward the Korean peninsula, a perception that has remained all through the post-war years after the retreat from empire, still remains the case today.

일본과 한반도 통일 - 무관심의 기원

후지와라 기이치(Fujiwara Kiichi)

도쿄대 교수

- 한반도 분단은 오늘날까지 지속되고 있는 잔인한 냉전의 산물이자 동아시아 지역의 현 정세(status quo)를 반영함.
 - 주변국들에게는 한반도 통일이 가져올 변화에 대한 기대보다는 불안감이 우세
 - 중국은 한반도 통일로 미군이 자국 국경에 더 가까이 진출할 것을 우려하고 있으며 일본은 통일에 대한 기대나 불안감보다 오히려 무관심한 입장
 - 한반도 통일에 대한 일본인들의 무관심은 일본이 메이지유신 이후 근대적 민족국가(nation-state)와 식민지 지배를 통한 제국주의적 팽창을 거듭하다가 패전 이후 오늘날의 민족국가로 후퇴하는 과정에서 기원
- 메이지 유신을 통해 근대적 민족국가로 거듭난 일본은 당시 영국, 프랑스를 비롯한 서구의 제국주의적 식민지 팽창을 보면서 일본도 당연히 한반도와 중국에 진출해 식민지를 건설하고 제국을 이뤄야 한다고 생각했음.
 - 제2차 세계대전을 전후로 일본은 근대 민족국가로서 자국민들의 우월성을 강조하는 한편 식민지 지배를 통해 여러 아시아 국가들과 화합(harmony)을 도모해야 하는 딜레마에 봉착
 - 제2차 세계대전이 끝난 뒤 일본은 모든 식민지를 잃었으며 제국의 2등 신민으로 일본 내에 거주하던 한국인과 중국인들은 신민이 아닌 외국인(alien)으로 신분이 바뀌고 그에 상응하던 권리도 모두 박탈
 - 당시 상당수 재일 한인들은 지상낙원을 기대하며 북한으로 이주했는데 일본 경찰뿐만 아니라 적십자사(Red Cross)도 이러한 움직임을 지지
 - 일본이 제2차 세계대전 이후 제국에서 민족국가로 이행(transition)하면서 일본인들이 과거 다른 아시아 민족들에게 가졌던 차별의식이 차별과 방치(neglect)가 혼재된 형태로 지속
- 제2차 세계대전 이후 일본정치는 미 군정 이후 미국과 동맹을 통한 안보이익을 중시한 우파와 평화헌법에 근거한 이상적 평화주의 내지는 고립주의를 중시한 좌파가 대립하는 양상으로 전개 되었으며 한반도에 대한 인식 역시 양 진영 간 차이를 보임.
 - 당시 일본의 보수주의자들은 서방과 동맹을 맺은 남한이 북한과 중국, 소련의 진출을 막아줄 수 있기 때문에 분단지속이 일본의 안전과 부합한다고 판단한 반면, 사회주의를 추구하던 진

보수주의자들은 북한을 지지하는 맥락에서 한반도 분단을 반대해옴.

- 1950년대 이후 일본정치가 경제성장과 더불어 우파의 장기집권으로 귀결되면서 북한식 한반도 통일을 지지하던 좌파는 소수 세력으로 몰락
- 한반도 통일에 대한 일본의 시각은 북한을 지지하는 좌파의 몰락과 더불어 냉전시기 내내 동력 상실
- 일본의 한반도 통일에 대한 무관심은 민주화 이후 한국이 햇볕정책과 같이 북한에 대한 전향적인 태도를 취하기 시작하면서 새로운 국면에 접어들게 됨.
- 통일에 대한 일본의 무관심은 남한 국민들의 지지와는 별개로 북한의 일본인 납치문제 해결이라는 더욱 중요한 이슈에 매몰
- 납치자 문제는 일본에게 북한 핵·미사일 문제 해결에 선행하는 중요한 사안으로 여전히 일본과 북한 관계에 중요한 변수로 자리잡고 있으며 보수주의자인 아베 총리마저도 납치자 문제 해결을 위해 북한과 협상하기로 결정
- 납치자 문제와 관련한 일본과 북한의 협상이 결실을 맺을 가능성은 희박하다고 판단되지만 더 중요한 문제는 한반도에 대한 전후 일본인들의 인식이 여전히 냉담하다는 것이며 결국 이러한 인식이 변화되어야만 일본의 한반도 통일 지지를 얻어낼 수 있게 될 것임.

East Asia's Fluid Dynamics

변화하는 동아시아

Frank JANNUZI
President and CEO, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation

프랭크 자누지
맨스필드재단 대표



East Asia's Fluid Dynamics

Frank Jannuzi

Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation

East Asia is a region in transition, being shaped by economic and political forces of enormous magnitude. The defining element of East Asia's regional architecture is its *fluidity*. Not surprisingly, the dynamic situation has been accompanied by uncertainty and mounting anxiety.

On the plus side, the region is more economically intertwined than at any time since the height of the Qing Dynasty. Over the past 20 years, China has emerged as the largest trading partner for almost all of its neighbors, in the process becoming the “factory floor” for many elite companies from the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Intra-Asia trade is growing rapidly, encouraged by various free trade agreements and investment treaties and encouraged by a veritable alphabet soup of multinational organizations with a strong economic focus, including the Association for East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).¹ Economic interdependence contributes ballast to relationships otherwise prone to listing, and the growing trade and investment links serve as a check on nationalistic or xenophobic behavior. The interdependence among the region's great powers also provides a firm foundation for regional stability and an incentive for political reconciliation. This is true across the region, to include the Russian Far East, which is looking to Asia as a market for natural resources and as a source of capital investment to bring oil and gas reserves on line.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement, once concluded, will reinforce these positive trends. The TPP nations together represent more than 40 percent of global GDP, and the agreement promises not only to promote trade and investment, but also to help balance China's growing economic clout, providing fresh opportunities to countries like Vietnam and Indonesia to expand links with the United States. Assurances from Washington that China could eventually join TPP have helped assuage concerns in Beijing that the TPP was part of a U.S.-led containment strategy, and senior Chinese Communist Party voices have now cautiously welcomed the challenge of readying the Chinese economy for the demands of the TPP regime.²

Also on the plus side is the growing alignment of the region's great powers with respect to their assessment of the dangers posed by North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Apart from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the other five members of the “Six Party Talks” increasingly are united in their view that the DPRK must abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and demonstrate a genuine commitment to peace and respect for international norms. The recent summit meeting between presidents Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye was remarkable in its demonstration of solidarity between Beijing and Seoul in how best to respond to North Korea's continued intransigence.³

Unfortunately, despite these positive indications of mutual economic and security interests, a countervailing trend of growing nationalism and zero-sum thinking has accompanied China's rise,

¹ <http://www1.chineseshipping.com.cn/en/news/newsinfo.jsp?id=314591>

² <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/03/20/china-debates-the-tpp/>

³ <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/chinese-leaders-seoul-visit-snubs-north-korea>

Japan's renaissance, and Korea's globalization. A raft of unresolved territorial disputes is roiling the waters in East Asia, with dueling assertions of sovereignty over islands, large and tiny, causing tension between China and other claimants to territory in the South China Sea, between the Republic of Korea and Japan, and between Japan and the Russian Federation. Differences among the great powers over the future of the Korean Peninsula – specifically how best to orchestrate/encourage/respond to the prospects for Korean unification – could further strain ties. Nowhere are the tensions more pronounced than between Japan and China.

China's rise and two decade of economic stagnation in Japan have flipped the two nations' relative positions and brought about concern in Tokyo of "Japan's passing" and hubris in Beijing that the 21st century belongs to the Middle Kingdom. The Sumo wrestling between Japan and China for dominance in East Asia necessarily involves the United States, Japan's treaty ally and ultimate security guarantor. And as if issues of economic muscle and maritime boundaries were not enough of a headache, competing interpretations of history, particularly the roots of the Second World War and Japan's responsibility for war crimes during that conflict, have flared since Prime Minister Abe's controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.⁴

In fact, to listen to some prominent voices on the current state of affairs in Northeast Asia is to hear dire warnings of the potential for great power conflict. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe caused a big splash at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 23, when he compared contemporary Sino-Japanese relations to German-UK relations prior to the start of World War I.⁵ Taking the analogy further, he blamed China's rapid increase in military spending – double digit growth for more than a decade – for causing instability in the region. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's rebuttal of Abe's remarks – calling them a "total disorder of space and time" – was biting enough to actually underscore Abe's central point: tensions among the great powers of Northeast Asia are high, and growing. Something needs to be done to calm the waters. Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se of the ROK recently said, "Our choices will dictate whether we will be able to overcome the confrontation and conflict and usher in an era of trust and cooperation, or shall let the specter of old history, i.e. "the curse of geopolitics" return to haunt us."⁶ And speaking in Munich earlier this year, Henry Kissinger warned, "Asia is more in a position of 19th-century Europe, where military conflict is not ruled out."⁷

Abe's words resonated with his audience at Davos – even those who disagreed with his analogy – because the world has never been deft at accommodating the rise of a new great power, and China's emergence on the global stage is unlikely to be an exception to this rule. In fact, China's rise is reshaping East Asia. China has tried to reassure its neighbors that its rise will be "peaceful," but the very formulation – China's *peaceful* rise – underscores the fact that many in the region and beyond are nervous about the implications of China's growing comprehensive national power. No one talks of India's peaceful rise or Brazil's peaceful rise.

⁴ http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/world/asia/japans-foreign-minister-says-apologies-to-wartime-victims-will-be-upheld.html?_r=0

⁵ <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-japan-china-idUSBREA0M08G20140123>

⁶

http://www.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp?typeID=12&boardid=14137&seqno=313852&c=&t=&pagenu m=1&tableName=TYPE_ENGLISH&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=

⁷ <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-02/kissinger-says-asia-is-like-19th-century-europe-on-use-of-force.html>

East Asia is marked by the relative absence of effective multilateral security arrangements. As Former Japanese Defense Minister Yuriko Koike observed in April, 2013, “Although Asia is the world’s most dynamic region, it has a paucity of institutional mechanisms for resolving – or at least mitigating – international disputes of the type that are ratcheting up tension across the region.”⁸ The East Asia Summit provides a venue for high level policy deliberations, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) affords an annual opportunity for defense officials to meet and compare notes on regional developments. But these talk shops provide only a veneer of regionalism to an architecture defined more by growing nationalism than by the subservience of national ambitions to a shared vision of regional prosperity and security. In fact, as at this year’s ARF meeting in Singapore, recent gatherings of East Asian security officials seem as likely to *inflame* passions as to calm the waters and foster collegiality.

East Asia has no NATO-like structures to provide strategic reassurance to smaller states worried about the potential consequences of the rise of China across all dimensions – economic, military, and political. Instead, the still dominant and most enduring security structure of East Asia is the U.S. “hub and spoke” system defined by a series of bilateral relationships woven into a *de facto* regional alliance structure. U.S. treaty allies Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines anchor this hub and spoke system. Strong defense ties between the United States, Singapore, Indonesia, and Taiwan, augmented by growing security partnerships with Malaysia and Vietnam, provide additional capability to mitigate regional strife, fight piracy, and respond to humanitarian disasters. But much of this architecture is both politically and militarily antiquated, and badly in need of refresh. It was built, as Chinese critics are quick to point out, with the Cold War in mind, and is only just now beginning to adapt to the security challenges of the 21st Century. Ironically, it is on the divided Korean Peninsula – where the shadows of the Cold War still linger – that the United States, its Korean and Japanese allies, and China and Russia may soon be forced to adapt their thinking and their mode of interaction.

Korean Unification will shake, but not shatter, the regional order

Although it is impossible to predict precisely when and how the Korean Peninsula will be united, it seems inevitable that one day the Korean people, long divided, will join together as one nation. And although the mode of unification — peaceful, violent, voluntary, coerced — will have a huge impact on the unified state that emerges, certain ground truths will likely prove decisive. The ROK is a vibrant, politically stable, economically developed, democratic society, fully integrated into the global community. It has twice the population of the DPRK and its economy dwarfs that of its northern neighbor. It enjoys a close military alliance with the United States, and its own armed forces are much more capable than those of North Korea, with the important exception of their lack of nuclear weapons. But that deficiency is more than compensated by the credible extended deterrence offered by the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal. By contrast, the DPRK is an impoverished, underdeveloped, politically anachronistic state. It is isolated diplomatically and economically, and heavily sanctioned for its pursuit of nuclear

⁸ <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/defusing-tensions-between-northeast-asia-s-big-three-by-yuriko-koike>

weapons. Its military is equipped with antiquated weapons, and personnel are undertrained and undernourished. The North most likely has a small stockpile of nuclear weapons, but no proven delivery system.

When unification comes, the people of South Korea and their elected leaders will determine the final disposition of a unitary Korean state.

That will be a good thing for the Korean people, for the contrast between North and South does not stop with “rich and poor,” or “strong and weak.” The government of the DPRK — marked by feudal succession — is responsible for a system characterized by massive human rights abuses. As Roseanne Rife wrote last year in her capacity as Director of East Asia Research at Amnesty International, “The gravity and nature of human rights violations are off the scale.”

Amnesty’s conclusions were validated in 2013 by the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) into the human rights conditions in the DPRK. The key findings of the commission about the DPRK include the following:

- There is almost complete denial of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
- Entrenched patterns of discrimination, rooted in the state-assigned class system, affect every part of life;
- Discrimination against women is pervasive in all aspects of society;
- The state has used food as a means of control over the population and deliberately blocked aid for ideological reasons, causing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people;
- Hundreds of thousands of political prisoners have died in “unspeakable atrocities” in prison camps in the past 50 years; and
- Security forces systematically employ violence and punishments that amount to gross human rights violations in order to create a climate of fear.

The COI found that crimes against humanity have likely been committed by North Korea, and it wrote to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, warning him that senior officials may be held responsible.

So when Korea is unified, we can expect several things:

- The new state will adopt political, economic, and social systems closely resembling those of the ROK, bringing a higher quality of life to the people of the DPRK;
- The unified state will likely enjoy normal relations with all of its neighbors, including China — just as the ROK does today;
- The unified state will be a member in good standing in the international community.

Will a unified Korea remain a treaty ally of the United States? That will be up to the Korean people to decide, but it seems unlikely that the benefits of the alliance — security assurances in a region where Korea is surrounded by larger powers, access to advanced military hardware and intelligence assets, interoperability with a global superpower, and a track record of six decades of common struggle against common adversaries — would somehow be ignored by the Korean people once the threat of the DPRK was removed. The nature of the alliance would change, and there would almost certainly be

a reassessment of balance and disposition of forces. Some would advocate a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, and a significant draw-down, particularly of Army troops, seems very likely in the context of peaceful unification. But I bet the alliance will endure.

Americans will uniformly welcome unification, as it will remove a dire national security threat to both the USA and the ROK, and bring about an improvement in the lives of more than 20 million Koreans living north of the DMZ. It will free up military resources to be deployed elsewhere or to be demobilized. And despite the enormous challenges associated with the North's poverty, poor infrastructure, and failed economy, unification will not only be a "burden," but also an opportunity. It will create vast new economic opportunities — trade links to Europe, raw materials, cheap skilled labor, land — that the people of a unified Korea will exploit. There will be plenty of tasks, and the investment and energy not only of the Korean people, but also of Europeans, Americans, Japanese, and Chinese, will be needed to bring about a transformation of the North.

Chinese pragmatism will trump history and ideology

The impact of Korean unification on U.S.-China relations is harder to predict. Much will depend on the means of unification, and we simply cannot predict that with any certainty. Some Chinese may lament the loss of their traditional "buffer state" and ally. The People's Liberation Army dispatched upwards of 1 million "volunteers" to fight in the Korean War, and Mao's son was among the casualties. There will likely be voices in China who ask on unification, "What were we fighting for?" Others may be concerned that unification would undermine China's privileged economic position in the North. Sanctions on North Korea have left China with a strangle hold on DPRK trade and investment opportunities, such as they are. But overall, China-DPRK economic relations are much less important than China-ROK trade, which now exceeds \$200 billion. The North is more economic liability for China than asset; standing in the way of greater Chinese prosperity in Dongbei.

Ultimately, China seems likely to respond pragmatically to unification, concluding as U.S. scholar Minxin Pei did, that the smart bet for Beijing is on Seoul.⁹ Officially, the Chinese government is on record welcoming unification, but with the caveat that Beijing would prefer to see an "independent" nation. Beijing's support for the Six Party Talks, which include a mechanism to negotiate an end to the war and a process of North-South rapprochement, provides further evidence of China's embrace of unification as a desirable end state.

Future Regional Order

Projecting into the future, East Asia's regional order will likely hinge on whether China and the United States make room for each other. The process of Korean denuclearization and unification may be the first test of the ability of the great powers to cooperate — a test of whether China will view the U.S. hubs and spokes as a strategy of containment or a bulwark of stability.

For the better part of 30 years, the United States and its allies have been trying to convince the

⁹ <http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/would-china-block-korean-unification/>

DPRK to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, with disappointing results. It's time for the United States to launch a multilateral initiative designed to attack the DPRK's nuclear ambitions enfilade rather than by frontal assault. The objective would be to shift the focus of diplomacy from the North's plutonium to its people through a multifaceted engagement strategy based on the Helsinki process launched by the United States and its allies during the Cold War.

A Helsinki-style engagement strategy could be designed to augment, rather than replace the Six Party Talks, assuming they can be resuscitated. The Helsinki-style approach would begin with a modest agenda focused on confidence and security building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of conflict emerging from miscommunication or miscalculation. Other dialogue topics would include energy security, economic modernization, agriculture reform, international trade and finance, social welfare, health policy, education, legal and judicial systems, women's rights, refugees, freedom of religion and belief and the rights of the disabled.

Engagement of this sort would have to be given time to succeed. It does not offer a quick fix to end the North's nuclear ambitions or eliminate its human rights violations, but neither do the alternatives of coercive diplomacy or military strikes — and all military options run the risk of exacerbating rather than alleviating great power tensions. The goal would be to so fundamentally alter the situation that a treaty ending the Korean War and denuclearizing the Korean peninsula would be within reach rather than a bridge too far.

This approach has a number of advantages. First, it has the potential to unify South Korean progressives, who first embraced the notion under the presidency of Kim Dae Jung, and conservatives, who see potential for it based on the German model of unification. Second, Helsinki-style engagement has proven its value already, helping to promote economic reform and greater respect for human rights inside the nations of the Soviet bloc. Third, it offers a step-by-step approach suited to a political environment devoid of trust. Initial small-scale confidence building measures—reciprocal actions that signal peaceful intentions—could create an environment more conducive to taking larger risks for peace. Finally, an inclusive, regional approach allays concerns that any one country would dominate the structure. It would also allow middle powers to play a constructive role—note the helpful advice on freedom of expression Mongolian President Elbegdorj offered Kim Jong-Un in a speech to students at Kim Il Sung University during his recent visit to Pyongyang.

So why hasn't the Helsinki concept gained more traction in the corridors of the Old Executive Office Building or the State Department? Perhaps because the necessary preconditions for a Helsinki process have not been met. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act did not *begin* the process of détente; it followed it.

Jump-starting détente in Northeast Asia will require a bold diplomatic opening—think Kissinger to China bold. President Obama would have to channel the “yes we can” spirit of 2008 rather than the “oh, no we shouldn't” spirit of 2013. And the President will need to coordinate his approach with North Korea's neighbors and other potential partners, almost all of whom seem likely to embrace any move that breathes fresh life into the diplomatic process.

It's hard to say exactly how the DPRK would respond to such an opening. Officials managing energy policy, agriculture, light industry, science, and education have much to gain from reducing North

Korea's political and economic isolation and cultivating foreign investment, trade, and exchanges. But their clout has been undercut by years of failed nuclear diplomacy and heightened military tension. Kim Jong Un and his cohorts cannot navigate the path toward peace and denuclearization in the dark. The world must illuminate that path for them.

변화하는 동아시아

프랭크 자누지(Frank Jannuzi)

맨스필드재단 대표

- 오늘날 동아시아 정세는 거대한 정치·경제적 변화를 맞이하고 있다. 이러한 변화는 긍정적 또는 부정적 변화를 모두 포함하고 있으며, 그 저변에는 유동성(fluidity)에 기반한 불확실성과 불안감이 자리잡고 있다.
 - 긍정적인 변화: 무역을 통한 경제적 상호의존의 심화, APEC, ASEAN 등 지역다자협력체를 통한 경제교류 활성화, FTA, TPP와 같은 다양한 경제 통합 모델, 북한의 핵개발에 대한 공통된 위협인식
 - 부정적인 변화: 첨예한 국가주의와 제로섬(zero-sum)적 사고방식, 영토분쟁 및 통일한국의 미래에 대한 강대국들의 서로 다른 입장
- 오늘날 동아시아 갈등 중에서 가장 우려되는 부분은 중국과 일본의 대립임.
 - 중국의 부상과 20여 년에 걸친 일본의 침체는 상호 국력 차가 역전되었다는 인식과 함께 단순한 미중 양자갈등을 넘어 일본과 동맹관계에 있는 미국에게도 영향을 미침
 - 중국과 일본의 갈등 양상은 경제적 영향력과 해양경계의 문제를 넘어 일본 아베 신조 총리의 야스쿠니 신사 참배가 상징하는 과거 역사인식 문제로 비화되면서 그 심각성이 더 커지고 있는 실정
 - 지난 다보스 회의에서 아베 총리가 오늘날 중일관계를 지난 20세기 초 1차 세계대전 직전 영국과 독일의 관계와 비슷하다고 비교해 중국의 강한 반발 초래
 - 한국의 윤병세 외교장관은 동아시아 국가들이 갈등을 극복하고 신뢰와 협력의 시대를 열지 못하면 과거 “지정학의 저주”로부터 자유롭지 못할 것이라고 경고
 - 헨리 키신저는 아시아가 군사적 충돌이 배제되지 않던 19세기 유럽과 비슷한 상황에 처해있다고 언급
 - 중국의 부상은 동아시아 변화를 주도하고 있으며 중국이 아무리 자국의 부상이 평화적이라는 점을 설파하여도 주변국들은 물론 전 세계가 불안감을 드러냄 - 인도나 브라질의 평화로운 부상에 대한 논의가 없다는 점과 대비
- 동아시아정상회의(EAS), 아세안지역안보포럼(ARF) 등이 지역통합을 촉진시키지 못하는 가운데 오히려 갈등을 확인하는 자리가 되고 있다는 점에서 여전히 민족주의적 사고방식이 각자의 차이를 초월한 지역안보와 공동번영의 필요성보다 우선하고 있음을 보여줌.
 - 북대서양조약기구(NATO)와 같은 다자안보기구가 없는 동아시아는 중국의 부상에 대한 주변국들의 불안감을 불식시켜 줄 수 있는 전략 기제가 불충분한 가운데 미국과 미국 동맹국들

간의 양자 동맹체제(hub and spoke system)가 그나마 비슷한 기능을 수행

- 미국 중심의 동맹체제 안에서 일본, 한국, 호주, 뉴질랜드, 태국, 필리핀은 물론 싱가포르, 인도네시아, 대만을 포함하여 말레이시아, 베트남에 이르기까지 여러 국가가 미국과 군사적인 협력관계를 구축함으로써 지역갈등을 완화하고 해적소탕, 인도주의활동 등에 기여
- 하지만 미국 중심의 동맹체제는 중국이 지적하듯이 과거 냉전체제의 산물이자 21세기에 적합한 형태로 발전하기 위해서는 정치적으로나 군사적으로 많은 수정과 보완이 필요
- 냉전의 그림자가 현존하는 분단된 한반도에서야말로 미국, 일본, 한국 그리고 중국과 러시아가 서로의 입장과 관계를 재정립함으로써 새로운 미래 동아시아 체제를 여는 장이 펼쳐질 것으로 예상
- 한반도 통일이 언제 어떻게 이루어질 것인지 예측하기란 불가능하지만, 언젠가 한민족이 분단을 극복하고 하나의 국가로 거듭나게 될 것임은 분명함.
- 통일 과정은 평화적 또는 폭력적으로, 자발적 또는 강제적으로 전개될 수 있으며 통일한국은 어떠한 통일 과정을 거쳤는지에 따라 극명하게 다른 모습을 보여줄 것으로 예상
- 미래 통일한국과 한반도의 운명은 결국 오늘날 남한의 국민들과 그들이 선출한 지도자들에 의해 최종적으로 결정될 것임.
- 최근 국제사면위원회(Amnesty)와 국제연합(United Nations: UN) 북한 인권조사위원회(Commission of Inquiry: COI)보고서를 통해 알 수 있듯이 북한 정권이 아직까지도 전근대적인 봉건체제를 유지하면서 엄청난 인권유린을 자행하고 있다는 점에서, 한국이 주도하는 통일한국 건설은 한민족 전체에 유익
- 남한이 주도하는 통일한국은 결국 남한의 정치, 경제, 사회제도와 유사한 제도를 받아들임으로써 북한 주민들에게 더 높은 생활의 질을 제공하고, 중국을 포함한 주변국들과 정상적인 국가관계를 수립하며, 국제사회에 유용한 일원으로 거듭날 수 있는 기회 제공
- 통일한국이 현재의 한미동맹과 같이 미국과 지속적인 동맹을 유지할 것인지는 전적으로 통일한국 국민들이 판단할 사안임.
- 그러나 오늘날 한미동맹을 통해 남한이 누리고 있는 각종 안보이익이 통일한국에게도 무시할 수 없는 큰 이득이라는 점에서 통일한국-미국 간의 동맹은 지속적으로 유지·발전될 것으로 예상
- 현존하는 안보위협이 사라진다는 측면에서만 보더라도 미국은 통일을 긍정적으로 인식하고 지지할 것임.
- 미국에게 한반도 통일은 북한 지역에 거주하는 2400만 주민들의 삶의 질 향상뿐만 아니라 현재 한반도에 배치된 각종 군사 자원을 줄이거나 다른 곳으로 돌릴 수 있다는 점에서 긍정적

- 통일은 초기 경제 부담이 큰 것도 사실이지만 그만큼 엄청난 기회를 통일한국 국민들에게 제공할 것이며 북한 지역의 변화를 이루어내기 위해서는 이러한 내부적인 노력과 더불어 유럽, 미국, 일본, 중국 등 국제사회의 지원도 필요
- 한반도 통일이 미중관계에 미치는 영향은 예측하기 어려운 부분임.
 - 중국 일부에서는 통일로 인하여 전통적인 “완충국가” 내지는 동맹국을 잃어버렸다고 한탄할 수 있으며 과거 북한과 함께 전쟁을 치렀던 군부의 경우 그 상실감이 상당
 - 오늘날 중국이 북한에 대해 갖고 있는 무역 특권을 잃어버리게 될 가능성 또한 우려되지만 현재 2000억 달러를 상회하는 한중무역 규모를 감안한다면 북한은 오히려 중국에게 자국의 동북지방 번영을 가로막고 있는 골칫덩어리라는 점을 직시할 필요가 있음.
- 중국은 한반도 통일을 지극히 실용적인 관점에서 평가할 것이며, 통일 과정 속에서 베이징이 서울의 손을 들어주는 방향으로 귀결될 것임.
 - 중국 정부가 지지하는 6자회담이 종전(終戰)협상과 남북화해를 포괄한다는 점에서 중국이 한반도 통일을 지지할 개연성은 충분
- 동아시아의 미래는 결국 미국과 중국이 과연 얼마나 서로의 공간을 만들어 줄 것인지에 달렸다고 해도 과언이 아니며 한반도 비핵화와 통일은 미중관계의 협력적 발전 가능성을 가늠해 볼 수 있는 첫 시금석이 될 수 있음.
 - 한반도의 미래가 어떻게 전개되느냐에 따라 중국은 그동안 미국 중심의 동맹체제가 중국을 봉쇄(containment)하려는 전략인지, 아니면 지역 안정을 담보하는 호혜적 수단인지 확인할 수 있을 것으로 예상
- 지난 30여 년 동안 미국과 동맹국들은 북한이 핵을 포기할 것을 요구하고 설득해 왔지만 그 결과는 실망스러웠으며 이제는 단순히 비핵화라는 관점에서만 북한의 핵 포기를 종용할 것이 아니라 전방위적인 접근을 시도해야 할 시기임.
 - 새로운 시도는 과거 냉전체제 당시 미국과 동맹국들이 함께 일구어낸 헬싱키 프로세스와 같은 다자적, 다방면적 관여(engagement)전략을 통해서 가능
 - 헬싱키 프로세스에 입각한 관여전략은 6자회담을 강화시키는 형태로 발전시키되 그 핵심은 신뢰구축을 통한 오해불식, 오판방지이며 남북이 상호 협력 가능한 작은 이슈에서부터 출발하여 서로에 대한 신뢰를 늘려나감으로써 최종적으로는 종전선언과 한반도 비핵화 달성이라는 큰 목표에 도달
 - 이러한 전략은 당장 큰 성과를 내지 못하기 때문에 시간을 두고 지속적으로 추진하는 것이 중요
- 다자적 관여전략은 과거 김대중 대통령이 처음 받아들였다는 점에서 남한 진보진영으로부터 지지를 얻어냄과 동시에 독일식 통일 모델이라는 점에서 보수진영으로부터도 지지를 얻어낼 수 있음.

- 독일의 경험을 통해 이미 검증된 모델이라는 것과 신뢰가 부족한 정치환경을 벗어날 수 있는 단계별 접근법이라는 것이 장점
- 포괄적이고(inclusive) 지역적인 접근을 통해 강대국이 주도하는 체제라는 우려를 불식시키고 중견국들의 건설적 참여를 유도해 낼 수 있는 좋은 방안
- 미국이 다자적 관여전략을 한반도 문제에 적용하지 않는 것은 과거 헬싱키 프로세스가 데탕트에 선행했던 것이 아니라 데탕트가 이루어짐에 따라 그 다음 단계로 추진된 전략이었기 때문임.
- 오늘날 동북아시아 데탕트를 이끌어내기 위해서는 키신저가 중국을 방문했던 것과 같이 과감한 외교적 추진력이 필요
- 미국 오바마 대통령은 2013년 “어, 그러면 안 될 거야(oh, no we shouldn’t)” 보다 2008년 초선 당시 “그래 할 수 있어(yes we can)”와 같은 정신으로 동북아시아 전략을 펼칠 필요가 있으며 그러한 전략은 가능한 모든 주변국들과 함께 추진
- 다자적 관여전략에 북한이 어떻게 반응할지는 정확히 알 수 없지만 우리는 북한이 원하는 경제발전의 길이 핵개발과 군사적 긴장고조로 인해 늘 가로막혀 왔음을 일깨워 줌으로써, 북한 스스로 신뢰, 평화, 공동번영의 길을 걸어갈 수 있도록 불을 밝혀줘야 할 것임

China's Stance on the Unification in Korean Peninsula

한반도 통일에 관한 중국의 입장

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China's Stance on the Unification in Korean Peninsula¹

Li Nan

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Bridged by the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia - China, Japan, the two Koreas, Mongolia, and Far East Russia - has traditionally been a strategic focus of Chinese foreign policy at least since the late 19th century. This is now one of the most densely populated, highly dynamic, and fastest growing regions in the world. Northeast Asia, however, remains politically divided and uncertain, culturally and ideologically fractious and conflicting, and militarily facing several serious frontlines among its members. Most of the world's divided nations, unsolved territorial disputes, and lingering emotional and historical disagreements resulting from the Second World War (or even earlier) and the Cold War are in the region.

From the Chinese view, the geopolitical structure of Northeast Asian remains a frozen Cold War state chiefly because of the Korean division, despite the highly dynamic and profound socioeconomic developments and transformations throughout the region. The U.S. is still deeply involved in the region's security affairs through its alliances with South Korea and Japan. Under circumstance of the zero-sum game in the region, whether a united Korea will meaningfully alter the geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia is becoming a big concern from China.

Most nations involved in the Korea dispute, including the U.S., support a one-state political solution, viewing the peninsula's current division as a historic anomaly. China's official stance and interests are clear to define. The current China's policy envisions "a durable peace on the peninsula which leads to peaceful reunification on the principles of self-determination"² Although the clarification put China in the pro-unification camp, Chinese roadmap for Korean unification envisions a normalization regime that constitutes a gradual step toward reunification.

Currently, the opinions, conclusions, and recommendations on Korean unification within a chorus of academics, diplomats and strategists in China reflect growing divided views. Some Chinese experts support a reunified Korea as a peaceful, independent nation. However, others worry that a united Korea would remain in the U.S. orbit. If the U.S. implements a policy containing China, then China, they contend, would not be able to keep U.S. forces away at a safe distance.

Concerning China's stance and behavior in reaction to the Kim regime's implosion, North-South reconciliation, or any scenario that would produce a reunified Korea, the following responses are possible.

Firstly, China would keep its consistent principles of "no war and no chaos at the Korean peninsula," opposing any military provocation and intervention from both sides. If chaos unfolds, one scenario would be China witnessing a "friendly" DPRK disappearing or being replaced by a unified Korea dominated by Seoul, aligned with Washington, and armed as far north as the Chinese border. In this case, China would express its serious concerns to the ROK and the U.S., asking the following questions:

¹ Any comments and observations in this paper are entirely the author's personal view and by no means reflect any official position of the government of the People's Republic of China.

² Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement, July 4, 2002(as found on http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn).

1. Will the U.S. military forces cross the 38th parallel?
2. Will the U.S. establish new bases north of the 38th parallel?
3. Will the U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula transfer operational control to the ROK, leaving it to take action in the north by itself?
4. Will international organizations such as the UN, IAEA, etc. be involved in the unification process?

Such concerns are related to the China's stance on Korean unification in the context of Chinese interests. If they could be addressed well, China, ROK and the U.S. would be able to build confidence and the Chinese domestic audience could also be persuaded that the Chinese position in Korea is still secure.

Secondly, the Chinese believe a Korea that is reunified under more plausible scenarios furthers the strategic interests of only the U.S. and the ROK. "Underpinning this position is a fear that the allies would exploit the DPRK's demise and the peninsula's reunification to contain China."³ Traditionally, China has long been strategically comfortable with the DPRK providing a buffer against military threats from the ROK and its U.S. bases. Once the status quo is broken, China would like to settle the disputes with a united Korea in order to strengthen its relationship. These issues probably include:

1. Korea's clarification of its position on whether U.S. military presence would remain on the peninsula when unification is achieved. This key question is important for China that is reluctant to believe that a reunified Korea, under Seoul's control, and lacking a DPRK threat, would immediately oust American forces. The Chinese would begin by discussing future force levels and military posture on the peninsula. In the realists' worst-case scenario, a rising Korea that maintains U.S. forces and inherits the Kim regime's WMD arsenal becomes a strategic near-peer, the long-feared "dagger to the heart of China and a traditional route for Japanese invasion."⁴ A handful of reassurances from Korea could assuage many of Beijing's concerns.
2. A united Korea would settle some disputed issues with China, such as territorial disputes on Gando and the Yalu River estuary, northern fishing areas, etc..
3. A united Korea would engage with China on the economic development of the north in order to strengthen economic ties with China. From China's perspective, reunification implies reconstruction that could improve the economic situation in the north, as well as job creation necessary to keep the Chinese countryside developing. So China will be positive on the reconstruction of the north and enlargement of trade with the south.

Thirdly, possible migration pressures would make China readjust its humanitarian relief during the period of the unification.

³ Gregory Macris, "China on Korean Reunification: Spoiler, Beneficiary, or Something in Between?" January 2013, p. 30. (<https://www.usnwc.edu/Lucent/OpenPdf.aspx?id=156>)

⁴ Tsunetoshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, "China a Unified Korea, and Geopolitics," presented to the Southern Political Science association January 6, 2005 (<https://www.allacademic.com>).

Concluding Thoughts

There is little certainty regarding Korean reunification, and it is hard to predict future developments. Two absolute points concerning China's stance are apparent, however. First, the Chinese would seek to manage the process and take an active role on the peninsula. Second, domestic opinion and suspicion toward US/ROK intentions will condition Chinese thinking and options. It is highly possible that the positions towards reunification by China and the U.S./ROK can ultimately reach a consensus as long as high-level political-military engagement among all parties, including the increase of strategic trust between China and the U.S., can alleviate fear and correct misconceptions.

한반도 통일에 관한 중국의 입장⁵

리 난(Li Nan)

중국 사회과학원 연구원

- 중국 시각에서 봤을 때 동북아시아의 지정학적 구조는 한반도 분단으로 인해 여전히 냉전 상태에 머물러 있음.
 - 한미, 미일 동맹을 통해 미국은 여전히 이 지역 안보문제에 깊이 관여
 - 통일한국이 동북아의 지정학적 위상을 심각하게 변화시킬 수 있다는 점이 중국 입장에서는 큰 근심거리
- 한반도 분단이 역사상 예외적인 상태라는 점을 인정하기 때문에 미국을 포함해 한반도에 관여하는 대부분의 국가들은 일국가체제라는 정치적 해법을 지지함.
 - 한반도와 관련한 중국의 공식입장은 “자결(self-determination) 원칙에 입각한 한반도 평화통일과 지속적 평화”
 - 중국은 분명 한반도 통일 지지그룹에 속하지만, 통일에 관한 중국의 로드맵은 점진적인 통일
- 한반도 통일에 관한 중국의 입장은 양분된 상태임.
 - 일부 전문가는 평화적이고 독립적인 국가로서 통일한국을 지지
 - 통일 한국이 미국의 위성국가가 될 것을 우려하면서, 미국이 중국 봉쇄정책을 펼칠 경우 미군을 안전한 거리에 두지 못하기 때문에 한반도 통일에 반대하는 의견
- 한반도 통일이 어떤 시나리오로 펼쳐지든 중국이 취할 수 있는 반응은 다음과 같음. 첫째, 어떠한 군사적 도발이나 개입에 반대하면서 “한반도 전쟁과 혼란에 반대”하는 일관된 원칙 고수
 - 혼란이 발생할 경우 우방인 북한이 사라지고 한국이 주도하는 통일한국으로 대체되는 상황을 중국이 목격하는 시나리오
 - 이 때 중국은 한국과 미국에게 깊은 우려를 표명하면서 다음과 같은 질문을 제기
 - 미군은 38도선을 넘어올 것인가?
 - 미국은 38도선 이북에 새로운 기지를 구축할 것인가?
 - 미국은 통일한국이 스스로 북측 지역에 행동을 취하도록 전시작전권을 통일한국에 넘길 것인가?
 - UN, IAEA와 같은 국제기구는 통일과정에 개입할 것인가?
 - 한반도 통일에 관한 중국의 입장 그리고 중국의 이해관계와 밀접하게 관련된 위의 우려가

⁵ 본 요약에 포함된 모든 내용은 저자의 개인적 소견이며 어떠한 경우에도 중화인민공화국의 공식 입장과는 다를 수 있음을 밝힘.

잘 해소된다면, 중국-한국-미국은 신뢰를 형성할 수 있고 중국 내부에서도 한국을 안심해도 된다는 목소리가 높아질 것

- 둘째, 가장 그럴듯한 시나리오는 통일한국이 미국과 한국의 전략적 이익만 증대시킬 것이라는 중국의 의구심임.
 - 한미 양국이 북한의 붕괴를 시도하고 통일한국은 중국을 봉쇄할지도 모른다는 두려움
 - 중국은 한미 양국의 군사적 위협을 완충하는 전략적 지역으로 북한을 고려해왔음
 - 이 현상유지가 붕괴될 경우 중국이 제기할 수 있는 이슈
 - 통일 이후, 위협세력이었던 북한이 없어져도 미군은 한반도에 여전히 주둔할 것인지 여부와 이에 대한 한국의 입장
 - 간도, 압록강 하구, 북방어로구역 등 영토 문제와 관련된 한국의 입장
 - 중국과 경제적 유대를 강화하기 위해 북한지역 개발에 중국을 참여시키는 것에 대한 한국의 입장
- 셋째, 이주 문제에 대한 압력이 심해지면서 중국은 통일 기간 동안 자국의 인도주의적 구호를 재조정할 것임.
- 결론적으로 한반도 통일에 관해 불확실성이 상존하지만, 명확한 중국의 입장은 다음 두 가지임.
 - 첫째, 한반도 통일 과정의 관리와 한반도에서 적극적인 역할 추구
 - 둘째, 한미 양국의 의도에 대한 국내 여론과 의구심은 한반도 통일에 관한 중국인들의 사고와 선택에 영향을 미침
 - 중국-한국-미국이 고위급 정치·군사적 접촉을 통해 미중간 전략적 신뢰를 제고하고 공포감을 완화하며 오해를 해소할 경우, 3국은 한반도 통일에 관해 궁극적 합의에 이를 수 있는 높은 가능성

East Asian Regional Architecture

동아시아 지역 아키텍처

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East Asian Regional Architecture

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1.1 What are the main elements that define the East Asian regional architecture?

Currently, we are encountering **the crisis of global international governance** – the system based on a special role of great powers – winners in the Second World War and on the geopolitical confrontation between the two superpowers. In 1990s, one of them – Russia – lost the capability to set rules for global politics. The other – the US – considered itself as the indisputable global leader.

The crisis is evident, as during the last decade the number of countries dissatisfied with this system of global governance increased, as well as their capabilities:

- **Russia** has been showing growing dissatisfaction with its role of a rule-taker with regard to important decisions, including those relevant to its security interests, made by the West.
- In 2000s, **China and other large developing economies** came to be dissatisfied with the existing system of global governance, primarily with their subordinate position in the global political system. These countries pushed for establishment and greater significance of international consultations within G-20 framework and strengthening their positions in global economy, international trade and investment exchanges. By 2012, the share of China and other states of G-20 (except states of G-7) measured by purchasing power parity accounted for about 45% of the global GDP.
- Last but not least, some members of the G-7 also have resolved to increase their influence on global decision-making. The most representative example is Japan which intends to build an independent military and defense-industrial complex and strengthen its security capabilities.

The current system of global governance is losing its power. In Europe, the crisis is obvious – neither inviolability of state borders, nor institutional stability are properly guaranteed. In Pacific Asia, effectiveness of the existing international mechanisms is being questioned. China, Japan and South Korea feel that the global community and the global institutions cannot answer or ease their security concerns. Consequently, these countries try to resolve their problems with their own efforts ignoring international institutions.

This generates **lessening of trust** between the countries and for existing international institutions. **Uncertainty and tensions** are on the rise; **limitations** on increasing mutual trade and investment are growing.

Specifically, this means the following:

- It becomes evident that **North Korea** sees the only guarantee of its security in accelerated development of its **nuclear and missile programs**. The latter are also used for political and diplomatic bargaining for economic benefits. The six-party talks initiated by big powers have been unable to resolve the nuclear problem and even to seriously influence it. In recent years,

the uncertainty about the future of the Korean peninsula has increased.

- **Territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea** have conspicuously escalated. The parties are moving from verbal attacks to establishing their actual presence and control over the disputed areas. As a result, clashes turning into armed confrontation or even full-scale conflict have become a highly probable scenario. So far, traditional international mechanisms have demonstrated very limited potential to deal with these issues.
- Because of regional territorial disputes as well as other factors, **security of navigation and economic activity** in maritime East Asia is weakening. Apart from traditional activities of international criminal groups, governments are unilaterally imposing restrictions on foreign actors. Attempts to maintain the rule of international law by regional actors do not produce tangible results.
- International efforts based on the traditional paradigm turn out useless in cases of **political destabilization** in the countries of the region. The examples are religious and ethnic conflicts in Thailand and in some parts of China. The international mediation is either rejected by the conflicting parties or inefficient.
- The current model of global politics cannot resolve the problem of **divided nations**. This relates to the situation on the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. The existing issues are dealt with separately rather than by collective efforts and not comprehensively.
- Last but not least, the existing model of global governance is unable to maintain an **efficient control over arms and military build-up** in the region – as well as in other regions.

This indicates a **necessity** to build a **qualitatively new architecture of international security** on a global scale, and in Pacific Asia in particular.

1.2 What will be the implications of Korean unification on the changing East Asian regional order? How do they relate to the security, economic, and/or socio-cultural landscape of the region?

I proceed from the point that **the only realistic way of unification is absorption of the North by the South on the market-democracy principles of the South Korea**.

The Korean unification brings to East Asian security and cooperation order both new **chances** and new **challenges**.

New **chances** cover all the economic, political, security and social cultural spheres:

- Deeper involvement of the unified Korea, with market and open economy, into regional cooperation. Better prospects for North East Asia Free trade Area.
- Elimination of the main threat to regional security that, currently, is North Korean regime and the North Korean nuclear program.
- Better environment for solving other political and security problems of the region.
- Better environment for “**normal**” humanitarian contacts in the region.

New **challenges**, first of all, do cover political and security spheres.

After the North Korean problem is solved, the role and security meaning of other pending issues will grow up: territorial and historical disputes, competition for leadership, etc. Moreover, the North Korean nuclear problem made the region more united – as all the countries were against the nuclear North Korea. After the unification, this uniting-the countries-factor will disappear.

The region will need a new agenda for providing new environment for security and cooperation. First of all, US Alliances with South Korea and Japan will be checked for whether they correspond with the new, post-North Korea security situation.

In my view, it is reasonable for regional intellectual and political community to start to think in advance about and to work out a new, post-North Korea agenda for building-up regional security and cooperation architecture. Otherwise, we risk that new tensions among regional players could substitute the North Korean problem as the main threat to regional order.

1.3 How do they relate to the future of U.S.-China relations in general?

The Korean unification is not the main issue of China – US relations. The main issue of the bilateral relations is the relations themselves. At the current, the main challenge to China – US relations to them is whether two countries **do succeed or do not succeed** in construction of relationship of a “**New type**”.

“New type”, in my understanding, means, first, comprehensive approach and more cooperation rather than competition and confrontation. Second, as it is impossible to avoid competition and confrontation in a visible future, “New type” means that conflict in one sphere of relationship, for example in politics, should not impede development of cooperation in other spheres, military, economy or cultural contacts.

At the same time, the Korean Unification will bring new **challenges** to China – US relations. The main of them will be related to the issues of American military presence in Korea, Korea involvement in the US-led regional Missile Defense system, future of the US – Korea Alliance.

Korean unification could raise the following concerns:

- If US troops stay in unified Korea it could mean that US military infrastructure comes closer to China borders with unclear response from the Chinese side.
- After the North Korean threat is eliminated, what are the reasons for keeping American troops in Korea, for maintaining the US-Korea Alliance, for developing missile defense?

If China and US succeed in construction bilateral relationship of the “New type”, they could get a chance to respond to such kind of challenges **in a compromising and cooperative way** with small negative consequences for bilateral relations. Otherwise, the China – US relationship could face serious challenges, which can bring new misbalances to the regional political and security architecture.

II. What are the concerns and/or expectations of Russia with regards to a unified Korea?

The main Russian concerns are:

- American military infrastructure will move close to Russian border. Under the current crisis of Russia – American relations against background of the Ukrainian crisis, this concern becomes stronger.
- Russia will lose economic competition to China on the markets of the unified Korea.
- South Korea will be preoccupied with financial assistance to the Northern part of the unified Korea, and South Korean investment in Russian economy will slow down.
- There are some voices in Russia that the unified Korea will continue North Korean nuclear program. But, in my view, perceiving Seoul as a responsible and democratic country, such a scenario is not realistic.

The main Russian expectations:

- The unification will bring more security to the Korean Peninsula and North East Asia, including Russian Far East.
- The unification will automatically solve the North Korean nuclear threat.
- In a long run, unification will open new opportunities for economic integration in North East Asia with new chances for Russia, although in a short run it can limit Korean investment in Russia.

During the last decades Moscow's approach to Korean unification changed. **The former Soviet Union (SU)**, officially, supported the idea of the Korean Unification on the conditions of the "Korean Federation" proposed by North Korea, at that time – the Soviet's official ally. However, in reality, the SU opposed the unification idea because of the following reasons.

Firstly, Moscow understood that the unification would mean the end of the SU – DPRK military-political alliance. And will lead to widespread of capitalist system on the Korean Peninsula. Secondly, Moscow considered that, after the Unification, American military bases, located in South Korea, would go closer to the Soviet border. Thirdly, there existed concerns that the Unified Korea could raise a question about presenting status of national autonomy to Russian Far Eastern territories where a lot of Russian Koreans were living.

Nowadays, **Russian approach** to the Korean unification is **neutrally-positive**.

It is "**positive**" because the Korean unification will automatically mean solving of the nuclear weapons issue of North Korea. It will provide for stronger security in North East Asia – that is vital interest of Russia. Russia needs stability on its Far Eastern borders in order to fulfill governmental programs aimed at accelerating social-economic development of non-efficient economy of the Russian Far East.

Russian approach to the Korean unification is "**neutrally**" positive because of a few reasons. First, Russia maintains diplomatic relation with two Korean states – DPRK and the ROK. It means that, diplomatically and formally, Moscow should respect interests of, both, Pyongyang and Seoul. And, as we

know, formally, both Koreas insist on their own “Unification” formula. This brings some inconvenience in Russian position. Second, Russian positive approach to the Korean unification is “neutral” because the Korean issue is not in the focus of contemporary Russian foreign policy. Third, Russia, remembering the German unification experience and experience of market reforms in Eastern Europe, clearly understands that to support actively the Korean unification (absorption) means to invest in restructuring of North Korea. But Russia is preoccupied with its own economic and social problems. Forth, as it was mentioned above, Russia sees a risk of negative consequences for Russia–South Korea economic and financial cooperation in case, if the South really starts to spend huge money for the North’s reconstruction.

III. What would be the desirable direction toward developing a new regional order in East Asia?

The main principles of the new system could be as following.

First, this system should be based on the **polycentric world order**. It is evident that in the contemporary world, as opposed to the previous model, neither one nor two global centers of power can guarantee that conflicts will be resolved, and peace and security maintained. The global order can and should be polycentric in terms of both economic and political security order.

Second, this system should presuppose **the hierarchy of powers and responsibility**. It is evident that countries of the region differ in their economic and political weight and capabilities. Because of this, they bear different responsibility for maintaining global and regional security. Their role in maintaining security, including resolving regional issues, is different. The principle of consensus that ignore different capabilities of the actors seriously affects possibilities for multilateral frameworks, makes them inefficient in tackling urgent problems. The stronger is a country – the more responsibility.

Third, this system should be premised on the **dynamic equilibrium**. The disadvantages of the current system of global governance stems from the attempts made by this system to conserve itself while the world is facing notable changes in capabilities of individual actors. The change in relative strength of individual international actors should be accompanied by changes in their role and responsibilities for maintaining security.

Fourth, the system should recognize **specific** rather than standard character **of each concrete issue or situation**. The principles and approaches, which fit some situations or actors, are often not appropriate or counter-productive for others. For instance, debates about the right of self-determination of nations versus the principle of territorial integrity are nothing more than scholastic exercises if they don’t take into account specific characteristics of individual cases. No universal answer can be given with respect to the expediency of internationalizing bilateral or internal conflicts and disputes.

It should be noted that **all the aforementioned principles are interrelated and cannot be taken out of overall context**.

The hierarchy of powers and responsibilities cannot be separated from the principle of polycentrism, which makes this hierarchy productive and relatively non-threatening for weaker actors. On the other hand, the efficiency of this polycentric hierarchy can be achieved only in case the principle of

dynamic equilibrium is maintained. Otherwise, forms and mechanisms that don't respond to the changes will be artificially conserved. Finally, equilibrium in the system is impossible without individual approach to every specific case.

Based on the principles outlined above, the proposed new **security model for Pacific Asia** embraces the following dimensions:

1. This system should be **comprehensive**. Issues related to military, transport, information, ecology, trade, investment, emergency response etc. should be considered as parts of the integrated international security framework.
2. The outdated vision of security as of a system managed from a single center should be rejected. The model for the new global order should be **a network in the countries' rights and a pyramid – in responsibilities**.
3. Unlike the case of OSCE in Europe in the 1970s – 1980s, a single comprehensive format in the Pacific Asia may not be a good option. All of **the existing mechanisms** should be used, including APEC, EAS, international frameworks based on ASEAN, and others.
4. Multilateral diplomacy doesn't exclude **actions initiated or implemented by individual countries**. In reality the key actors are not ready to relinquish their sovereign right to implement defense policies based on their own understanding of threats and means to cope with them.
5. An absence of a single center (or two centers during the Cold War) doesn't mean an absence of **hierarchy of power and responsibility**. Countries differ from each other, and their roles and degrees of responsibility cannot be equal. For objective reasons, regional actors that possess strategic capabilities have more possibilities and bear more responsibility for the situation. The new security architecture in Pacific Asia has to be premised on a full-fledged participation of key regional actors – the US, China, Japan and Russia, as well as ASEAN. The necessary formats for such interaction already exist.
6. An efficient security system presupposes that the key actors constantly engage themselves in **dialogue and consultations** to enhance mutual understanding of their positions and issues of common concerns. The results should be reflected in positions and activities of all the existing multilateral frameworks and forums.
7. The basic precondition for this is to form **a compromise-oriented mindset as opposed to confrontation mentality**. This is a long process and the most difficult task to implement. This process can start from political decisions made by the four key regional states – China, the US, Japan and Russia. Although the Ukrainian crisis has made it more difficult, further course of events and objective needs will inevitably bring about mutually acceptable decisions.
8. A very important role in forming a compromise-oriented mentality as the prerequisite to establish new security architecture in Pacific Asia should be played by the **regional expert community**.

IV. Final Remark

IMEMO, the leading Russian think-tank, apart from general principles of strengthening security in Pacific Asia, proposes a number of practical steps. Ukrainian crisis led to deterioration of the Russia – US relations. But negative consequences of the crisis are different on different continents. In Europe – much stronger, in Asia Pacific, were the crisis does not impose direct threats to the countries, –weaker. So, we think that cooperation in Asia Pacific is possible and, moreover, necessary for future normalization of Russia – the West relations.

Looking into the future, we propose:

- To continue the Six-Party Talks to promote security on the Korean peninsula. Five participants of 6PT (minus North Korea) could closely coordinate their efforts at the sessions of the Fifth working group. It is aimed to discuss security in Northeast Asia. North Korean participation is not obligatory.
- Strengthen efforts to build confidence and develop cooperation within and between regional multilateral frameworks. As far as American alliances are concerned, we offer to promote dialogue of key defense alliances (US-Japan and US – South Korea) with Russia and with China.
- Officially involve government specialists in expert discussions and promote this dialogue using the “1.5 track” format.

동아시아 지역 아키텍처

바실리 미헤예프(Vasily Mikheev)
러시아 국제경제 및 국제관계연구소(IMEMO) 부원장

- 오늘날 국제관계는 냉전 종식 이후 미국의 상대적 쇠퇴와 함께 러시아, 중국, 일본 등 지역 강대국들이 대안세력 내지는 보완세력으로 등장하면서 새로운 대전환기를 맞이함.
 - 러시아는 1990년 소련 몰락 이후 점차 국력을 회복해 나가며 그동안 서방에 의해 주어진 규범을 따라야만(rule-taker) 했던 현실에 불만을 표출 중
 - 중국을 필두로 2000년대 이후 등장한 신흥강국들도 주어진 국제정치체제에 대한 불만과 함께 G-20과 같은 다자 메커니즘을 통해 세계경제 및 국제무역, 투자교류 등의 분야에서 자국의 입지를 강화
 - 일본도 안보역량 강화 및 독립 군산복합체 건설 등에 적극적인 의지를 표출함으로써 글로벌 의사결정구조에 대한 영향력 증대에 노력
- 지금의 글로벌 거버넌스 체계는 유럽은 물론 아시아 태평양 지역 등지에서 국경에 대한 불가침, 제도적 안정성 등을 담보해내지 못하고 있으며 이로 인해 그 영향력이 약화되고 있음.
 - 글로벌 거버넌스 체계 약화는 동아시아 국가간 신뢰를 낮추고 불확실성과 긴장을 고조시키는 결과를 초래
 - 북한의 핵·미사일 개발, 남중국해와 동중국해 해양분쟁, 한반도와 대만의 분단상황 지속, 지역 내 군비경쟁 심화 등은 기존과 다른 새로운 세계질서, 새로운 아시아 태평양 지역질서 건축의 필요성을 제시
- 민주주의와 시장경제에 기반한 한국 주도의 한반도 통일이 유일한 방안임.
 - 새로운 기회: 동북아 자유무역지대 확장 및 역내 경제교류 심화, 북한 정권과 북핵으로 인한 지역 안보위협 요인 제거, 역내 정치·안보 관련 문제 해결에 유리한 환경조성, 인도주의적 교류 확대 등이 통일이 제시하는 새로운 기회
 - 새로운 도전: 역내 영토 및 역사분쟁, 역내 주도권 경쟁 심화 및 새로운 정치·안보 이슈 등장, 북핵문제와 같이 협력 가능한 공동의제 상실, 통일 이후 미국 주도 동맹체제의 유지 가능성 등이 통일이 제시하는 새로운 도전
- 미중관계에서 가장 중요한 점은 미국과 중국 양국이 과연 성공적으로 새로운 형태의 관계를 설정할 수 있을 것인지 여부이며, 주한미군 주둔, 미국주도의 미사일방어체제(MD)에 한국의 관여, 한미동맹의 미래 등과 관련되어 한반도 통일은 미중관계에 새로운 도전 요인이 될 것임.
 - 새로운 형태의 미중관계는 협력과 갈등이 공존하는 포괄적 관계임과 동시에 갈등보다 협력이 더 많은 관계로, 정치와 같은 특정 부문에서 발생한 갈등이 군사, 경제, 문화교류와 같은

다른 부문의 협력을 저해하지 않는 형태로 발전해 나가는 것을 의미

- 한반도 통일이 미중관계에 제기할 도전 요인은 주로 주한미군과 관련된 사항들로 예상
 - 통일 이후 미군이 한반도에 계속 주둔할 경우 기지나 시설이 얼마나 중국 국경과 가까워질 것인가?
 - 통일로 북한의 위협이 사라진 이후 왜 한미동맹이 지속되어야 하는가?
- 미국과 중국이 성공적으로 새로운 관계를 정립한다면 한반도 통일이 미중관계에 미칠 도전 요인에도 적절히 대응할 수 있겠지만, 그렇지 못할 경우에는 매우 큰 갈등을 유발하여 지역 내 정치·안보 구조에 새로운 불균형이 초래될 것으로 우려
- 러시아에게 한반도 통일이란 우려와 기대가 공존하는 미래를 제시함.
 - 우려사항: 미국의 군사시설이 러시아 국경지대와 근접할 가능성, 통일한국 시장에서 중국에게 경제적으로 뒤처질 가능성, 남한 자본이 북한지역으로 몰리면서 러시아에 대한 투자가 상대적으로 위축될 가능성, 통일한국이 북한의 핵개발을 지속할 가능성(핵 보유 가능성은 매우 낮지만 러시아 일각의 우려사항)
 - 기대사항: 통일이 한반도와 러시아 극동을 포함한 동북아시아 지역에 제공할 안보이익, 통일을 통한 북한 핵 위협 제거, 통일한국과 러시아의 장기적 경제통합 가능성(단기적으로는 한국의 러시아 투자 위축 가능)
- 구 소련 시기 러시아는 동맹인 북한이 주도하는 한반도 통일에 원칙적으로 동의하면서도 실질적으로는 통일을 반대했으나 오늘날 러시아는 한반도 통일에 대해 긍정적(positive) 내지는 중립-긍정적(neutrally-positive) 입장을 견지함.
 - 러시아는 한반도 통일이 북한의 핵 문제를 해소하고 동북아시아 안보에 기여함으로써 장기간 침체된 러시아 극동경제에 안정과 활력을 제공할 수 있다는 점에서 긍정적인 입장
 - 러시아가 현재 남북한 모두와 국교를 수립하고 있다는 점, 한반도 문제가 러시아 대외정책에 중요한 관심사안이 아니라는 점, 독일과 동유럽의 경험에 비추었을 때 통일 이후 북한 지역에 대한 국제사회의 막대한 투자가 필요할 것이라는 점, 통일 이후 현재와 같은 수준의 경제·금융분야 협력을 한국으로부터 기대하기 어렵다는 점에서 한반도 통일에 중립-긍정적
- 양극 또는 단극체제를 뛰어넘는 새로운 국제체제는 다중심적(polycentric) 질서, 위계구조(hierarchy) 내에서 국력에 비례하는 책임감(responsibility), 역동적 세력균형(dynamic equilibrium), 그리고 사안과 상황의 특수성 인정을 원칙으로 건축되어야 함.
 - 제시된 원칙들은 서로 밀접한 관계를 유지하고 있기 때문에 총체적인 접근이 필요
 - 새로운 국제체제 원칙 속에서 아시아 태평양 지역의 새로운 안보 모델을 다음과 같이 제안
 - 국제안보 틀 속에서 군사, 운송, 정보, 환경, 무역, 투자, 위기대응 등 다양한 이슈에 대하여 종합적으로 접근

- 한 국가가 중심이 되지 않고 여러 국가가 네트워크를 이루되 책임은 국력에 따라 피라미드 식으로 분배
 - 1970년대-1980년대 유럽안보협력기구(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: OSCE)와 같이 하나의 체제에 기반하지 않고 아태경제협력체(APEC), 동아시아 정상회의(EAS), 동남아시아국가연합(ASEAN) 등 기존 협력체를 활용
 - 다자외교가 개별 국가의 행동이나 정책에 우선하지 못하는 현실 인정
 - 역량에 따른 책임이 국가별로 다르다는 것을 인정하고 미국, 중국, 일본, 러시아, ASEAN 등 지역 내 주요 행위자의 적극적 참여 유도
 - 지역 내 주요 행위자들이 지속적으로 대화하고 상의함으로써 서로의 입장과 문제상황에 대한 이해와 우려 공유
 - 대립하려는 경향보다 타협에 기반한 사고방식 배양
 - 지역 내 전문가집단(regional expert community)들을 통해 타협적 사고방식 확산
- 러시아의 대표적 싱크탱크인 IMEMO는 한반도국제포럼에서 제시한 아시아 태평양 지역 안보 증진을 위한 일반적인 원칙들에 더하여 현 정세에 대한 인식과 향후 관계발전을 위한 제언을 다음과 같이 제시함.
- 우크라이나 사태로 인해 현재 러시아와 미국의 관계가 악화되고 있지만 러시아는 아시아 태평양 국가들과 협력이 가능할 뿐만 아니라 향후 러시아와 서방의 관계복원이 필요하다고 판단
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 - IMEMO는 앞으로도 전문가 토론에 정부측 인사를 공식적으로 참여시키는 '1.5 트랙' 형식의 대화를 활성화시킬 것을 제안

Session 2
제2부

**Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula:
Current Outcomes and Future Tasks**

한반도 신뢰프로세스의 성과 및 과제

**Trust-Politik and Confidence-Building Measures:
A German Experience**
신뢰외교와 신뢰구축방안: 독일의 경험

Hans-Ulrich SEIDT
Inspector General, German Foreign Office

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Trust-Politik and Confidence-Building Measures: A German Experience

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For any forward looking modern diplomacy it remains a priority to build among nations the framework for peaceful political and social change. However, initiating and implementing confidence-building measures is a difficult task which requires a clear strategy and a long-term approach.

History and experience

If we look back on Germany's history during the last decades we realize that the German experience with confidence-building measures, trust building and security cooperation among former enemies is wide and a positive one. Confidence-building, arms control and non-proliferation will therefore remain cornerstones of Germany's foreign and security policy.

Of course the concrete political results of Germany's long-term strategy of peaceful change during the Cold War, in particular the re-unification of Europe and Germany, were unforeseen and unpredictable. No realistic strategic planning could have anticipated the timing and the course of events. Nevertheless there are some lessons that might be useful today when we talk about future perspectives on the Korean Peninsula.

For a policy based on trust and confidence-building measures you need first of all the trust of others. In the case of Germany it was an enormous challenge to regain trust, understanding and support after World War II. In 1945, the Third Reich ended in military defeat, massive destruction and unconditional surrender. It was above all a moral catastrophe. Germany had to face the terrible crimes committed during the years 1933 to 1945 and to assume responsibility. To restore relations and to win allies, partners and friends was only possible through confidence-building measures leading to a better understanding, mutual trust and ultimately to peaceful change.

From security to cooperation

Germany's comprehensive strategy she developed included three dimensions: the security dimension, the economic dimension and the human dimension. For Germany it was therefore very important that the Conference on Security in Europe (CSE), promoted during the Cold War by the former Soviet Union, dealt with all three dimensions at the same time and was not restricted to the security aspect alone. Finally the Soviet concept of the CSE was successfully integrated into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

The CSCE's Final Act adopted 1975 in Helsinki not only created the legal framework for a detailed arms control mechanism including on the spot inspections. It also opened up new perspectives for a mutually beneficial economic cooperation between East and West. Of paramount importance was that the signatories of the Final Act recognized the importance of the human dimension, thus stimulating a

substantial increase of contacts among separated families, among artists, scientists and ordinary citizens.

Today a key instrument of trust and confidence-building in Europe is the Vienna Document, which was adopted in 1990 in the context of Germany's re-unification at the end of the Cold War. But its origins date back to 1975, the year in which the CSCE Final Act was signed in Helsinki.

The Vienna Document: A basis for building trust on the Korean peninsula?

The Vienna Document in its current version was adopted at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Vilnius on 6 December 2011. Minor amendments were added in 2012 and 2013. All 57 OSCE member states regard the Vienna Document as an essential basis for trust and cooperation. It provides measures for increased transparency and confidence-building as well as mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution.

All OSCE member states have committed themselves to sharing once a year detailed information on their armed forces and principal weapon systems, their military budgets, their defense and force planning and arranged manoeuvres. The participating OSCE states can conduct confidence-building inspections on the ground to check the collected information and the compliance against the provisions of the Vienna Document.

Inspection trips under the auspices of the OSCE have been conducted since the 1990s. They are performed unarmed and facilitate transparency with regard to military activities in the OSCE area. These inspections are arranged in consultation with the host country and communicated to all OSCE member states. Each OSCE member state is therefore informed in advance of each individual mission. Participating states meet once a year in Vienna to discuss current practical implementation issues.

In Germany the Federal Armed Forces Verification Centre (ZVBs) plans, coordinates and conducts all missions based on the Vienna Document. It also organizes missions by other OSCE member states in Germany, provides the necessary personnel, analyses the results of the inspections and accompanies visiting missions.

Germany also organizes meetings of experts, gives technical support to other OSCE member states and helps them to train personnel who participates in the implementation of the Vienna Document, in particular in verification missions.

Outlook

However, we always have to keep in mind that a policy based on confidence-building measures, mutual security, economic cooperation and human contacts remains a long-term and open-ended strategy. We cannot expect quick results. There might even be setbacks like - in a historical retrospective - the nuclear re-armament in Europe after the deployment of the Soviet Union's SS 20 during the last phase of the Cold War. Today the current crisis in the Ukraine is a serious threat for trust, cooperation and security on a regional and global level. But in difficult times a diplomat may find some encouragement in Otto von Bismarck's words: "Diplomacy is like a dark forest. After you have entered it you will not know exactly where you will leave it. But stay the course!"

국문요약

신뢰외교와 신뢰구축방안: 독일의 경험

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- 정치·사회적 변화가 평화롭게 이루어질 수 있는 틀을 구축해 나가는 것이 미래지향적 외교에서 가장 중요하며, 신뢰구축방안을 시작하고 현실에 적용하기 위해서는 명확한 전략과 장기적 접근이 필요함.
- 독일이 지난 수십 년 동안 과거의 적과 일구어 낸 신뢰와 안보협력은 광범위하고 긍정적인 형태로 발전해왔으며 신뢰구축, 군비통제, 핵 비확산 등과 같은 목표는 오늘날에도 여전히 독일 대외정책의 초석
- 과거 서독이 장기적 관점에서 동독의 긍정적 변화를 유도하는 정책을 지속한 것은 사실이지만 그렇다고 통일 상황을 미리 예측할 수 있었던 것은 아님.
- 독일의 경험은 언제 어떻게 통일이 이루어질 것인지 미리 예측하고 그에 따른 전략적 준비를 해 나간다는 것이 불가능했음을 보여주지만, 한반도의 미래에 주는 함의는 크다고 판단
- 신뢰에 기반한 정책을 성공시키려면 우선 주변국들의 신뢰를 확보하는 것이 필요함.
- 독일은 주변국들로부터 전쟁을 통해 잃어버린 신뢰를 되찾기 위해 군사적 패배는 물론 전쟁 기간 동안 자행된 범죄에 대한 책임과 직면해야만 했음
- 관계 회복과 동맹 및 동반자관계 확립을 위한 유일한 방법은 상호 이해증진, 상호 신뢰, 그리고 궁극적으로 평화적인 변화를 이끌 수 있는 신뢰구축방안임.
- 독일의 신뢰구축과정은 안보, 경제, 인도주의 분야 등에 걸쳐 종합적으로 진행됨.
- 냉전시기 구 소련이 주도한 유럽안보회의(Conference on Security in Europe: CSE)와 이후 구성된 유럽안보협력회의(Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; CSCE), 그리고 1975년 헬싱키 최종협약에 이르기까지 독일의 신뢰구축 노력은 안보분야뿐만 아니라 경제, 인도주의 분야를 포괄하는 형태로 지속
- 독일 통일을 계기로 1990년 유럽안보협력기구(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; OSCE) 회원국들에 의해 채택되어 발효된 비엔나 문서(Vienna Document)는 1975년 헬싱키 최종협약에서 비롯되었으며 오늘날 유럽 신뢰구축의 근간이 되는 문건
- 비엔나 문서는 국가들 간 투명성 제고 및 신뢰구축, 평화로운 갈등 해결 방안을 제시함으로써 오늘날까지 유럽 내 신뢰와 협력의 기본 틀을 제공하고 있음.
- 모든 OSCE 국가들은 매년 1회 자국의 군사력과 핵심 무기체계, 국방비 및 군사 계획과 작전에 대한 정보를 서로 공유하며 어떤 국가든지 신뢰구축 차원에서 특정 국가를 방문하여 시찰함으로써 제출된 정보를 확인 및 비엔나 문서에 대한 합의준수 여부 확인이 가능

- 독일은 연방군사검증센터(Federal Armed Forces Verification Centre: ZVBs)를 통해 비엔나 문서에 의거한 임무 수행 및 다른 OSCE 회원국들의 독일 시찰에 필요한 제반 사항 제공
- 유럽과 독일의 경험에서 주지해야 할 사항은 신뢰구축과 안보·경제분야 협력, 인적왕래 등을 목표로 하는 정책이 장기적 관점에서 시행되었으며 단기적 성과를 기대해서는 안 된다는 점임.
- 냉전 말기 소련의 SS-20 중거리탄도미사일 배치와 유럽 핵 재무장, 오늘날 우크라이나 사태로 인한 안보불안 상황 지속 등 오히려 신뢰구축에 역행하는 상황도 발생
- 어려운 시기일수록 “외교는 어두운 숲과도 같아 한치 앞도 분간하기 어렵다. 그러니 처음 방향 그대로 앞으로 나가라”는 비스마르크의 말을 경청할 필요가 있을 것임.

Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula:
Current Outcomes and Future Tasks
한반도 신뢰프로세스의 성과 및 과제

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Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula: Current Outcomes and Future Tasks

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South Korean Government's North Korea Policy for Building up Peace and Trustship on the Korean Peninsula

There are plans being drafted to respond to various pressing issues such as the follow-up measures related to the re-opening of the Kaesong economic zone, reunion of separated families, the Mt. Geumgang tourist zone, and other cooperative measures. However, in reality these issues must be resolved with due consideration to the economic appropriateness and responsibility of business enterprises related to the stabilization of inter-Korean relations.

In particular, the fact of whether or not the May 24th Measures are to be maintained or removed will need to be determined only after sufficient analysis has been performed regarding the improvement of North-South relations as well as the strategic usefulness and appropriateness of sanctions against North Korea.

Even if the Kaesong Industrial Zone has been re-opened and in operation as normal as before the shut down, any further comprehensive or fundamental economic cooperation between North and South, purely for economic interests, will take longer to be accomplished in the absence of serious opening or reform measures on the part of North Korea.

As for the resumption of large-scale economic aid for the North, that is something that will require strategic judgment based on concrete analysis of the material gains and losses regarding inter-Korean relations, and require sufficient analysis of the experiences and practices of international organizations in maintaining transparency over the distribution of aid. International sanctions placed upon the North Korean regime by the international community represent international scrutiny into the North Korean involvement with the *Cheonan* incident, pressure tactics for the realization of denuclearization on the North Korean peninsula through means such as the Six Party Talks, and a strategy to develop new plans and course of actions to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue if the talks fail.

The United States has pursued an aggressive policy of sanctions towards the North following North Korea's unilateral annulment of the Feb 29 Leap Day Agreement in 2012 and its third nuclear test in 2013. The U.S. is keeping a strong line on the maintenance of preliminary conditions for the resumption of the Six Party Talks while at the same time maintaining the position that they cannot consider relaxation of sanctions merely as a way to resume talks. The Park Geun-hye government needs to take the U.S. position into account and continue to cooperate and coordinate with the United States by concentrating on the issue of preliminary action. If the Six Party Talks are resumed, it can allow the member states to debate the request by North Korea for guarantees to the safety of the regime as well as for the relaxation of sanctions, as well as the concrete and practical development of a peace regime on the peninsula. If North Korea were to commit to denuclearization and take concrete steps towards realizing it, the member states of the Six Party Talks, including the U.S. and of course South

Korea, have repeatedly committed to preserving the sanctity of the North Korean state and helping to develop their economy through comprehensive economic aid. With this in mind, South Korea must take a leading role in the structure of such a program if it comes to pass.

However, if North Korea engages in an uncompromising stance using the preservation of the regime and distrust of the intentions of the U.S. and South Korea as its justification, despite the UN sanctions resolution, then there will be no choice but to continue to strengthen the sanctions measures in cooperation with the international community. North Korea has spent the last 20 years developing its nuclear capability as a means of preserving the sanctity of the regime, and has shown off these substantial capabilities through three nuclear tests and expansion of its plutonium and enriched uranium reserves. Despite this, it has failed to gain recognition as a nuclear power and the basic position of the Park Geun-hye government is that it will never gain such recognition in the future. The disarmament of North Korea's nuclear weapons is an important issue for all the Six Party Talks member states in order to maintain WMD control and prevent the diffusion of nuclear technology. The Park Geun-hye government must show its diplomatic capabilities in ensuring that the other member states of the Six Party Talks (the chairman state of the talks, China, as well as Japan, the U.S., and Russia) continue to maintain the strong conviction in denuclearization.

The issue of constructing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula is composed of a number of complicated and difficult challenges in the trust and verification procedures following disarmament. As much as the participation and assistance of neighboring states such as China and the U.S. will be essential in the construction of a peace regime, the Park Geun-hye government will likely go forward with comprehensive proposals for strategic talks between South Korea, the U.S. and China. The denuclearization of North Korea is a principle that the South Korean government cannot afford to give up, and this is a condition and core environmental prerequisite for any hope of policy change in the North. In addition, when looking at the background and strategy behind the North Korean desire for nuclear capability, we cannot afford today to accept the pro-North Korean position of "Peace System First, Denuclearization After". As long as North Korea lacks the ability to actually deploy its nuclear weapons, the chance of an all-out military attack is slim at best. However, as there still remains the possibility of the North engaging in small-scale or local attacks in order to achieve political goals, we need to continue to develop response strategies to deal with such an eventuality.

Lessons from the German Unification and the Realization of Support and Cooperation in East Asia for Korean Unification

In order to create bonds of sympathy between the North, the South and the international community for the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula, there must be efforts to establish a unification policy that is both sustainable and consistent, while pursuing active efforts in unification diplomacy. Carrying on and developing the Unification formula under the notion of Korean National Community that was adopted in 1989, there needs to be a strengthening of our capability to handle the costs of unification, as well as practical, realistic and concrete intentions and plans related to the means in which unification will be achieved.

President Park Geun-hye has announced she will pursue a “Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative” by expanding trust-building, cooperative security, socio-economic cooperation and human security with all neighboring countries, in order to nurture lasting peace and development in the Northeast Asian region. This can be likened to an Asian version of the famous Helsinki Process. The Helsinki Process refers to the process of the passage of the Helsinki Accords which were signed by 35 member states of the US-led NATO and Soviet-led Warsaw Pact during the Cold War at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975. The Accords contained a number of trust-building measures to maintain the peace in Europe. President Park Geun-hye is exploring ways in which a similar peace cooperation plan in East Asia can ease tensions and the lower possibility of conflict between China and the United States, and allow Seoul to become a center for peace in the Northeast Asian region. For a Peace Cooperation Plan for the Northeast Asian region to succeed, it needs at minimum to ensure the national interests of each regional state, as well as develop far-reaching bonds of trust to maintain the post-Cold War status quo order in the Northeast Asian region.

The development of the Demilitarized Zone into the World Peace Park is something that can be accomplished not just by the Koreans themselves but also with the assistance of the UN, World Bank and all the interested nations. Connecting the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) with the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) will allow for the development of an integrated freight system and by actively promoting the program as a Eurasian Initiative, Korea could claim an advantageous position in Eurasia. Through diplomatic measures such as the summit meeting between President Park Geun-hye and Russian President Vladimir Putin, a new base of trust can be developed and the country will be able to play an active part in balancing diplomacy as a middle-ranking power.

Despite the fact that a new era of permanent peace and cooperation is dawning in the region through the development of new agendas in cooperative diplomacy, there has been little progress in improving relations between Korea and Japan due to historical problems such as the issue of comfort women and the history of invasion, as well as territorial disputes such as Dokdo Island. In the future, the potential competitive structure between U.S. and China will develop along the basic axes of the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance and Sino-Russian strategic competition, while the emergence of a new Cold War era cannot be discounted.

However, it is imperative that an integrated network is actively developed for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia, including the deepening of cooperation and trust between regional partners and 1.5 track strategic talks such as regional FTAs. As in Northeast Asia the elements of conflict such as the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute and the Korean-Japanese disputes over Dokdo and historical issues are exacerbated by the North Korean issue, it is important that the Six Party Talks proceed with 3-party (Korean-Chinese-Japanese, Korean-American-Chinese, Korean-American-Japanese) and 4-party strategic talks for the sake of mutual understanding.

The Park Geun-hye government during its tenure should maintain consistency in its national security, diplomatic, unification and North Korea policy, work through mediation at the highest levels, secure the support of the international community, and maintain consistency in its relations with the North. The end result of such policies would be to allow North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons of its own accord and become a normalized member of the global community. This would ensure the

realization of peace and security on the Korean peninsula, and eventually create the basis for the normalization of inter-Korean relations and achievement of peaceful unification.

To conclude, while the ultimate goal of our policy towards the North is the achievement of peaceful national reunification, the steadily decreasing expectations and commitment to unification in our society today is an issue that the government needs to confront head-on. We also need to include in our plans a variety of strategies to cultivate a positive sentiment towards the South amongst the elite and citizens of the DPRK. We need to prepare for the time of a paradigm shift inside the north through concentrated and systematic assistance for the tens of thousands of North Korean refugees in China and more than 27,000 North Korean defectors living in South Korea today.

We need to overcome the fear and doubt over the issue of unification and prepare a vision that is ready to turn crisis into opportunity. We need to move away from the purely functional approach of the Cold War era Unification Policy under the Korean National Community, and adopt a more positive unification plan for the construction of a unified Korea following a shift in the North Korean regime. It has been only in the last year that the Ministry of Unification started to put in more efforts to prepare the public toward national unification and concentrated research into the work needed to build the basis of a North-South Community by seeking ways to develop a truly positive and systematic action plan. As we are unable to determine the precise shape or means by which unification will be achieved, we need to prepare policy solutions through the development of various potential scenarios and potential funding sources, analyzing the pros and cons of each method and begin to form a national consensus on the issue. If North Korea shows a serious commitment to give up its nuclear weapons and engage in reform and opening in order to realize economic reconstruction, we will be able to follow the existing policies towards the North in order to work together with the domestic and international community and provide aid, thereby minimizing the costs and increasing the chance of a successful unification.

국문요약

한반도 신뢰프로세스의 성과 및 과제

유호열
고려대 교수

- 현재 한국의 대북정책은 개성공단 정상화 후속조치, 이산가족 상봉, 금강산 관광 등 다방면에 걸친 대응 방안을 강구하고 있는 단계이며, 정부가 고려해야 할 사항은 각각의 대응 방안이 남북관계 안정화라는 목표와 얼마나 부합하는지 여부임.
 - 민간 기업들의 대북교류는 남북관계의 안정화와 관련하여 경제적 측면의 타당성 여부도 고려대상
 - 지난 정부가 취한 대북제재 방안인 5.24 조치를 앞으로도 유지할 것인지 여부는 북한에 대한 제재전략의 효용성과 남북관계 개선 여부 등 다양한 차원에서 고민해 봐야 할 문제
 - 개성공단 정상화 이후 해당 지역 생산활동이 폐쇄 이전과 비슷한 수준으로 회복된 것은 사실이지만, 북한의 진정한 개혁개방 없이는 경제적 이해타산에 기반한 종합적이고 근본적인 남북경협 추진 불가능
 - 대규모 대북 경제지원의 경우 구체적인 남북관계 현황 분석과 배급의 투명성과 같은 국제적 기준 등을 종합적으로 고려한 전략적 판단이 필요함.
- 2012년 2.29 합의가 무산되고 2013년 북한이 제3차 핵실험을 감행함에 따라 더 이상 북한과 “대화를 위한 대화”를 하지 않겠다는 미국의 강경한 입장을 고려하여, 6자회담 재개 등과 같은 협상에 앞서 해결되어야 할 사항들이 무엇인지 고민할 필요가 있음.
 - 만약 6자회담이 재개된다면 당사국들은 북한이 요구하는 정권보장과 제재완화를 협의하게 될 것이며 한반도 평화체제에 대한 논의도 이루어질 것으로 예상
 - 북한이 비핵화를 결심한다면 미국과 한국을 포함한 6자회담 당사국들은 북한의 정권 보장과 종합적인 경제지원을 제공할 수 있을 것이며 한국은 이런 과정 속에서 주도적인 역할을 수행해야 할 것임
 - 북한의 핵 보유국 지위는 결코 인정될 수 없으며 정부는 6자회담 당사국들이 북한의 비핵화 노력에 충실할 수 있도록 지속적인 외교적 노력을 기울여야 할 것임
- 한반도 평화체제에 대한 논의는 남북한뿐만 아니라 중국과 미국의 참여와 지원이 필요한 사안이며 “선 평화체제, 후 비핵화”와 같은 북한의 주장은 받아들일 수 없음.
 - 어떠한 경우에도 북한의 비핵화를 포기할 수 없고, 이러한 입장을 견지한 가운데 한미중 전략대화 등의 종합적 대북접근을 추진할 수 있을 것으로 예상

- 북한이 핵무기를 배치할 수 있는 역량을 갖추지 못하는 이상 전면전 발생 가능성은 낮음.
 - 다만 북한의 국지도발과 같은 위협은 지속적으로 발생할 것으로 예상되는 만큼 이에 대한 정부의 대응전략을 지속적으로 발전시켜 나가야 함
- 한반도 평화통일을 향한 남북한과 국제사회의 이해와 결속을 도모하기 위해서는 지속가능하고 일관된 통일정책 추진이 필요하며 통일외교 노력도 지속되어야 함
 - 지난 1989년 수립된 한민족공동체통일방안을 지속적으로 발전시켜 나가는 가운데 구체적인 통일비용 마련 및 통일역량 강화 노력이 필요
 - 정부가 제시한 “동북아 평화협력 구상”은 아시아판 헬싱키 프로세스라고 볼 수 있으며 이를 통해 한국은 동북아시아 평화의 중심지로 발돋움해 나갈 수 있을 것으로 기대
 - 비무장지대(DMZ) 세계평화공원 건설, 시베리아 횡단 철도(TSR)와 한반도 종단 철도(TKR) 연결, 유라시아 구상과 같은 추진 사업들을 통해 한국은 한반도에 대한 국제사회의 지원과 관심을 유도하고 러시아와 새로운 신뢰기반을 조성함으로써 균형 있는 중견국으로서 역할 수행 가능
- 중국, 일본을 포함한 한반도 주변 정세는 각종 외교 노력에도 불구하고 역사문제와 영토분쟁 등으로 악화되고 있으며 북한문제는 이러한 전략적 대립관계를 심화시킬 수 있음.
 - 지역 내 갈등 해소와 북한문제 해결을 위해서는 6자회담 당사국들 간 공감대 조성이 절실하며 이를 위해 한중일, 한미중, 한미일 등과 같은 3자 협의체 및 4자 협의체와 같은 틀을 활용하는 것이 중요
 - 정부는 박근혜 대통령 임기 동안 국가안보, 외교, 통일, 북한 관련 정책에 대한 일관성을 유지하는 가운데 국제사회의 지지와 일관된 남북관계를 추구함으로써 북한이 정상적인 국제사회 일원으로 한반도 평화와 안보에 기여함으로써 평화통일을 향한 길에 동참할 수 있도록 유도해 나가야 함
- 한국의 대북정책이 추구하는 궁극적 목표가 평화통일이라는 점에서 갈수록 저하되고 있는 통일에 대한 사회적 인식을 제고시킬 수 있는 방안을 강구해야 할 것임.
 - 북한 사회 엘리트 계층과 일반 주민들에게 한국에 대한 긍정적 인식을 전파하는 것은 물론 중국 동북지방에 거주하는 수십만 재중동포들과 국내 북한이탈주민들을 지원함으로써 북한 내 패러다임 전환의 시기에 대비해야 함
 - 정부는 통일이 위기보다 기회라는 점을 보여줄 수 있는 통일비전 마련과 함께 예측하기 어려운 다양한 상황에 대한 정책대안을 강구하여 국민적 합의를 도출해야 함
 - 북한이 핵무기를 포기하고 경제 재건을 위해 개혁개방에 나설 경우, 확실한 지원방안을 준비해 제시할 수 있어야 할 것



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