



Evolving East Asia Security and the Future of ROK-Japan Strategic Cooperation

November 14-16, 2011

Best Western Premier Kukdo Hotel, Seoul

**East Asia Institute
and
Alliance Project Team, supported by Suntory Foundation**

Knowledge-Net for a Better World

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Information on Venues

1. Conference Venue

- November 16, 2011 (Wednesday)
Tulip A/B, 3rd floor at the Kukdo Hotel
<http://hotelkukdo.com/>
#310 Euljiro 4(Sa)-ga, Jung-gu, SEOUL 100-849 Korea
Tel. 82-2-6436-1234

2. JSA/DMZ Tour

- November 15, 2011 (Tuesday)
JSA/DMZ Tour with USFK staff
 - ※ The participants will meet at 09:00AM in the Lotus Hall, B1 of the hotel for the briefing and then travel to the JSA by bus at 10:15AM.
 - ※ Tour Schedule

09:00-10:10	Brief by Mr. Stephen M. Tharp, Chief, Strategic Outreach, Public Affairs Office, USFK
10:15	Pick-up at the Kukdo hotel
11:30-12:30	3rd Tunnel
12:40-13:10	Lunch (Restaurant at CIQ)
13:30-15:30	UNCMAC Brief/Tour
15:45-16:15	OP Dora

3. Luncheon & Dinner Venue

- November 15, 18:30_Dinner [Jihwaja \(Traditional Korean Restaurant\)](#)
- November 16, 12:00-14:00_Luncheon Tulip C/D, 3rd floor at the Kukdo Hotel
- November 16, 18:30-20:00_Dinner Tulip C/D, 3rd floor at the Kukdo Hotel



Program Schedule

November 16, 2011

9:30~9:45	Registration	Venue: Tulip room A/B, 3rd floor
9:45~10:00	Welcoming Remarks Prof. Sook-Jong Lee, President, East Asia Institute Professor Noboru Yamaguchi (Lt. Gen, Ret.), NDA	
10:00~12:00	Session I. “Evolving East Asian Security Landscape” Moderator Noboru Yamaguchi, National Defense Academy Presenters “The Emerging Structure of Asian International Politics,” Dong Sun Lee, Korea University “Changes and continuity of Japan’s foreign and security policy under the DPJ Government,” Masayuki Tadokoro, Keio University Discussants Keeseok Kim, Kangwon University Daniel Kliman, German Marshall Fund Changhee Nam, Inha University Daisaku Sakaguchi, National Defense Academy Seongho Sheen, Seoul National University Yul Sohn, Yonsei University Tsuneo Watanabe, Tokyo Foundation	
12:00~14:00	Luncheon Speaker	Venue: Tulip room C/D, 3rd floor Kanehara Nobukatsu, Minister and DCM, Japanese Embassy in Seoul Gen. (retired) Burwell B. Bell III, Former Commander United Nations Command; ROK-US Combined Forces Command; United States Forces Korea
14:00~16:00	Session II. “Challenges for Alliance Networks in East Asia” Moderator Brad Glosserman, Pacific Forum CSIS Presenters “U.S. Strategic Shift in the Asia Pacific and Its Impact on the Alliance Network,” Yoichi Kato, Asahi Shimbun “America Abroad: Retrenchment and Rebalancing,”	



		<p>Daniel Kliman, German Marshall Fund “The Challenges and Tasks for the ROK-US Alliance in the 21st Century,” Young-June Park, Korea National Defense University</p>
	Discussants	<p>Chaesung Chun, EAI & Seoul National University Justin Goldman, Pacific Forum CSIS Koki Kawamura, National Defense Academy Toshihiro Minohara, Kobe University Cheol-Hee Park, Seoul National University Ihn-Hwi Park, Ehwa Womans University Atsushi Tago, Kobe University</p>
16:00~16:15	Coffee Break	
16:15~18:15	Session III. “Strengthening ROK-Japan Strategic Cooperation”	
	Moderator	Sook-Jong Lee, EAI
	Presenters	<p>“Japan-ROK strategic cooperation on China and North-east Asia security,” Yasuyo Sakata, Kanda University of International Studies “Post 3/11 regional cooperation on nuclear safety,” Jin Ho Jeon, Kwangwoon University</p>
	Discussants	<p>Seong-Whun Cheon, Korea Institute for National Unification Brad Glosserman, Pacific Forum CSIS Jihwan Hwang, University of Seoul Ho Sup Kim, Chungang University Bong-geun Jun, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security Hideya Kurata, National Defense Academy Noboru Yamaguchi, National Defense Academy</p>
18:15~18:30	Closing Session: Concluding Remarks	
18:30~20:00	Dinner	Venue: Tulip room C/D, 3rd floor
	Speaker	Jin Ha Hwang, Assemblyman, the Grand National Party



List of Participants

1. PANELISTS FROM KOREA

Dr. Seong-Whun Cheon, Korea Institute for National Unification

Prof. Chaesung Chun, East Asia Institute & Seoul National University

Prof. Jihwan Hwang, University of Seoul

Prof. Jin Ho Jeon, Kwangwoon University

Prof. Bong-geun Jun, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security

Prof. Ho Sup Kim, Chungang University

Prof. Keeseok Kim, Kangwon University

Prof. Dong Sun Lee, Korea University

Prof. Sook-Jong Lee, President, East Asia Institute & Sungkyunkwan University

Prof. Changhee Nam, Inha University

Prof. Cheol-Hee Park, Seoul National University

Prof. Ihn-Hwi Park, Ehwa Womans University

Prof. Young-June Park, Korea National Defense University

Prof. Seongho Sheen, Seoul National University

Prof. Yul Sohn, Yonsei University

2. PANELISTS FROM JAPAN

Mr. Yoichi Kato, Asahi Shimbun

Mr. Koki Kawamura, (Lieutenant Colonel, Japan Ground Self Defense Forces (JGSDF), Ground Staff Office of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force, Ministry of Defense

Prof. Hideya Kurata, National Defense Academy, Graduate School of Security Studies

Prof. Toshihiro Minohara, Kobe University

Prof. Yasuyo Sakata, Kanda University of International Studies

Prof. Daisaku Sakaguchi (Colonel, JGSDF), National Defense Academy

Prof. Masayuki Tadokoro, Keio University

Prof. Atsushi Tago, Kobe University

Mr. Shunei Tamura (Captain, Japan Air Self Defense Forces), Planning and Coordination Officer, School of Defense Sciences, National Defense Academy

Mr. Tsuneo Watanabe, Tokyo Foundation, Security Studies Program Director

Prof. Noboru Yamaguchi, Lieutenant General (Ret.), National Defense Academy (Yokosuka);
Director of the Center for Security and Crisis Management



3. PANELISTS FROM THE U.S.A.

Mr. Brad Glosserman, the Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Justin Goldman, Pacific Forum CSIS, Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow

Dr. Daniel Kliman, Transatlantic Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States

4. SPECIAL GUESTS

Mr. Kihyung Kim, Captain, ROK Army; Master's candidate, Graduate School of Security Studies, National Defense Academy (Yokosuka)

Mr. Youngtae Lee, Lieutenant, ROK Navy; Master's candidate, Graduate School of Security Studies, National Defense Academy (Yokosuka)

Mr. Jose H. Ocasio-Santiago, MAJ, IN, Special Assistant to the Eighth Army Commanding General

Mr. Bryan M. Port, Deputy Director of Strategy, Assistant Chief of Staff U/C/J5, UNC/CFC/USFK

Kwang-sok Ryu, Former Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore

Scott Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director, Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign Relations



Biographies of Participants

PANELISTS FROM KOREA

Seong-Whun CHEON

Cheon Seongwhun received his Ph.D. in Management Sciences from the University of Waterloo, Canada. He is a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), Seoul, South Korea. Currently, he is a member of Foreign Affairs and Security Bureau, Presidential Council for Future & Vision and a member of Policy Advisory Committees for the Ministry of Unification, and for Crisis Management, Office of the President. He is also an Editorial Consultant for the Radio Free Asia (RFA). He is the recipient of Commendation of President of the Republic of Korea in 2003 and awards for excellent research from the Korea Research Council for Humanities & Social Sciences in 2001, 2002 and 2003. He is the author of numerous books and reports including “Changing dynamics of US extended nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula,” *Pacific Focus*, Vol.XXVI, No.1 (April 2011), Center for International Studies, Inha University; *ROK-U.S. Strategic Cooperation for Denuclearizing North Korea* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009) (in Korean); *PSI and the South Korean Position* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2008) (in Korean); “North Korea and the ROK-U.S. security alliance,” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.34, No.1 (October 2007).

Chaesung CHUN

Dr. Chaesung Chun is a professor of the department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. He is also a director of Asian Security Initiative Research Center of East Asian Institute. He is a member of Advisory Committee for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Ministry of Reunification. He received his MA degree from the Seoul National University, and Ph.D degree from Northwestern University in the field of International Relations Theory. Major fields include international relations theory, security studies, South Korean Foreign policy, East Asian security relations. Major articles include “A Study on the Formation of European Modern States System,” “Critique of constructivism from the perspective of postmodernism and realism,” “The Rise of New Powers and the Responding Strategies of Other Countries.”



Jihwan HWANG

Jihwan Hwang is an assistant professor of International Relations at University of Seoul, Seoul, Korea. Professor Hwang was a professor of North Korean studies at Myongji University. His research interests include East Asian international relations and security studies, focusing on the North Korean nuclear crisis. His main concern is how to explain North Korea's foreign policy in terms of international relations theories. He published numerous articles, and his recent publications include "International Relations Theory and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis," "Offensive Realism, Weaker States, and Windows of Opportunity: The Soviet Union and North Korea in Comparative Perspective," "The Second Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy," and "Rethinking the East Asian Balance of Power." Professor Hwang received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Jin Ho JEON

Jin Ho Jeon is a professor of international relations at Kwangwoon University, Seoul, Korea. Professor Jeon is also research fellow of East Asia Institute. His research interests are Japan's foreign policy and Korea-Japan relations. He was visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Tokyo, Japan. He also published numerous articles, and edited several books. His recent publications include "International Politics of Fukushima Nuclear Accident," "A New Approach of the Korea-Japan Security Cooperation," and "Japan's East Asian Foreign Policy." Professor Jeon received his Ph.D. in International Relations from Tokyo University.

Bong-geun JUN

Bong-Geun Jun is a Professor and the Director of Center for Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS). Before joining the IFANS, Professor Jun held a few government and NGO positions. Dr. Jun's research area covers the North Korean nuclear issue, inter-Korean relations, nonproliferation and nuclear energy policies. Dr. Jun received a BA and MA in political science from Seoul National University in 1982 and 1984 respectively and the Ph.D. in Political Science from University of Oregon in 1992.



Ho Sup KIM

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Kim Keeseok is a professor of political science at Kangwon National University in Chunchon, Kangwon-Do. He received Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and teaches Comparative Politics, Japanese politics and East Asian regionalism. His research interests are Japanese policies for East Asian regional cooperation and East Asian Regional Architecture, and his most recent publications include “*How Has Korea Imagined Its Region? Asia-Pacific, Northeast Asia, and East Asia*,” (2010), “*Japan’s East Asian Policy*,” (2010) etc. e-mail: keeseok@kangwon.ac.kr

Dong Sun LEE

Dong Sun Lee is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. His research interests include East Asian security and international relations theory. Dr. Lee received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago and conducted research for the East-West Center, before assuming his current position.

He is author of *Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining States and International Conflict* (Routledge, 2008) and of articles in scholarly journals, including *Asian Security*, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, *Journal of East Asian Studies*, and *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*.

He also contributed to edited volumes such as *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia* (Stanford University Press, 2008) and *The International Encyclopedia of Peace* (Oxford University Press, 2009). His current research focuses on North Korea and alliances of the Asia-Pacific region.

Sook-Jong LEE

Sook Jong Lee is a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, Korea. Professor Lee is currently the President of East Asia Institute, an independent, non-profit think-tank based in Seoul. Her research interests are the civil society and democracy of Korea and Japan, and the two countries’ political economy and policy opinions. Her previous positions include Re-



search Fellow at the Sejong Institute, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Professorial Lecturer at the SAIS of Johns Hopkins University. She has been participating in the Korea-Japan Forum, speaking at various American universities as well as think-tanks. She also published numerous articles, and edited several books. Her recent publications include “The Demise of ‘Korea Inc.’: Paradigm Shift in Korea's Developmental State,” “The Assertive Nationalism of South Korean Youth: Cultural Dynamism and Political Activism,” and “Japan’s Changing Security norms and Perceptions since the 1990s.” Professor Lee received her Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University.

Changhee NAM

Chang-hee Nam is Professor of the Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Inha University of the Republic of Korea. Prior to joining Inha University in 2001, he was a research fellow at KIDA (1994-2000), working on Korea-Japan security cooperation, ROK-US alliance management, and analyses of Japan’s security policies. He was also a visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, Japan in 1999, and conducted research as a visiting fellow at Kyushu University in 2006. He graduated Yonsei University in 1987 with B.A. in political science and diplomacy, and received his M.A. (1989) and Ph.D. (1992) in political science from the University of Kansas at Lawrence. He has published many books and articles, including “Relocating the U.S. Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture,” in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July/August 2006); “The Alliance Transformation and US-Japan-Korea Security Network: A Case for Trilateral Cooperation,” *Pacific Focus*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (April 2010).

Cheol-Hee PARK

Cheol Hee Park is a professor and associate dean at the Graduate school of International Studies (GSIS) at Seoul National University, where he teaches Japanese politics, Korea-Japan relations, and international relations in East Asia. He got a Ph.D. at Columbia University. Before joining a faculty at Seoul National University, Dr. Park was an assistant professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Japan, and also served as an assistant professor at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security under the Korean Foreign Ministry. He also served as a visiting professor at Columbia University, Keio University and Kobe University. He authored two books independently: *Daigishi no Tsukurare Kata* (How Japan’s Dietman Is Made) (Bungeishun-



gyu, 2000); and *Jamindang Jongkwon gwa Chonhu Cheje eui Byunyong* (LDP Politics and the Transformation of Postwar System in Japan) (SNU Press, 2011). He published many articles on East Asian politics and international relations in Korean, Japanese, and English at various journals, including *Asian Survey*, *Japanese Journal of Political Studies*, *Asian Journal of Political Science*, *Asia-Pacific Review*, *International Political Science Review*, *Korean Political Science Review*, *Korean Journal of International Relations*, and etc. He is a coauthor of several books, including *Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia* (Routledge, 2011), *U.S. Leadership, History, and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia* (Cambridge University Press, 2011), *East Asia's Haunted Present* (Praeger International Security, 2008), and *Japan's Strategic Thought toward Asia* (Palgrave, 2007). He received the First Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2005 in recognition of academic activities and practical contribution to the friendly ties between South Korea and Japan. He can be reached at chpark82@snu.ac.kr.

Ihn-Hwi PARK

Ihn-hwi Park is an associate professor of the Division of International Studies at Ewha Womans University in the Rep. of Korea. Prof. Park's area of expertise lies in international security, U.S. foreign policy and East Asian international relations. He was a Research Professor of Asiatic Research Center at Korea University (2001-02), and has been a Non-resident Research Fellow for Korea-US Exchange Council (2001-04). He is currently a member of the Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade since 2011, and a member of the Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Unification since 2009. Prof. Park has also served as a member of the Internal Performance Evaluation Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2006-2010). He is a director of research committee of the Korean Association of International Studies for 2011, and was a director of editorial committee of the Korean Political Science Association for 2008. He also serves as a member of editorial board for *The Korean Journal of Unification Affairs* and for *East and West Studies*. Prof. Park published numerous articles, and edited several books. His recent publications include *Korea's National Security in the age of Globalization: Key Subjects and Significances*, "Sino-Japan Strategic Rivalry and the Security of the Korean Peninsula" in *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* (in English, 2007), and "Politics of Security and Insecurity on the Korean Peninsula" in the *Korean Political Science Review* (in Korean, 2011). He receives his Ph. D. in Political Science from Northwestern University in 1999.



Young-June PARK

Young-June Park is professor of the National Security College of the Korea National Defense University (KNDU) and also Director of the Research Center for International Conflicts and Terrorism in the KNDU. He received his B.A. from Yonsei University and M.A. from Seoul National University. After receiving Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Tokyo in 2002, his academic interests cover Japanese security policy, as well as international security issues. He has written dozens of articles on international security issues focusing on Japanese foreign policy and East Asian security affairs and published some books including *The Third Japan* (2008, in Korean) and co-edited *The International Politics of Security*(2010, in Korean). He was a member of policy advisers for Korean National Security Council from 2004 to 2006 and is a member of Presidential Committee of the Joint Research for a New Era between Korea and Japan. He also was an academic associate of the US-Japan program of Harvard University from 2010-2011.

Seongho SHEEN

Seongho Sheen is an associate professor at Graduate School of Int'l Studies, Seoul National University. He was a visiting fellow at the East-West Center DC, a CNAPS fellow at the Brookings Institution, an assistant research professor at Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), Honolulu, Hawaii and a research fellow at Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), Cambridge, Mass, the U.S. His area of interest includes International Security, US Foreign Policy, Northeast Asian Politics and the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Sheen received his Ph.D. and M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and his B.A. from Seoul National University.

Yul SOHN

Yul Sohn is Professor of Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies. He received his Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Chicago, and served as professor at Chung-ang University, foreign scholar at the University of Tokyo's Institute of Social Science, and visiting professor at Waseda University. His research interests are Japanese politics and foreign policy, international political economy, and East Asian regionalism, and his recent academic publications include: "Japan's New Regionalism: China Shock, Universal Values and East Asian Community" (*Asian Survey* 2010), "The Post-Crisis East Asia and the Future of Regionalism," (*East Asian Review* 2011), "Securing Trade: The Case of Korea-US FTA"(coauthored with Mingyo Koo) (*International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 2011).



PANELISTS FROM JAPAN

Yoichi KATO

Yoichi Kato is national security correspondent of *The Asahi Shimbun*. His area of expertise is the national security strategy of Japan and its alliance with the United States. He also writes extensively on the regional strategic issues. He was the bureau chief of *Asahi's* American General Bureau in Washington, D.C. until May 2009. He covered the presidential election of 2008 and interviewed the president of the United States, George W. Bush in 2008. He was deputy editor of both the political and foreign news departments from 2002 to 2004 in Tokyo. From 2001 to 2002 he was a visiting research fellow at both the Institute for National Strategic Studies/ National Defense University (INSS/NDU) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Prior to his assignment in Washington, D.C., Mr. Kato extensively covered Japanese politics and government policies, specializing in the area of national security as a staff writer in the Political News Department. He received Masters of Arts (MA) in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He teaches national security strategy at Gakushuin University in Tokyo

Koki KAWAMURA

Koki Kawamura is now on the Ground Staff Office of the Ministry of Defense working on defense policy at the Policy and Plans Division. He was commissioned as a signal corps officer at the Officer Candidate School, JGSDF in 1996 and served at various assignments including company commander of Signal School's Demonstration Unit and staff officer of the Training Division of the Northern Army Headquarters. He is a graduate from the Keio University majoring History and received his master's degree from the Law Department of the Keio University before joining the JGSDF. He attended the Command and General Staff Course of the JGSDF Staff College and received his second master's degree from the National Defense Academy's Graduate School of Security Studies.

**Hideya KURATA**

Hideya Kurata is professor at the National Defense Academy. Received B.A. and M.A. in political science from Keio University; completed the doctoral program at the same university. He was also a Fellow at Graduate School of Social Science of Yonsei University in ROK from 1986 to 1987. He had served various positions including Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Associate Professor in International Studies, Tokoha-Gakuen Fuji Junior College, Associate Professor and Professor at Kyorin University, and Lecturer at University of Tokyo. His research interests are international security, nuclear non-proliferation, and Korean politics. His recent publications include, *Foreign Policies of Expanding China* (co-authored, Keisho-shobo, 2010, in Japanese), *Politics and Laws of Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation* (co-authored, Shinzansha, 2008, in Japanese) and “A Conceptual Analysis of the Six-Party Talks: Building Peace through Security Assurances,” *Asian Security*, Vol. 3, No.1 (2007, in English).

Toshihiro MINOHARA

Toshihiro Minohara is currently Professor of International History (diplomacy, politics and intelligence) at Kobe University, Graduate School of Law. He received his B.A. in international relations from University of California (UC), Davis, and his M.A. and Ph.D. in diplomatic history from Kobe University, Graduate School of Law. Dr. Minohara has had various visiting appointments with such universities as Harvard University, UC Irvine, University of Iowa, Stockholm University, Cairo University, Kuwait University, University of Oxford, Leiden University and Seoul National University. His major book publications include *Hainichi iminhō to nichibei kankei* [The Japanese Exclusion Act and US-Japan Relations] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2002) which was awarded the 2003 Japanese Association for American Studies *Shimizu Hiroshi Prize*; “*Karifornia-shu ni okeru hainichi undo to nichibei kankei* [The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and U.S.-Japan Relations] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2006). He has contributed chapters in Makoto Iokibe ed., *Nichibeikankeishi* [A History of US-Japan Relations] (Yuhikaku, 2008) and edited two books, *Zero nendai: Nihon no Judai Ronten; Gaikou to Anzenhoshou de yomitoku* [Japanese Foreign Relations and National Security during the 2000s] (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobo, 2011) and *Tumultuous Decade: Japan's Quest for Alternative Internationalism, 1931-1941* (University of Toronto Press, forthcoming in 2012). He also maintains a keen interest in current affairs relating to Japanese foreign policy and American-Japanese relations.



Yasuyo SAKATA

Yasuyo Sakata is professor of international relations at Kanda University of International Studies in Japan. She specializes in Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia security. Received her M.A. in political science from Keio University. She was a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Modern Korean Studies at the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University, 2008-09. She participated in Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project (2009-present), Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) Northeast Asia Security Project, Study Group on Defense and Diplomacy (Japan Ministry of Defense), Japan-Korea Cooperation Committee, Japan-Korea Forum, Japan-Korea Policy Dialogue (Sejong Institute), Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). Contributed chapters to publications including Masao Okonogi, ed., *Kiki no Chousenhantou [Crisis on the Korean Peninsula]* (co-authored; Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2005), Kim Myongsob, Amitav Acharya, eds., *Northeast Asia and the Two Koreas* (co-authored; Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2008), Ken Jimbo, Tokyo Zaidan Asia Security Project, *Ajia Taiheiyou no Anzenhoshou Arukitekucha: Chiiki Anzenhoshou no Sansou kouzou [Asia-Pacific Security Architecture: Three-Tiered Approach to Regional Security]* (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 2011), “Korea and the Japan-U.S. Alliance” in T. Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, Y. Sato, eds., *The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance* (Palgrave, 2011), “Japan and Korea” in Toshihiro Minohara, ed., *Zeronendai* (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 2011).

Daisaku SAKAGUCHI

Daisaku Sakaguchi is currently a professor of the School of Defense Sciences at the National Defense Academy of Japan. Prior to the current assignment, he served as a Researcher of the National Institute for Defense Studies. He also served as a Staff officer in the Office of Strategic Studies, Defense Policy Bureau, Japan Defense Agency and Company Commander, 4th Infantry Regiment, 5th Division, Hokkaido. He graduated from the National Defense Academy in 1984 majored in International relations, matriculated at the GSDF Staff College, and received Master of Sociology from Graduate School of Security Studies, National Defense Academy in 2000, and Master of Public and International Affairs from Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A. in 2005. His recent writings include: “Comparative Advantage Theory and Deepening the Alliance? Dividing military responsibility between Japan and U.S. and optimization of force composition” *Journal of Ground Warfare* (January 2011); “Distance and Military Operations-Theoretical background for Stronger Defense of Islands,” *NIDS Security Reports*, Vol.13, Number 1, October 2010; and “Realignment of USFJ and its Influence on Interdependence between the U.S. and Japan” *NIDS Security Studies*, Vol.1, Number11, November 2008.

**Masayuki TADOKORO**

Masayuki Tadokoro is professor of International Relations at Keio University (2002-). Born in Osaka, he attended Kyoto University and London School of Economics for postgraduate studies. Previously he was a professor at the National Defense Academy. In 1988-89, he stayed in Washington DC as a fellow at American Council of Learned Societies. In 1991, he taught for a semester as Fulbright Scholar in Residence at the University of Pittsburg in Johnstown. His main field is international political economy. He also works on Japanese foreign and security policy and international organizations. Publications include: *The Realities of the UN: A Budgetary Analysis* (Yuhikaku, 1996); *Foreign Correspondents in Tokyo* (co-authored with Masato Kimura, NHK Publishing Co., 1998); *The Dollar goes beyond "America"* (Chuokoron Shinsha, 2001); and *International Political Economy* (Nagoya University Press, 2008). His recent publications in English includes, "Why did Japan fail to become the 'Britain' of Asia", David Wolff etc. ed., *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective*, Brill, 2007, "After dollar?", *International Relations of Asia Pacific* (2010) 10(3). Also he edited with David Welch and Yoshihide Soeya, *Japan as a 'Normal Country'?: A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World*, Toronto U.P. 2011.

Atsushi TAGO

Atsushi Tago is associate professor of International Relations of the Graduate School of Law, Kobe University, Japan. From October 2010 to September 2012, Professor Tago is on his two-year-sabbatical at the Department of Political Science, the UC San Diego. His research interests are international and domestic politics over US multilateral/unilateral use of force, alliance reliability theory, and empirical analyses on US-led military coalitions. He was a visiting scholar of the Department of Political Science, the University of Michigan from 2002-2004. He has been serving as an associate editor of the *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, the official English journal published by the Japanese Association of International Relations since 2009. He has published several articles in English/Japanese and a book in Japanese. Recent publications include "When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable?" (*Journal of Peace Research*: 2009), "Why do states join US-led military coalitions?" (*International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*: 2007) and "Determinants of multilateralism in US use of force" (*Journal of Peace Research*: 2005). Professor Tago received his Ph.D. in Advanced Social and International Studies from the University of Tokyo in 2007.



Shunei TAMURA

Shunei Tamura is currently planning and coordination officer of the School of Defense Sciences at the National Defense Academy of Japan. He graduated from the National Defense Academy in 2001 and majored in public administration. After receiving his original training as a rescue pilot, he switched his occupational specialty to intelligence in 2004. He worked as an intelligence officer at Misawa JASDF Base. In 2007 he became a group leader of intelligence section of the Headquarter of the 5th air wing. He completed his four month-long tour to Kuwait for the mission of Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq as an intelligence officer. He received his MA from the Asia-Pacific Studies program at Waseda University in 2011. His research interests are the U.S – Australia alliance and Australia disaster relief policy.

Tsuneo WATANABE

Tsuneo Watanabe is director of foreign & security policy research and senior fellow at the Tokyo Foundation, an independent think tank in Tokyo. In October 2008, Watanabe joined the Tokyo Foundation after serving as senior fellow at the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute in Tokyo since April 2005. His current research interests are U.S.-Japan relations, Japan's foreign & security policy, and U.S politics and policies. In 1995, Watanabe joined the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. He served as visiting research scholar, research associate, fellow, senior fellow and currently adjunct fellow. His recent publications include “Think-tanks and Foundations on Japan and the US-Japan relations” in *What supports the US Politics: Study of the Political Infrastructure* [co-authored with Fumiaki Kubo et al. in Japanese] (Japan Institute for International Affairs, 2010); “US Strategy after the Global Posture Review” in *Strategic Yet Strained* [co-authored with Derek Mitchell et al] (Henry Stimson Center, 2008), *To Understand Contemporary America* [in Japanese] (Mikasashobo, 2007); *the Challenge of 9/11 Terrorism to Japan: Warning from a U.S. Think Tank* [in Japanese] (Zaikai21, 2002) and “*Changing Japanese Views of China: A New Generation Moves toward Realism and Nationalism*” in *The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications* [co-authored with Kurt Campbell et al] (Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College 2002) Watanabe received his D.D.S. from Tohoku University in Japan and his M.A. in political science from the New School for Social Research in New York.

**Noboru YAMAGUCHI**

Noboru Yamaguchi is currently a professor and the Director of the Center for National Security and Crisis Management Studies of the National Defense Academy of Japan. He graduated from the National Defense Academy in 1974 majoring in applied physics and originally trained as an army aviator flying mainly helicopters. LTG Yamauchi received his MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University in 1988, and was a National Security Fellow at John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University in 1991-1992. He has held positions as Senior Defense Attaché at the Japanese Embassy in the United States, Deputy Commandant of the GSDF Aviation School, Vice President of the National Institute for Defense Studies. Since 2006 he held responsibilities as Commanding General of the GSDF Research and Development Command until his retirement from active duty in December 2008. His recent writings include: “Japan and China: Towards a 'Strategic Relationship for Mutual Benefit' from 'Politically Cold but Economically Warm' Relations,” in *China Rising: Reactions, Assessments, and Strategic Consequences, Strategic Yearbook 2007*, edited by Bo Huldt et al. (Sweden: Swedish National Defence College, 2008); and “US Defence Transformation and Japan's Defence Policy,” in *RUSI Journal* (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2006).



3. PANELISTS FROM THE U.S.A

Brad GLOSSERMAN

Brad Glosserman is Executive Director of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, a nonprofit, foreign policy research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Affairs (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. The Pacific Forum has provided policy-oriented analysis and promoted dialogue on regional security, political, economic and environmental issues in the Asia-Pacific region since 1975. He oversees all aspects of Pacific Forum activities. Mr. Glosserman is co-editor of *Comparative Connections*, the Pacific Forum's quarterly electronic journal, and writes, along with Pacific Forum President Ralph Cossa, the regional review. He directs the Pacific Forum's Young Leaders program and all other fellowships. He has written dozens of monographs on U.S. foreign policy and Asian security relations. Other articles have appeared in scholarly journals throughout the region, and he has contributed numerous chapters to various books on regional security. He is the editor (with Tae-hyo Kim) of *The Future of U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Balancing Values and Interests* (CSIS Press 2004). His opinion articles and commentary regularly appear in media around the globe. He is a frequent participant in U.S. State Department visiting lecture programs and speaks at conferences, research institutes and universities around the world. He has served on several foreign policy task forces, is a member of the executive committee of the US Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, is on the International Advisory Board of the Korean Demilitarized Zone Council, and is an international advisor for Hawaii Pacific University. Prior to joining Pacific Forum, Mr. Glosserman was, for 10 years, a member of The Japan Times editorial board, and wrote a weekly column on technology. He continues to serve as a contributing editor for the newspaper. While in Japan, he also was a lecturer on Japanese politics at the Institute for the International Education of Students.

Justin GOLDMAN

Justin Goldman is a 2011-2012 Pacific Forum CSIS Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow. He joined the U.S. Marine Corps in June 1998 after graduating from high school. As a machine-gunner he participated in two Western Pacific naval deployments, training in countries ranging from Singapore to the United Arab Emirates. He participated in humanitarian assistance in East Timor before operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit during



2001-2002. Following an honorable discharge, Goldman entered Regis University in August 2002. In the spring of 2005 he worked as a researcher in the office of the Right Honorable Colin Breed, a Member of Parliament from the southwest of England. He graduated from Regis in May 2006 with a B.A. in International Policy and began working on the U.S.-Royal Australian Navy joint heavyweight torpedo program. In April 2007 he accepted a position as a West Africa analyst for the Marine Corps and deployed in the spring of 2008 with Africa Partnership Station, a regional maritime security cooperation engagement onboard USS Fort McHenry. He entered the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore in July 2009 and earned his MSc in Strategic Studies in July 2010. As an Associate Research Fellow in Military Studies at RSIS he was involved with instruction for the Singapore Armed Forces up to the Command and Staff College level.

Daniel KLIMAN

Daniel Kliman is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). He helps to lead GMF's growing line of work on Japan; South Korea; fostering deeper cooperation between democratic Asia and the West; and managing the impact of rising powers on the international system. Before joining GMF, Kliman was a visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Kliman received his Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University. He has served as a Japan Policy Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and an Adjunct Research Associate with the Institute for Defense Analyses. He has also held positions at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Kliman has authored one book, *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World*, and has published op-eds in the *The Washington Post*, *The Wall Street Journal Asia Edition*, *Foreign Policy*, *CNN*, *the Diplomat*, and other major news outlets. Kliman graduated from Stanford University, where he studied political science and economics. He speaks fluent Japanese and is conversant in basic Chinese.



4. SPECIAL GUESTS

Kihyung KIM

Kihyung KIM is Captain of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and is presently working on his Master's Degree at the Graduate School of Security Studies, National Defense Academy from April 2010. He graduated from the Korea Military Academy. He majored in Japanese language. His previous assignment was with the Maneuver Battalion, 37th Division where he served as a Personnel Officer. He completed his infantry Officer Advanced Course at Joen-nam. His current research theme is the impact of Okinawa's reversion to Japan and U.S commitment on the security of Korea.

Youngtae LEE

Young-tae LEE is Lieutenant of the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) and is presently working on his Master's Degree at the Graduate School of Security Studies, National Defense Academy from April 2010. He graduated from the Korea Naval Academy. He majored in Management Science & Operation Research. His previous assignment was Headquarter of ROKN, Military Force Analysis & Test & Evaluation Group, System Analysis Office where he served as a Munition Analysis Officer. His current research theme is "Korea and Japan's security perception gap on a Rising China".

Jose H. OCASIO-SANTIAGO

Major Ocasio is a native of Puerto Rico and moved to the United States in 1983 where he attended schooling THRU University at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He joined the military in 1990 as a soldier and commissioned as an officer in 1995 where he served in the infantry. Major Ocasio has conducted multiple deployments in a variety of environments (peace enforcement, early entry operations and combat) and locations (Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia). Major Ocasio is also an army strategist and a joint planner. He is a graduate of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in Norfolk Virginia. He has served in Korea since Nov 2010 and his portfolio includes transformation, WMD and regional analysis.

**Bryan M. PORT**

Bryan M. Port is an international relations officer serving as the Deputy Director of Strategy, Assistant Chief of Staff U/C/J5 (Strategy, Policy, and Plans) United Nations Command (UNC), Combined Forces Command (CFC), and US Forces Korea (USFK). He has served in the Army and as a Civilian since 1995 in multiple positions in Korea, the U.S., Iraq, and Afghanistan. Port is proficient in Korean and was previously proficient in Japanese. He holds a Masters Degree in national security studies from Georgetown University.

Kwang-sok RYU

Kwang-sok RYU is Adviser, Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). He was a diplomat from 1973 to 2009. During his diplomat career, he served as Secretary General for the Northeast Asian History Foundation in 2006; the Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore 2003 to 2006; Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission, Korean Embassy in Japan from 2000 to 2003; Consul-General in Korean Consulate General in Atlanta, U.S.; Director-General of Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau at the MOFA. He was visiting scholar at Keio University in Japan from 1990 to 1992. Mr. Ryu received his M.A. from Georgetown University and his B.A. from Seoul National University.

Scott SNYDER

Scott Snyder is senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), where he had served as an adjunct fellow from 2008 to 2011. Mr. Snyder's program examines South Korea's efforts to contribute on the international stage; its potential influence and contributions as a middle power in East Asia; and the peninsular, regional, and global implications of North Korean instability. Mr. Snyder is also the editor of *The U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Meeting New Security Challenges* (forthcoming, Lynne Rienner Publishers). He served as the project director for the CFR's Independent Task Force on policy toward the Korean Peninsula. He currently writes for the blog, "Asia Unbound." Prior to joining CFR, Snyder was a senior associate in the international relations program of The Asia Foundation, where he founded and directed the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and served as The Asia Foundation's representative in Korea (2000-2004). He was also a senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS. Mr. Snyder has worked as an Asia specialist in the research and studies program of the U.S. Institute of Peace and as acting director of Asia Society's contemporary affairs program. He was a Pan-



tech visiting fellow at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center during 2005-06, and received an Abe fellowship, administered by the Social Sciences Research Council, in 1998-99.

Mr. Snyder has authored numerous book chapters on aspects of Korean politics and foreign policy and Asian regionalism and is the author of *China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security* (2009), *Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea* (co-editor, 2003), and *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* (1999). He has provided advice to NGOs and humanitarian organizations active in North Korea and serves on the advisory council of the National Committee on North Korea and Global Resource Services.

Mr. Snyder received a BA from Rice University and an MA from the regional studies East Asia program at Harvard University and was a Thomas G. Watson fellow at Yonsei University in South Korea.



Presentation Materials

Session I. Evolving East Asian Security Landscape



Session 1 Evolving East Asian Security Landscape

“The Emerging Structure of Asian International Politics”

Dong Sun Lee, Korea University

The Emerging Structure of Asian International Politics

Dong Sun Lee
Korea University

Questions

- What will Asian security landscape look like in 2025?
 - ▣ Power distribution
 - ▣ Security order
- What are the best strategic options available to Korea and Japan?

Security landscape

■ Power distribution in Asia

- The US and China will be first-rate great powers, while India and Russia will be second-rate great powers.

□ Latent power

	China	USA	India	Russia	Japan	Korea
GDP (US\$ bn)	9,658	15,568	3,219	837.8	5,726	1,411
Power index	17.61	17	10.71	2.464	3.225	1.721

□ Military power

- The US will possess superior naval power, while China will enjoy an advantage in land power.
- India and Russia will have potent land power and nuclear force.

■ Security order

- The US and China will be leaders of regional politics.
- The US will be the leader of maritime Asia—including The Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, New Guinea, and Australia.
- China will be the leading power in adjacent continental sub-region—containing North Korea, Mongolia, Laos, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
- The US and China will compete to expand their spheres of influence, due to security dilemmas:
 - Sea lanes
 - Littoral areas: e.g., the Korean Peninsula

- The Sino-US competition will be limited:
 - Both states will not attempt to achieve regional hegemony, because they are unable to do so.
 - Geography reduces their offensive capabilities against each other.
- India and Russia will adopt balancing strategies in order to maintain political autonomy and exert influence over their close vicinities.
 - These continental powers are likely to perceive China as the most threatening state.

Strategic options available


- Korea
 - Strategies for hegemony or leadership are infeasible.
 - Accommodation is problematic:
 - Neutrality destroys US alliance—an effective instrument for deterring North Korea and China as well as for protecting sea-borne trade.
 - Neutrality could intensify the Sino-US security dilemma.
 - Bandwagoning with China might endanger political independence.

- Balancing is the best available option.
- Effective balancing will require:
 - Security cooperation with the US and other maritime states.
 - Armament with clear priorities—land power, coastal navy, tactical air power

■ Japan

- Hegemony and leadership are beyond reach.
- Accommodation with China is unrealistic:
 - China will pose larger security threats (e.g., to sea lanes).
 - The US will go to a great length to keep Japan as an ally.
- Balancing is the best available strategy.
- Effective balancing will require:
 - Developing naval and air power.
 - Cooperating with the US and maritime states
 - Preventing China's control of Korea.

- Korea-Japan security cooperation
 - ▣ The states share strategic goals.
 - ▣ They possess complementary types of military powers.
 - ▣ Korea-Japan security cooperation has a good *long-term* prospect.
 - ▣ An optimal model for cooperation is a division of labor.





Session 1 Evolving East Asian Security Landscape

“Changes and continuity of Japan’s foreign and security policy under the DPJ Government”

Masayuki Tadokoro, Keio University


Changes and continuity of Japan's foreign and security policy under the DPJ Government

Masayuki Tadokoro
Keio University


Defense Activism before the DPJ?

- * Systemic changes in strategic landscape
- * More intensive involvement into UN peace keeping missions
- * Hawkish anti-China discourses
- * Revision of the Constitution openly discussed


Total GDP (millions of 1990 US\$, converted at Geary Khamis PPPs)




Public Opinion on Constitutional Amendment (Yomiuri Shimbun)



Armed forces personnel (thousands)



Total military expenditure



DPJ Platform in 2009

- * “close and equal Japan-US relation”
- * “autonomous foreign policy strategy”
 - * Termination of the refueling mission by JMSDF
- * Revision of SOFA
- * Reexamine the realignment of US forces in Japan
 - * Futenma Base relocation out of Okinawa


DPJ Platform cont.,

- * Building an “East Asian Community”
- * Promote “intra-regional cooperation”.
- * FTAs with countries in the Asia-Pacific region”.
- * “aim to reduce CO2 emission by 25% by 2020”


After two years

- * Return to the original plan for Futenma relocation
- * Anti-piracy operation off Somalia
- * dispatching JGSDF for peacekeeping in Sudan
- * 2010 NDPG, return to home?
- * More dependence on fossil fuel
- * Starting TPP negotiation
- * No improvement in Sino-Japanese Relations

Japanese image of China



Japanese image of Korea




Why the U-turn?

- * DPJ's incompetence
- * China's hardline policies
- * US's successful handling of the DPJ
- * The Tohoku Earthquake
- * Korean factors?

Return to “Normalcy”?

- * US-Japan relations stuck by the Futenma issue.
- * DPJ 's unpopularity in recent elections
- * Decay of LDP?
- * Further realignment of political parties?
- * Internal agenda likely to dominate Japan's politics

Revision of the Constitution



Long-term implications

- * Bi-partisan support for the mainstream position?
- * Weakening of the foreign–security community?
- * A pioneering attempt to redefine Japan’s security strategy?

Korean Factors

- * Korea as a geopolitical factors
 - * the Cheonan incident etc.,
- * Korea as a model
 - * FTA with the US, Samsung, alliance management etc.
- * Korea as a competitor
 - * Industrial competition, Aid agencies etc.
- * Korea as a partner in non-traditional security fields?
 - * Handling China, Energy, Environments etc.,



Session II. Challenges for Alliance Networks in East Asia



Session II Challenges for Alliance Networks in East Asia

“U.S. Strategic Shift in the Asia Pacific and Its Impact on the Alliance Network”

Yoichi Kato, Asahi Shimbun

“US Strategic Shift in the Asia Pacific and Its Impact on the Alliance Network “

East Asia Institute & Alliance Project Team

Seoul, ROK

November 16, 2001

Yoichi Kato

Table of Contents

- (1) Strategic Shift of US Asia Pacific Strategy
- (2) Drivers for Change
- (3) Shift of Leadership Structure
- (4) Possible impact on Japan-US alliance

(1) Two “Strategic Shifts” of US Asia Pacific Strategy

- “Return of US to Asia”
- Air Sea Battle

QDR 2010

- The United States has been a **Pacific power** for more than a century.
- We seek to **sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific alliances** and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region.
- we will **augment and adapt our forward presence**, which reassures allies of the U.S. commitment to their security.
- we will encourage our allies and partners to enhance their roles in security and in regular multilateral security cooperation within the region to build trust, increase transparency, and reduce the risks of crisis or conflict.

Eat Asia Strategy Report 1995

U.S. Interests in Asia

- Peace and Security
- Commercial Access to the Region
- Freedom of Navigation
- **The Prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition**

(2) Drivers for Change

- Pressure of Defense Budget Reduction
- End of Iraq/Afghanistan War
- China's Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities
- Perception: US can't maintain primacy

Pressure of Defense Budget Reduction(1)

“It will do more damage to their fighting capacity than the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or any other external force could possibly inflict”

(Max Boot, Testimony at Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, September 13, 2011)

Pressure of Defense Budget Reduction(2)

“The most significant threat to our national security is our debt.”

"And the reason is because the ability for our country to resource our military is going to be directly proportional to help our economy.”

(Adm. Michael Mullen, CJCS, August 27, 2010)

End of Iraq/Afghanistan War

➤ Shift of US Strategic Focus

“Global War on Terror”



How to deal with Rise of China

China's Growing Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities

“ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENTS “

“As part of its planning for a regional contingency, [China is developing measures to deter or counter third-party intervention, including by the United States](#). Although many of these capabilities were developed with a focus on Taiwan, they have broad applications and implications extending beyond a Taiwan scenario. [The U.S. Department of Defense characterizes these as ‘anti-access’ and ‘area denial’ capabilities.](#) “

(ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011)



Challenge to U.S. Forces

- The combination of China's improving anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities poses a **significant challenge to U.S. military forces** operating in the region.

(2010 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission)

PLA's Conventional Anti-Access Capabilities





Perception: US can't maintain
primacy

U.S. Leadership in Crisis?

- "Renewing American Leadership" (National Security Strategy 2010)
- "Sustain Leadership"
(Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century,"
Foreign Policy, November 2011)
- "Dual Leadership"?

(3) Shift of Leadership Structure

Shift of Leadership Structure


- Cold War Era
 - “**uncontested US primacy**”
 - Major Trading Partner—USA
 - Primary Security Guarantor—USA

- Post-CW, 9/11, Lehman Shock Era
 - “**Dual Dependency**”
 - Major Trading Partner--China
 - Primary Security Guarantor--USA

Shift of Regional Leadership Structure

	Cold War Era	Present	Future?
Major Trading Partner	USA ➔ Shift 1	China	China
Primary Security Guarantor	USA	USA ➔ Shift 2	China
Leadership Structure	Uncontested US Primacy ➔	Contested US Primacy Or Dual Leadership Power Share ➔	China Primacy?

A2/AD AS Battle



Lack of Common Understanding

➤ Unintended (?) Consequence of A2/AD

China: Counter-intervention measures for Taiwan contingency (“反介入”)

USA: Beyond Taiwan; Challenge to US Leadership position (米国主導への挑戦)

➡ Mutual Skepticism

➡ Need for more strategic transparency and strategic dialogue on regional security order ; 地域安全保障秩序に関する透明性、戦略対話の必要性

Possible Changes of US Asia Pacific Strategy

➤ Enhancement of its Regional Commitment

“Pacific Power”

➤ Expansion of Strategic Scope

Geographical:

“Asia-Pacific” ➡ “Indo-Pacific” + “Eurasia”

Dimensional:

Ground/Sea ➡ Air/Space/Cyber

maritime security, cyber security, space security

➤ Change of role

➤ Beyond “Strategic Assurance”?

➤ Operationalization of “Joint Air Sea Battle” Concept

➤ Pre-JASB Adjustments

Enhancement of its Regional Commitment

Messages from USG 1

Hillary Clinton, “**America’s Pacific Century**,”
Foreign Policy, November 2011

Clinton, “**America’s Pacific Century**”

➤ Goals

- (1) Sustain Our Leadership
- (2) Secure Our Interests
- (3) Advance Our Values

Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”

➤ American Interests

“Harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama.”

Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”

➤ Regional Security Challenges

- (1) Defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea
- (2) Countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea
- (3) Ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players

➤ Issues with China

Maritime Security, Cyber security

Recent Messages from USG (2)

“The message that I want to send is simple. The United States is and always will be a Pacific power, and **we are here to stay.**”

(SecDef Leon Panetta at joint press conference with Japanese Defense Minister, October 25, 2011)

Recent Messages from USG (3)

“America is a resident military, diplomatic and economic power in the Asia-Pacific -- and we will remain an **Asia-Pacific power**. No region of the world matters more to our future in the new century unfolding before us.”

(Remarks by Deputy Secretary Burns at University of Tokyo, October 27, 2011)

Beyond “Strategic Assurance”?

“Responsible Stakeholder” (Bush Admin)



“Strategic Reassurance” (Obama Admin)



??

Chang of role ?

“First Responder”

“Global 911 Force”



“Global System Enabler”

Four Grand Visions

Primacy

Cooperative Security

Selective Engagement

Isolationism

Further Development?

“Return to Asia Pacific”

Enhance commitment to the region



(But if this approach does not work?)

Dysfunctional Japan & ROK



“Off-Shore,” “Stand off” Strategy?

Stand Off Strategy?

- “To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan”
(Op-ed in NYT on November 10, 2011)
- “To Stop Iran, Lean on China”
(Op-ed in NYT on November 8, 2011)

Air Sea Battle

DOD Briefing on Nov. 9, 2011 (1)

- Stand up of **Air-Sea Battle Office (ASBO)** as of Aug. 12
Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force
Framework to implementation the ASB Concept
- The work **of writing the concept is complete**
- SecDef gave the green light to move forward with the **implementation** of the concept

DOD Briefing on Nov. 9, 2011 (2)

- ASB concept
 - to counter emerging **A2/AD threats**
 - enable the **projection of force** in defense of US interests and those of US allies
 - by sustaining the stability and **freedom of access** throughout the **global commons**
- **A2/AD threats**
 - (1) Conventional Ballistic Missiles
 - (2) Long-range Precision Cruise Missiles
 - (3) Advanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense Systems
 - (4) Electronic and Cyber Warfare Capabilities
 - (5) Submarines
 - (6) Surface Combatants
 - (7) Modern Combat Aircraft


DOD Briefing on Nov. 9, 2011 (3)

➤ Impact on the Alliance

“The environment demands that U.S. forces not to turn and leave the area, but to stay in place and to continue to operate within an area of the global commons.”

“What we need to make sure of is that we don’t leave our allies and our partners behind as we implement these things.”

“there will be an allied role in air-sea battle as trained and exercised and operated in the future.”



“A2/AD” and “Air-Sea Battle Concept”

*Develop a **joint air-sea battle concept**.*

The Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated **anti-access and area denial capabilities**. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—to counter growing challenges to U.S. freedom of action. As it matures, the concept will also help guide the **development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations**.

(Quadrennial Defense Review 2010)

Remarks by Gates on ASB at SLD 2011

“The U.S. Navy and Air Force have been concerned about anti-access and area denial scenarios for some time. These two military services are working together to develop a new concept of operations – called “**Air-Sea Battle**” – to ensure that America’s military will continue to be able to deploy, move, and strike over great distances in defense of our allies and vital interests.”

AT THE SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE, SINGAPORE, JUNE 3, 2011

AIRSEA BATTLE

MAY 18, 2010

JAN VAN TOL
MARK GUNZINGER
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Proliferation of anti-access/area-denial capabilities threatens traditional US methods of providing forward presence and projecting power

East Asia and the Western Pacific
an area of enduring vital US interest

The US has longstanding security commitments throughout the region

The Most Stressful Case

PLA developing an advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) network and associated capabilities threaten regional stability and security

Bottom Line

Current trends suggest that unless offsetting actions are taken by the United States and its allies, over the next decade the military balance in the WPTO will become both unfavorable and unstable

ASB is **NOT** about war with China or containment of China

ASB **IS** part of a larger “offsetting strategy” aimed at preserving a stable military balance and maintaining crisis stability in East Asia

ASB must demonstrate the ability of the U.S. to intervene effectively in the event of military conflict

ASB should increase the confidence of regional actors that China, should it choose war, would fail to realize its objectives through military aggression or coercion

Substantial U.S. forces are forward-based and increasingly vulnerable to preemption

Consequently, U.S. ability to reassure allies and partners, deter adversaries, and defeat enemies is almost certainly in decline


This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States, its allies and partners:
acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it

Action needs to be taken now to alter the situation—
 with an “offset” strategy

Western Pacific geography calls for an integrated air and maritime approach

The U.S. has only a handful of large, virtually undefended bases, mostly either too close to China/difficult to defend or too far away/less militarily useful


Vast distances place a premium on range and endurance



Pre-ASB Adjustments

Tactical Adjustments for Anti-Network Centric Environment

- Electronic Attack
 - Communication/SATCOM Jamming/Spoofing
 - GPS Jamming/Spoofing
- Data Link Degraded Operations
- GPS Degraded Operations



(4) Possible impact on Japan-US alliance

CSBA

GEOSTRATEGIC FACTORS

15

The U.S. must be able to reassure its allies and partners in the region

- Most are island nations (or quasi-islands in the case of South Korea), and lack strategic depth
- All must be supported and defended from the sea

U.S. inability—real or perceived—to defend its allies and partners could lead to regional instability, to include coercion or aggression




US success will depend heavily on Japan's active participation as an ally



Vulnerability of US Bases in Japan

- PLA currently has the capability to attack with its conventional missile capabilities five of the six main U.S. air bases in East Asia. In addition, improvements to the PLA Air Force's bomber fleet soon could allow it to target Guam, where the sixth U.S. Air Force base is located.

(2010 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission)



PLA Conventional Missile Capabilities Against U.S. Air Force Bases in East Asia

Base	Distance from China	PLA Nonnuclear Missile Capabilities
Osan Air Base, South Korea	400 km	480 theater ballistic missiles, 350 ground launched cruise missiles
Kunsan Air Base, South Korea	400 km	480 theater ballistic missiles, 350 ground launched cruise missiles
Kadena Air Base, Japan	650 km	80 theater ballistic missiles, 350 ground launched cruise missiles
Misawa Air Base, Japan	850 km	80 theater ballistic missiles, 350 ground launched cruise missiles
Yokota Air Base, Japan	1,100 km	80 theater ballistic missiles, 350 ground launched cruise missiles
Andersen Air Force Base, Guam	3,000 km	Currently free from theater ballistic missile threats; could face threats from medium-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and air-launched cruise missiles

Need for Strategy Coordination and Adjustment


How to establish strategic compatibility between

US: "Air Sea Battle"

VS.

Japan: "Dynamic Defense"

Dynamic Defense --Japan's Emerging Strategy



Based on Report by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era for NDPG, August 2010

“Air Sea Battle” vs. “Dynamic Defense”

	Super High-End Conflicts (Nuclear)	High-End Conflicts (Conventional)	Mid-Low Intensity Conflicts	Gray Zone Conflicts	Absence of Conflicts
Air Sea Battle (US)					
Dynamic Defense (Japan)					

GOJ's Official Statement on ASB

“Nothing was concrete about Air-Sea Battle concept when we put together the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and so it still is. We hear only the broad idea that this is aimed at enhancing the capabilities through integrating air and maritime powers, but nothing specific has worked out.”

Defense Minister Kitazawa, Budget Committee of Lower House, August 8, 2011

ASB and Alliance

Necessary Adjustments for Allies

➤ Objectives

- Help USG to maintain
Forward Presence (to address “Home Alone” concern)
Power Projection Capabilities


➤ Measures

- Integration and Adjustments of
Defense Strategy/Policy (esp. Maritime and Air)
Military Posture/Deployment
Domestic Legal Framework

Japan's Response

- (1) Hardening Existing Bases and Facilities
- (2) Enhancement of ASW Capabilities
- (3) Further Buildup of Ballistic Missile Defense

Safeguard both Japan's Dynamic Defense and US Power Projection Capabilities



Impact of 3/11 on Regional Security



Impact of 3/11 on Regional Security

Higher readiness of Japan-US alliance

→ Enhanced deterrence?

Weaker Japan?

→ Enhanced "Rise of China"?

Change in strategic balance?

→ Need for strategic adjustment?

Impact of 3/11 on Regional Security

Higher readiness of Japan-US alliance

→ Enhanced deterrence?

Weaker Japan?

→ Enhanced “Rise of China”?

Change in strategic balance?

→ Need for strategic adjustment?

“Weakened US-Japan”?

“ASEAN nations may face a painful choice. Do they seek to appease, and thereby embolden, **an increasingly influential China** or do they rely on assurances of diplomatic and strategic support from **relatively weakened and distracted offshore powers like the US and Japan?**”

“ASEAN’s dilemma in South China Sea”, *The Straits Times*, July 4, 2011

Japan's Task ?

- Version-up the alliance with the United States to make better use of limited asset; “Do more with less”
- Overcome the dilemma of “dual dependency”
- Help USA and China to work out a sustainable and stable new leadership structure in the Asia Pacific

Thank you



Session II Challenges for Alliance Networks in East Asia

“America Abroad: Retrenchment and Rebalancing”

Daniel Kliman, German Marshall Fund

America Abroad: Retrenchment and Rebalancing

Daniel M. Kliman
November 16, 2011
Seoul, South Korea

Overview

- Pressures to retrench
- How America will rebalance
- Implications for U.S. allies in Asia



Pressures to Retrench

Spiraling National Debt

- 40% of U.S. GDP in 2008
- 70% of U.S. GDP by end of 2011
- 84% to 190% of U.S. GDP by 2035

Source: CBO's 2011 Long-Term Budget Outlook



Pressures to Retrench


American Public Opinion

- 54% see U.S. in long term decline
- 57% identify economy/jobs as most pressing challenge
- 63% oppose war in Afghanistan
- 51% support military spending cuts to reduce deficit
- 79% say U.S. spends too much defending other countries

Sources: Polls by WSJ/NBC, CBS/NYT, CNN/ORC, WP/Bloomberg, Rasumussen



Pressures to Retrench



America Rebalances

Counterinsurgency

- Withdrawal from Iraq
- Drawdown in Afghanistan
- Rely on air power, special forces, drones



Ways to Rebalance

International Affairs Budget

- A small fraction of U.S. budget but a popular target
- \$55 billion in FY 2010 to \$49 billion today
- Continued pressure for deeper cuts
- Focus on reducing support for multilateral aid, global health
- Next election will determine scope of future cuts

Ways to Rebalance

Defense Budget

- \$301 billion in 2000 to \$698 billion in 2010
- Growing acceptance that cuts necessary, even useful
- Question is how deep, and how to distribute

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditures Database



Implications for U.S. Allies in Asia

A Say-Do Gap

- Bipartisan U.S. commitment to Asia
- But long-term resource gap in both hard and soft power
- Fiscal austerity may bring this gap forward



Implications for U.S. Allies in Asia

Pressure to Do More

- Increased responsibility for self-defense
- Growing role in countering Chinese anti-access and area-denial capabilities
- Expectations for more over the horizon contributions



Implications for U.S. Allies in Asia

Trilateral Cooperation Key

- Regular military exercises
- Coordination and capacity building in South China Sea
- Cyber security and Internet Freedom initiatives
- Support Indonesia's emergence



Implications for U.S. Allies in Asia

Partner with Europe

- A growing economic presence in Asia
- A way to diversify beyond the Chinese market
- A global actor with democratic values



Thank You



Session II Challenges for Alliance Networks in East Asia

“The Challenges and Tasks for the ROK-US Alliance in the 21st Century”

Young-June Park, Korea National Defense University



The Challenges and Tasks for the ROK-US Alliance in the 21st Century

Young-June Park
Korea National Defense University

1. Introduction

Right after the establishment of the ROK government in 1948, President Syngman Rhee put forward three conditions which can guarantee the security of the new-born ROK; bolstering the weapon system for South Korea by importing from the US, concluding the alliance treaty with the US, and the formation of Pacific Treaty Organization which will include so-called anti-communist countries in East Asia such as the ROK, the Philippine, Taiwan, etc. However, Mr. Rhee's proposals could not be met with satisfactory responses from the US and other neighboring countries. Eventually, ROK found no allies or no guarantor for security when North Korean leaders decided to wage all-out war unilaterally by invading South Korea in 1950.

In the midst of the confusion right after the armistice agreement in 1953, Mr. Rhee's administration at last could conclude an alliance treaty with the US. The effect of this bloody alliance has been proved for over six decades. Despite frequent internal disorders in Korean internal politics, the alliance with the US could successfully deter another war by hostile North Korea. With a strong security guarantee from the US, South Korea could devote itself to economic development and elevation of its international status. Unquestionably, the ROK-US alliance has been functioned as a backbone to the rapid economic development as well as successful democratization of the Republic of Korea.

However, the security situation in the early 21st century is rapidly changing. North Korea conducted nuclear tests two times in 2006 and 2009. China is rapidly increasing its arsenal including its aircraft carrier, submarines, stealth-type aircraft and tried to expand its influence over the East Asian region. Non-traditional security threat factors are apparent in this region such as pirates and terrorist groups. Does the ROK-US alliance can provide remedies to such new threatening factors? Or, should we probe for any new security mechanism in this region replacing the existing alliance mechanism? In view of these questions, I will argue some points in this paper.

First, I will argue that the ROK-US alliance continued to improve its system by adopting high-level political consultation mechanism, adjusting command structure, holding joint drills, and its redefining its mission in accordance with the changing security environment on the Korean peninsula for over six decades.

Second, I will argue that we should readjust the ROK-US alliance facing new security environments in the early 21st century such as the nuclear development by North Korea and the ris-



ing China. In this circumstance, I will argue that the ROK-US alliance should be supplemented by adopting other security framework, like the expanded ROK-US-Japan Security cooperation as well as a multilateral security mechanism in East Asia.

2. The Evolution of the ROK-US Alliance system

Alliance can be defined as a mutual security support mechanism among two or more countries against common enemy. Alliance is different from any other security mechanism such as cooperative security mechanism or multilateral security dialogue in that the alliance presupposed the presence of common adversary.¹ To accomplish these missions to deter possible threat from common adversary, an alliance is usually consisted of plural components such as mutual security treaty which promises prompt assistance in case of war in which one signatory involved, deployment of armed forces or promise to dispatch armed forces in support for allies, high-level strategic dialogue channel between the signatories to evaluate security situations surrounding them, joint military plans, and regularly held joint drill to exercise its military plan.

When the alliance treaty was signed between South Korea and the US in 1953, it was a great success for South Korea in that Seoul could maintain the deterrent power by stopping the entire withdrawal of American forces from the Korean peninsula. For the Syngman Rhee's administration, the presence of the US forces on the peninsula itself had a significant meaning to assure the security of the ROK. Whereas, for the United States, the alliance with the South Korea seemed to have two objectives; the one was to defend Western bloc against the communist expansion, the other was to deter any aggressive action by Syngman Rhee's administration.² Washington did not want to involve in another conflict which could be triggered by the aggressive unification policy by Seoul.

Since then, the ROK-US alliance system has been refurbished gradually in accordance with the changing security situations in this region. When the USA decided to involve in Vietnam war in 1965, Park Chung-hee's administration decided to dispatch its armed forces to Vietnam in support for Washington's war there. In return, Park's administration could conclude its first Agreement Regarding the Status of the US Forces in Korea (SOFA) treaty with the US in 1966.³ By signing SOFA treaty, South Korea provided a privilege of extraterritoriality to US soldiers and

¹ Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse", *Survival*, Vol.39, No.1. (Spring 1997),pp.157-158.

² Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S.Alliance System in Asia" *International Security*, vol.34, no.3 (Winter 2009/10), p.163. For the United States, South Korea then could be an another "rogue ally".

³ Already, the US had concluded the SOFA treaty with the UK, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, the Philippines, and Japan.



claimed its jurisdiction on the illegal crimes by the US soldiers on its soil. In 1968, Seoul and Washington held its first defense minister-level security consultation meeting to evaluate security situations and share opinions on alliance. This minister-level meeting began to held annually from 1971 in the name of Security Consultation Meeting (SCM). As such, the ROK-US alliance system has been institutionalized during the 1960s by signing SOFA and establishing the SCM.⁴

When the President Nixon declared the so-called Nixon doctrine in 1969, it was a great shock for Park's administration. Seoul worried whether US forces in Korea would withdraw from the peninsula. Under such circumstances, Korean government decided to consolidate its alliance system by holding joint drills annually and establishing a unified command headquarters. In 1976, the two countries held their joint military drill, the Team Spirit, for the first time and it has been held annually. In 1978, ROK and the US agreed to establish the ROK-US Combined Forces Command(CFC).⁵

As the Cold War period was ended in the early 1990s, entire alliance network in which the United States had been involved had to adjust new environment by redefining its missions and roles. Old adversaries such as communist countries disappeared on the European continent. The Soviet Union was dissolved into plural independent countries. The collapse of the Cold War system influenced upon the Korean peninsula. The two Koreas agreed to issue a Basic Agreement in 1991 and declare the Non-nuclear Declaration on the Korean peninsula. However, despite the collapse of communist bloc on the European continent, North Korea still poses security threat by embarking on nuclear development. Under such circumstances, there had been no drastic change on the part of the ROK-US alliance, except the return of the peace-time command control to the Korea in 1994.

Significant change of the ROK-US alliance has been taken place in the early 2000s. The 9.11 terrorist attack was a turning point which propelled the US government to conduct critical review of the new threat and consequently transform the doctrine and deployment posture of the US armed forces around the world. As the result of this Global Posture Review, the United States began to ask its allies to utilize the stationing US Forces freely based on the principle of strategic flexibility. The US Forces in Korea was not exceptional. On the other hand, Roh Moo-hyun administration also began to raise some nationalistic demand to the existing ROK-US alliance.

As a result, the two countries reached an agreement to move the US military bases in Seoul or the northern part of Han River to Pyeongtaek area. Furthermore, the two allies also agreed to

⁴ Parallel with the SCM, each country's Chief of Joint Staff has held the Military Consultation Meeting (MCM) annually.

⁵ Kim Il-Young, "The US Forces in Korea as a Trip Wire" Kim Il-Young and Cho Sung-Ryol, *The US Forces in Korea: History, Issues, and Prospects* (Hanul Academy, 2003) (Korean), 김일영 「인계철선으로서의 주한미군: 규모, 편제, 운용방식의 변화를 중심으로」 김일영, 조성렬, 『주한미군: 역사, 쟁점, 전망』 (한울아카데미, 2003).



transfer the war-time command to the Korean part till 2012. Under the Lee Myung-bak administration which took power in 2008, slight revision was added to the existing agreement on the alliance re-adjustment, the postponement of transfer of war-time command till the end of 2015.

3. The New Security Challenges for the Alliance in the 21st Century

For over six decades, the ROK-US alliance contributed successfully to deter another possibility of war by North Korea. In addition, South Korea's economic development and social stability has indebted a lot to the presence of the US Forces on the peninsula.

However, new changes and challenges in the security environment have been appeared in the region.

First, North Korea began to provoke militarily against South Korea using unexpected military means. Pyongyang launched its ballistic missiles in 1998 and 2005. Also it conducted its nuclear weapon tests in 2006 and 2009. In view of the history of nuclear weapons development, Pyongyang will try to upload nuclear warhead to its long-range missiles as the former Soviet Union or Communist China had done in the early 1950s and in the 1960s.⁶

Some observes said that North Korea developed nuclear weapons to use them as chips in the diplomatic negotiations with the US. But, I don't agree with this kind of opinion. Every weapons system, including the nuclear warheads, should be functioned in the context of military strategy or national strategy. In that sense, I guess North Korean military strategists would assign new missions for its new military assets to strengthen its security capabilities and increase its international status.⁷

In addition, Pyongyang has posed a incessant military threats to South Korea by infringing on the Northern Limit Line area. North Korean naval vessels have intruded the NLL area frequently since the late 1990s. Last year, North Korea was said to be deeply involved in the sinking of the ROK frigate Cheonan and shelled the Yeonpyong island on that area. ⁸Pyongyang's nuclear development program and its frequent military provocations on the NLL area pose a severe new threat to the ROK-US alliance in the early 21st century.

Second, China is rapidly rising economically and militarily. Rising China is searching new strategy to extend its influence over the region and globe. One of the representative Chinese stra-

⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).p.68.

⁷ Jonathan D.Pollack, *No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011),p.207.

⁸ Nan Kim, "Korea on the Brink: Reading the Yonpyong Shelling and its Aftermath" *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol.70, no. 2(May, 2011).



tegrists, professor Yan Xuetong once said that China should exert its global leadership by boldly engaging in international issues such as Japanese natural disasters and Libyan cases. ⁹I don't think that rising China will inevitably become a challenger to the current international society. However, in the process of becoming one of the global leaders, China can cause some worry in terms of security around the region. The signs are already apparent.

Chinese growing naval activities ignited keen disputes with Japan and other Southeast Asian countries. Chinese squadrons frequently infringed on other countries sovereignty in the process of deploying its fleets to the Pacific Ocean by penetrating the important straits between Japan and the Philippines. Chinese trawlers also became the sources of international conflicts by intruding other countries territorial water.

We are also witnessing the growing cyber insecurities in this region. Major governmental offices and main companies in South Korea as well as in Japan are suffering from cyber attack whose origins are supposed to be from China or North Korea.¹⁰

How to reduce the uncertainty which can be originated by rising China is becoming the important common tasks for small countries in this region.

Third, turning our eyes to the global area, we can find many humanitarian necessities, in the field of non-traditional securities, in which need collaborated international support. After the anti-terrorist war in Iraq and Afghanistan, new tasks for post-war construction and humanitarian relief are emerging. When the terrible tsunami assaulted the northeastern Japan and nuclear power plants there were meltdown in this March, more collaborate international support and relief activities were necessary. When South Sudan was born as a new independent country this year, international society, including the United Nations, are feeling the necessity of more collaborated humanitarian support for it.

Like these, we are witnessing the new necessities to address the newly emerging traditional or non-traditional threats of security around the Korean peninsula. How can existing ROK-US alliance structure address these new challenges? Or is there any necessity that other than the existing alliance mechanism should be invented?

4. Some suggestions for the existing Alliance and the Korea-Japan security cooperation

To cope with new challenges and needs for security, I suggest some supplementing ideas for the existing ROK-US alliance mechanism.

⁹ Yan Xuetong, "How assertive should a great power be?" International Herald Tribune, April 1, 2011.

¹⁰ For example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry was damaged by an cyber attack. "Japan orders arms maker to look into cyberattack" International Herald Tribune, September 21, 2011.



First, we must admit that existing ROK-US alliance originally intended to deter any possible military threat from North Korea. This basic purpose should be maintained as long as North Korea still poses severe security threat by conducting nuclear weapons tests and provoking NLL area militarily. Especially, to address the nuclear threat by North Korea, ROK-US alliance should fortify its anti-nuclear capability in the name of "extended deterrence".

Some South Korean politicians and experts urged that Seoul should make an important decision to develop its nuclear capabilities. However, I don't agree with this opinion. This kind of opinions is careless in that this position is contrary to South Korea's traditional non-nuclear policy by ratifying the NPT and concluding the Nuclear Pact with the US in 1974.¹¹

To deter the possible nuclear threat by Pyongyang, we should strengthen our deterrent power by borrowing 'extended-deterrence' capability from the US within the framework of existing ROK-US alliance.

Second, South Korea should enhance security cooperation with Japan in various ways. In addition to democratic political system and free-market economy, South Korea and Japan are sharing another important feturs; same alliance structure with the US. If the ROK and Japan should cooperate each other, the deterrent power of the ROK-US alliance against North Korea undoubtedly will increase a lot. ROK and Japan can share important information on North Korea's military capabilities and political situations. Increase security cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo also can contribute a lot to more efficient military preparedness of the US forces which is stationed in Japan as well as in Korea.

In addition, increased security cooperation between South Korea and Japan can exert a hedging effect on rising China. Chinese muscular activities in this region can be muted in front of ROK-Japan security collaborations.

Korea and Japan also can contribute a lot to international society by participating jointly in humanitarian support in devastated area after the war such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Recently, Japan decided to dispatch its Self Defense Forces to South Sudan as a Peace Keeping Operation.¹² If South Korea accepted the UN's proposal to join the PKO activities in same area, the tow countries could cooperate each other for the purpose of humanitarian support for new-born country.

South Korea also can expand its security ties with the US and Japan. The three countries already took part in joint drills as a part of the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) activities which was held in Busan in 2010.

Third, we also should develop multilateral security framework in this region. Some observers, observing the case in the European continent, pointed out that a formation of multilateral security mechanism in East Asian region would be difficult due to the lack of common cultural herit-

¹¹ 문정인, 선부른 핵무장론을 반박한다 (중앙일보 2011.5.9)

¹² *Asahi Shimbun*, 2011.10.15



age here. However, we are witnessing plural embryonic multilateral security framework here such as the Asian Regional Forum(ARF), Shangrilla Dialogue, NEACD, the Six Party Talks and so on. The East Asian Summit (EAS) also can be functioned as an security mechanism. These multilateral security frameworks can be an effective mechanism to enhance mutual trust and dissolve security conflicts on this region.

In these multilateral security frame work, China and North Korea, potential adversaries to the US and South Korea, should be included. We should evade the security dilemma in this region by inviting North Korea and China to the multiple security framework in this region as responsible actors. South Korea, the US and Japan should utilize these mechanism to address common security problems.

5. Conclusion

The ROK-US alliance can be evaluated as one of the most successful alliance for the US who has operated over 40 alliances over the world. As was explained, the ROK-US alliance has experienced the gradual evolution since its birth in 1953.

Nowadays, we are witnessing the advent of new challenges surround the Korean peninsula. North Korea had tried to be a nuclear power by conducting successive nuclear tests. China poses a potential security threat by expanding its naval forces to the Asia-pacific area. Also we cannot turn a blind eye to the non-traditional security threats such as pirates, terrorist groups, cyber attacks, and poverty and disorder in new-born countries.

Facing new security challenges, the ROK-US alliance system should reset itself to address new tasks by converting the concept of extended deterrence to the real capabilities. Furthermore, South Korea and the US and should extend its security network to Japan by investigating more ways to enhance its deterrent power against North Korea and conduct hedging against China. In addition, South Korea and the US should actively galvanize embryonic multilateral security framework in this region. It should be noted that Korea and the US should invite China and North Korea to these mechanisms to evade the vicious circle of security dilemma in this region.



Session III. Strengthening ROK-Japan Strategic Cooperation



Session III Strengthening ROK-Japan Strategic Cooperation

“Japan-ROK strategic cooperation on China and Northeast Asia security”

Yasuyo Sakata, Kanda University of International Studies

EAI-Alliance Project (Suntory Foundation) Seminar
Evolving East Asia Security and the Future of ROK-Japan Strategic Cooperation
Seoul, Korea, November 16, 2011
<Session III: Strengthening ROK-Japan Strategic Cooperation>

TALKING POINTS PAPER (NOT FOR CITATION)

Japan-ROK Strategic Cooperation on China and Northeast Asia Security: How can we promote Japan-ROK strategic cooperation ? ¹

Yasuyo Sakata

Professor, Kanda University of International Studies

1. Rise of assertive China and an “ambivalent” Japan-ROK Strategic Axis

Expansion of China's presence in Northeast Asia will mean an increase in opportunities for cooperation as stakeholders in the region, but an assertive China, as seen in recent years in the era of “power shift,” will also give rise to friction and at times, tension². Neighboring countries Japan and South Korea are taking great pains to address the question of what kind of relationship to build with China in connection with Northeast Asian security. Japan-South Korea strategic cooperation is a key axis in the Asia-Pacific security architecture, as both countries share alliances with the United States which constitute the main pillar in their respective security policies³. At the same time, Japan and South Korea also live as neighbors to China, with ever-growing interdependence in economic and social affairs. This demands

¹ This presentation is adapted from the Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project Policy Report, *Japan's Security Strategy toward China: Integration, Balancing and Deterrence in the Era of Power Shift* (October 2011), mainly Proposal 10, pp.59-62. <http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2011/china-strategy>. The original Japanese version 東京財団アジアの安全保障プロジェクト 『政策提言 日本の対中安全保障戦略—パワーシフト時代の統合・バランス・抑止』 <http://www.tkfd.or.jp/research/project/news.php?id=791>

² on rise of China and “power shift” see Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project, *Japan's Security Strategy toward China*, part 1, sections 1-2, pp.16-26.

³ See Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project, 『アジア太平洋の地域安全保障アーキテクチャ』 *Ajia Taiheiyo no Chiiki Anzen Hosho Akitekucha: Chiiki Anzen Hosho no Jusoteki Kozo* [The Regional Security Architecture in the Asia-Pacific: Three Tiered Structure of Regional Security] (August 2010), chapter 4 Northeast Asia Security Cooperation (Sakata), <http://www.tkfd.or.jp/admin/files/2010-08.pdf>. Revised edition to be published from Nihon Hyouronsha (日本評論社) this coming December.

very delicate management of relations with China. The question being asked now is how to build the relationship with a more assertive China upon that pillar.

Due to geopolitical and geo-economic situations, there are commonalities as well as differences between Japan and South Korea on China issues, especially security. While Japan tends to take a more assertive stance, South Korea has taken a more circumspect attitude toward promotion of Japan-ROK cooperation, and ROK-Japan-U.S. cooperation, regarding security issues with China. There is concern that Japan-South Korea cooperation (and ROK-Japan-U.S. cooperation) will antagonize or damage South Korea-China relations ---- that such cooperation may turn into a zero sum game in which South Korea would be entrapped in regional power politics. Thus South Korea tends to be ambivalent toward cooperation with other countries on China security issues.

2. The 2010 China Shock in Northeast Asia– Strategic Convergence ?

The series of diplomatic incidents with China that occurred in 2010 may have changed the situation somewhat. In 2010, both Japan and South Korea experienced what could be termed as the “China shock” in Northeast Asia, and was prompted to review their relationship with China. The Senkaku Islands incident in September 2010 was a complex issue involving illegal operation by a Chinese fishing boat and the territorial dispute between Japan and China. The confusion in managing the incident was a diplomatic setback for Japan, and raised questions about the content of the Japan-China “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” (戰略的互惠關係) proposed in 2006. For South Korea, also the year 2010 became an occasion for reconsidering its China policy as well as the substance of the ROK-China relationship of “strategic cooperative partnership”(戰略的同伴者關係).

From February 2008, the Lee Myung-bak administration placed top priority on rebuilding confidence in the strained U.S.-South Korea alliance upgrading its alliance to a “strategic alliance.” Looking at these moves, China made overtures to South Korea, and at the ROK-PRC summit in May 2008, bilateral relations was “upgraded” from “comprehensive cooperative partnership” to “strategic cooperative partnership.” In 2010, however, the Korean Peninsula experienced a series of incidents that shook the South Korea-China relationship. In March of that year, the ROK Navy patrol ship Cheonan was sunk by an unidentified torpedo, and in October, the Yeonpyeong Island attack occurred. Both incidents were condemned as North Korean military provocations by ROK and the international team and supporters. China's responses to these incidents were different, however, and revealed the fragility of the South Korea-China “strategic cooperative partnership.” At the end of 2010, China for the first time openly protested U.S. and South Korean military exercises in the Yellow Sea (West Sea) in an attempt to constrain the U.S.-ROK alliance. This was a new phenomenon in security on the Korean peninsula. South Korea (like Japan) also faces problems with illegal operation by Chinese fishing vessels, as indicated by the seizure of the Chinese fishing ship by the ROK coast guard in the Yellow Sea (West Sea) in December 2010.

As such, both Japan and South Korea experienced a “China shock” in 2010, and heightened their perception of security problems involving China. As a result, there is increased convergence in the Japanese and South Korean perceptions of China regarding security. It is worth noting, for example, that the Japan-South Korea New Era Joint Research Project, an experts group commissioned by the two governments issued a policy recommendation report, *Recommendations for a 'New Era for Japan and South Korea: Building Complex Network for Coexistence* in October 2010 and addressed China policy including security issues as a common agenda.⁴ In other words, having experienced the “China shock” of 2010, strategic convergence between Japan and South Korea has increased and both face new opportunities to advance cooperation on China policy and Northeast Asia security.

Even so, while South Korea bolstered its deterrent capability toward North Korea with the US-ROK alliance, and Japan bolstered its dynamic deterrence (動的抑止 *douteki yokusi*) capabilities especially on Southwestern island defense with the US-Japan alliance⁵, South Korea continued to take a cautious attitude toward promotion of Japan-South Korea cooperation, and ROK-Japan-U.S. cooperation, regarding security problems with China (such as the case in December 2010 where Japan and ROK military personnel participated as observers in their respective US-Japan and US-ROK exercises).

Therefore, in order to advance Japan-South Korea cooperation on policy regarding China, it will be necessary to not lose sight of common goals, but also take into consideration the subtle differences between Japan and South Korea and promote cooperation “wisely.”

3. How can we promote Japan-ROK strategic cooperation on China ? **----“Integration”, “Balancing”, “Deterrence” ?**

Under these circumstances, how can we promote Japan-ROK strategic cooperation on China policy, wisely ? For the sake of discussion, I would like to introduce three concepts, “integration,” “balancing” and “deterrence” from the Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project report on Japan’s security strategy toward China, and use them to explore venues for Japan-ROK strategic cooperation on China.

(1) Approaches toward China –Integration, Balancing, and Deterrence

The Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project team proposed a three-layered approach to Japan’s security strategy toward China with a combination of “integration,” “balancing” and

⁴ Japan-South Korea New Age Joint Research Project, (chaired by Masao Okonogi, Professor, Keio University, and Ha Young-Sun, Professor, Seoul National University). "Nikkan Shinjidai' no Tame no Teigen: Kyosei no Tame no Fukugoteki Nettowaku Kochiku" [Recommendations for a 'New Era for Japan and South Korea: Building Complex Network for Coexistence],(October 2010), pp. 18-19.http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/22/10/1022_03.html.

⁵ on “dynamic deterrence” see Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project, *Japan’s Security Strategy toward China*, Proposal 8, pp.57-58.

“deterrence.”⁶ The goal of this strategy is to induce or shape China to choose to live in a liberal order where neighboring countries can live in peace and prosperity. But with the rise of an assertive China in recent years, approaches toward China must be reconsidered. This is premised on the assumption that a “power shift” is occurring and the transition from “hierarchical liberal order” to “asymmetric balance of power” (**Figure 7**) may continue in the next 10-20 years. In the era of “power shift”, the Asia Security Project proposed that we must go beyond the “engagement” and “hedging” approach back when China was passive and less confrontational, and take a more proactive approach toward an assertive and proactive China with a strategy composed of integration, balancing and deterrence.

“**Integration**” means integration of China into the international community by eliciting participation in forming rules and practices (**China-in**) (**Figure 8**). Here China is seen as a partner and responsible member of the international community (i.e., responsible stakeholder) (**Figure 10**). If China does not display actions of a responsible stakeholder, then “balancing” comes into play. Balancing in broad terms has three patterns: hard balancing, soft balancing, and institutional balancing. “**Balancing**” in this report refers to “**soft balancing**” and “**institutional balancing**.” Soft balancing is coordination among countries using nonmilitary measures (economics, diplomacy and social influence) to limit the one-sided actions and influence of a dominant country. Institutional balancing refers to the activity of restraining a dominant country and reigning in its activities by engaging in the establishment, formation or development of rules, international institutions and forums of various kinds. Here China is seen as a diplomatic rival (**Figure 10**) and others would “balance” China by forming strategic partnerships with the U.S. and other countries by joint declarations on security, capacity building and economic assistance (**Figure 9**) (**China-out and China-in**). “**Deterrence**” here falls under **hard balancing** which consists of the consolidation of force (external balancing) to resist a dominant country and strengthening one’s own capabilities (internal balancing). Here China is seen as a “military concern” and thus other countries would promote its own military capabilities and forge or strengthen alliances (**China-out**).

(2) Exploring venues for Japan-ROK cooperation

Where are the venues for Japan-ROK cooperation among these three approaches toward China? There are limits, but also opportunities. Japan and ROK should be mutually aware of each others’ limits, but at the same time identify and maximize opportunities.

“**Integration**” (**China-In**) (○)

From the perspective of integration, balancing, and deterrence strategy toward China, the area of China policy in which Japan and South Korea converge most and can exert the most influence is “integration”. This is a field in which South Korea has active interest in light of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and economic relations with China. Japan-China and Japan-ROK bilateral relations together with the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral

⁶ see Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project, *Japan’s Security Strategy toward China*, Part 1, section 4, pp.30-37.

cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) should be utilized⁷.

The Six Party Talks will be useful for the purpose of advancing cooperation not only on the North Korea issue but potentially on Northeast Asia cooperation through the cooperation of Japan and South Korea with China. However, due to the stalemate of the Six Party Talks, the driving force or platform for broader Northeast Asia cooperation has moved from Six Party Talks to the emerging Japan-China-South Korea trilateral cooperation framework. This framework is not suited to deal with traditional security issues but is useful in nurturing habits of cooperation through functional security issues. In the post-3.11 East Japan earthquake environment, nuclear safety, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are focus areas. Defense dialogues should also be used to promote confidence building and supplement deterrence functions.

“Balancing “(China-in, China-Out) (△ ?)

The next field that must be addressed is “balancing, ”i.e., soft balancing (diplomatic balancing) and institutional balancing with regard to China. Japan can take initiative more readily in this area, while South Korea approaches the matter more circumspectly. South Korea, however, is likely to take even greater interest in light of the security on the Korean Peninsula and other aspects of the rise of China, such as maritime security in the South China Sea and East China Sea. With that objective in mind, Japan and ROK can utilize Japan-U.S.-ROK, Japan-Australia-ROK, and other such trilaterals and minilaterals⁸ (China-out) as well as broader frameworks such as the ARF to promote norms and practices in areas of concern⁹ (China-in). Japan and Korea should deepen discussion on what kind of cooperation and/or division of roles can be made in “balancing” China.

Deterrence (China-Out -> China-In) (X ?)

“Deterrence” of Chinese military expansion is a sensitive matter for South Korea. Overtly promoting Japan-South Korea cooperation regarding deterrence of China would be perceived as a trilateral US-Japan-ROK military alliance and pose great diplomatic difficulties for South Korea. This is particularly so for as long as South Korea requires China's cooperation on North Korean problems as well as economic relations. South Korea, however, feels a certain degree of concern about China's military build-up and maritime incursions, and will probably continue to depend on the U.S.-Japan alliance for deterrence of Chinese military expansion.

However, in order to buttress U.S.-Japan alliance deterrent capabilities and the effectiveness of

⁷ see Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project, *Japan's Security Strategy toward China*, Proposal 11, pp.62-64.

⁸ re. security cooperation with Australia, South Korea, India and Southeast Asia, see Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project, *Japan's Security Strategy toward China*, Proposal 6, pp.54-56

⁹ re. the use of region-wide institutions such as ARF and EAS, see Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project, *Japan's Security Strategy toward China*, Proposals 13-15, pp.66-70.

the overall U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance network, the so-called “intra-spokes” cooperation with Japan, Australia, South Korea, and emerging powers such as Vietnam, Indonesia, India should be promoted for general broader objectives such as maritime security (China could be in or out; this would be integration and/or institutional balancing behavior). Japan-ROK defense and security cooperation is an integral part of the network which would focus on the Korean peninsula but also expand broader maritime security cooperation. Japan-ROK defense and security cooperation should continue to explore frameworks used in Japan-Australia cooperation. Habits of bilateral cooperation would also help advance US-Japan-ROK security cooperation and Japan-China-ROK trilateral defense dialogues.

Furthermore, similar to Japan-China military exchanges and security cooperation¹⁰, the development of ROK-China military exchanges and confidence-building measures, including the creation and improvement of agreements on the prevention of incidents, hot lines, and other such crisis management mechanisms, will contribute to the prevention of unnecessary conflict and to the stability of the Korean Peninsula. As such, it should be encouraged Japan and the United States.

4. Deepen Japan-ROK Strategic Dialogue, Strengthen the Japan-ROK Strategic Axis,


As discussed above, Japan and South Korea should promote more actively bilateral strategic policy dialogues for the purpose of exploring new fields of cooperation related to China policy and understanding each other's “comfort zones”.

At the government level (Track 1), strategic dialogue at the vice ministerial level should be deepened; at the private-sector level (Track 2), dialogue by think tanks and universities should also be promoted, to understand mutual perceptions on China and strategic thinking. Track 1.5 dialogue can also help to promote and can be a virtual dialogue for Track 1 to discuss sensitive issues. Dialogue not only among researchers, working-level bureaucrats, and politicians but also among media journalists will be useful in examining perceptions of China, because public understanding and public diplomacy will be more important in promoting cooperation on China policy. An important precondition for advancing Japan-South Korea cooperation is sharing the understanding that alliances with the U.S. (the Japan-U.S. alliance and the U.S.-South Korea alliance) and relations with China (the Japan-China and the South Korea-China relations) are not necessarily zero sum, but can be a plus sum relationship if managed wisely. This will be key to strengthening the Japan-ROK strategic axis in Northeast Asia security.

¹⁰ on development of Japan-China security cooperation and crisis management mechanisms, see Tokyo Foundation


Asia Security Project, *Japan's Security Strategy toward China*, Proposals 2-3, pp.47-51.

Figure 7: The Spiral Dynamics of U.S.-China Security Relations (p.28)




Source: The Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project

Figure 10: Three Images of China and Strategy toward China (p.35)



Source: The Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project

Figure 8. Integration of China in the world (p.33)



Source: The Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project

Figure 9 Seeking Balance through Diplomacy (p.33)



Source: The Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project

Source: Tokyo Foundation Asia Security Project Policy Proposal

Japan's Security Strategy Toward China: Integration, Balancing and Deterrence in the Era of Power Shift

(October 2011) <http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2011/china-strategy>



Session III Strengthening ROK-Japan Strategic Cooperation

“Post 3/11 regional cooperation on nuclear safety”

Jin Ho Jeon, Kwangwoon University



Post 3/11 Regional Cooperation on Nuclear Safety

(ポスト・フクシマと日韓協力)

JEON, Jinho (Kwangwoon University)

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- Japan (日本)
 - : Active investigation of post-nuclear plants,
Development of renewable energy
 - : Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)
- Korea (韓国)
 - : Maintenance of nuclear exporting strategy
 - : stress test on nuclear plant
 - : Nuclear Safety and Security Commission(NSSC)

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Implications from Fukushima Nuclear Accident (福島原発事故の示唆点)

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 - : Absence of early measurement system for immediate response in case of nuclear accidents
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 - : Inability of fast dispatch of prompt information
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 - : Network formation for international and comprehensive measurement for major nuclear accidents



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Lessons for Korea(韓国への教訓)

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Search for Nuclear Safety Cooperation among Korea, China, and Japan (日中韓原子力安全協力の模索)

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Search for Nuclear Safety Cooperation among Korea, China, and Japan (日中韓原子力安全協力の模索)

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Security cooperation against traditional, military threats
(伝統的・軍事的脅威に対する安保協力)

→ Korea-Japan cooperation against non-traditional and non-military threats (非伝統的・非軍事的脅威に対する日韓協力)

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Proposal(提言)

- Network establishment of nuclear safety cooperation among Korea, China, & Japan
(日中韓の原子力安全協力ネットワークの構築)
- Establishment of a joint-response system for nuclear emergency crisis among Korea, China, & Japan (日中韓の原子力共同対応システムの構築)
- Investigation for international cooperation beyond Korea, China, & Japan
(原子力安全国際協力ネットワークへの発展)
- Fortification of Korea-Japan cooperation against non-traditional security threats
(非伝統的安保脅威に対する日韓協力の強化)

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