

# New Emerging Security Arrangements in Asia

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East Asia security relies on unilateral and bilateral approaches, there has not been any systemic and institutionalized multilateral security arrangement in the region. And in history and also in recent years, there were and there have been some emerging some important sub-regional security arrangements such the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Central Asia, Russia and China.

## I. The Weakness of Current Security Arrangements in Asia

One of the major reasons for the emerging of sub-regional security arrangements in East Asia is because there is clear weakness of current security arrangements in the region.

### 1. The American Security Alliance System

To the Americans and perhaps also Japanese, and Koreans (ROK), American bilateral security alliances with Japan, ROK, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia has been and is the security arrangements and system in East Asian region. The U.S. government and Japanese one have always praised the bilateral arrangements as the “cornerstone” of East Asia security.

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However, besides few alliances of the U.S., there is not wide range reorganization towards the bilateral alliance system as the legitimated and desirable security arrangement in the region. Because in deed the arrangements are done by few countries and not by majority nor whole countries in the region. No many nations give up their security rights to others, and rely other bilateral alliance for its own security. So as the Iraq War indicates strongly, the world does not accept and endorse unilateral or bilateral approaches in regional and global security. There is clear tendency that our world is becoming much more globalized, multilateral, and democratic, not becoming more unilateral nor bilateral. One or two countries cannot decide the security for most of other nations and whole region, and the world.

## 2. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

ARF is only an official multilateral security forum in East Asia till now, with all East Asian countries, including DPRK, and non-regional sates of the U.S., Russia, India, and EU as the members. So far ARF has not made substancial progress in promoting regional security cooperation in East Asia. Part of the preseason is the most of the members such as ASEAN countries and China do not want it goes to quick and to far, and the U.S. has not showed strong interests and commitment to the process. However, countries can do something to improve ARF, and the three Northeast countries of China, Japan, and ROK have built and developed their trilateral approach through the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process in the past ten years.

As indicated by the APEC, multilateral mechanism is one of the workable ways to avoid unilateral domination or bilateral rivalry in the zero-sum game fashion, and at the sometime to provide opportunity for countries to play even a leading role in regional and global affairs. In a multilateral setting, major powers such as the U.S., China, and Japan can play a leading role, put their ideas forward when they are routinely host the meeting. As we have seen in European Union, countries such a as Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy all have the opportunity to play a leading role when they each chairs the meeting at rotation, without competing for “leadership” in a zero-sum game form. APEC has also provided similar format to its

members in that sense. “Multilateralism clearly helps defuse nationalism, which lies at the heart of Sino-Japanese tensions, by blurring zero-sum bilateral rivalries. Given both rising strategic dangers and political uncertainties –involving Japan and China, while transcending them—a broad Northeast Asia Strategic Dialogue is very much needed.”<sup>1</sup>

## II. Sub-regional Security Arrangements

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### 1. Multilateral Security Mechanism as a Possible Results of the SPT Process

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The Six-Party Talks (SPT) on North Korean nuclear issues has been in the process for six years since August 2003. Whether the SPT can be going on and whether it will reach its stated goal to the denuclearization on Korean Peninsula remain uncertain, unclear. However, one thing seems pretty clear and certain, that is the process would bring a sort of multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia in few years. This is and will continue to be a major important and successful part of the process of the SPT. The meeting of the heads of the delegations of the SPT on July 21, 2007 agreed to set up “the working group on peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia,” as one the five “working groups of the SPT.”<sup>2</sup> The working group has conducted three meetings since then.

And even the region of Northeast Asia has been a major power house and conflicting area in Asia and the world, there has not been any meaningful multilateral security cooperation among majority of countries. This is a huge vacuum which needs to be full. Almost all other regions, such as Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Europe, and North America, have some sorts of multilateral security cooperation or

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<sup>1</sup> Kent E. Calder, “Stabilizing the US-Japan-China Strategic Triangle,” *Asia-Pacific Policy Papers Series*, The Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., 2006, p.20.

<sup>2</sup> The “Joint Statement of the Six-Parties Talks” on September 19, 2005, states that “the six parties are willing to discuss the ways to enhance security cooperation in Northeast Asia,” *Renmin Ribao*, September 20, 2005, p.3; The News Communiqué of the Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Six-Party Talks on July 20, 2007 states that they agree to set up five “working groups” under the SPT, and one the “working groups” is the “working group on Peace and Security Mechanism in Northeast Asia.” *Renmin Ribao*, July 21, 2007, p.3.; The Meeting of Heads of Delegations of the Six-Party Talks issued the News Communiqué on July 12, 2008 and stated: “The Six Parties agree to search deeply and further on guiding principles for maintaining peace and security in Northeast Asia.” See *China Daily*, July 12-13, 2008, p.10.

mechanism there. As Iraq War and North Korean nuclear issues approve once again, no single country, no matter how powerful it is, cannot resolve all the major security problems alone, there needs joint efforts and cooperation among countries in the region and in the world.

Now, the good news is almost all the countries in Northeast Asia realize this. For long time, Japan and ROK, and even Russia, call for some sort of multilateral security cooperation in the region of Northeast Asia, but China and the U.S. had been reluctant. With American bilateral approach on North Korean nuclear issue failed in 1990s and unilateral approach on Iraq failed in the early of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there is more and clear willingness even from the Bush Administration toward the multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Secretary of State Ms. Condoleezza Rice has stated it very clearly for couple of times in recent years.<sup>1</sup> The new American administration is likely to be more active in the multilateral approaches.

For long time China had been almost the most reluctant part toward the multilateral security cooperation. Because the country did not have too much experience in the multilateral security cooperation and therefore, it did not know and believe too much on it. The only formal security multilateral cooperation that China had in the past is the experience in the Soviet bloc in the 1950s, and that experience was very short (lasting for only ten years) and not so positive. After that till early 1990s, China never involved in any multilateral economic cooperation before it joined APEC (The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and did not taking part in any multilateral security cooperation before it joined ARF in 1994, and the SCO with Russia and Central Asian countries since 1996.

China used to be very skeptical and passive toward the multilateral institutions even it joined. The Chinese used to believe the world is in fact only sovereign states' world, and international relations were truly bilateral relations, multilateral institutions are nothing than the instruments of individual state to reach its unilateral foreign policy goal. And the first war that the "new China" fighting between 1950 and 1953 was officially a war between China and "the United Nations' Army"

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<sup>1</sup> "Rice Happy With Talks, Meets DPRK Counterpart," *China Daily*, July 24, 2008, p.1.

led by the United States. Such experience strengthened and confirmed the Chinese suspicion toward multilateral security cooperation and institutions.

With the experiences of APEC, ARF, and SCO, and even the United Nations, the Chinese become more knowledgeable about the multilateral approaches, including the multilateral institutions and organizations, and become more acceptable and even comfortable with the multilateral approaches in Asia and in the world. No longer the Chinese considering the multilateral approaches are something to be feared, instead, the Chinese increasingly find that the approaches are best way for countries, especially the rising powers such as China, to play a bigger role in international community. The multilateralism coincides Chinese thinking of taking greater “responsibilities” in Asia and the world. And the Chinese understand well that their country is a controversial one in Asia and in the world. Not only because it is a rising powerful country, but also it is still socialist country with the communist party rule. The Chinese are fully aware that the rising and socialist China has been and will be for long time a concern and even a “threat” or “potential threat” to many countries in Asia and the in the world. And a best way for rising and controversial power to play a bigger role in Asia and the world is the multilateral approach. If China tries play a bigger role unilaterally, as the U.S. tried to do in Iraq, then China would meet with greater criticism and resistance than the United States. Same as if China tries to play a bigger in Asia and in the world through a bilateral approach, then it would also be skeptical. <sup>1</sup>

SPT process and model is the good example. China has been praised by almost everybody in Asia and the world for its contribution to try to resolve the issue peacefully through the multilateral approach. Suppose China did not play the host or mediate role in the SPT process, but plays a unilateral role on the issue, or through a bilateral approach with North Korea, or with the United States, then there would be a

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<sup>1</sup> There have been I increasing voice for multilateral security cooperation in Northeast and East Asia by the Chinese officials and scholars in recent years, such as the following publications: Wang Yi, “Neo-Asianism in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Foreign Affairs Review*, June 2006, pp.6-10; Yang Wenchang, “Building New Security Pattern in Northeast Asia,” *China Daily*, July 24, 2007, p.11; Wang Kuo, “Building Efficient Regional Security Cooperation Mechanism,” *Renmin Ribao*, February 1, 2007, p.3; Xue Xiapeng, “Changes in China’s Ideas on East Asian Regionalism,” *Foreign Affairs Review*, June 2006, pp.28-33; and Zhang Tuosheng, “Confidence Building Needed in Northeast Asia,” *China Daily*, July 11, 2006, p.4.

suspicion from others about China's intention and efforts, there would be some resistance from other parties to the Chinese efforts. Then the outcome would not be constructive nor successful. Now China plays a bigger and important role in the SPT process through the multilateral approach of the SPT, then everybody welcomes and supports the Chinese efforts.

Therefore, we can say now at the 21<sup>st</sup> century that multilateral approach is the best way for a major power, including the U.S. and China, to play a constructive and important role in international relations. First, because as stated earlier, no country, no matter how powerful it is, can resolve the important problems by itself alone in this globalized, interdependent, and more democratic world. Second, unilateralism and bilateralism are skeptical to most of the countries, because other countries do not participate the process, do not have full information, and do not have direct influence toward the process, then they tend to have suspicion about it. But as a multilateral process, it is open, is transparent, lot of countries participate, they know the process, they participate process, and they can have influence to the process because they know and participate, so they trust, welcome, and support the process.

But not every country in the SPT believes multilateralism. North Korea is not only possible to fail the process of the SPT itself, fails the goal of resolving the nuclear issue through the SPT, but it can also reject the multilateral approach along with the SPT. It is possible that DPRK will not give up its nuclear weapons in the future years, even the SPT process can be going on; and it will also oppose the multilateral process or any multilateral security approach in Northeast Asia.

However, the good news is that the North Koreans can decide whether the SPT process to resolve nuclear issue to be successful or not, it cannot decide the future of multilateral security cooperation among almost all other countries in Northeast Asia.

With or without the success of the SPT to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, the other parties of the SPT process will keep the multilateral approach going on in the region.

Firstly, with the SPT process, other parties of ROK, Japan, the U.S., China, and Russia have become custom to the multilateral process. The process unites all of them in some sense and some ways. All the five countries find this is a good approach to address security issues in the region. All of them like the approach, need the approach, and agree the approach should be going on, and going better. All of them need the multilateral approach to address their and common concerns, interests, to communicate with others, all of them need further regional integration for each country's security and economic development, and all of them need some multilateral settings to provide the opportunity for bilateral engagement, especially when the bilateral relations are not good and there is little channel or possibility for bilateral talks. Actually this is also a party of the value of the multilateral approach. Like already happened in the SPT process, both sides of DPRK and the U.S. need and want talk with each other, but they do not have the tone, atmosphere, trust, and chance to talk with each other, and the SPT process has provided natural and good opportunity for DPRK and the U.S. to engage intensive, constructive bilateral dialogue, as it also provides for other parties for bilateral engagement.

Certainly the SPT process should and will focus on North Korean nuclear issues when it is going on. And when it fails to resolve the nuclear issue for various reasons, the multilateral approach in Northeast Asia, we may call the "Five-Party Talks," or continue to call it the "Six-Party Talks" when DPRK is out and Mongolia is in. The focus of the five or new six party talks should also on North Korean nuclear issue, even the content may no longer be denuclearization but non-proliferation.

If the SPT fails to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, certainly the new multilateral security approach should and need to focus on preventing North Korea to proliferate its nuclear, missile, and other weapons and skills of mass destruction to others in this and other regions. This is a common task and interests of all the five countries of the U.S., Japan, ROK, China, and Russia.

And besides non-proliferation, how to deal with a nuclearized DPRK and maintain peace and stability in the region is a common challenge to all the other

countries in the region. North Korea would not be quite after it refuses to denuclearization, it may cause more troubles and problems to the region, therefore, other countries should be coordinated to deal with common challenges. Certainly we would like to see that DPRK will not go to that direction, but we cannot be certain.

And the region has other important issues to be dressed in addition to North Korean issues. Overall military buildup, arms control and disarmament, transparency, CBMs (confidence building measures) are big and long-term jobs in this region now and in the future. And the region even has not started on it.

The region of Northeast Asia is still divided and dangerous in security, and needs hard work of dialogue, engagement, and integration. North and South Koreans are still divided and basically hostile with each other. China is in the process of increasing its economic, technological, cultural, and military strengthens. Yes, China is entitled to be more powerful in every area, however, its needs to be “rising peacefully,” as its leadership and government stated. And “peaceful rising” is and cannot be simply a world or intention, it needs lot of real efforts and works, and it needs to be done unilaterally by the Chinese themselves, and it also needs to be done multilaterally with other countries in the reason. Among those real works to be done are transparency and CBMs. China and others should talk and be clear about China military modernization, the levels of its strategic and conventional buildups, the intention and strategy, and the impact on others and the whole region, so that the modernization will not cause instability in the region. Other powers such as the U.S., Japan, or even Russia, also have the same works to do make their military efforts transparent and understandable, without cause major concerns, threats, and conflicts in the region.

The region also has economic\environmental and other non-traditional security issues to be addressed multilaterally, and has a great job to do for promoting economic integration and even community building in Northeast Asia.

Northeast Asia is a global power house and will become one of the few more powerful and influence centers in the whole world. Here you have currently world’s

second, third, and thirteenth largest economies of Japan, China, ROK, and Russia, and the superpower the U.S. is deeply involved in the region. Those powers would have greater influence upon the world's future. Therefore, it is hard to believe that those powers can integrate with the whole international community when they do not integrate with each other in their region. So in order for those powers such as China, Japan, and Korea to be fully integrated with the international community and play a bigger and positive role in Asia and in the world, there needs the regional integration in Northeast Asia in security, economic, social, and political terms. The region has not started with the regional integration, and the SPT can be a try or starting point of the integration. The regional integration process should be going on in a greater scope and quicker path. This is global as well as every country's interests in both economic and security arenas.

The SPT has started the multilateral approach and regional integration in Northeast Asia. With or without the process being resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, the process of multilateralism should be going on, and going formally now and in the future. This is the great hope of Northeast Asia, whole Asia and the world, certainly is also the great hope of all the nations in the region.

### 3. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

Originally the confidence-building measures on border issues between the Soviet Union and China in the early 1990s, the four countries in Central Asia after the breakout of the Soviet Union have joined the bilateral process and thus it becomes a sub-regional multilateral arrangement for security and development. Now even more countries such as Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan want to join the SCO.

The SCO looks likely to be rising because all the six countries find and develop stronger common interest in fighting terrorism, extremism, and separatists in their countries and in the region of Central, Southern, and Western Asia. They have long way to go to ensure their security in the front. Besides, all the countries see and develop strong interests in economic and development and cooperation, including in

the areas of trade, investment, and energy.

#### 4. ASEAN as a Security Arrangement?


ASEAN so far serves as political grouping, and it sets to become an “economic community” in the middle of the 2010s. It has not become a security institution or arrangement. However, as member states getting closer in political, economic, and social ties, they do improve their security relations and defuse conflicts among them. Therefore, ASEAN is likely to become a “community” arrangement in security area too in the future.

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# Security Implications of East Asian Financial Regionalism

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## Three Main Points

- Regionalism essentially involves the **politics of identity** in terms of whom to include and whom to exclude in defining a region (regional membership question).
- Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 has become an important defining moment for East Asian countries to pursue **exclusionary regionalism** that tends to exclude the U.S. from regional initiatives, such as the CMI, the ABMI, and ACU.
- Security implications of exclusionary East Asian financial regionalism are:
  - East Asian states started to perceive the U.S. as an external force.
  - When fully developed, a financially autonomous East Asia may reduce U.S. ability to use economic means to advance political/security goals in East Asia.

# East Asian Financial Regionalism



- Definition of East Asian Financial Regionalism:
  - East Asian states' attempts to create frameworks to contain financial crises, to reduce currency volatility, and to develop local financial markets
- Framework to Contain Financial Crises: Chiang Mai Initiative (bilateral swap arrangement) and Asian Monetary Fund
- Management of Currency Volatility: ACU (Asian Currency Unit toward Common Currency) away from Dollar-Peg
- Development of Local Financial Markets: Asian Bond Markets Initiative (development of local bond markets issuing local bonds denominated in local currencies)

# Main Characteristics of East Asian Financial Regionalism



- More formal and institutionalized monetary cooperation (CMI, ACU, and ABMI) among East Asian States
- Exclusion of the United States from Monetary Cooperation Initiatives
  - “Asian matters should be discussed among Asian states.” (Interview with Japan’s Ministry of Finance officials)
- Away from Global toward Regional (Local)
  - Open/inclusive regionalism to exclusive regionalism

# CMI to Asian Monetary Fund




- Purpose
  - Contain and manage financial crises (“self-help support mechanism in East Asia)
- Origin and Development
  - Dissatisfaction with U.S.-led IMF management of the AFC.
  - May 2000 (Chiang Mai, Thailand): Establishment of bilateral swap arrangements among central banks of East Asian states.
  - May 2007 (Kyoto, Japan): Agreement to multilateralize the CMI.
  - May 2009 (Bali, Indonesia): Concretization of the CMIM
    - Agreement on the size of the CMIM: \$120 Billion
    - Agreement on contribution size: China and Japan (38.4 each), Korea (19.4), and ASEAN (23.8)
    - Agreement on voting rights: China and Japan (32% each), Korea (16%), and ASEAN (20%)
- *De facto* AMF (Asian Monetary Fund)?

# Asian Bond Market Initiative



- Purpose
  - Development of regional financial markets for financial independence (development of local bond markets issuing local bonds denominated in local currencies)
- Origin and Development
  - Dissatisfaction with the current financial arrangement (East Asia's surplus savings → Western financial markets → East Asian borrowers (loans))
  - December 2002: Japan proposed the idea of the ABMI
  - May 2008: ASEAN plus Three announced “New ABMI Roadmap.”
    - Facility to increase demand of local currency-denominated bonds
    - Improvement of regulatory framework (rating system and information dissemination)
    - Enhancement of infrastructure for local bond markets (credit guarantee and investment mechanisms & settlement coordination)
- End of Capital Recycling?

# Asian Common Currency



- Purpose
  - Management of currency volatility for trade and investment
- Origin and Development
  - 2002: Establishment of “Kobe Study Group” for monetary integration process in East Asia.
  - 2006: ASEAN plus Three’s agreement on the study of feasibility of developing the ACU, modeled after the ECU (unit of exchange based on the weighted average of basket of currencies)
- End of Dollar Hegemony?



## Summary and Implications


- CMIM (AMF)
  - Replacement of the IMF in financial crisis management in East Asia.
- ABMI
  - More money circulation in East Asia and less incentive to finance and invest outside the region through recycling
- ACU
  - De-Dollarization (reduction of role of dollar as reserve currency)

# Security Implications for the U.S.



- East Asian states started to perceive the U.S. as an eternal force
- When fully development, a financially autonomous East Asia may reduce the U.S. ability to use economic means to achieve political/security goals (i.e., alliance maintenance)
  - Liquidity Provision (IMF for U.S. policy objectives) (CMIM/AMF, ABDI)
  - Exchange Rate Manipulation (Exchange-Rate Weapon for delaying/deflecting macroeconomic adjustment) (ABDI, ACU)

# Thank You



- Welcome Your Comments, Suggestions, and Questions

# Security Implications of Free Trade Arrangements in East Asia

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
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# Categorizing trade and security arrangements


*Number of Actors*

Unilateral	Bilateral		Minilateral		Global Multilateral
	Geographically concentrated	Geographically dispersed	Geographically concentrated	Geographically dispersed	
APEC-based Individual Action Plans	FTAs: Japan-Korea (under negotiation) China-Korea (under study) China-Singapore (2008)	FTAs: Japan-Singapore (2002) Korea-Chile (2003) Japan-Malaysia (2004) Japan-Mexico (2004) Korea-Singapore (2005) Japan-Philippines (2006) China-Chile (2006) Japan-Chile (2007) Korea-U.S. (2007) China-New Zealand (2008)	China-ASEAN FTA (2003) Northeast Asian FTA (proposed)	APEC (1989) EAEC (1994) ASEM (1996) APT (1998) Korea-ASEAN FTA (2006) Korea-EU FTA (2009)	GATT/WTO (1947/1995) ITA (1997) BTA (1998) FSA (1999)
Unilateral use of force	Joint military exercises	U.S. military treaties with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan	Northeast Asian Security Dialogue (under study)	ARF (1994) CSCAP (1993) NEACD (1993) SPT (2003)	UN (1945) NPT (1968) PSI (2003)




## The puzzle

- The proliferation of FTAs in East Asia and a growing scholarly interest in “security-embedded” FTAs
  - China-ASEAN (2003)
  - Singapore-U.S. (2003)
  - Australia-U.S. (2004)
  - South Korea-U.S. (2007)
  - China-Singapore (2008)
- Are East Asian economics and security getting more connected through FTAs than ever before?
- The dependent variable (i.e., recent East Asian FTAs) is limited and truncated, thus causing a selection bias.




## Two aspects of the economics-security nexus

- The Kantian tripod of “perpetual peace” and the debate about “liberal peace”
- Neither simple nor self-evident
  - Liberal peace thesis: security < economics
  - Realist critique: security > economics
- In the post-war period, the economics-security nexus in East Asia has undergone three distinct phases depending on U.S. hegemony.
  - Security-embedded economics relations during the CW period
  - De-securitization of economics in the 1990s
  - Re-securitization of economic relations in the post-9/11 world?



## Security-embedded econ relations in the CW era

- East Asia at the crossroad of CW tensions b/w the U.S. and the Soviet Union
- Provision of trade liberalization for America's East Asian allies in return for their support for American hegemony
  - *De jure*: multilateral club goods through the GATT
  - *De facto*: semi-public goods
  - *As a result*: No need for exclusive trade arrangements
- “The U.S. saw these institutions as beneficial to its national interest and its view of world order, but it defined its interests broadly and in a sufficiently inclusive manner that other countries felt able to sign on to a vision that stressed the importance of due process and the rule of law.” (Higgott 2004)




## De-securitization of economics in the 1990s

- The heyday of American neo-liberalism and the subordination of security policy to economic policy
- Subtle modification of America's strategic goals in geo-economic terms as opposed to geo-strategic terms, largely as a function of the Clinton administration's concentrated focus on advancing the process of globalization and trade liberalization.
- The AFC as a catalyst for the dramatic departure of East Asian countries from their traditional focus on the U.S. and global institutions such as the GATT/WTO and the IMF in economic relations




## Re-securitization of economic relations in the post-9/11 world?

- Bush Administration's "securitization" of the neoliberal economic agenda and its foreign economic policy in the context of its changing view of sovereignty and security in the post-9/11 world.
- The Trade Act of 2002 and the trade promotion authority (TPA)
- Mixed evidence as to whether or not America's economic and security position in East Asia has been strengthened by linking trade and security for the past decade
  - Singapore (2003)
  - Australia (2004)
  - Korea (2007)




## The case of the KORUS FTA

- For Korea, maximizing the gains from trade and investment against the background of the growing strategic and economics uncertainties
- For the U.S., maintaining a strong strategic and economic foothold
- The bones of contention in the ratification process: beef and automobiles
- The delayed ratification in the U.S. indicates that the Administration's effort to "re-securitize economic relations" has yet to gain domestic support, esp. from Congress.



# T

- Neither simple nor self-evident
  - Liberal peace thesis: security < economics
- In the post-war period, the economics-security nexus in East Asia has undergone three distinct phases depending on U.S. hegemony.
  - Re-securitization of economic relations in the post-9/11 world?



## Conclusion and Implications

- The varying degrees of the economics-security nexus in East Asia can be explained by the rise and decline of U.S. hegemony.
- Some East Asian FTAs—particularly the ones with the U.S.—are security-embedded, but in general it can't be said that East Asian economics and security could not be more connected than at present in favor or the U.S.
- Implications for East Asian economic and security regionalism
  - Shrinking provision of public goods in both economic and security issue areas
  - Growing interest in regional club goods in the form of FTAs, swap agreements, security dialogues, etc.
  - Requiring more research on the dynamics of economic and security regionalism