

국가안보패널보고서 13호

“확산안보구상(PSI)과 한반도”

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<부록1> 미 백악관 보도자료

1. Remarks by the President to the People of Poland

Wawel Royal Castle

Krakow, Poland

May 31, 2003

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-2.html>

THE PRESIDENT: My friend, Mr. President. It's really good to be with you again and, of course, the First Lady. Mr. Prime Minister, Your Eminence, distinguished guests, citizens of Poland. I'm honored to be in the city of Krakow, where so many landmarks give witness to Poland's history and Poland's faith.

From this castle, Polish kings ruled for centuries in a tradition of tolerance. Below this hill lies the market square, where Kosciuszko swore loyalty to the first democratic constitution of Europe. And at Wawel Cathedral in 1978, a Polish Cardinal began his journey to a conclave in Rome, and entered history as Pope John Paul II -- one of the greatest moral leaders of our time. (Applause.)

In all the tests and hardship Poland has known, the soul of the Polish people has always been strong. Mrs. Bush and I are pleased to make our second visit to this beautiful country, and we bring with us the friendship and the good wishes of the American people. (Applause.)

In Warsaw two years ago, I affirmed the commitment of my country to a united Europe, bound to America by close ties of history, of commerce and of friendship. I said that Europe must finally overturn the bitter legacy of Yalta and remove the false boundaries and spheres of influence that divided this continent for too long.

We have acted on this commitment. Poland, the United States and our allies have agreed to extend NATO eastward and southward, bringing the peace and security of our alliance to the young democracies of Europe. (Applause.)

And as the Atlantic alliance has expanded, it has also been tested. America and European countries have been called to confront the threat of global terror. Each nation has faced difficult decisions about the use of military force to keep the peace. We have seen unity and common purpose. We have also seen debate -- some of it healthy, some of it divisive.

I have come to Krakow to state the intentions of my country. The United States is committed to a strong Atlantic alliance, to ensure our security, to advance human freedom and to keep peace in the world. (Applause.) Poland struggled for decades to gain freedom and to fully participate in life in Europe. And soon you will be a member of the European Union.

You also struggled to become a full member of the Atlantic alliance, yet you have not come all this way -- through occupations and tyranny and brave uprisings -- only to be told that you must now choose between Europe and America. Poland is a good citizen of Europe and Poland is a close friend of America -- (applause) -- and there is no conflict between the two. (Applause.)

America owes our moral heritage of democracy and tolerance and freedom to Europe. We have sacrificed for those ideals together, in the great struggles of the past. In the second world war, the forces of freedom came together to defeat Nazism. In the Cold War, our transatlantic alliance opposed imperial communism. And today our alliance of freedom faces a new enemy, a lethal combination of terrorist groups, outlaw states seeking weapons of mass destruction, and an ideology of power and domination that targets the innocent and justifies any crime.

This is a time for all of us to unite in the defense of liberty and to step up to the shared duties of free nations. This is no time to stir up divisions in a great alliance. (Applause.)

For America, our resolve to fight terror was firmly set on a single day of violence and sorrow. The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, changed my country. On that morning, the American people saw the hatred of our enemies and the future of grief they intend for us. The American government accepted a mission to strike and defeat the terror network and to hold accountable all who harbor it and all who support it.

For my country, the events of September the 11th were as decisive as the attack on Pearl Harbor and the treachery of another September in 1939. (Applause.) And the lesson of all those events is the same: aggression and evil intent must not be ignored or appeased; they must be opposed early and decisively. (Applause.)

We are striving for a world in which men and women can live in freedom and peace, instead of fear and chaos. And every civilized nation has a stake in the outcome. By waging this fight together, we will speed the day of final victory.

One of the main fronts in this war is right here in Europe, where al Qaeda used the cities as staging areas for their attacks. Europe's capable police forces and intelligence services are playing essential roles in hunting the terrorists. And Poland has led the effort to increase anti-terror cooperation amongst central and eastern European nations. And America is grateful. (Applause.)

Some challenges of terrorism, however, cannot be met with law enforcement alone. They must be met with direct military action. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan chose to support and harbor al Qaeda terrorists. And so that regime is no more. The dictator in Iraq pursued weapons of mass murder, cultivated ties to terror and defied the demands of the United Nations -- so his regime has been ended.

In the battles of Afghanistan and Iraq, Polish forces served with skill and honor. America will not forget that Poland rose to the moment. Again you have lived out the words of the Polish motto: for your freedom and ours. (Applause.)

In order to win the war on terror, our alliances must be strong. (Applause.) Poland and America are proud members of NATO, and NATO must be prepared to meet the challenges of our time. This is a matter of capability and a matter of will. Our common security requires European governments to invest in modern military capabilities, so our forces can move quickly with a precision that can strike the guilty and spare the innocent.

NATO must show resolve and foresight to act beyond Europe, and it has begun to do so. NATO has agreed to lead security forces in Afghanistan and to support our Polish allies in Iraq. A strong NATO alliance, with a broad vision of its role, will serve our security and the cause of peace.

The greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. And we must work together to stop proliferation. The countries of the G8 committed last year to aiding Russia and others in securing and eliminating deadly weapons that remain from the Soviet era. I welcome Poland's decision to join this effort.

And I call on America's G8 partners to follow through on their financial commitments so that we can stop proliferation at one of its sources. When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must have the means and authority to seize them. So today I announce a new effort to fight proliferation called the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States and a number of our close allies, including Poland, have begun working on new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal

weapons or missile technologies. Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our common enemies.

In the last 20 months, the world has seen the determination of my country and many others to fight terror. Yet, armed force is always the last resort. And Americans know that terrorism is not defeated by military power alone. We believe that the ultimate answer to hatred is hope. And as we fight the forces of terror, we must also change the conditions in which terror can take root.

Terrorism is often bred in failing states, so we must help nations in crisis to build a civil society of free institutions. The ideology of terror takes hold in an atmosphere of resentment and hopelessness, so we must help men and women around the world to build lives of purpose and dignity.

In the long-term, we add to our security by helping to spread freedom and alleviate suffering. And this sets a broad agenda for nations on both sides of the Atlantic. In Africa, the spread of HIV/AIDS threatens millions, and the stability of an entire continent. The United States has undertaken a comprehensive, \$15 billion effort to prevent AIDS and to treat AIDS and provide humane care for its victims. I urge our partners in Europe to make a similar commitment, so we can work together in turning the tide against AIDS. (Applause.)

Global hunger is a chronic challenge, and we have a crisis in Africa. The United States is establishing an emergency fund so we can rush help to countries where the first signs of famine appear. The nations of Europe can greatly help in this effort, with emergency funds of their own. I hope European governments will reconsider policies that discourage farmers in developing countries from using safe biotechnology to feed their own people. (Applause.)

Wealthy nations have the responsibility to help the developing world and to make certain our help is effective. Through the Millennium Challenge Account, I have proposed a 50 percent increase in America's core development assistance. This aid will go to where it will do the most good -- not to corrupt elites but to nations that are ruled justly, nations that invest in the health and education of their people, and nations that encourage economic freedom. (Applause.)

If European governments will adopt the same standards, we can work side-by-side in providing the kind of development aid that helps transform entire societies. One of the greatest sources of development and growth in any society is trade. America and Europe should lead the effort to bring down global trade barriers. (Applause.)

A world that trades in freedom can bring millions of people into a growing circle of prosperity. And America and Europe must work closely to develop and apply new technologies that will improve our air and water quality, and protect the health of the world's people. (Applause.)

America and Europe are called to advance the cause of freedom and peace, and these two commitments are inseparable. It is human rights and private property, the rule of law and free trade and political openness that undermine the appeal of extremism and create the stable environment that peace requires. We are determined to demonstrate the power of these ideals in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. And these ideals will provide the foundation for a reformed and peaceful and independent Palestinian state.

Today in the Middle East, the emergence of new Palestinian leadership, which has condemned terror, is a hopeful sign that the parties can agree to two states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security. (Applause.)

Early next week I will go to the Middle East to meet with the Palestinian and Israeli Prime Ministers, and other leaders in the region. I will remind them that the work ahead will require difficult decisions. I will remind them that for peace to prevail, all leaders must fight terrorism and shake off old arguments and old ways. No leader of conscience can accept more months and years of humiliation and killing and mourning. I will do all that I can to help the parties reach an agreement, and then to see that that agreement is enforced. (Applause.)

To meet these goals of security and peace and a hopeful future for the developing world, we welcome, we need the help, the advice and the wisdom of our European friends and allies. (Applause.)

New theories of rivalry should not be permitted to undermine the great principles and obligations that we share. The enemies of freedom have always preferred a divided alliance -- because when Europe and America are united, no problem and no enemy can stand against us. (Applause.)

Within an hour's journey of this castle lies a monument to the darkest impulses of man. Today, I saw Auschwitz, the sites of the Holocaust and Polish martyrdom; a place where evil found its willing servants and its innocent victims. One boy imprisoned there was branded with the number A70713. Returning to Auschwitz a lifetime later, Elie Wiesel recalled his first night in the camp: I asked myself, God, is this the end of your people, the end of mankind, the end of the world?

With every murder, a world was ended. And the death camps still bare witness.

They remind us that evil is real and must be called by name and must be opposed. All the good that has come to this continent -- all the progress, the prosperity, the peace -- came because beyond the barbed wire there were people willing to take up arms against evil. (Applause.)

And history asks more than memory, because hatred and aggression and murderous ambitions are still alive in the world. Having seen the works of evil firsthand on this continent, we must never lose the courage to oppose it everywhere. (Applause.)

Through the years of the Second World War, another legacy of the 20th century was unfolding, here in this city of Krakow. A young seminarian, Karol Wojtyla, saw the swastika flag flying over the ramparts of Wawel Castle. He shared the suffering of his people and was put into forced labor. From this priest's experience and faith came a vision: that every person must be treated with dignity, because every person is known and loved by God.

In time, this man's vision and this man's courage would bring fear to tyrants and freedom to his beloved country, and liberation to half a continent. To this very hour, Pope John Paul II speaks for the dignity of every life and expresses the highest aspirations of the culture we share. Europe and America will always be joined by more than our interests. Ours is a union of ideals and convictions. We believe in human rights, and justice under law, and self-government, and economic freedom tempered by compassion.

We do not own these beliefs, but we have carried them through the centuries. We will advance them further and we will defend them together. (Applause.)

Thank you for your hospitality. Thank you for your friendship. May God bless this great nation, and may God bless the Polish people. (Applause.)

END 12:44 P.M. (L)

<부록2> 미 국무부 자료

1. Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles

Fact Sheet

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary

September 4, 2003

<http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm>

Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and stronger actions by the international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of "Interdiction Principles."

Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative

PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from

states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to:

1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include:
 - a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
 - b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other

state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

- c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.
- d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
- e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
- f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

2. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

US Department of State

April 28, 2004

<http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/31990.htm>

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004

The Security Council,

Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,* constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,

Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability,

Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation,

Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation,

Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors* such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to

whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials,* which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security,

Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,

Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and agreements to which they are party,

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides that* all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

2. *Decides also* that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing

activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

3. *Decides also* that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;

(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;

(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;

4. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution;

5. *Decides* that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

6. *Recognizes* the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists;

7. *Recognizes* that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions;

8. *Calls upon* all States:

(a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;

(b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral nonproliferation treaties;

(c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes;

(d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;

9. *Calls upon* all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery;

10. Further to counter that threat, *calls upon* all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;

11. *Expresses* its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end;

12. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

3. The United States and Belize Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement

Media Note

Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State

Washington, DC

August 4, 2005

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/50787.htm>

The United States and Belize Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement

On Thursday, August 4, 2005, the United States and Belize signed a reciprocal Ship Boarding Agreement in support of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Belizean Ambassador to the U.S. Lisa Shoman signed the agreement on behalf of Belize and Assistant Secretary Stephen Rademaker signed on behalf of the United States.

The Proliferation Security Initiative was announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, and is aimed at establishing cooperative partnerships worldwide to prevent the flow of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Proliferation Security Initiative partners marked the recent second anniversary of the Initiative through a series of activities, including exercises in the Czech Republic and Spain and an event hosted by Secretary Rice on May 31 for the Washington diplomatic corps.

The ship boarding agreement signed by the U.S. and Belize will facilitate cooperation between the two countries to prevent the maritime trafficking of proliferation-related shipments by establishing points of contact and procedures to expedite requests to board and search suspect vessels in international waters. If a U.S.- or Belizean-flagged vessel is suspected of trafficking proliferation-related cargo, either Party to this agreement can request authorization to board, search, and possibly detain the other's vessel and its cargo. The agreement does not apply to the vessels of third states.

Belize is the first CARICOM member state and the sixth country in total to

sign a Ship Boarding Agreement with the U.S. in support of the Proliferation Security Initiative; we have concluded similar agreements with Liberia, Panama, the Marshall Islands, Croatia and Cyprus. The combination of states with which we have signed bilateral ship boarding agreements, plus the commitments made by other Proliferation Security Initiative partners under the Statement of Interdiction Principles, translates into more than 60 percent of the global commercial shipping fleet dead weight tonnage now being subject to rapid action consent procedures for boarding, search, and seizure.

Signing the ship boarding agreement demonstrates the commitment of Belize and the United States to ensuring the highest standards of security for their flag registries. This reciprocal agreement also sends a clear message to proliferators that neither the U.S. nor Belize will tolerate the involvement of their vessels in the trade of proliferation-related cargoes. We believe that ship boarding agreements in support of the Proliferation Security Initiative simultaneously deter proliferators and attract legitimate commercial shipping interests that want to ensure their goods are transported under a reputable and responsible flag, which is not "misused" to transport illicit proliferation-related shipments.

<부록3> 일본 외무성 보도자료

1. The Proliferation Security Initiative Maritime Interdiction Exercise "Team Samurai 04" (Overview and Evaluation)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

October 28, 2004

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/psi/overview0410.html>

1. Overview

(1) Itinerary

October 25 (Monday) Pre-Exercise Meeting on the Scenario-based PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise

(Venue: Yokohama Maritime Disaster Prevention Base)

October 26 (Tuesday) Scenario-based PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise

(Venue: Off the coast of Sagami Bay)

October 27 (Wednesday) Post-Exercise review meeting on the Scenario-based PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise

(Venue: Yokosuka district of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force)

Maritime interdiction activities Training demonstration

(Venue: Within the port of Yokosuka (Note))

(Note) Originally scheduled to be conducted off the Port of Yokosuka, but took place within the port due to conditions at sea.

(2) Details of participation from Japan

(a) Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Overall coordination concerning itinerary, participating assets, scenario and others.

(b) Japan Coast Guard: Execution of law enforcement activities on suspected vessels such as pursuit, stopping, boarding, searching and seizure during the scenario-based PSI maritime interdiction exercise.

- (c) Japan Defense Agency and Japan Self-Defense Forces: Execution of guard and surveillance activities such as search and monitoring by vessels and aircraft during the Scenario-based PSI maritime interdiction exercise. In addition, execution of the maritime interdiction activities training demonstration.

(3) Participating Countries: 22 countries in total

-Countries participating with assets such as vessels and aircraft: 4 countries (Japan, Australia, France, and the United States)

-Countries participating as observers: 18 countries (Cambodia, Canada, Greece, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom)

<Points>

1. All 15 PSI core group countries took part in the exercise in one form or another. (Japan, Australia, France and the United States provided vessels and aircraft while the other eleven countries dispatched observers.)
2. In addition to Singapore which is already a member of the core group, Cambodia, the Philippines and Thailand participated for the first time from Asia.
3. The United States dispatched high-level officials as its observers including Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton.

(4) Overview of the exercise scenario

-Under the circumstance of a possible terrorist attack in Japan by a certain terrorist organization, the government obtains information that a suspected Japanese vessel is going to receive a cargo suspected to be sarin-related

from a suspected US vessel. The strengthening of information gathering system is confirmed at the Prime Minister's Official Residence. Japan Coast Guard obtains a search/seizure warrant for the suspected Japanese vessel.

-A patrol aircraft of Japan Self-Defense Forces identifies a inspected US vessel on the high seas and reports to the relevant authorities. Japan Self-Defense Forces and Japan Coast Guard continue surveillance activities.

-The suspected Japanese vessel approaches the suspected US vessel and the crew of each vessel start transshipping the material in question on the high seas. Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels attempt to approach the vessels, but both vessels suspend the transshipment of the material and flee from the scene.

-Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels stop the suspected Japanese vessel on the high seas and identify the material in question as a result of boarding and searching. On confirmation that the material is sarin by a sample check, the material is seized. The Japanese vessel is diverted to the nearest port. As a result of an expert examination, it becomes definite that the material is sarin. The suspects are sent to the prosecutor's office.

-Based on the information provided from Japan Coast Guard and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, the US vessels start the pursuit of the suspected US vessel on the high seas, as do the Australian and French vessels at the request of the US. The US vessel stops the suspected vessel on the high seas. The US calls for support of the Australian and French ships in conducting search of the material in question, and secures it as a result of the joint search. The US conducts an examination of the material and as a result of comparison of the data with that of Japan Coast Guard, it becomes definite that the material is sarin. The material is seized.

(Note) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

-PSI is an effort to consider collective measures among the participating

countries, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, in order to impede and stop prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and their related materials that pose threats to the peace and stability of the international community. It was announced by US President George W. Bush in May 2003.

-The PSI participating countries have held plenary meetings at director-general level and experts meetings at deputy director-general level.

-At present, 15 PSI core group countries are: Japan, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, UK, and US.

-Japan has actively participated in the activities of the PSI which is in line with the efforts Japan has made for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

2. Evaluation

- (1) Improvement was seen in the proficiency level of maritime interdiction of relevant authorities (navy, coast guard, customs) of countries that provided their vessel and aircraft for this exercise (Japan, Australia, France and the United States), and coordination was strengthened.
- (2) All 15 PSI core group countries took part in the exercise in one form or another. (Japan, Australia, France and the United States provided vessels and aircraft while the other eleven countries dispatched observers.). This demonstrated an international partnership towards the interdiction of proliferation with the PSI core group playing a central role.
- (3) This interdiction exercise is the first PSI interdiction exercise Japan has hosted and it highlighted both domestically and abroad the active contribution Japan is making for PSI.

- (4) In addition to Australia and Singapore that are already member countries of the core group, Cambodia, the Philippines, New Zealand and Thailand from the Asia-and Oceania region participated for the first time in the PSI interdiction exercise. The understanding regarding the PSI among Asia Oceania Countries was promoted through the implementation of the exercise (outreach effect).

<부록4> UN 해양법협약

1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica

December 10, 1982

<http://globelaw.com/LawSea/lawsea82.txt>

UN 해양법협약의 총 분량이 112쪽이 넘는 관계로 본 부록에서는 Part 1. Introduction 부분까지만 실었습니다. Part 1을 제외한 나머지 협약을 참조하시고 싶으시면 위에 링크된 주소로 들어가시면 됩니다.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 December 1982

NOT YET IN FORCE

The States Parties to this Convention,

Prompted by the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation, all issues relating to the law of the sea and aware of the historic significance of this Convention as an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world,

Noting that developments since the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea held at Geneva in 1958 and 1960 have accentuated the need for a new and generally acceptable Convention on the law of the sea,

Conscious that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole,

Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment,

Bearing in mind that the achievement of these goals will contribute to the realization of a just and equitable international economic order which takes into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in particular, the special interests and needs of developing countries, whether coastal or

land-locked,

Desiring by this Convention to develop the principles embodied in resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 in which the General Assembly of the United Nations solemnly declared inter alia that the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States,

Believing that the codification and progressive development of the law of the sea achieved in this Convention will contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, co-operation and friendly relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of justice and equal rights and will promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples of the world, in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as set forth in the Charter,

Affirming that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law, Have agreed as follows:

PART I

INTRODUCTION

Article 1

Use of terms and scope

1. For the purposes of this Convention:

- (1) "Area" means the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
- (2) "Authority" means the International Sea-Bed Authority;
- (3) "activities in the Area" means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area;
- (4) "pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities;
- (5) (a) "dumping" means:
 - (i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea;
 - (ii) any deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other

- man-made structures at sea
- (b) "dumping" does not include:
- (i) the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea and their equipment, other than wastes or other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or structures;
 - (ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention.
2. (1) "States Parties" means States which have consented to be bound by this Convention and for which this Convention is in force.
- (2) This Convention applies mutatis mutandis to the entities referred to in article 305, paragraph 1(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), which become Parties to this Convention in accordance with the conditions relevant to each, and to that extent "States Parties" refers to those entities.

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TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE

PART III
STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION

PART IV
ARCHIPELAGIC STATES

PART V
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

PART VI
CONTINENTAL SHELF

PART VII
HIGH SEAS

PART VIII
REGIME OF ISLANDS

PART IX
ENCLOSED OR SEMI-ENCLOSED SEAS

PART X
RIGHT OF ACCESS OF LAND-LOCKED STATES TO AND FROM THE SEA
AND FREEDOM OF TRANSIT

PART XI
THE AREA

PART XII
PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

PART XIII
MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

PART XIV
DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF
MARINE TECHNOLOGY

PART XV
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

PART XVI
GENERAL PROVISIONS

PART XVII
FINAL PROVISIONS

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**ANNEX II. COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL
SHELF**

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EXPLOITATION**

ANNEX IV. STATUTE OF THE ENTERPRISE

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ANNEX VIII. SPECIAL ARBITRATION

ANNEX IX. PARTICIPATION BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS