

## 국가안보패널보고서 7호

## “일본의 안보선택과 한국의 진로”

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## <부록1> 일본 신방위대강 (영문본: Unofficial translation)

### 1. National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005 and After

Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004

([http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f\\_work/taikou05/e17taiko.pdf](http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/e17taiko.pdf))

- I. Purpose
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#### I. Purpose

Based on the Security Council and Cabinet Decision “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures” of December 19, 2003, the Government of Japan hereby presents the “National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005 and After” as a guideline for Japan’s future security and defense capabilities designed to preserve peace and security of Japan as well as peace and stability of the international community in the new security environment surrounding Japan.

#### II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. As demonstrated in the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States, non-state actors, such as international terrorist organizations, have emerged as a serious threat in today’s security environment in addition to the traditional problems such as inter-state military confrontations. Against the backdrop of ever-deepening interdependence among states and globalization, new threats and other various situations that affect peace and security, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as well as international terrorist activities (hereinafter referred to as “the new threats and various situations”), pose an imminent challenge to today’s international community. Moreover, we have to bear in mind that the traditional strategy of deterrence does not work as effectively as in the past vis-à-vis international terrorist organizations which do not have their own state or people to protect.

In the meanwhile, more than ten years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and mutual cooperation and interdependence among major powers have deepened, exemplified by the growing trust between the United States and Russia. Under these circumstances, international coordination and cooperation on security issues have taken root in the international community as the stable international environment serves the

interests of all nations, and nations of the world are making wide range of efforts including those under the framework of international organizations such as the United Nations.

In this context, the United States, as the sole superpower, continues to play an important role in international peace and stability by taking proactive measures to combat terrorism and prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Besides, military force has begun to play broader roles and is actively used for various purposes, such as preventing conflict and reconstructing failed states in addition to deterring and/or responding to armed conflict.

2. In the vicinity of Japan, efforts are being made to promote and strengthen bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation, as a result of further expansion and deepening of interdependence among the nations in the region in recent years. In contrast, while Russian military power in the Far East has significantly decreased in quantitative terms after the end of the Cold War, large-scale military force, including nuclear capabilities, continues to exist in this region, and a number of countries have been modernizing their military forces.

In addition, unpredictability and uncertainty still remain in the situation on the Korean Peninsula as well as in the Taiwan Straits. North Korea is developing, deploying, and proliferating weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and maintains a large number of special operations forces. North Korea's such military activities constitute a major destabilizing factor to the regional security and a serious challenge to the international efforts for non-proliferation. In addition, China, which has a strong influence on the security in this region, has been modernizing its nuclear and missile capabilities as well as naval and air forces, and expanding its area of operation at sea. We have to remain attentive to its future course.

In this context, close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play a key role for the security of Japan as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. In light of the security environment surrounding Japa as described above, while on the one hand a full-scale invasion against Japan has become less likely to occur, Japan has to deal with new threats and various situations in addition to the security problems in the region.

4. In considering Japan's security, we have to take the following factors into account: that the country has security vulnerabilities resulting from its narrow land, long coastal lines and numerous small islands, high population density, and the concentration of population and industry in urban areas and a large number of important facilities in coastal areas; that Japan is prone to disaster in geographical and geological terms; and that the security of sea lines of communication is indispensable to its prosperity and growth.

### **III. Basic Principles of the Security of Japan**

#### **1. Basic Principles**

The first objective of Japan's security policy is to prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, to repel the threat as well as to minimize the damage. The second objective is to reduce the chances of any threat arising in various parts of the world in order to prevent it from reaching Japan. Japan will try to achieve these objectives by integrating its own efforts and cooperative efforts with the United States and the international community. To this end, Japan will, make diplomatic efforts to support United Nations activities for international peace and security, and to promote cooperative relationships with foreign countries, maintain close cooperative relationship with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, establish a basis for national security by preserving domestic political stability, and build up efficient defense force.

Under the Constitution of Japan, in accordance with fundamental principles of maintaining exclusively defense-oriented policy and of not becoming a major military power that might pose a threat to foreign countries, Japan will continue to uphold the basic policies of securing civilian control, adhering to the three non-nuclear principles, and building modest defense capability on its own initiative. To cope with the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan continues to rely on the nuclear deterrent provided by the United States, while at the same time play an active role in taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It will also play an active role in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding other weapons of mass destruction and delivery means such as missiles.

#### **2. Japan's Own Efforts**

##### **(1) Basic Ideas**

Based on the awareness that any country's security depends first and foremost on its own endeavors, Japan will make its utmost efforts, by utilizing all available means, to prevent any threat from reaching the country directly. In addition, it will engage in its own diplomatic activities to prevent the emergence of threats by improving international security environment, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and its alliance partner.

##### **(2) Japan's Integrated Response**

In the event that these efforts failed to prevent the threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan would take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions through mechanisms such as the Security Council, bringing together all relevant organizations, and having them cooperate adequately. To achieve this, the Government

will strive to improve its ability to collect and analyze information to facilitate decision-making. Through an appropriate role-sharing, relevant organizations, such as the Self-Defense Forces, the police, and the Japan Coast Guard, will ensure their close coordination through increased information sharing, joint exercises and other activities, and improve their overall performance. In addition, the Government will establish necessary civil defense systems, for example, to respond to different types of disasters and to quickly issue warning signals. For that purpose, the central and local governments will work closely together to establish adequate systems.

### **(3) Japan's Defense Capability**

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantee for its national security, representing its will and ability to repel any threat in case it reaches Japan. Japan's defense capability has been built upon the "National Defense Program Outline for FY 1996 and After" (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on November 28, 1995), which incorporated the key elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept espousing that rather than preparing to directly counter military threat, Japan, as an independent state, should maintain the minimum necessary basic defense capability lest it becomes a destabilizing factor in this region by creating a power vacuum.

Combined with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, this policy has been successful in preventing armed invasion from occurring. Given the new security environment, the future defense force should be capable of effectively responding to the new threats and various situations while preserving valid elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept. In addition, based on the awareness that peace and security of Japan are inextricably linked to the peace and stability of the international community, Japan should be able to proactively and on its own initiative participate, in order to promote its own peace and security, in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to improve international security environment (hereafter called "international peace cooperation activities"). We have to take it into account that while roles which the defense capability has to play are multiplying, the population of the youth in Japan keeps decreasing resulting from low birth rate, and the fiscal conditions continue deteriorating.

From this standpoint, Japan's future defense capability should be a multi-functional, flexible, and effective force with high level of readiness, mobility, adaptability and multi-purpose capability, and be equipped with advanced technologies and intelligence capabilities comparable to global military-technological level. In building such defense force without expanding its size, the Government of Japan should work to attain greater results with limited resources by rationalizing and streamlining personnel, equipment, and operations.

### **3. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements**

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable for Japan's security. In addition,

the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which continues to be stricken with unpredictability and uncertainty. Moreover, close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements plays an important role in facilitating international efforts to prevent the new threats and various situations, such as terrorism and ballistic missile attacks, from emerging, and to cope with them if necessary.

From this point of view, the Government of Japan will on its own initiative engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and the military posture such as force structure of the U.S. forces in Japan, while trying to share common views on the new security environment and on strategic objectives in that context. In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that U.S. military bases and facilities place on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides. In addition, Japan will continue to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements by actively promoting intelligence exchange, operational cooperation including that in the “situations in areas surrounding Japan,” cooperation on ballistic missile defense, equipment and technology exchange, and efforts to make the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smooth and efficient.

#### **4. Cooperation with the International Community**

In order to improve international security environment and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will proactively engage in various diplomatic efforts, including a strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Based on the recognition that threat to peace and stability of the international community by situations such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorist attacks would in turn seriously affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities as integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan given the fact that it traditionally has close economic ties with the region, that Japan’s sea lines of communication run through the region, and that Japan depends heavily on foreign countries for energy and natural resources. In this context, Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts, in conjunction with other concerned countries, to deal with common security challenges in the region.

To enable the international community to effectively address new challenges in the twenty-first century, we will have to undertake the reform of the world’s only global and comprehensive international organization—the United Nations—to make it more effective and reliable. Japan will actively pursue this goal. In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateral regional frameworks for security such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and multilateral efforts to cope with common agendas such as developing counter-terrorism

and counter-piracy measures are taking root. By continuing to support these positive developments, Japan will continue to play an appropriate role, in addition to the combined efforts with the United States, to promote stable security environment in this region.

#### **IV. Vision for the Future Defense Capability**

##### **1. Role of the Defense Capability**

Based on the assessment as described above, Japan's future defense capability should be able to effectively carry out missions in the following areas. Japan will develop and maintain necessary Self-Defense Forces posture in an efficient manner to achieve this.

##### **(1) Effective Response to the New Threats and Various Situations**

Japan will try to cope effectively with the new threats and various situations by developing and deploying highly ready and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to various different situations in accordance with the characteristic of the units and Japan's geographical characteristics. When such situations actually take place, the defense force will act quickly and appropriately to seamlessly respond to situations in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations in accordance with the circumstances and division of labor. Japan's response to and necessary Self-Defense Forces posture for the key elements of the new threats and various situations will be the following:

##### **a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks**

Japan will establish necessary defense force structure, including the introduction of ballistic missile defense systems, to cope effectively with ballistic missile attacks. With this effort and dependence on nuclear deterrent provided by the United States combined, we will adequately respond to the threat of nuclear weapons.

##### **b. Response to Guerrillas and Special Operations Units Attacks**

Japan will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations units, by enhancing readiness and mobility of the defense force units, and by coping with such attacks in a flexible manner.

##### **c. Response to Invasion against Outlying Islands**

Japan will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to invasion against outlying islands, by improving and strengthening capabilities to transport and deploy forces, and by coping with the invasion in a flexible manner.

##### **d. Patrol and Surveillance in the Peripheral Sea and Air, and the Response**

to the Violation of Territorial Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Operations Vessels and Others Japan will maintain necessary defense force structure, involving warships, aircraft and other necessary assets, to maintain around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the peripheral sea and air. We will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly and adequately to the violation of territorial airspace. And we will also maintain destroyers and other assets to respond adequately to armed special-operations vessels in the peripheral sea and foreign submarines which navigate submerged in the territorial sea of Japan.

#### **e. Response to Large-Scale and/or Unconventional Disaster (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Disasters)**

Japan will cope effectively with various situations, such as large-scale and/or unconventional disaster(nuclear, biological and chemical disasters), where protection of life and property is needed, by maintaining the posture equipped with defense force units and specialized capabilities to conduct disaster relief operations in any part of Japan.

#### **(2) Preparations to Deal with Full-Scale Invasion**

Since the likelihood of full-scale invasion against Japan will remain small in the foreseeable future, we will modify our current defense force concept that emphasized Cold War type counter-armor warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will make a sweeping review to reduce personnel and equipment earmarked for coping with full-scale invasion.

At the same time, however, considering the fact that the indigenous purpose of defense capability is to cope with full-scale invasion, and that establishing such a force from scratch would take a long time, we will maintain the most basic part of the defense force, taking orientation of neighboring countries into account and making use of technological progress.

#### **(3) Proactive Efforts on Its Own Decision to Improve International Security Environment**

In order to engage adequately in international peace cooperation activities, Japan will take the following measures: develop education and training systems, highly ready force posture for relevant units, and transport and other required capabilities; establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch and maintain defense force units overseas for an considerable period of time; and make necessary arrangements including the effort to properly embed international peace cooperation activities within the Self-Defense Forces mission priorities.

Japan will strongly promote activities for international peace and stability, such as security dialogue and defense exchanges including bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and arms control and disarmament efforts engineered by international organizations such as the United Nations.



## **2. Fundamental Measures for Our Defense Capabilities**

Following are fundamental measures for realizing defense capabilities that can carry out the missions described above:

### **(1) Enhancing Joint Operation Capabilities**

To have three services of the Self-Defense Forces operate in an integrated manner and enable them to execute their missions swiftly and effectively, we will employ them jointly, and enhance necessary arrangements. We will create a central organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for jointness in training and education as well as intelligence and communications. In doing so, we will reexamine existing organizations to enhance their effectiveness.

### **(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities**

In order to respond effectively to the new threats and various situations and employ our defense capability successfully in any situations, it is imperative for the Government to be able to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and adequately, and to identify indications of a situation at the earliest possible time. For this purpose, we will cultivate various intelligence collection capabilities taking consideration of security environment, technological progress and other relevant factors, and enhance our ability to analyze and evaluate intelligence in a comprehensive manner. We will also strengthen Japan's intelligence community, of which the Defense Intelligence Headquarters is a part, to attain first-class intelligence capabilities.

### **(3) Incorporating Advanced Technologies**

We will incorporate fruits of advanced technological innovations such as development of information and communications technologies, into our defense capability. In particular, we will develop reliable command and control system as well as speedy intelligence sharing systems, which are indispensable for joint operations, in tune with advanced information and communication technologies available at home and overseas. In addition, we will construct advanced systems for command and communications and a network for information and communications with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks.

### **(4) Efficient Use of Human Resources**

The Government of Japan will take various means to maintain high morale and strict discipline in the Self-Defense Forces. Japan will also recruit, cultivate, train and educate human resources to adequately cope with diversification and internationalization of the Self-Defense Forces missions, and to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech equipment. It will also promote research and education on security issues and enhance human basis for security issue. The posture of defense capability required to fulfill the missions described above is indicated in the attachment.

## V. Additional Elements for Consideration

1. In developing, maintaining, and operating the defense force as described in section IV, we will take the following elements into consideration.

(1) Mindful of the markedly worsening fiscal conditions, we will curb defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining our defense capability, and will try to make it successfully carry out its missions by harmonizing its operations with other measures taken by the Government.

(2) The Government of Japan will try to make the procurement and the research and development (R&D) process more effective and efficient by taking the following measures: curbing life-cycle cost, including purchase price, of the defense equipment; actively using cutting-edge technologies developed by private enterprises, universities, and governmental organizations; allocating R&D resource in a more focused manner; and appropriately and timely reviewing different R&D projects. At the same time, we will work to establish truly necessary defense production and technological base, especially that of core technological areas indispensable for our national security.

(3) In order to efficiently develop and maintain defense-related facilities, the Government of Japan will, in close cooperation with relevant local authorities, take various measures to harmonize these facilities with local communities.

**2. This National Defense Program Guideline** provides the vision for our defense force for approximately next ten years. However, we will review and, if necessary, revise it after five years from now or in case there is a significant change in the security environment, taking consideration of the security environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.

### Attachment Table

The following posture will be established in order to make Japan's new defense forces multi-functional, flexible and effective, and able to undertake diverse roles as discussed above (IV).

Classification	Type	Size of Procurement
Ground Self-Defense Force	Personnel	155,000
	Regular	148,000
	Reserve (Ready Reserve Personnel)	7,000
	Major Units	
	Regionally Deployed Units	8 divisions 6 brigades
	Mobile Operation Units	1 armored division Central Readiness Group
	Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
	Major Equipment	
Tanks	approx. 600	
Main Artillery	approx. 600	
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	
	Destroyer Units (for mobile operations)	4 flotillas (8 divisions)
	Destroyer Units (regional district units)	5 divisions
	Submarine Units	4 divisions
	Minesweeper Unit	1 flotilla
	Patrol Aircraft Units	9 squadrons
	Major Equipment	
	Destroyers	47
Submarines	16	
Combat Aircraft	approx. 150	
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	
	Air Warning and Control Units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne early-warning group (2 squadrons)
	Fighter Aircraft Units	12 squadrons
	Air Reconnaissance Unit	1 squadron
	Air Transport Units	3 squadrons
	Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit	1 squadron
	Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	6 groups
	Major Equipment	
	Combat Aircraft	approx. 350
	Fighters	approx. 260 *
Assets for Ballistic Missile Defense	Major Equipment	**
	Aegis-Equipped Destroyers	4
	Major Units	
	Air Warning and Control Units	7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons
	Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	3 groups

\*The number already included in total figure for combat aircraft, above.

\*\*The numbers of units and equipment below are already included in the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces sections above.

## 2. Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda

([http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f\\_work/taikou05/enaikan.pdf](http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/enaikan.pdf))

1. The Government of Japan approved the “National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005 and After” (the new NDPG) and the “Mid-Term Defense Force Improvement Program for FY 2005-FY 2009” at the Security Council and the Cabinet Meeting today.

2. The Government has developed the “National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005 and After” since it recognized the need to set new guidelines for shaping Japan’s future security and defense capabilities in the midst of today’s security environment which poses a challenge of coping with new threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as well as international terrorist activities and other various situations that affect peace and security.

3. The new NDPG has spelled out not only Japan’s vision for future defense forces but also its premise—basic principles of our security policy. We have two basic security policy objectives: (a) to prevent any direct threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, to repel it; and (b) to improve international security environment in order to prevent any threat from reaching Japan in the first place.

Regarding the latter objective in particular, the new NDPG has made it clear that improving international security environment is one of the major pillars of the security policy of Japan, whose prosperity and growth depend heavily on the security of sea lanes. We will try to achieve these goals by combining our own effort and cooperative efforts with the United States and the international community. At the same time, we will continue to firmly uphold the basic principles of our defense policy that we have ascribed to in accordance with the Constitution of Japan.

4. In implementing this policy, the Government of Japan will employ all available means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. In the event that these efforts failed to prevent the threat from reaching Japan, the Government would take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions, bringing together all relevant organizations, and having them cooperate adequately. The new NDPG has clearly stated that relevant organizations such as the Self-Defense Forces, the police, and the Japan Coast Guard would have to utilize all available means and work closely together to protect Japan and its people.

In addition, Japan will engage in diplomatic activities to prevent the emergence of threats by improving international security environment Japan’s defense capabilities—the ultimate guarantee of its national security—should be capable of effectively responding to the new threats and various situations as well as actively participating in international peace

cooperation activities in order to improve international security environment, while inheriting the original elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that still remain valid. We have to take into account the fact that while roles that the defense capabilities have to play are multiplying, the fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate.

In this context, Japan's future defense capabilities should be multi-functional, flexible, and effective; while, at the same time, we will have to rationalize and streamline them. As for the cooperation with Japan's alliance partner, the new NDPG has stated not only that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to the security of Japan as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, but also that close cooperative relationship based on the arrangements with the United States plays an important role in facilitating international efforts to address the new threats and various situations.

From this point of view, Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture including the structure of U.S. forces in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions on the new security environment and the appropriate strategic objectives. With regard to the cooperation with the international community, Japan will utilize Official Development Assistance (ODA) strategically and actively participate in international peace cooperation activities. The new NDPG has clearly defined these activities as part of our effort to improve international security environment.

5. Regarding the future defense force, Japan will cope effectively with the new threats and various situations by developing highly responsive and mobile defense capabilities capable of responding properly to various situations and by deploying them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical characteristics. Japan's future defense capabilities should be capable of coping with ballistic missile attacks, attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations units, and invasion of offshore outlying islands.

They should also be able to execute patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and respond to the violation of airspace, the intrusion of armed special-operations vessels, and large-scale and/or unconventional disasters(nuclear, biological and chemical disasters). When such situations actually emerge, the defense capabilities will respond in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, seamlessly delegating or inheriting missions in accordance with circumstances and their designated roles.

Since the likelihood of large-scale invasion of Japan will remain modest in the foreseeable future, we will significantly reduce personnel and equipment earmarked to cope with it. At the same time, however, considering the fact that the original purpose of

our defense capabilities is to cope with large-scale invasion, and that reconstructing such forces would take a long time, we will maintain the most basic part of our defense capabilities, taking into account developments in neighboring countries and taking advantage of technological progress. In our effort to improve international security environment, we will establish infrastructure and make necessary arrangements to engage adequately in international peace cooperation activities. We will strongly promote activities for international peace and stability, such as security dialogue and defense exchanges.

6. Based on the basic principle of Japan being a peace-loving nation and its corollary—the Three Principles on Arms Export and their related provisions, the Government of Japan will firmly maintain the policy of dealing the arms export control issues carefully. However, given the fact that ballistic missile defense (BMD) will contribute to the effective management of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and to the security of Japan, the Government will exempt the items related to the BMD systems from the regulations of the Three Principles on Arms Export and their related provisions, on the condition that those items will come under strict export control.

In the process of developing the new NDPG, it was discussed whether to make it possible for Japan to engage in joint projects on arms development and production with the United States, and to export equipment to the countries in support of their combat against terrorism or piracy. The Government will decide, on the case-by-case basis, whether to take these actions in the future, taking consideration of Japan's basic principle of being a peace-loving nation and of not exacerbating international conflicts by selling arms.

7. Based on the new NDPG, the Government will devise Japan's vision for international peace cooperation activities, and take legal and other necessary measures concerning Japan's various security and defense policy agendas including placement of international peace cooperation activities in Self-Defense Forces' mission priorities, and operational issues pertaining to the ballistic missile defense systems.

8. To clearly indicate the target period in which the planned defense force level will be achieved, the new NDPG has provided the vision for our defense capabilities in the next ten years. In addition, in order to better adjust our defense policy to the changing security environment, we will review and, if necessary, revise the NDPG five years from now, in accordance with the security environment at the particular point of time.

9. The "Mid-Term Defense Force Improvement Program for FY 2005-FY 2009" was formulated for the purpose of achieving the defense capabilities level that Japan should possess, as provided in the new NDPG. We expect the total defense-related budget for the new Mid-Term Defense Force Improvement Program to be approximately ¥24,240

billion measured in constant FY 2004 yen.

**10.** The Government of Japan will report today's decision to the Diet. I would sincerely hope that the people of Japan will understand and give their support to the decision.

### 3. Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005–2009)

([http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f\\_work/taikou05/e17tyuuki.pdf](http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/e17tyuuki.pdf))

#### I Policies for the Program

From FY 2005 to FY 2009, the GOJ of Japan will appropriately build up Japan's defense forces based on the following plan, in accordance with "National Defense Program Guideline, FY 2005-" (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004. Hereinafter the new NDPG).

1. In order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations as well as to voluntarily and proactively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter "international peace cooperation activities"), the GOJ will efficiently establish multi-functional, flexible and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities, while maintaining the most capabilities of its defense forces to cope with large-scale invasion.

2. Under the new security environment, the GOJ will review current organs of defense administration, and transit the major units and main equipment of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to the new defense posture prescribed in the new NDPG while reducing equipment and personnel earmarked for large-scale invasion.

3. In order to realize defense forces that are multi-functional, flexible, and effective, the GOJ will advance the critical elements of defense capabilities by strengthening joint operation capabilities and strengthening intelligence capabilities while incorporating the progress in science and technology, and making effective use of human resources as well.

4. In building, maintaining and making use of defense forces, the GOJ will promote measures that support the defense forces such as: procuring defense equipment more effectively and efficiently; and improving cooperative ties with related administrative institutions and local communities.

5. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, close cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements plays an important role in facilitating international efforts in security fields. The GOJ will promote measures to further strengthen the Japan-US Security Arrangements and the close relations with the U.S.



based on the Arrangements.

6. Mindful of seriously deteriorating fiscal conditions, the GOJ will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces by harmonizing its operations with other measures taken by it.

## **II Review of the organizations of Defense Agency and SDF**

1. The GOJ will review organization and methods of defense administration including the Internal Bureau of Defense Agency and take any necessary measures.

2. The GOJ will establish a new joint staff organization and transform each service Staff Office in order to strengthen structure for the joint operations. Further, the GOJ will reconsider organizations in view of implementing effective joint operations and take any necessary measures. The GOJ will place the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under direct control of the Minister of State for Defense.

3. On the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the GOJ will: transform a Division and two Combined Brigades into three Brigades and transform four other Divisions and another Brigade in order to improve responsiveness and mobility while reducing number of tanks and artillery; and establish the Central Readiness Group that administrates and operates mobile operations units and special units. The GOJ will decline the authorized number of GSDF personnel to around 161,000 persons (152,000 persons for regular personnel and 8,000 persons for reservists) at the end of the FY 2009. The actual number of GSDF regular personnel will be approximately 146,000 by the end of FY 2009.

4. On the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will reduce the number of the Escort divisions of the Destroyer unit for mobile operations into 8, each of which is deployed 4 destroyers; and abolish an Escort division for regional deployment. The GOJ also reduce the number of divisions of the Submarine unit into 5, Flight Squadrons of Fixed-wings Patrol Aircraft unit into 4 and Patrol Helicopter unit into 5.

5. On the Air Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will transform the Early Warning Group into that composed by two squadrons. The GOJ will establish the first Aerial Refueling Transport Unit.

## **III Major Plans related to SDF Capabilities**

### **1. Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations**

**(1) Response to ballistic missile attacks**

The GOJ will improve the capabilities of the Aegis destroyers and patriots Surface-to-Air missiles to enable them to respond to ballistic missile attacks. But the GOJ will review the course of improvement for FY 2008 and after, taking into consideration the status of development in the U.S., and take any necessary measures. The GOJ will also improve the BADGE system as well as to start to build up a new warning and control radar which can detect and track ballistic missiles. The GOJ will promote the joint Japan-U.S. technical research targeting the sea-based upper-tier system, consider the possibility of transition to the development stage and take any necessary measures.

**(2) Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Units**

In order to effectively respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations units, The GOJ will improve the responsiveness and mobility of ground units, and strengthen the capability of infantries and procure: light armored vehicles; multi-purpose helicopters (UH-60JA, UH-1J); and combat helicopters (AH-64D). The GOJ will also improve the capability to deal with nuclear, biological and/or chemical attacks.

**(3) Response to invasions of Japan's offshore islands**

In order to effectively respond to invasion of Japan's offshore islands by improving transportation and deployment capabilities, the GOJ will procure transport helicopters (CH-47JA/J), air tanker-transport aircrafts (KC-767), fighters (F-2) and transport aircrafts that will replace C-1s. The GOJ will reconsider the number of possession of air tanker-transport aircrafts, which will be based on actual operations of them, and will take any necessary measures. The GOJ will also improve rescuing capability by attaching the in-flight refueling function to transport aircraft (C-130H) for rescue helicopters (UH-60J).

**(4) Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace** surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation of Japan's Airspace or the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships In order to patrol and survey in the the sea and airspace surrounding Japan constantly and continuously, and to deal properly with armed special-purpose ships or submerged foreign submarines navigating under Japanese territorial sea, the GOJ will: procure destroyers (DDH and DD), patrol helicopters (SH-60K) and minesweeper-transport helicopters (MCH-101); improve early warning aircrafts (E-2C) and modernize the air control and warning systems of the BADGE; and procure new patrol aircrafts that will replace P-3Cs: improve E-767s The GOJ will promote the modernization of F-15s while procuring new fighters that will replace F-4s, taking the restraint of procurement number under the new NDPO given the fiscal situation.

**(5) Response to large-scale or special disasters**

The GOJ will promote to improve the capability to dispatch SDF to the disaster areas.

## **2. Preparation for full-scale invasions against Japan**

Under the declining possibility of full-scale invasions against Japan in the foreseeable future, the GOJ will transform the defense build-up concept which had emphasized anti-tanks, anti-submarines, warfare, or anti-air invasions operations. At the same time, mindful of the fact that defense capabilities cannot be made in a short time, the GOJ will continue to procure tanks, artilleries, mid-range land to air missiles, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol aircrafts, fighters while reducing equipment and personnel for full-scale invasions.

## **3. Proactive and positive effort to improve international security environment.**

### **(1) Appropriate effort for international peace cooperation activity**

The GOJ will establish units of education and research for international peace cooperation activities. The GOJ will enhance stand-by posture by rotation as well as to procure equipment for international peace cooperation activity.

### **(2) Enhancement of security dialog, defense exchange and joint training with other countries**

The GOJ will promote policies for bi-lateral or multi-lateral security dialog and defense exchange by positively promoting defense exchange in each level and joint training. The GOJ will cooperate with efforts of international organizations in the areas of arms control and disarmament.

## **4. Fundamental elements of defense capabilities**

### **(1) Strengthening Joint Operations**

The GOJ will establish a new joint staff organization, reorganize the Joint Staff College, conduct joint exercise and establish common information and communication infrastructure.

### **(2) Functionally, strengthening intelligence capabilities**

The GOJ will strengthen the capability of intelligence section such as Defense Intelligence Headquarters and enhance equipment for intelligence gathering. The GOJ will start tentative modification for converting some of F-15 fighters to reconnaissance planes. In addition, take necessary measures, upon consideration, with regard to unmanned aerial vehicle of endurance type.

### **(3) Response to development of science and technology**

#### **Strengthening command and control capability, etc.**

The GOJ will establish advanced command and control system and information

communication network by concentrating and circulating information of command and order system, sharing information in unit level, strengthening response capability against cyber attack and enhancing information sharing among relevant organizations.

#### **Promoting research and development**

The GOJ will promote developments of next generation aircrafts that will replace P-3C and C-1, and next generation tank. The GOJ will promote taking into account trends of science and technology, research and development of various command and control systems and unmanned aerial vehicle, with stressed distribution of resources. In that case, the GOJ will make efforts for effective and efficient research and development. Furthermore, the GOJ will review methods for stressed investment in research and development and the organization of the Technical Research and Development Institute, and take any necessary measures.

#### **(4) Effective utilization of human resources**

##### **Enhancement of measures for personnel, education and training**

The GOJ will promote various measures for maintaining high morale and strict discipline of the personnel. The GOJ will secure and train of high quality so that the Self Defense Forces can better respond to the diversified and internationalized missions. The GOJ will consider effective way of utilization of retired personnel in the society and take any necessary measures.

##### **Promotion of research regarding security issues**

The GOJ will improve research and education function of the National Institute for Defense Studies regarding security policy. The GOJ will enhance human basis by personnel exchanges in security area.

#### **5. Promoting policies for supporting defense capability.**

##### **(1) Streamlined and efficient acquisition of equipment**

The GOJ will strengthen efforts to curb life-cycle-cost of equipment, and promote general procurement reform.

##### **(2) Promotion of cooperation with relevant administrative organizations and local societies**

The GOJ will strengthen cooperation with the relevant organizations such as police department, fire department, the Japan Coast Guard, and promote cooperation with local governments and local societies with the civil protection legislature on its basis. In addition, maintain defense facilities efficiently and continue to promote measures for areas surrounding bases under close cooperation with local governments.

## IV Measures to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

### 1. Exchanges of intelligence and Policy consultations

Promote exchanges of intelligence and views regarding international situations, and keep strategic dialogue with the U.S. on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between two countries and the military posture such as force structure of USFJ, bearing in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that U.S. military bases and facilities place on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

### 2. Operational cooperation and bilateral exercise/training

Make efforts to build an effective posture for operational cooperation, and to frequent bilateral exercise/training.

### 3. Promotion of cooperation based on ballistic missile defense (BMD)

Strengthen Japan-US bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, and promote cooperation with the U.S. from the fields of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology.

### 4. Exchanges of equipment and technology

Regarding equipment and technology, make efforts to enhance broad mutual exchanges with the U.S.

**5. Promotion of efforts** to make the stationing of the USFJ smooth and effective  
Promote the measures to make the stationing of the USFJ smooth and effective, such as support to the stationing of the USFJ and realignment, consolidation, and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, while engaging in strategic dialogue with the U.S. regarding force structure of the USFJ on its own initiative and continuously maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

**6. Enhancement of Japan-U.S.** cooperation concerning international measures in regional or global security  
Promote measures to closely cooperate with the U.S. and proactively participate in international activities to prevent or to tackle new threats and various emergencies such as war against terrorism and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

## V Size of Procurement

Regarding the size of equipment procurement, specific numbers of main equipment are shown in the attached table.

## VI Expenses Required

1. The limit of the total amount of defense-related expenditures needed for this program is approximately 24.24 trillion yens at the prices of FY 2005. In case of needs to respond an unforeseeable situation in future, extra budget might be provided within the limit of 100 billion yens on condition that the Security Council of Japan would approve.
2. In the annual budget-formulation process, decide it within the framework of the expenditures required by this Program, while making utmost efforts to limit expenditure so as to achieve harmony with other Government measures by seeking further efficiency and rationalization. In case of needs to respond an unforeseeable situation in future or to contribute to promote stable security environment, extra budget, except for the above the defense related-expenditures, might be provided within the limit of 100 billion yens on condition that the Security Council of Japan would approve. In doing so, continue to respect the spirit of seeking a moderate defense build-up as stated in the Program for the Future Build-up of Defense Capability (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet in January 24, 1987)
3. Within the limit of the total budget amount, the Program will be reviewed as required in three years from now, noting both domestic and international situations prevailing at that time, including global trend, technological standards and the economic and fiscal situation.

## VII Others

1. Review the modality of defense capabilities stated in the new NDPO after five years or when serious situational changes take place, in order to make necessary amendments taking into account security environment and technological trend at the time.
2. Implement steadily projects related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The costs required for their implementation will be separately identified.

(Attached Table)

Classification	Type	Size of Procurement
Ground Self-Defense Force	Tanks	49 vehicles
	Artillery (excluding mortar)	38 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	104 vehicles
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	7 craft
	Transport helicopters(CH-47JA)	11 craft
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	8 batteries
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of AEGIS system equipped Destroyers	3 ships
	Submarines	5 ships
	Others	4 ships
	Total number of self-defense ships to be built (Tonnage)	11 ships
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft	20 ships (Approx. 59,000 tons)
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	4 craft
	Minesweeping and transport helicopters?(MCH-101)	23 craft
Air Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of surface-to-air guided patriot missiles	3 craft
	Modernization of fighters (F-15)	2 groups & for education, etc.
	Fighters(F-2)	26 craft
	New fighters	22 craft
	New transport aircraft	7 craft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	8 craft
Air tanker-transport aircraft (KC-767)	4 craft	
		1 craft

(끝).

## <부록2> 미일안보공동성명(2005. 2. 20)

### Joint Statement of US-Japan Security Consultative Committee

(<http://asia.news.yahoo.com/050220/kyodo/d88bta3g0.html>)

#### Text of joint statement of US-Japan Security Consultative Committee

(Kyodo) \_ The following is the full text of a joint statement issued after a meeting of Japanese and U.S. foreign ministers and defense chiefs in Washington:

#### **JOINT STATEMENT OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE**

1. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hosted Japan's Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura and minister of state for defense and Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono in a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee in Washington on Feb. 19, 2005. They addressed security and alliance issues facing the United States and Japan, as well as other aspects of the relationship.

#### **WORKING TOGETHER ON CHALLENGES FACING THE WORLD TODAY**

2. The ministers noted the excellent state of cooperative relations between the United States and Japan on a broad array of security, political and economic issues. They looked to expand that cooperation, recognizing that the U.S.-Japan alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security arrangements at its core, continues to play a vital role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as in enhancing regional and global peace and stability.

3. The ministers underscored the importance of U.S. and Japanese leadership in providing international assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader Middle East -- efforts that are already producing results. The ministers lauded the successful cooperation between the United States and Japan with other countries in extending wide-ranging assistance to those who suffered from the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean.

4. The ministers recognized that cooperation and consultation between the United States and Japan have been pivotal in promoting nonproliferation, particularly through the Proliferation Security Initiative. They welcomed the success of multinational interdiction exercises hosted by the United States and Japan and by others.

5. The ministers expressed their confidence that ballistic missile defense (BMD) enhances our ability to defend against and deter ballistic missile attacks and dissuade other parties from investing in ballistic missiles. Taking note of achievements in missile defense cooperation, such as Japan's decision to introduce ballistic missile defense systems and its recent announcement



on its three principles on arms export, the ministers reaffirmed their commitment to close cooperation on policy and operational matters and to advancing U.S.-Japan cooperative research in BMD systems, with a view to possible cooperative development.

## COMMON STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

6. The ministers discussed the new security environment in which new and emerging threats, such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, have surfaced as common challenges. They recognized that deepening interdependence among nations in a global community means that such threats can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the United States and Japan.

7. While noting that these threats are also emerging in the Asia-Pacific region, the ministers also emphasized that persistent challenges continue to create unpredictability and uncertainty. Moreover, they noted that modernization of military capabilities in the region also requires attention.

8. The ministers strongly urged North Korea to return to the six-party talks expeditiously and without preconditions, and to commit itself to complete dismantlement of all its nuclear programs in a transparent manner subject to verification.

9. Based on this understanding of the international security environment, the ministers concurred that both governments need to work closely together to pursue common strategic objectives through their respective efforts, implementation of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and other joint efforts based on the alliance. Both sides decided to hold regular consultations to coordinate policies in accordance with these common strategic objectives and to update these objectives as the security environment requires.

10. In the region, common strategic objectives include:

- Ensure the security of Japan, strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and maintain the capability to address contingencies affecting the United States and Japan.
- Support peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
- Seek peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, including its nuclear programs, ballistic missile activities, illicit activities, and humanitarian issues such as the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea.
- Develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.
- Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.
- Encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs.
- Encourage Russia's constructive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Fully normalize Japan-Russia relations through the resolution of the Northern Territories issue.

- Promote a peaceful, stable, and vibrant Southeast Asia.
- Welcome the development of various forms of regional cooperation, while stressing the importance of open, inclusive, and transparent regional mechanisms.
- Discourage destabilizing sales and transfers of arms and military technology.
- Maintain the security of maritime traffic.

**11. Global common strategic objectives include:**

- Promote fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community.
- Further consolidate U.S.-Japan partnership in international peace cooperation activities and development assistance to promote peace, stability, and prosperity worldwide.
- Promote the reduction and nonproliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, including through improved reliability and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other regimes, and initiatives such as the PSI.
- Prevent and eradicate terrorism.
- Coordinate efforts to improve the effectiveness of the U.N. Security Council by making the best use of the current momentum to realize Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member.
- Maintain and enhance the stability of the global energy supply.

## **STRENGTHENING OF U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION**

**12.** The ministers expressed their support and appreciation for each other's efforts to develop their respective security and defense policies. Japan's new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) emphasize Japan's capability to respond effectively to new threats and diverse contingencies, Japan's active engagement to improve the international security environment, and the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance. As a central component of its broad defense transformation effort, the United States is reorienting and strengthening its global defense posture to provide it with appropriate, strategy-driven capabilities in an uncertain security environment. The ministers confirmed that these efforts will ensure and strengthen effective security and defense cooperation as both countries pursue common strategic objectives.

**13.** In this context, the ministers underscored the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner. This examination will take into account recent achievements and developments such as Japan's NDPG and new legislation to deal with contingencies, as well as the expanded agreement on mutual logistical support and progress in BMD cooperation. The ministers also emphasized the importance of enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.

**14.** The ministers concurred that this examination should contribute to these consultations on

realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. They decided to intensify these consultations in a comprehensive effort to strengthen the alliance as the bedrock of Japan's security and the anchor of regional stability. In this context, both sides confirmed their commitment to maintaining deterrence and capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan while reducing the burden on local communities, including those in Okinawa. The ministers directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results of these consultations.

**15.** The ministers also stressed the importance of continued efforts to enhance positive relations between local communities and U.S. forces. They emphasized that improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement, including due attention to the environment, and steady implementation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa final report are important to the stable presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

**16.** The ministers, noting that the current Special Measures Agreement (SMA) will expire in March 2006, decided to start consultations on future arrangements to provide appropriate levels of host nation support, bearing in mind the significant role of the SMA in supporting the presence of U.S. forces in Japan. (끝).

### <부록3> 아미티지 보고서(INSS Special Report: 2000. 10. 11)

#### The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership

([http://www.ne.jp/asahi/nozaki/peace/data/data\\_inss\\_sr.html](http://www.ne.jp/asahi/nozaki/peace/data/data_inss_sr.html))

#### About this report

The following report presents a consensus view of the members of a bipartisan study group on the U.S.-Japan partnership. It is not a political document and reflects the views of the study group members only. This is solely an attempt by the group to inject consistency and strategic direction into what it believes is our essential Asian relationship.

The study group consisted of Richard L. Armitage, Armitage and Associates; Dan E. Bob, Office of Senator William V. Roth, Jr.; Kurt M. Campbell, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Michael J. Green, Council on Foreign Relations; Kent M. Harrington, Harrington Group LLC; Frank Jannuzi, Minority Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; James A. Kelly, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Edward J. Lincoln, Brookings Institution; Robert A. Manning, Council on Foreign Relations; Kevin G. Nealer, Scowcroft Group; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., JFK School of Government, Harvard University; Torkel L. Patterson, GeoInSight; James J. Przystup, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; Robin H. Sakoda, Sakoda Associates; Barbara P. Wanner, French and Company; and Paul D. Wolfowitz, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other government agency or nongovernment organization.

Asia, in the throes of historic change, should carry major weight in the calculus of American political, security, economic, and other interests. Accounting for 53 percent of the world's population, 25 percent of the global economy, and nearly \$600 billion annually in two-way trade with the United States, Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, from Japan and Australia, to the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, countries across the region are demonstrating the universal appeal of democratic values. China is facing momentous social and economic changes, the consequences of which are not yet clear.

Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world's largest and

most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world's fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region's de facto security architecture.

In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world's second-largest economy and a well-equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America's global security strategy.

Japan, too, is experiencing an important transition. Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformation since the end of World War II. Japanese society, economy, national identity, and international role are undergoing change that is potentially as fundamental as that Japan experienced during the Meiji Restoration.

The effects of this transformation are yet to be fully understood. Just as Western countries dramatically underestimated the potential of the modern nation that emerged from the Meiji Restoration, many are ignoring a similar transition the effects of which, while not immediately apparent, could be no less profound. For the United States, the key to sustaining and enhancing the alliance in the 21st century lies in reshaping our bilateral relationship in a way that anticipates the consequences of changes now underway in Japan.

Since the end of World War II, Japan has played a positive role in Asia. As a mature democracy with an educated and active electorate, Japan has demonstrated that changes in government can occur peacefully. Tokyo has helped to foster regional stability and build confidence through its proactive diplomacy and economic involvement throughout the region.

Japan's participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s, its various defense exchanges and security dialogues, and its participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the new plus Three grouping are further testimony to Tokyo's increasing activism. Most significantly, Japan's alliance with the United States has served as the foundation for regional order.

We have considered six key elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth a

bipartisan action agenda aimed at creating an enduring alliance foundation for the 21st century.

### Post-Cold War Drift

As partners in the broad Western alliance, the United States and Japan worked together to win the Cold War and helped to usher in a new era of democracy and economic opportunity in Asia. In the aftermath of our shared victory, however, the course of U.S.-Japan relations has wandered, losing its focus and coherence--notwithstanding the real threats and potential risks facing both partners.

Once freed from the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet Union, both Washington and Tokyo ignored the real, practical, and pressing needs of the bilateral alliance. Well-intentioned efforts to find substitutes for concrete collaboration and clear goal-setting have produced a diffuse dialogue but no clear definition of a common purpose. Efforts to experiment with new concepts of international security have proceeded fitfully, but without discernable results in redefining and reinvigorating bilateral security ties.

This lack of focus and follow-through has been evident in both countries. Some in Japan have been drawn to the notion of Asianization and the hope that economic interdependence and multilateral institutions would put the region on a path similar to that of Europe. Many in the United States regarded the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to return to economic priorities.

The early 1990s was a period of heightened bilateral tensions, primarily over the question of access to Japanese markets. Some Americans saw economic competition from Japan as a threat. In the past five years, however, trade tensions have diminished. Envy and concern over Japanese economic prowess have turned to dismay over the Japanese recession and building financial crisis.

Neither country dealt with the need to redefine and reinvigorate the alliance. In fact, both took it for granted. The drift in the alliance was obvious until the mid-1990s when the crisis on the Korean peninsula--punctuated by the horror of the Okinawa rape incident--captured the attention of policymakers in Washington and Tokyo. These episodes prompted them to recognize belatedly the costs of neglecting the bilateral relationship. The subsequent Taiwan Strait confrontation in March 1996 gave even more impetus to efforts on both sides of the Pacific to reaffirm the bilateral security alliance.

The 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration went a long way toward directing attention in both capitals toward the need to refurbish the alliance, and led to concrete

changes that updated defense ties in the form of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the 1996 report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and the bilateral agreement to cooperate in theater missile defense research. But the symbolism of the 1996 declaration stood alone, unsupported by sustained high-level attention. As a result, the United States and Japan soon returned to bickering and poor policy coordination.

The costs of the deterioration in the U.S.-Japan relationship have been insidious as well as obvious. By the end of the 1990s, many U.S. policymakers had lost interest in a Japan that appeared incapable of renewing itself. Indeed, Japan's prolonged recession has discouraged or dispirited even some Japanese officials.

In Tokyo, many see Washington as arrogant and unable to recognize that its prescriptions are not universally applicable to others' economic, political, and social needs. A number of government officials and opinion-makers perceived the U.S. approach as a self-serving rationale for commercial and economic interests and grew resentful of a United States seemingly preoccupied with its own self-centered version of globalization.

It has been obvious that U.S. attention and interests have turned elsewhere in Asia. More recently, the principal focus of American policymakers has been the bilateral relationship with China--a relationship characterized by a series of crises ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations. Neither Washington nor Tokyo followed through aggressively on the security agenda set forth in the 1996 declaration, in large measure because of concerns over Beijing's hostile reaction to the reinvigoration of the security partnership.

Beijing let it be known in no uncertain terms that it regarded the U.S.-Japan partnership as an important element of a broader effort by Washington to constrain its regional diplomacy. And as the United States and--to a lesser extent--Japan sought to improve relations with China, both demonstrated a clear desire to downplay the notion of a containment strategy.

In fact, the only active security dialogue between the United States and Japan has been a byproduct of a desire to coax North Korea out of its self-imposed isolation. The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea all concur that close cooperation and unity of purpose offer the most effective strategy to deal with Pyongyang.

This record of diffidence, uncertainty, and indirection has no single father, nor does it support an oversimplified laying of blame. Rather, it demands a recognition that the time has arrived for renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Both the United States and Japan face an uncertain security environment in Asia at a time of political transition and important change in both countries--for the United States, a new national leadership, and for Japan, a continuing process of economic, political, and social transformation. At the same time, political and economic uncertainties in China and Russia, the fragile nature of detente on the Korean peninsula, and the prospect of protracted instability in Indonesia--all pose shared challenges.

For those who argue that Japan is a lasting asset in irreversible decline, it might be useful to recall that it has been only a decade since it was taken as an article of faith that American power was ebbing on the international scene. It would be foolhardy to underestimate the enduring dimensions of Japanese power, much as it was unwise for some Japanese to dismiss the latent and enduring qualities of American power in the 1980s and 1990s.

## Politics

Over the past decade, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), faced with internal divisions, a clash of traditional interest group agendas, and a growing split among key constituencies, has focused primarily on hanging on to its dwindling power. At the same time, the political opposition has failed to produce credible, well-conceived policy proposals. The net effect is an LDP struggling to maintain its grip on the reins of government, an opposition unable to provide a governing alternative, and a Japanese public, faced with a lack of credible alternative leadership, reluctantly returning the LDP to office. The result has been a government stuck in neutral, incapable of more than muddling through.

Nevertheless, the necessity of economic reform and restructuring, driven by the pressures of a relentless globalization of the international economy, are likely to lead to political change. These economic forces are breaking apart the monopoly power of the so-called Iron Triangle--the heretofore collusive relationships among politicians, business, and the bureaucracies--and making power more diffuse. The Japanese political order is experiencing protracted change.

Political changes in Japan could lead to unprecedented opportunities to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan relationship--as well as test it further. The end of bipolar ideological confrontation in Japanese politics and the emergence of a new pragmatism about security affairs among a younger generation of elected officials provide fertile soil for creative new approaches to leadership.

It would be unrealistic to expect the current leadership suddenly to embrace reform or to



assume a higher profile on the global stage. The demands of Japan's parliamentary system make it difficult to implement policies, that require short-term pain in exchange for long-term gain. The political system is risk-averse. But the successor generations of politicians and the public-at-large also recognize that economic power alone will no longer be enough to secure Japan's future. Moreover, the Japanese public, by giving official standing to the national flag and anthem, and in focusing on such territorial claims as the Senkaku islands, has evidenced a new respect for the sovereignty and integrity of the nation state. The implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship stemming from these changes are profound.

A similar process is at work in the United States. The growing role of Congress as a force in foreign policy, the rising influence of state and local governments, and the dramatic transformation of the private sector as the initiator of economic change--driven by technology and the empowerment of the individual--are altering the influence of once-central foreign policymaking institutions.

But, just as Japan's risk-averse political leadership has held back the nation's economic transformation, the lack of clear direction from Washington also has taken a toll. Episodic executive branch leadership has failed to produce a well-conceived game plan for America's relationship with Japan. This, in turn, has accelerated the erosion of political support and popular understanding of the importance of the alliance. In short, the political, economic, and social changes underway in the United States put an even greater premium on executive branch leadership in foreign affairs.

If the United States can exercise leadership--that is to say, excellence without arrogance--in its relations with Japan, the two countries will be better able to realize the full potential for cooperation nurtured during the past 50 years. If the changes underway in Japan ultimately produce a stronger, more responsive political and economic system, the synergy in U.S.-Japan relations will enhance our abilities to play an engaged, mutually supportive, and fundamentally constructive role in regional and global arenas in the years to come.

## Security

Because the stakes are so high in Asia, it is urgent that the United States and Japan develop a common perception and approach regarding their relationship in the 21st century. The potential for conflict in Asia is lowered dramatically by a visible and real U.S.-Japan defense relationship. The use of bases granted by Japan allows the U.S. to affect the security environment from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. The revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the basis for joint defense planning,

should be regarded as the floor--not the ceiling--for an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance, and the uncertainties of the post-Cold War regional setting require a more dynamic approach to bilateral defense planning.

Japan's prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security policies and should continue to do so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner.

We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance. This arrangement requires the following elements:

- Reaffirming the defense commitment. The United States should reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Japan and those areas under the administrative control of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands.
- Diligent implementation of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, including passage of crisis management legislation.
- Robust cooperation of all three U.S. armed services with their Japanese counterparts. The U.S. and Japan should strive for greater jointness in the use of facilities and for integration of training activities and should review and update the roles and missions of the Armed Forces agreed upon in 1981. Both partners should invest in training that replicates reality, rather than follows old patterns. They also should define how to assist each other with emerging new challenges, such as international terrorism and transnational criminal activity, as well as longstanding potential threats, and how to collaborate in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities.
- Full participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions. Japan would need to remove its 1992 self-imposed restraints on these activities so as not to burden other peacekeeping nations.
- Development of a force structure that has the characteristics of versatility, mobility, flexibility, diversity, and survivability. Any adjustments should not be based on an artificial number, but should reflect the regional security environment. As this process unfolds, changes to force structure should be made through a process of consultation and dialogue, and be mutually agreeable. The United States should take advantage of technological changes and regional developments to restructure

its force presence on the archipelago. We should strive to reduce the American military footprint in Japan as long as our capabilities can be maintained. This includes continued consolidation of U.S. bases and rapid implementation of the terms of the 1996 U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement.

- Making priority availability of U.S. defense technology to Japan. Defense technology must be seen as an essential component of the overall alliance. We should encourage the American defense industry to make strategic alliances with Japanese companies to facilitate a greater two-way flow of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies.
- Broadening the scope of U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation.

There will be a healthy debate in both countries arising from the larger role that we advocate for Japan. And U.S. Government officials and lawmakers will have to recognize that Japanese policy will not be identical to American policy in every instance. It is time for burdensharing to evolve into power-sharing and this means that the next administration will have to devote the considerable time that will be necessary to bring this into being.

## Okinawa

A large concentration of U.S. forces in Japan--approximately 75 percent--are stationed on Okinawa. They are situated there because in matters of security, distance matters. Okinawa is positioned at the intersection of the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean--only about one hour's flying time from Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.

The U.S. Air Force base at Kadena provides a critical link to American power projection throughout the region. It is also crucial to the defense of Japan. The III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa provides a self-sustaining, joint forward echelon for rapid response to problems in the region, ranging from evacuation of noncombatant personnel to serving as cutting edge combat elements to enable large formations to defeat aggression.

But the heavy concentration of U.S. forces on Okinawa also creates an obvious burden for Japan and a less obvious one for the United States, arising, for example, from restrictions, such as those on training. Because of their intense operational tempo and younger demographic profile, the Marines have drawn particular scrutiny from a Japanese public ready for some changes in the U.S. military presence in the southernmost

prefecture of the country.

For their part, the Marines have striven to be better neighbors, but readiness and training have suffered with the growing constraints imposed on them by encroachment around the bases. And while statistics on incidents of misconduct by American service personnel are sharply down, in the current political climate, attention to episodes of deeply unfortunate behavior that do occur is sharply magnified.

In 1996, the U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement called for a realignment, consolidation, and reduction of U.S. bases on Okinawa. The United States and Japan must complete implementation of that accord, which will reduce U.S. assets by about 5,000 hectares and 11 facilities, including the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma.

We believe the SACO agreement should have had an important fourth goal—diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region. From a military perspective, it is important for U.S. forces to have broad and flexible access across the region. But from a political perspective, it is essential to ease the burden borne by the Okinawans so that our presence is sustainable and credible. American thinking about force structure in Japan must not stop with the SACO accord. The United States should consider broader and more flexible deployment and training options for the Marines throughout the region.

## **Intelligence**

The changing nature of the potential threats and the evident dangers for both the United States and Japan in East Asia require greater cooperation and integration of intelligence capabilities between the two allies. Despite the importance of the bilateral alliance, intelligence sharing with Japan contrasts sharply with the increasingly close relationships we have enjoyed with our NATO partners in this area. While global developments have driven that trend, so, too, has the recognition that declining resources and such new missions as peacekeeping and peacemaking require greater cooperation and integration of allied intelligence capabilities.

Ironically, with the end of the Cold War, the ambiguous nature of threats and the often more complex policy choices have sharpened the need to cooperate in analyzing and collecting vital information on shared security threats around the world. Tokyo has made it clear that existing U.S.-Japan intelligence ties do not meet its needs.

For the United States, the potential for greater cooperation with Japan is obvious. Allies need to articulate their differences as well as reach agreement on policy actions based

on comparative and competitive analysis. Shared intelligence represents the road to that goal. Moreover, a division of labor--apportioning analytical tasks according to the comparative advantages of each partner--offers gains for a resource-strapped intelligence community. Japan has the capacity to bring valuable information and insights to a strategic intelligence dialogue because of its global engagement.

Perhaps more important, a strategic vision of intelligence cooperation with Japan is long overdue. Failure to strengthen U.S.-Japan intelligence ties only raises the risks that our perception--and possibly our policies--will diverge when challenges demand common understanding and action within the alliance.

Improved intelligence cooperation is no less important for Japan. The path to a greater international contribution by Japan requires both a stronger indigenous Japanese intelligence capability and greater cooperation with the United States.

Strengthened intelligence cooperation will help Japan to improve its own policymaking, crisis management, and decisionmaking processes. In addition, both within and beyond Asia, Japan faces more diverse threats and more complex international responsibilities, which call for intelligence that provides a better understanding of its national security needs.

Intelligence cooperation also will strengthen Japan's role in the bilateral alliance. Given the disparity in size between the U.S. and Japanese intelligence communities, more balanced sharing inevitably will take time. But the long-term result--improved information on potential threats, competitive analytical products, and complementary perspectives--will enrich cooperation as well as better inform both allies.

As a national-level issue in both countries, U.S.-Japan intelligence cooperation needs national-level management. Cooperation needs to take new forms and to expand existing relationships.

It is incumbent on Washington to do the following:

- The National Security Advisor must make strengthened intelligence cooperation a policy and intelligence priority.
- In coordination with U.S. policymakers, the Director of Central Intelligence must work with Japan to broaden cooperation in a way that fits with Japan's national security priorities. Transnational issues, such as illegal immigration, international crime, and terrorism all require coordinated interagency programs in both countries.

- The United States should support Japan's reasonable desire to develop an independent intelligence capability, including its own satellites. Improving the quality of sharing requires immediate attention.
- U.S. policy should give priority to joint staffing of analytical centers, reciprocal educational programs, and similar elbow-to-elbow initiatives to enrich the intelligence network.

An enhanced intelligence relationship between the United States and Japan also needs political support in both countries. In this regard, Tokyo needs to take several basic steps:

- Japanese leaders need to win public and political support for a new law to protect classified information.
- While improved intelligence capabilities will offer improved support to Japanese policymaking, leaders in Tokyo need to address their own decisionmaking processes as well. Intelligence sharing must occur within the Japanese Government as well as between the United States and Japan.
- Experience argues strongly for a dialogue on how to include the Diet in the intelligence process. Oversight of intelligence in democracies is a critically important component in sustaining political support.

In short, as Japan addresses its future defense needs and reorganizes its government, the time has come to bring our intelligence cooperation out of the closet.

## **Economic Relations**

An economically healthy Japan is essential to a thriving bilateral partnership. Indeed, U.S. interests in all of Asia benefit from having a prosperous, growing, and robust Japanese economy. Japan remains the third-largest customer for U.S. goods, and its continued frailty has meant lost opportunities for American workers and businesses. A weak Japan contributes to volatility and uncertainty in global capital flows. In addition, an inward-looking, frustrated, insecure Japanese populace will be less willing or able to play a larger role in the alliance.

Unfortunately, Japan has experienced a disappointing decade of economic stagnation and recession. From 1992 through 1999, average annual real economic growth was only 1 percent. The decade ended with a recession in 1997 to 1998, and again in the second

half of 1999.

The restoration of sustained economic growth in Japan will depend in large measure on opening markets and recognizing that the key to economic recovery rests in allowing the private sector to respond to the forces of globalization. This will involve continued deregulation and the reduction of trade barriers, as well as the development of stronger rules and institutions to support more open markets.

This is a fact understood by some Japanese policy elites and documented in a host of official commentaries, beginning with the Maekawa Report of 1986. Since the mid-1970s, foreigners have attempted to encourage Japanese policymakers to take steps to increase the transparency and openness of the economy. With mounting frustration, successive U.S. administrations have tried to prod Tokyo to adopt a range of invented and reinvented trade and economic policy options.

Barriers to reform are significant. Mature workers (including the 20-30 percent who still enjoy the cozy sanctuary of lifetime employment), protected industries, and bureaucrats long accustomed to calling the shots for various industries continue to protect the status quo. Moreover, the Japanese tend to be averse to radical change, except in circumstances where no other options exist. And some in Japan argue that the nation's economic problems have yet to reach crisis proportions. The lack of a sense of urgency, and a national character resistant to abrupt shifts in established practices, impede adoption of necessary restructuring measures that are politically and psychologically painful.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that Japan has made some progress in addressing its economic problems. For example, many Western economists have given high marks to Tokyo's so-called Big Bang financial sector deregulation package and the banking bailout of 1998. Foreign direct investment has increased dramatically (though it remains lower than in any other major industrialized economy). These developments have introduced greater competition and new business models. Businesses have begun to place greater emphasis on profitability over relationships, a shift that has weakened the increasingly archaic keiretsu system. Entrepreneurship is on the rise, and the venture capital market is growing.

The information technology (IT) sector is growing rapidly. New firms are starting up, and the potential benefits across many sectors of the economy are substantial. Yet economists remain divided as to whether IT sector growth will be sufficient to rescue the economy from the stagnation of the past decade. Regulatory barriers have constrained growth and slowed the adoption of IT technologies in other industries. The potential importance of this sector for the economy, therefore, reinforces the need for additional

reform and deregulation of the economic system as part of ensuring a positive future for the economy. Perhaps the most important contribution IT can make is to provide the thin wedge to encourage deregulation and greater flexibility of business models in the broader Japanese economy.

Yet obstacles to recovery continue to exist, In particular, banking problems have yet to be addressed adequately, and fiscal stimulus has relied too heavily on pork-barrel public works projects with little if any potential for fostering long-term growth. This flawed fiscal approach has produced a ratio of debt to gross domestic product of at least 1.2:1, far higher than in the rest of the world's major developed economies.

A more innovative approach that uses private sector dynamism to drive economic change is now in order. For Japan, the price still will be high. Restoring the long-term health of the Japanese economy will require some short-term costs that Japanese politicians so far have refused to incur. The United States should urge Japan to develop policies along the following lines:

Further systemic reform of the Japanese economy. Greater reliance on markets that are open to all players--both domestic and foreign--is critical to a sustained economic recovery:

- Continued short-term fiscal and monetary stimulus. Despite Japan's growing debt problems, Tokyo should focus on areas that promise to foster future growth. The era of building bridges, tunnels, and high-speed rail links to nowhere must end.
- There must be greater transparency in accounting, business practices, and rule making. The quality of Japanese economic statistics should be improved, and financial institutions and local governments should be required to give a full accounting of their true financial condition. The government has a similar need to be more open in its disclosure of government information.
- Deregulation should be accelerated, particularly in sectors with the greatest potential to benefit the economy, such as telecommunications.
- A free trade agreement between Japan and Singapore should be encouraged as a test case for similar agreements with South Korea, Canada, the United States, and other interested countries.

The ability of American government initiatives to open Japanese markets and to drive structural change is diminishing. The United States does have legitimate interests when the lack of reform affects U.S. firms or endangers the global economy. In these areas,



including the creation of corporate good-governance standards and greater transparency in business practices, U.S. Government attention and action continue to matter.

The U.S. should pursue several key goals in the years ahead that will foster an improved bilateral partnership:

- American economic interests must be expressed in one voice. Washington must have its priorities straight in order to deal effectively with the systemic change Japan is undergoing. In this regard, the next administration must gain the support of the American people for a focused economic agenda.
- Washington should start a dialogue on enhancing foreign direct investment in Japan. Foreign firms bring new technologies and new business models that help the economy both directly and through their competitive impact on Japanese firms.
- The new administration must make a new round of global trade negotiations one of its highest priorities. American leadership is vital to this initiative. In this endeavor, the United States and its partners should seek the elimination of industrial tariffs, agricultural subsidies, and barriers to trade in financial services, and should pursue the negotiation of internationally accepted accounting standards, particularly for financial institutions.
- Because of the importance of U.S.-Japan economic relations, bilateral trade negotiations remain an essential tool, even as the United States and Japan turn to the World Trade Organization to resolve disputes and open new doors to cooperation.
- The United States should encourage the fledgling economic coordination underway between Japan and the Republic of Korea.

## Diplomacy

Traditionally, the United States has encouraged Japan to play a larger international role. The overlooked reality is that Japan has responded to that encouragement, particularly in humanitarian efforts and other nontraditional areas of security, often in cooperation with the United States. Japan is either the leading or the second-largest contributor to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the Asian Development Bank, as well as being a leading contributor to all the major multilateral institutions. It is imperative to nurture popular support in the United States and Japan to sustain current cooperation and to open the door to new bilateral endeavors.

There should be no surprises in diplomatic cooperation. Japan often has promoted ideas, such as the Asian Monetary Fund, without coordinating with Washington. The United States too often has brought Japan belatedly into its own diplomacy. Both countries suffer when policymaking-by-afterthought characterizes our relationship. It is past time for the United States to drop the image of Japanese cooperation in foreign policy as checkbook diplomacy. Japan must recognize that international leadership involves risk-taking beyond its traditional donor's role.

U.S. policy must consider Japan's goals, even as it strives to ensure that our agenda is well understood and actively supported by Tokyo. Washington must recognize that multilateral efforts are important to Tokyo. The Japanese Government regards such initiatives as expressions of national identity, not as attempts to undermine U.S. leadership. Quiet, behind-the-scenes coordination of strategies often is more effective than theatrical pronouncements of partnership thrown together at the last moment as an outcome of bilateral summits.

The search for an independent Japanese identity in foreign affairs is not in conflict with American diplomacy. Indeed, the United States and Japan largely share the same overall diplomatic goals. The two countries have many common interests.

- Maintaining an engaged, forward-deployed American presence in Asia.
- Reforming the United Nations as an institution to deal more effectively with conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking activities. The U.S. should continue to support Japan's quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council. However, there are obvious obligations of collective security with which Japan must come to grips.
- Encouraging the People's Republic of China to become a positive force in regional political and economic affairs. The United States and Japan should engage in an ongoing strategic dialogue on this subject.
- Fostering reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. Washington and Tokyo should continue to support the Trilateral Coordination Group (South Korea, Japan, and the United States) to deal with issues related to the peninsula, while looking for opportunities to broaden their cooperation.
- Supporting Russian stability in the Far East and facilitating the development of the vast Russian store of natural resources. The United States and Japan should more effectively coordinate their policies toward Russia.

- Encouraging an activist, independent, democratic, and prosperous Association of Southeast Asian Nations even as the United States and Japan have divergent policies toward individual ASEAN members.
- Coordinating our efforts to support territorial integrity and revival of Indonesia.

Japan, with the world's second-largest economy, should not allow its economic problems to become an excuse to reverse the evolution of its foreign aid policy away from one that focuses on benefitting the recipient rather than the donor. Japan's policies should further economic growth and openness in Asia. Tokyo's proposals for internationalization of the yen will only succeed if Japanese financial markets are transparent.

## Conclusion

Since the arrival of Commodore Perry's Black Ships in Tokyo Bay nearly 150 years ago, U.S.-Japan relations have shaped the history of Japan and Asia--for better or for worse. At the dawn of the new millennium, the inescapable forces of globalization and the dynamics of the post-Cold War Asian security setting pose new and complex challenges to the United States and Japan. How the two countries respond, individually and as alliance partners, will define significantly the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific as well as the possibilities of the new century--much as their interaction has affected the economic, political, and strategic contours of the past.(끝).

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